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Preface 
PREFACE 
The origin of my desire to research and write this thesis lies in a number of 
interests which are brought together in the refined and narrow subject area. The 
first interest is in the movement of people between states. Such movement takes 
place for many reasons, both subjective and objective. I decided to concentrate on 
forced flight, and within that still broad category, on flight caused by a situation of 
armed conflict in the state of origin. Furthermore, I want to limit the study to an 
examination of the protection people forced to flee for this reason can claim and 
receive. 
A second interest lies in the field of European integration, and regional 
cooperation on issues such as migration policies, and how regionalism can affect 
universal or global attitudes and actions. In addition, in the migration context, 
Europe and the developed world had long been at the forefront of legal and political 
developments in the protection of forced migrants. However recent decades have 
seen the rise of additional refugee related legal instruments in Africa and Latin 
America, but none in Europe. As the Cold War ended and suppressed ethnic 
tensions in and around Europe began to develop into displacement producing crises, 
the ability of Europe to maintain claimed levels of human rights protection and 
humanitarianism within the confines of Cold War legal instruments came into 
question. 
These then were the personal interests which brought me to this subject area. 
In the more objective realm, the displacements caused by the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, and particularly by the policy of 'ethnic cleansing' caused UNHCR and 
some European states to start looking to establish means of affording protection to 
persons not covered by the current international instruments, and for groups which 
were too large to be considered for the various levels of humanitarian or de facto 
statuses available in some states. 
The crisis of displacement caused by the conflict in former Yugoslavia, and 
particularly in the republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, was in some ways simply the 
latest in a long series of 'refugee' crises in all parts of the world. However, this 
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crisis, for a number of reasons, brought the need for a re-evaluation of the nature of 
protection and indeed of refugeehood itself to the attention of the organisations and 
states called on to deal with such displacements. The major reasons for this 
realisation can be narrowed down to questions of time, place and numbers. 
In summary therefore, from the broader subjects of migration and European 
integration, I have refined the subject to that of an analysis of temporary protection. 
This covers a group of migrants who are not covered by current refugee law, who to 
some extent suffer from the reaction to the relative liberalism towards economic 
migrants and illegal immigrants during the 1970s and '80s. In addition, the subject 
takes in an area of migration law and policies which, while it is dealt with on a 
regional level by African and American states, has no universal or pan-European 
legal basis, and which is being promoted by UNHCR and the European Commission 
at a time when other areas of European asylum and immigration policies are being 
worked on for harmonisation. 
III 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the issue of refugee protection in Europe, and draws on 
the approaches taken to the crisis in former Yugoslavia to find lessons for future 
policies and strategies. 
The protection of refugees in Europe has a long history and during the 
twentieth century has provided a basis and model both for other regions and for a 
universal approach. At the end of the twentieth century refugee protection in 
Europe is being challenged. Part of the test arises from the number of immigrants, 
with various motivations, arriving in Europe combined with the continent's own 
moves towards territorial integration and free movement for its own citizens. 
Another factor is the potential for mass movement arising from various 
manifestations of the end of the Cold War, exemplified by the displacements in 
former Yugoslavia. 
The progressive development of refugee law and policies shows that while a 
strong basis to universal protection was established with the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, later developments, including the 1967 Protocol, 
have been made according to the circumstances of the moment. Given the regional 
situation at the end of the twentieth century, a further contextualised evolution may 
be appropriate. This could take the form of a mechanism of temporary protection, 
supplementary to and supportive of the foundations of the 1951 Convention. 
In this thesis the existing basis of protection, and its essential components, 
are established through an assessment of who may be defined as a refugee and how, 
and an analysis of the human rights norms in which refugee protection is grounded. 
The situation in Europe in the 1990s shows that there is the potential for continued 
evolution, meeting the requirements to which states have internationally agreed and 
maintaining the humanitarian stance upheld by European states for most of the 
twentieth century. 
The development of European protection strategies must occur in a holistic 
context, addressing the causes of movement, involving different types of protection 
(in the country of origin; in the neighbouring states and wider region of origin on a 
short-term basis and longer-term asylum) and admitting that various solutions are 
possible. protection in itself does not solve a refugee'S situation. The opportunity 
to return, remain in the host state or resettle to another state, with in any of the 
three situations a long-term perspective for employment and family life and 
involvment in all the political, social and cultural aspects of citizenship, can solve 
the personal, and wider, crisis, although certain scars may remain. 
European states have developed different strategies to cope with the short-
term protection needs of those displaced during the conflict in former Yugoslavia. 
As well as protection in so-called 'safe areas' they have developed 'temporary 
protection' policies, allowing a short-term, limited status to people who were not 
accorded Convention refugee status. In spite of efforts to harmonise their asylum 
and immigration policies, even European Union Member States created very 
different schemes, policies and legislation. Four of the mechanisms are assessed in 
this thesis. 
Policy options are advanced which favour protection for those in need, take 
into account the range of political and legal commitments and aims of states, citizens 





The issue of refugee protection lies at a juncture between domestic politics 
and international relations. The features of domestic politics, or a lack of political 
structures brought about by a conflict, can lead to the (forced) migration of civilians. 
Those who are forced to flee, or feel it is their only choice if they are to live in 
safety, either reject or lose the protection of their state of origin. The protection 
which a state accords to its citizens is at the heart of the nature of statehood and the 
accompanying concept of state sovereignty. 1 That protection both involves the 
relationship between the state and its citizens and is a factor in the acknowledgement 
by other states of the authority a government exerts over and on behalf of the people 
within its territorial jurisdiction. Once a person has lost the protection of his or her 
own state, he or she has no guarantor of any rights. An alternative protector will 
usually be sought. People who have lost the protection of their state will seek the 
protection of another state. They therefore cross international frontiers, making the 
domestic strife of their country of origin a matter of international concern. Once 
they have crossed a frontier (or in some cases several frontiers) the crisis of the 
refugees becomes a matter to be regulated by the internal political reaction of the 
state in which they seek refuge. If that state cannot or will not guarantee protection 
itself it either re-creates an international movement or must call for international 
assistance, from allies or organisations created for the protection of refugees. 
Sometimes people displaced by a conflict are unable, for numerous reasons, to cross 
an international boundary. Such people are not considered to be refugees in a legal 
or political sense, but their need for protection, as internally displaced persons, is 
See, for example, Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence: 
conflict and the refugee crisis in the developing world, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 
p.264: 
BeCalL\'e the elemental jlL<;tijication for the modern state, at least since 
Hobbes, is its ability to prOvide reasonable security for its citizens, the 
strongest pre~:<;ures must be exerted on governments not to lash out at 
their own people. Othel1vise, as the history of refugee flows shows, 
the inrernatitmal community - in practice otlrer states - will be called 
upon to provide such protection for people turning up at their borders. 
1 
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just as great if not greater. 2 
At the origins of modern refugee protection, the sovereign of a neighbouring 
state, or the leaders of free cities and republics granted a safe haven, otherwise 
known as 'asylum' to the unprotected. Over the course of the centuries since this 
tradition of state protection was initiated there have been many developments.3 
Evolutions have occurred on the levels of thought about individual rights; state 
duties; the nature of sovereignty; the relations between states and between the state 
and its citizens and the desirability of taking in migrants, whatever caused their 
movement. Each period of change in the relations between states and the causes for 
which people leave their homes, how they travel and how far they can go, has 
brought about some change in the way the question of migration generally and 
forced displacements in particular have been handled. 
The twentieth century has seen some of the greatest changes in the way 
forced migrations are viewed and received, in the way states relate with each other 
on the issue of protection and in the way the protection of individuals and their 
rights are perceived. Prior to the First World War, migration was seen as very 
much a natural, and often not unwelcome, phenomenon. It increased the population 
useful in the economic development and defence of the nation. The forced 
statelessness of thousands of people in the process of creating the Soviet Union 
caused massive movements towards European states. The members of the League of 
Nations saw the protection of these stateless masses as an area for cooperation, and 
developed the first politically motivated, international legal definitions of refugees.4 
From the twenties until the Second World War there were several forced 
displacement crises creating new masses of refugees, each of which was accorded a 
new definition and the protection of host states. 5 At the end of the forties the 
2 See Deng, Francis, Protecting the Dispossessed: a Challenge for the International Community, 
(Washington DC: Brookings, 1993). 
See, for example, UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: the challenge of Protection, 
(Middlesex: Penguin, 1993); Zolberg, et ai, op.cit .. 
See, Grahl-Madsen, A., The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol.l (Leiden: A.W. 
Sijthoff, 1966) 1'.12. 




leaders of the United Nations were faced with two large groups of displaced people 
for whom they created a legal definition intended to deal with the situation as it 
existed, and be sufficient to cover the limited forced migration envisaged in the 
short-term. The two situations faced by those formulating a universal refugee 
definition were the aftermath of the persecution and destruction of the Second World 
War and the on-going persecution in the Soviet Union and East European states as 
communism was forcibly spread to the latter. In the political climate of the early 
1950s the Convention drafters produced a document whose importance for refugees 
and their protectors has reigned for forty-four years at the time at which this thesis 
is being written. Forty-one years after the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees was drafted, and acceded to, a European contlict produced a displacement 
crisis of a magnitude not witnessed in Europe since the Convention was written. 
The continent had been the focal point of the Cold War for thirty-nine of those 
years, and for two years had been experiencing the spread of democracy and market 
economy after communism had collapsed. Among the hopes and fears of the two 
years following the end of the Cold War had been a west European dread of massive 
migration from the east. In 1992, as Yugoslavia descended into secessionist and 
ethnic conflict, Europe was indeed faced with a major refugee crisis, although not 
from Poland, Hungary and the former Soviet Union as it had most feared, and was 
still focused on. As both Glenny and Cviic noted in texts written in the early days 
of the Yugoslav crisis, the refugee flows convinced Europe that this was a conflict 
with European dimensions, and one challenge to Europe was how to protect the 
fleeing masses. 6 Its management of that crisis, just as its handling of the whole 
conflict, needs to be assessed for the lessons to be learnt for future situations of a 
similar nature. 
Politics have always driven the migration and protection issue. At the end of 
the twentieth century it is also being driven by regional containment, as the 
6 Glenny, Misha. The Fall of Yugoslavia: the Third Balkan War, (London: Penguin, 1992) p.16S: 
"The refugees finally brought home to other parts of the continent that there were European dimensions to 
the wars in Yugoslavia.· Cviic. Christopher, Remaking the Balkans. (London: Pinter/RIIA, 1991) p.88 
describes how sending on refugees is a way of passing on trouble and challenging countries that do not 
take notice of your problem so they feel the need to get involved. Together with the economic and 
military challenges presented to Europe by the Yugoslav breakdown. Cviic saw the protection of refugees 
as a major trial for Europe. 
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governments of developed countries attempt to restrict medium and long distance 
flight for a number of reasons, including the view that the further one migrates the 
less likely one is to return. European migration policies are also being formulated 
within the context of a contest between regional integration and state sovereignty. 
Regional politics meant that the Yugoslav displacements had to be contained. The 
nature of early 1990s European politics provoked a reluctance to include large 
groups of newcomers, who had the potential not only to impact on the 'national 
identity' (whatever that may be) of the receiving state, but also to induce tensions 
between neighbouring states which were in the process of removing their barriers to 
movement.? Regional containment essentially meant containing the refugees in their 
war-torn country of origin or as close by as possible. More positive regional 
containment would have taken place if there had been structured financial burden-
sharing with those countries, mainly other former Yugoslav republics and central 
European state, which were taking people in. 
The thesis of this study 
The thesis of this study is that the evolution of refugee protection in Europe 
will continue, and that its progress should involve the search for a mechanism of 
short-term protection for those forced to flee conflict. The mechanism should take 
into account the cause of flight and the nature of European cooperation and 
coordination. 
Many of the displacement situations of the post-Cold War period may be best 
dealt with by the granting of temporary protection, in line with the minimum 
7 Geddes describes the migration pressures on the European Union, ·emanating from the South and 
the East, as global forces similar in their persistence to the force of the economic logic of interdependence 
which pressured the moves towards the creation of a single market. The economic logic which forced the 
Union towards a single market has also pressured it towards restrictive general immigration policies. The 
model of European immigration policies hao; been generated, suggests Geddes, by the 'positive ideology' 
of 'Europeanness' and the 'negative ideology' of immigration, together with the apparent paradox of the 
single market and integration, which says that to have free movement inside one needs tight external 
controls. (Geddes, Andrew, 'Immigrant and Ethnic Minorities and the EU's "Democratic Deficit"', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, VoL33 No.2 (June 1995) pp.200-205). Those tighter controls 
motivating immigration policies were very much generalised and included asylum-seekers (more often than 
not painted as bogus claimants) as people to be excluded. The desire to exclude came face to face, in the 
Yugoslav case, with the undeniability of the genuine humanitarian need of many. Thus a policy of 
containment, responding to the humanitarian need while excluding, was developed. 
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protection guaranteed by nonrefoulementB, and in keeping with the notion of burden 
sharing9• As Loescher notes, the consequences of restrictive refugee and 
immigration policies and strict interpretation of the 1951 Convention definition of 
'refugee', the "erection of barriers to entry and ... containment of forced migration 
in countries or regions of origin"l0 can be lethal for those up-rooted in places such 
as, and conflicts such as that in, former Yugoslavia. 
The organisation of the study 
In assessing the viability of this hypothesis several key elements of the above 
statement of the thesis of this study need to be addressed. Who is a refugee? What 
is protection? What role have refugee protection issues had in European cooperation 
since the Second World War? These questions will be dealt with in Part One of 
this study, which is divided into three chapters taking these issues in tum. 
The whole question of the categorisation of refugees occupied much time and 
space for both academics and practitioners working on this subject during the decade 
from 1985 to 1995, and may continue to do so,ll The essence of the definitions 
debate is who to include and who to exclude, and the giving of some reasoning for 
the division. Inclusion and exclusion in this case does not simply mean allowing 
into or keeping out of one's society or even more simply allowing or denying access 
to a given territory. It can, at its most extreme (although not in extremely limited 
cases), mean including or excluding from life. The answer to the simple question 
• See Chapters I and 2 for discussions on the importance and meaning of the norm of 
nonrefoulement, as put forward in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. For further discussion of the links 
between nonrefoulement and temporary protection see ego Periuss, Deborah and Joan F. Hartman, 
'Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a customary norm', Virginia Journal of International Law, (Spring 
1986) p.572, and Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., 'Ncmrefoulement and the new asylum seekers' in David A. 
Martin (ed.) The New Asylum Seekers: Reftlgee Law in the 19808 - the Ninth Sokol Colloquium on 
International UtW (Dordrecht: Martinlls Nijhof, 1988). 
9 Burden-sharing is the concept whereby states should spread the financing and protection in 
refugee crises across the international community. The next section of this chapter will focus on this 
element of protection. 
10 Loescher, Gil, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993) \>.164. 
II See, for example, International Journal of Refugee Law, VoJ.3 No.3 Special Issue: the 1991 
Geneva Colloquium - 711t~ 1951 COl/vention rehIring to tl,e Status of Refugees: Principles. Problems and 
Potenrial, (1991). 
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'Who is a refugee?' is a matter or life or death for hundreds of thousands of people 
throughout the world, including those who were 'ethnically cleansed' in Bosnia 
Herzegovina. As Zolberg et at have stated, research which is narrowly based on 
those who are recognised by states and by UNHCR legitimises the practice of 
narrow definitions and excludes policy alternatives. 12 For this very reason this 
study looks also at the position of the excluded and seeks out policy options for their 
inclusion in the wider scope of protection. 
The definitions debate centred on interpreting the Convention definitionl3 
and what those who formulated the definition meant by the terms they used. 14 This 
question is included in the assessment of our hypothesis to demonstrate that in both 
political and legal terms there has been evolution and adaptation in the categorisation 
of those to be included throughout the twentieth century. The adaptation has been 
contextual. The circumstances in which the politically and legally accepted notions 
of refugeehood have evolved encompass the causes of movements, the relationship 
of the (potential) host states to the states of origin, the relationship between host 
states and the refugee group and the extent of cooperation between different host 
states. The case is made for the inclusion, in a regional accompaniment to the 
universal Convention, of those forced to flee the ethnic strife and conflicts emerging 
with the end of the relatively clear cut divisions of the Cold War as the logical 
extrapolation of the positions policy-makers and legislation drafters have taken to 
date. 
In assessing the meaning and content of 'protection' it is necessary to turn to 
human rights documents. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
formalised shortly before the 1951 Convention, in a similar political environment. 
12 
13 
Zolberg et ai, oll.cit., p.4. 
Article I A paragraph 2 of the Convention defines a refugee as any person who 
as a result of el'el/lS occuning before 1 JanuQly 1951 and owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membe/~\'IIip of (I particular social group or political 
opinion is OUTside tile country of IIis nationality and ;s unable or, 
owing to ~'ucll fear. is unwilling to amil himself of the protection of 
11101 cOllnll)'; or 11'110, nol having a nationality and being oUlside the 
countf)' of 11;.1' tonner habill/al residence as a ,.esult of stich events. is 
IIna/JIe or, owing 10 SlIcll fear, is IInwilling 10 return to it. 
14 See. for example. Hathaway. James C .• 'A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of 
Refugee Law'. Harvard International Law Journal Vol.3l. No.1 (1990) and by the same author, The Law 
of Refugees Status (Butterworths: Toronto. 1991). 
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While the protection of a refugee would most logically involve the upholding of all 
acknowledged human rights, the UNHCR suggestion of some nuancing of this 
position in the case of short-term protection in order for more people to have the 
most fundamental right, the right to life, assured is investigated and accepted. If 
there is a basic choice between the guarantee of protection to masses fleeing conflict 
by initially housing them in collective centres with limited spending money and the 
safety of a few people who would receive private housing and full-time employment 
instantly, then the position taken here is that the former is the more humane option. 
As an element of its growing political integration, the European Union has 
started to address the asylum and immigration issue, and its initial debates have 
indeed focused on harmonising national interpretations of the Convention definition. 
Other organisations have also been involved in issues associated with forced 
migration, and may in future have an important role to play, be it in addressing the 
causes of flows, the return of refugees or indeed their protection in states which are 
members of the organisations concerned. As of 1995, however, the European Union 
remained the only organisation with enough apparent strength, and the political will 
of sufficiently powerful and numerous members, to progress towards new 
adaptations of protection which involve international cooperation. The desire or 
need to this is added to by the progress towards a frontier free landmass of these 
neighbouring states. One of the earliest organisational steps towards a coordinated 
policy front was the creation in the Treaty on European Union of a 'third pillar' of 
negotiation on matters of Justice and Home Affairs. This included the establishment 
of a distinct directorate in the European Commission dealing with these issues, with 
immigration and asylum policies as one element. In 1994 the European Commission 
issued a Communication on Immigration and Asylum policies, and that document is 
analyzed for its contribution to the development of a comprehensive approach and 
temporary protection in particular in Chapter 3 and the chapters of Part Two of this 
study. IS 
Having addressed these three key background issues we turn to the wider 
question of the impact of refugee movements on other issues in international 
relations and the impact of political cooperation on flight and its management. The 
Yugoslav crisis saw the further development of what has become known as a 
IS Europl!an COlllmission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, (COM(94) 23 final} (Brussels: 23 February 1994). 
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'comprehensive approach' to the whole displacement issue, and this is the tool which 
is used to address this matter here. A comprehensive approach must, as its name 
suggests, be holistic. The notion of comprehensiveness is used here to cover the 
range of issues, and to allow a thematic exploration of the practical and theoretical 
issues involved in protection. Part Two therefore includes three chapters ranging 
from the causes of flight, through different modes of protection to potential 
solutions. Protection in itself is not a solution, but a palliative measure in the period 
between the onset of a movement and its resolution in the finding of a (semi-
)permanent place of settlement for the refugees. 
The pivotal feature of the comprehensive approach as advanced here is 
temporary protection. This type of protection has several potential forms. It could 
be seen either as a limited measure granted by states geographically close to the 
country of origin, prior to more long-term solutions through return or permanent re-
settlement elsewhere, or as a solution available from any state, with the protected 
status lasting for the duration of the conflict, or until alternative permanent 
protection is granted. This formulation poses questions over the sharing of the 
burden involved, as temporary protection could be granted by more than one state, 
to the same individual or group during the course of the conflict in the country of 
origin or habitual residence. In a mass influx situation the grant of temporary 
protection to large groups of people could have the added benefit of 'unclogging' 
regular, individualised, asylum application procedures, as a particular feature of 
temporary protection as advocated by UNHCR is that it should be accorded to entire 
groups on a prima facie basis. A more controversial perception of the meaning of 
temporary protection is that it could be used as a facility for evacuating all or most 
civilians from a conflict zone enabling the 'international community' to intervene 
and 'sort out' the situation without civilian casualties. While apparently permitting 
an ideal situation, this scenario is just that - idealistic and realistically impractical, 
particularly in Europe, where protection traditions no longer include camps and 
settlements. That is not to say that camps in Africa and Asia are used for protection 
purposes while regional or state intervention seeking to resolve the flight provoking 
conflict takes place. However, one reason for which western states reject the idea 
of an OAU style 'refugee' definition is their different tradition of protection and 
reception in Europe, and these practical issues influence the type of legal and 
lntroduclion 9 
political basis from which admissions decisions are taken. 
It could be argued that the offering of temporary protection assists in lending 
weight to both the sovereignty and normative based arguments for various forms of 
intervention. The weighting to the normative side is obvious: the granting of 
protection and upholding of human rights satisfies the major requirement of 
protection of life and limb. The sovereignty element of this position comes from the 
fact that the admission of displaced persons, particularly in massive numbers, puts 
strains on the normal boundaries of the sovereignty of the refuge state, potentially 
raises doubts over regional peace and security (particularly in regions where states 
other than that in turmoil face the real possibility of ethnic tensions and conflicts 
among the same ethnically rooted peoples). These factors taken together with the 
implication of return as the 'best' solution for the host state, the displaced population 
and for the future of the state of origin after the conflict, mean that swift resolution 
(prior to integration, and to give certainty and security to the displaced) is necessary. 
It should however be maintained that any intervention be for humanitarian purposes, 
and must not be a hostile act. 
The legislative and policy directions taken by a selection of four European 
states as a result of the former Yugoslav crisis are the subject of the case study 
which forms Pal-t Three. This is an assessment of the practical experience of 
various temporary protection mechanisms in Europe. The types of temporary 
protection policies and legislation enacted in Europe from 1992 onwards vary 
greatly. The findings of this case study offer support to the notions advanced in 
Chapters 2 and 3. While there is a desire amongst states to cooperate on the 
subjects of who should be admitted, the terms of their access to other European 
states and, to a lesser degree, the length of permitted stay, the characteristics of the 
effective protection are largely based on domestic political, societal and cultural 
variations. The suggestion advanced is, therefore, that rather than focusing on 
coordinating all elements of their asylum and immigration policies, European states 
should examine the alternative of harmonising their entry procedures, terms of 
residence and movement, and how they can effectively spread the protection in 
terms of numbers and finance, while allowing domestic or sub-regional variations in 
the content of protection. The latter nuancing, as well as the notions of burden-
sharing, should involve a recognition that the policies of neighbouring states will 
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influence the level of attractiveness. 
The use of jUl'idical documents in this study 
In addressing refugee issues, and particularly in dealing with the practical 
positions taken on the subject by actors in the international field, the use of legal 
documents and texts becomes unavoidable. Miillerson notes thatl6 
It has always been necessary to study international law in the context 
of an international system where the law is functioning and 
developing, and to analyse legal and political problems as inseparably 
intertwined (as indeed they are). 
He goes on to give several examples of scholars in both the international law and 
international relations field who take the more narrow view of their own discipline. 
These scholars often foclls even more narrowly their own preferred approach to their 
discipline, which is treated as an untouchable position, standing alone and unaffected 
by other means of approaching the same issue in the same or different fields or the 
variables which can alter the situation. The present study forms an assessment of 
the features of refugee protection which impact upon, and are influenced by, the 
nature of international relations. I do not think that anyone way of looking at this 
subject can offer many answers to the complex range of issues it raises. For this 
reason I am approaching it as a practical matter which a whole range of theories can 
help us to understand. At the same time I am admitting that international politics 
and international law are inseparably intertwined on this matter. The drawing up of 
international legal agreements, and the drafting of domestic legislation, are 
influenced by political factors. International legislation on refugee issues is 
influenced by reactions to the plight of those forced to flee, levels of domestic 
nationalism and racism, any perception of taking in too many people and the extent 
to which cooperation between receiving states, and involvement in the cause of flight 
is operating or may be desirable. Changes in domestic legislation are also altered by 
domestic politics. Meanwhile the agreements reached in international fora, be they 
binding or of a more guiding nature, influence the extent to which domestic political 
factors will be played up or tamed. All of the legal texts used in this study have a 
16 Mlillerson, Rein, International Law, Rights and politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the 
CIS, (London: LSEI Routledge, The New International Relations Series, 1994) p.2. 
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judicial weight, but it is their political significance which is central to their inclusion 
and handling here. 
This thesis forms, to an extent, a juridically based discussion, analyzing the 
laws and policies of states and organisations with regard to those who flee armed 
contlict. The discussion is informed by relevant theories in the international 
relations tield, in particular by the on-going philosophical debate centring on 
normative issues, and by theories of cooperation and international organisation. The 
normative debate is brought out through a discussion of the often opposing claims of 
the protection of human rights and upholding of state sovereignty, and in particular a 
discussion of how temporary protection can mediate these claims. Discussions in 
other academic fields closely related to refugee issues, for example psychology and 
sociology, wi 11 also be taken into account. 
Caveats 
There are, then, three caveats to be made in concluding this introduction. 
Firstly, this is a study made from an international relations perspective, and not 
from an international law standpoint. A political view of all the materials used is 
adopted, even if those materials include legal texts. 
Secondly, as should be clear from the title, although refugee situations in and 
from other parts of the world are referred to, this is essentially a study of the 
European management of European refugee crises. A very small percentage of 
refugees from other continents arrive in Europe to claim asylum. The difficulties 
the developing world has in shouldering the care and protection of the vast majority 
of displaced persons cannot be shrugged off. However, the subject of this study is 
the way in which Europe copes with its own refugees, since after all, no other 
continent is likely to assist developed western Europe with its regional migrations. 
As the title should also make clear, this is a study of forced migration, not of 
economic migration. Economic migration usually involves a high degree of choice 
in terms of when and how to move. In some cases the distinction between economic 
migration and the seeking of political asylum is blurred, either because the reason 
for an inability to find profitable employment is due to discrimination in the country 
of origin or to the political conditions there, or because people seeking economic 
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betterment attempt to claim political motives. In this study, however, the concern is 
the relation of forced migration due to conflict to the long-standing international 
position of defining refugees by individual persecution for political reasons, and the 
type of protection attainable by groups fleeing conflict. 
Finally, in addressing the refugee protection issue one cannot avoid making 
normative statements and using normative theories of international relations. 
However, this is not a study of the use which could be made of normative theories 
in a study of refugee protection, but by intention rather a study of the practical 
issues involved in refugee protection supported by a basis of various theoretical 
standpoints. Just as it is not a study of the use of realist theories in assessing states' 
approach to the issue, so it is not a study of the normative reasons for any 
humanitarian approach. The study is, however, interspersed by remarks pointing to 
positions from the realist and normative perspectives, and with points taken from the 
whole of the broader field of international relations theory. That the normative 
issues are not dealt with as a separate topic is not to leave something out. Rather 
the inclusion of this theoretical standpoint in a practically-based discussion is 
intended to strengthen that discussion and to avoid a limitation of this very complex 
human situation to the contines of theoretical standpoints. 
The future of refugee pl"Otection in Europe 
In the light of situations sllch as the refugee crisis resulting from the conflict 
in Bosnia Herzegovina, the problem to be faced is that of whether it is possible for 
the core of developed western European states to exclude people fleeing conflicts 
and tensions in the wider Europe, by continuing to apply an anachronistic 
interpretation of a still relevant Convention definition. Who else will protect 
Europeans in need of international protection? Should a liberal interpretation be 
applied only to fellow Europeans, while the restrictive interpretation is maintained 
for non-Europeans? Would such dualism be tenable in a region which prides itself 
on its democratic and humanitarian traditions? Would it be possible, therefore, to 
apply a liberal interpretation of the Convention definition to all, potentially opening 
the flood gates to all with the means and desire, and legitimate reasons based on a 
fear of persecution, or other reasons which could be interpreted as forcing flight, to 
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arrive in Europe and request undefined and unlimited protection? None of these 
options being realistically tenable, a regional protection mandate could be instituted 
for defined groups of people within detined time frames and with the upholding of 
defined rights and duties, and encouraging, within the democratic and humanitarian 
spirit, the institution of similar systems in other regions. 
The argument being presented in this thesis is that a mechanism of temporary 
protection is urgently required in Europe to complete and link the elements of a 
comprehensive approach and thus permit more success in the handling of future 
displacement crises than could be perceived in the early 1990s. 
PART ONE 
EUROPEAN PROTECTION 
A Regional History 
Par! One 
INTRODUCTION 
The first part of this thesis examines the background to the protection of 
refugees in the European continent. It is divided into three chapters. The first two 
seek to answer questions which range more broadly than Europe alone. In Chapter 
1 the question is 'Who is a refugee?' and in Chapter 2 we ask 'What is protection?'. 
Although the responses are more universal than regional in scope, the centrality of 
Europe's role in the development of refugee protection will be discerned throughout. 
Chapter 3 develops the first two chapters within a strictly regional context by 
looking at Europe's motives for alterations in its handling of protection issues, the 
process of these changes in the 1980s and 90s and the potential paths for the turn of 
the century. 
Chapter I concentrates on the evolving definitions of refugees in 
international law and politics. Why do we need to define a 'refugee'? To whom is 
such a definition of importance? Establishing criteria for the acknowledgement of 
refugeehood is the business of states. States define 'refugees' in order to announce 
which people under which circumstances may make a claim for protection, and how 
the outcome of such a claim will be determined. States maintain this right to define 
on behalf of the people their own sovereignty protects because protecting others 
traditionally means admitting them to the society of the protecting state and 
ultimately offering membership. How a refugee is defined can be a matter of life 
and death for the person claiming a need for protection. 
Defining a refugee involves international relations on two levels. Firstly, the 
definition of the characteristics of a person who needs protection in the international 
arena, or at least outside his or her country of origin, automatically makes a 
statement about that country. The acknowledgement of refugeehood gives 
international justification to the rejection of the protection of the country of origin by 
the individual or group, or recognises that the country either can or will no longer 
protect the individual or group. Secondly, international protection receives wider 




To know who is a refugee, know first who is asking, and why. 
Alternatively, ... ask instead whether protection is needed, and by 
whom; ... Detinitions will always be attractive, as long as they seem 
to impose finite limits on human problems that otherwise seem 
intractable. Definitions serve useful purposes but become deficient 
once their rationale and relation to other issues are ignored. I 
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Definitions have proved very attractive to those who have understood the occurrence 
of a need for protection in the twentieth century. The need for protection does not 
only encompass the assessment of necessity by the protection seeker. It also entails 
the protectors' understanding of that assessment and their own conviction that their 
protection is a necessity. Definitions have set the limits of the protectors' 
assessment of their own duty to protect and the right of the seeker to receive 
protection. Over time the definitions have adapted in part because the issues to 
which protection is related have changed, and in part because the understanding of 
the need for protection, by states, protection seekers and concerned observers has 
altered. 
The end of the Cold War provides an instance of transformation in the issues 
to which protection is related, in terms of the causes of flight and the political use of 
protection. In this period there have been movements towards an adapted form of 
protection, labelled temporary protection. These movements include developments 
in responses to the question of who is a refugee and who needs protection. 
In order to establish the potential for evolution in the defining of a 'refugee' 
it is necessary to trace the roots of current refugee law and politics. Chapter 1 
therefore examines the progression of refugee definitions from their 1920s origins to 
establish past developments in the context of the international political situation of 
the time. An evolutionary aspect to refugee definitions proving to be nothing new, 
the reasons for and potential directions of further developments of post Cold War 
categories of displaced persons will be presented. 
The chapter is divided into three sections, for simplicity labelled the Past, the 
Present and the Future. The similarities between the three periods lie in refugee 
movements caused by wars and social upheaval with political, religious and ethnic 
motivations. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, 
noted that "the landscape of displacement in the early part of this century was not 
Goodwin-Gill, G.S., 'Benigno Aquino Lecture in Human Rights', International Journal of 
Refugee Law, Special Issue (1990) p.33. 
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dissimilar to the one we are witnessing today",2 and the similarities include a 
disinclination towards the admission of the displaced. However, the early part of 
the century saw arrangements which resulted in a renewing of the protection 
tradition. The question is whether the 1990s will produce a similar revival. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the meaning of protection according to international 
legal instruments dealing with human rights, and political interpretations of those 
instruments within differing social and cultural contexts. This chapter includes some 
conceptual background to the differing forms of protection analyzed in Part Two, 
and lays the foundations for notions of differentiated mechanics of protection 
according to societal and cultural conditions which will be developed in Part Three. 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The links between human rights 
and protection policies are established. States often assess their need to provide 
protection on the basis of violations of internationally accepted standards of human 
rights. The constituent elements of protection are also characterised by reference to 
human rights instruments. However, while human rights documents are used to 
deduce the degeneration of a sovereign state to a situation where others discern a 
need to take over protection of some of its citizens, limits are set on international 
insistence for the respect and development of human rights by the sovereign rights of 
states, and respect for the sovereignty of other states. Refugees often are the 
political pawns in the practical opposition of human rights and state sovereignty.3 It 
is suggested that there are certain essential rights which, whether for natural law 
reasons or due to the development of protective instruments and stances in the 
twentieth century, must be upheld. These are the right to seek protection and to 
receive it outside the country of origin; the right not to be returned to a country 
2 Ogata. S .• 'Refugees: Lessons from the Past'. The Oxford International Review, VolA No.3 
(1993) p.39. Kjaerum also notes the parallels between 19308 refugee policies and those of the 1990s, 
comparing the exclusion of Jewish people from Germany and the introduction of visa requirements for 
people from former Yugoslavia as restrictive measures leading to reduced numbers receiving protection. 
Kjaerum. Morten. 'Temporary Protection in Europe in the 1990,,'. International Journal of Refugee Law, 
Vo1.6 No.3 (1994) 1'.448. 
The conceptual Opl)()sition between the same issues is not the concern of this thesis which deal~ 
with practical protection issues. The conceptual debate is on-going and lengthy. See for example 
Vincent, RJ., Human Rights and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pressl Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1986); Frost, M., Towards a Normative Theory (jf International 
Relations: a critical analysis of the philosophical and methodological assumptions in' the discipline with 
proposals towards a substantive normative theory, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1986); 
Brown, C., International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches, (Hertfordshire: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992). 
lnuoducrion 18 
where one's life would be endangered; and the right to family unity. Beyond these 
essential rights however, it is suggested that in practical terms, for both the 
protecting state and its society, and for the protected people, the entitlements of the 
protected become questions of the quality of protected life. This suggestion means 
that some nuancing of the meaning of social, cultural and economic rights according 
to the situation in the country of origin and in the host state may be possible and 
ultimately beneticial. It would, for example, be a nonsense to insist that protected 
people have rights and benefits beyond those of the indigenous society. However, 
protection of life requires an upholding of dignity and self worth for it to be viable. 
Particular attention also needs to be paid to the essential value of non-discrimination, 
both between groups in need of protection and between the protected and protecting. 
Within given circumstances, however, the upholding of civil and political rights and 
providing of meaningful protection prior to greater inclusion and potentially ultimate 
membership of the host society is a protection path which deserves consideration. 
Chapter 3 examines the European handling of protection issues within the 
context of regional integration and cooperation. The coordination of regional 
approaches to a whole range of security issues in the European continent has 
developed during the 1980s and '90s. In general it has had two directions. The 
first was economic and resultant political integration in western Europe, via the 
European Communities and Union in particular. On the EU level, cooperation on 
economic issues, and in particular the desire to remove frontiers for goods and 
people within the Member States' territory has lead to a need to coordinate policies 
on the admission and treatment of immigrants. If third country nationals legally 
enter one Member State and there are no further frontier checks on entry to further 
Union territory, then they have legally entered all Member States and can travel 
freely, and ultimately reside in any country. There is therefore a need for equal 
entry and residency rules for third country nationals, as restrictive states fear the 
admission of 'undesirables' via more liberal states, and liberal states could hesitate 
over the exclusion of needy cases due to excessive limitations. In tum, policies 
towards legal entrants need to be coordinated to a sufficient extent to avoid a 
funnelling of immigrants into one or a small number of more attractive states. 
Coordination of migration related policies has been embarked upon in the EU and 
also in a sub-group of EU Member States, known as the Schengen States, which 
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have taken the lead on the removal of frontiers and associated policies. 
The second direction of political cooperation in Europe focuses on security 
and human rights issues, and was begun during the Cold War by the Conference for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of EUrope. Both of these 
organisations included non-EU Members States, and have expanded eastward since 
the fall of communism, as states turn to democratic institutions and a valuing of 
human and minority rights. The extended interest in coordination in these areas is 
not only encouraged by emergent democracy in former totalitarian states. The re-
emergence of ethnic, religious and nationalist divides which had been subsumed 
during the communist era is opening further concerns for localised conflicts with 
regional implications for peace and security, including the outflow of massive groups 
of displaced people. While nationalisms and desires for self-determination are at the 
root of many refugee crises in the 1990s (much as they were during the break up of 
empires in the early twentieth century), nationalism and economic concerns in the 
potential protecting states are causing a questioning of the humanitarian impulse to 
protect within one's own state. In addition the possibility of a surrendering of 
national sovereignty over the control of admission and residence to a supra-national 
body sllch as the EU, albeit through the cooperation of sovereign governments, has 
the potential of raising the call to nationalism within EU states. 
Chapter 3 is divided into five sections. The first two sections look at the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, and 
describe the reasons for which coordination on regional temporary protection 
policies cannot be expected from these organisations in the near future, but why the 
former in particular offers potential for an eventual widening of EU agreements in 
this area. The European Union is suggested as the most likely forum for 
coordination of policies in this area, or eventually the creation of a regional 
mechanism. The third section examines work in the Schengen 'laboratory' as a 
precursor to EU activity. The final two sections examine European Union 
developments in protection. The period leading to the Treaty on European Union is 
examined, including the Dublin Convention4 and the particular focus of the 
Edinburgh Conclusions, and the initial effects of the TEU and the creation of a 
Third Pillar of the European Commission are analyzed. Finally, the way ahead, as 
The COllv~l1tiol1 d~termiJliJll! tht: State responsihle for examining an Asylum Request. 
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seen through the Commission's 1994 Communication on Immigration and Asylum 
Policies5 and suggestions for discussion of reception in the region of origin, is 
discussed. The Communication, like the Council of Ministers' Edinburgh 
Conclusions before it, looks at a comprehensive approach to migration policies, and 
the notions of reception in the region of origin point to certain elements of such an 
approach. As such the latter sections of Part One indicate the form in which Part 
Two will proceed. 
Europe has a century long history of evolving protection legislation and 
policies upon which it can potentially develop a protective stance appropriate for its 
circumstances in the 1990s. It also has a recent background in cooperative 
understanding between the states into which the continent is divided, and of 
protection not only of lives but of rights of individuals and minority groups. The 
three chapters of Part One develop this background to European regional refugee 
protection. 
Commissioll of th~ Eumpl!an Comllluniti~s. Communication from the Commission to the Council 




WHO IS A REFUGEE? 
In everyday language, including that of the media, anyone fleeing a problem, 
usually not of their own making, heading towards another country or another place 
within their country of origin, is labelled a 'refugee'. However, those (states) who 
need to recognise 'refugees' in order for them to qualify for all the entitlements and 
protection of that status are not so generous. Nor are they consistent. There is no 
way to establish a single, valid or strict definition of 'refugee', for as Grahl-Madsen 
has said, there is no such definition of 'refugee' even in international law, only 
'fitting' detinitions.l What is attainable through a distillation of international legal 
instruments, policy documents and politico-sociological indications is an idea of who 
might be accorded refugee status or at least protection and under what 
circumstances, in both the real and an ideal world. As Zolberg et 01 have noted, 
this problem of defining a refugee is "no mere academic exercise but has a bearing 
on matters of life and death ... 2 
The current, so-called 'universal', definition of a 'refugee' contained in the 
1951 Convention Relating to the status of Refugees3 [the Convention], and carried 
over, with the removal of its temporal limitations, in the 1967 New York Protocol 
influences all legislative and political approaches to the subject of migration. Article 
1 A paragraph 2 of the Convention defines a refugee as any person who 
1966). 
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
Grahl-Madsen, A., The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol.1 (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 
2 Zolberg, A., A. Suhrke and S. Aguayo, Escape from Violence: contlict and the refugee crisis in 
the developing world, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p.3. 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: 189 UNTS 137; text also in UNHCR, 
Collection of International Instruments relating to Refugees, (1979), p.IO. The Convention definition 
included the I>ossibility for Contracting States to stipulate on signing whether they wished "events 
occurring before I January 1951" to be understood as "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951" 
or "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951". The geographical limitation could 
be broadened after signature (Article 1 B). 
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nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
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The Times report on the signing of the Convention tellingly hinted at a need for 
contextualisation of refugee movements and the progressive need for changes or 
extensions to laws and definitions on this subject: 4 
"What is a refugee? From time to time, whenever an international 
effort is concerted to deal with a refugee problem, the attempt at 
definition is made; the resultant form of words may serve its 
immediate purpose, but it is likely to be useless for any other .... 
Today, as the Soviet system hardens its political grip on eastern 
Europe, refugees of a new type are leaving the countries under Soviet 
domination and arriving in western Europe in numbers that tend to 
grow. .. In the discussions the refugee problems of Europe played a 
large and perhaps dominant part, and the definition adopted reflects 
clearly the present state of Europe. .. For victims of future 
upheavals or future persecutions - displaced perhaps by a seizure of 
power in a country now relatively free - the convention will have to 
be extended or a new convention made ... [T]he convention, though 
it does not go far, will be valuable to the limited extent to which it 
gives him [the refugee] the freedom to rehabilitate himself." 
1. PAST: Refugees Before the 1951 Convention 
In comprehending current refugee definitions and Conventions and discussing 
possible innovative measures for dealing with future refugee flows, it is important to 
take into account the origins of notions of defining the characteristics of refugees. 
Beyond those origins one must note the developments which have brought refugee 
law to its current form, and which may play a part in informing further changes. 
Many works have been written on the subject of the history of refugee law, 
including the seminal work of Grahl-Madsen,s so a grand excursion into this period 
will not be made here. Neither will the centuries long background to refuge, 
The Times, (3) July 1951) 1>.7. 
Grahl-Madsen, Oll.cit.. 
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originating in the asylum offered by kings, republics, free cities and churches be 
assessed as it is the twentieth century categorisations which are of relevance to this 
discussion. 6 We will look rather at the essential characteristics of refugee law, in 
particular protection; persecution; territoriality; ethnicity; regionalism in refugee 
crisis management; definitions and conventions; war, and in particular, civil conflict. 
1.1 Groups fOl' whom arl'angements were made 
Prior to 1920 there was largely unrestricted migration, and the need or desire 
to categorise did not really arise. During the period from 1920 to 1950 the 
definition of refugees applied to particular nationalities or groups who had lost the 
protection of governments controlling specific territories. With the end of the First 
World War, the breakdown of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires and 
revolution in Russia and the creation of the Soviet Union, the numbers of displaced 
people were large. However, the displaced were generally stable groupings 
emerging from existing populations. Europe rushed to put up the first barriers to 
immigrants as regional security was perceived to be under renewed threat. In spite 
of this, the establishment of the League of Nations allowed for the evolution of 
international rules for the treatment of refugees as specific arrangements could be 
created, which permitted specified protection but limited international responsibility 
with narrow group definitions. Faced with 800,000 Russians fleeing the civil 
conflict, persecution, and totalitarian regime and ideology of the emerging Soviet 
Union in 1921, the League "found itself almost compelled to take some action. "7 
The first League resolution on refugees was passed on 26 February 1921, followed 
later that same year by a conference on the question of Russian refugees and the 
appointment of a High Commissioner for Refugees, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, Further 
arrangements granting travel documents [the Nansen Passport] to Russian refugees 
were adopted in July 1922, followed by more arrangements for Armenian refugees 
in 1924. No general definition of the term 'refugee' had been made in any of these 
arrangements. However, a further conference in 1926 amended and supplemented 
the earlier arrangements, and defined the terms 'Russian refugee' and 'Armenian 
For a summary of this longer history see Zolberg t't ai, op.cit., pp.5-11. 
Grahl-Madsen, op.cit., p.12. 
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refugee'. The term 'Russian refugee' was defined as: M 
Any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys 
the protection of the Government of the USSR and who has not 
acquired any other nationality. 
The term' Armenian refugee' was defined as:9 
Any person of Armenian origin, formerly a subject of the Ottoman 
Empire, who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the protection of the 
Government of the Turkish Republic and who has not acquired any 
other nationality. 
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Further instruments were adopted in 1928 which were extended to include Turkish, 
Assyrian and Assyro-Chaldean refugees. 
The factors which provoked mass movements during that period were almost 
identical to those which are the predominant causes of flight in the 1990s including 
civil war and ethnic tensions.1U In response to the movements in the twenties and 
thirties specific responsive arrangements were created, allowing for protection. 
Protective facilities and the whole system of asylum has changed over the decades. 
Whereas the politically pragmatic response to mass forced movements in the early 
part of the twentieth century was to make protective arrangements for incoming 
masses, the political situation has evolved to suggest that restrictive protection for 
limited numbers away from the country of origin, and ambitious plans for protection 
in situ are the pragmatic responses of the nineties. As such, protection has evolved. 
The question is whether this evolution is appropriate. 
The word 'origin' in the above definitions was held to signify territorial 
roots, in other words, these original refugee definitions were territorially based. 
Further definitions were employed, in which ethnic rather than territorial origins 
were used as defining characteristics, in order that minorities could be distinguished 
so that no particular group from one territory could be left out. In addition, the 
notion of loss of protection was not defined in conditional terms. No specific 
reasons were required to determine the basis for loss of protection, such as flight 
Ibid., p.123. 
9 Ibid., p.125. 
10 Similarities between the beginning and end of the twentieth century are being drawn in other 
areas of international relatiolls including for example the administration of disputed territories or those 
relinquished by vanquished states. See for example Lopez-Reyes, R., 'United Nations Zones of Peace 
Territories: a proposal for transforming the Trusteeship system', Peace Research. Vo1.27 No.1 (1995). 
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from conflict; fear of persecution; or grounds for flight such as race, religion or 
political opinion, as would later appear in the 1951 Convention. 
In 1933, "the time was ripe for a legally binding instrument: a Convention 
relating to the International Status of Refugees was adopted at Geneva on 28 
October" .11 This was followed in 1935 by arrangements for certificates of 
identification for those fleeing the Saar; in 1936 by provisional arrangements, and in 
1938 a Convention, concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany. The 
definition used in this latter Convention was: 12 
1 (a) Persons possessing or having possessed German nationality and 
not possessing any other nationality who are proved not to enjoy, in 
law or in fact, the protection of the German Government; 
(b) Stateless persons not covered by previous Conventions or 
Agreements who have left German territory after being established 
therein and who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in fact, the 
protection of the German Government. 
2 Persons who leave Germany for reasons of purely personal 
convenience are not included in this definition. 
These instruments were followed in 1939 by arrangements for those fleeing Austria, 
in which the definition stated that recognised refugees are those13 
Persons having possessed Austrian nationality not possessing any other 
than German nationality who are proved not to enjoy, in law or in 
fact, the protection of the German Government; and 
(b) Stateless persons not covered by any previous Convention or 
Arrangement and having left the territory which formerly constituted 
Austria after being established therein, who are proved not to enjoy, 
in law or in fact, the protection of the German Government. 
Persons who leave the territory which formerly constituted Austria for 
reasons of purely personal convenience are not included in this 
defini tion. 
Grahl-Madsen notes that these definitions for the first time refer indirectly to people 
leaving due to persecution. 14 At this point the definitional terms shift from 
refugeehood based on loss of protection for unspecified (but commonly understood) 
reasons, to refugeehood based on flight from persecution. The concepts of 
persecution and loss of protection are very closely linked, since as Goodwin-Gill 
II Grahl-Madsen, op.cit., p.13. 
12 Ibid., pp.131-132. 
13 Ibid., pp.132-3. 
14 Ibid., pp.131-132. 
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notes: 15 
The persecuted clearly do not enjoy the protection of their country of 
origin, while evidence of the lack of protection on either the internal 
or external level may create a presumption as to the likelihood of 
persecution and to the well-foundedness of any fear. The core 
meaning of persecution readily includes the threat of deprivation of 
life or physical freedom. In its broader sense, however, it remains 
very much a question of degree and proportion ... 
26 
Quite how the link between persecution and loss of protection is interpreted depends 
very much on the political context at the time of attempted understanding. It is 
heavily intluenced by the relationship between the sending and host states and their 
governments, and the relationship between the host government and opposition 
groups in the country of origin of refugees. 
The use of the term 'persecution' in refugee definitions leads to a more 
limited scope of the word 'refugee' in the context of civil war. Arguably the 
breakdown of state order indicates a general loss of protection for entire groups of 
people, hence persecution, or the fear thereof, can be seen as a potential 
consequence of this breakdown, although not always in respect of each individual 
citizen. 
Over time, the effectiveness of the League of Nations was declining, and its 
competence to deal with the on going refugee situation diminished. There was no 
international commitment to solving the causes of displacement, and in addition, 
with high unemployment and the foreign policy benefits of protection not obvious, 
the perceived need and desire to protect was disappearing. One ultimate 
manifestation of the ineffectiveness of international protection in the inter-war period 
is often said to be the large numbers killed in the holocaust. 16 
The tirst definition to be cited here which does not have the qualification of 
specific ethnic or territorial origins is that adopted in 1936 by a Brussels session of 
the Institut de Droit International in resolutions on the 'Statut juridique des apatrides 
et des refugies' (Legal status of stateless persons and refugees) of which Article 2 
IS 
Goodwin-Gill. G.S .• The Refugee in International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983). p.38. 
16 Loescher, G., 'The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the limit?', Journal of 
International Affairs. Vol.47 No.2 (Winter 1994) 1>1'.354-5. 
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(2) defined a refugee as: J7 
"tout individu qui, en raison d'evenements politiques survenus sur Ie 
territoire de I'Etat dont il etait ressortissant, a quitte volontairement ou 
non ce territoire ou en demeure eloigne, qui n'a acquis aucune 
nationalite nouvelle et ne jouit de la protection diplomatique d'aucun 
autre Etat." 
27 
This is not a legal definition but rather a statement of the political and sociological 
opinion of the time. The defining characteristics of this definition, involving 
political events, without specifying the nature of those political events, and of 
territoriality acknowledge the political realities of that time as do all the above 
definitions. A development of understanding was needed to recognise flight from 
totalitarian regimes, and flight from territorial expansion and conflict as elements of 
refugeehood. In this way, this definition demonstrates the over-riding theme of this 
chapter, that definitions of the term 'refugee' in international law and politics tend, 
quite naturally, to suit the contemporary circumstances of the drafters. The Institut 
de Droit International definition also acknowledges that loss of protection can stem 
from removal of protection by the government in question, and/or refusal of 
protection by the refugee. However, this is the first time in the definitions seen here 
that the individual had been specified rather than a group. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive commentator on refugee law and definitions 
in the 1930s was John Hope Simpson. He noted the deficiencies of all the 
definitions current in the late 1930s and himself offered a detailed alternative which 
emphasised his opinion that the essential quality of a refugee was flight from the 
territory of habitual residence. IS 
The essential quality of a refugee ... may be said to be that he has left 
his country of regular residence, of which he mayor may not be a 
national, as a result of political events in that country which render 
his continued residence impossible or intolerable, and has taken refuge 
in another country, or, if already absent from his home, is unwilling 
or unable to return, without danger to life or liberty, as a direct 
17 Quoted in Grahl-Madsen, op.cit., (>.74. The translation of this definition appearing in Jackson, 
Ivor C., 'The 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees: A universal basis for protection', 
International Journal of Refugee Law, (Special Issue: The 1991 Gene::va Colloquium), VoJ.J No.3 (1991) 
p.405: 
any person who, hecause of political events arising in the State of which he is a 
national, has left or remains outside:: the territory of that State, and has not acquired 
another nationality amI does not enjoy the protection of another State. 
18 Cited by Grahl-Madsen, op.cit.. p.74. [John Hope SIMPSON, 'Refugees. A Review of the 
situation since September 1938. The Refu1!ee Prohlem, (London:OUP, 1939).) 
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consequence of the political conditions existing there. In general the 
refugee cannot return without danger to life or liberty, though it may 
be, in some cases, but by no means in all, that complete political 
submission to the authorities would enable him to return and live at 
peace. The term political in this description is used in a sense wide 
enough to include religious conditions. Other features of the existence 
of a refugee, such as the absence of de jure national status (ie 
statelessness) may be incidental but are not essential to his quality as 
refugee in the non-technical sense. He is distinguished from the 
ordinary alien or migrant in that he has left his former territory 
because of political events there, not because of economic conditions 
or because of the economic attractions of another territory. 
28 
This unofficial definition demonstrates key features of refugeehood contained in the 
official definitions of the time, but excludes any limitations of territorial or ethnic 
origins. Particularly noteworthy is that this explanation of refugeehood contains 
notions of flight from conflict, and protection from forcible return, however 
temporary. 
Just as events following the First World War, including regional or internal 
conflicts and territorial changes, caused flights for which the members of the League 
of Nations saw a need to formulate arrangements the events of, and migrations 
resulting from, the Second World War caused the United Nations to establish 
instruments and institutions to regulate refugee definitions and the handling of 
refugee crises. These post World War Two developments began in 1946 with the 
Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation. In this Constitution a 
separate definition is used for those described as 'displaced persons', a distinction 
which many, such as Grahl-Madsen, felt became redundant once the IRO 
constitution became but another component of past laws assumed by the 1951 
Convention. 19 
Part I, section B of Annex I to the IRO Constitution [1946] said:20 
'displaced person' applies to a person who has been deported from, or 
has been obliged to leave his country of nationality or of former 
habitual residence as a result of the actions of the Nazi or fascist 
regimes or of regimes which took part on their side in the Second 
World War, or of the quisling or similar regimes which assisted them 
19 Howewr, it shOUld be noted that, as will be seen below, the term is still used within the context 
of the notion of the 'good oftict's' of UNHCR, although it is not involved in the definition of a 
Convention refugee. 
20 All citations of IRO Constitution taken from Grahl-Madsen, op.cit., 1'1'.134-135. 
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against the United Nations; for example persons who were compelled 
to undertake forced labour or who were deported for racial, religious 
or political reasons. 
Part I section A of Annex I to the IRO Constitution stated that a 
'Refugee' is a person who has left or is outside of his country of 
nationality or of former habitual residence, and who, whether or not 
he has retained his nationality, belongs to one of the following 
categories: 
(a) victims of the Nazi or Fascist regimes or regimes on their side, 
whether enjoying international status as refugees or not; 
(b) Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist regime 
in Spain, whether enjoying international status as refugees or 
not. 
(c) Persons who were considered 'refugees' before the outbreak of 
the second world war, for reasons of race, religion, nationality 
or political opinion. [NB This is not necessarily concerned 
with any particular instrument.] 
Paragraphs II to IV also described as a 'refugee' 
anyone, other than a 'displaced person' as defined in the IRO 
Constitution, who is outside his country of nationality or former 
habitual residence, and who as a result of events subsequent to the 
outbreak of the second world war is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of the government of his country of 
nationality or former nationality. 
Victims of Nazi persecution returned to Germany or Austria as a 
result of enemy action, but not yet firmly resettled. 
Unaccompanied children, war orphans outside the country of origin. 
29 
These definitions are still restricted in terms of geography, time and specific events, 
although they do incorporate and build on past definitions and thus become more 
'universalised' and comprehensive than previous definitions. One finds in them 
direct reference to the notion of victim, and thus to the element inherited by the 
1951 Convention definition of persecution as the propelling force behind 
refugeehood. However, unlike the Convention which is aimed at refugees as 
activists or as targets, these definitions refer also to more general victims.21 Other 
important features are that they are based on ideological points of reference, and 
deal with situations which have already arisen, rather than offering forward planning 
for possible future crises. 
The above definitions mention victims of the Falangist regime and the 
Spanish Civil War which is an important reference point in a discussion focusing on 
~I Zolherg t!( ai, op.cit., ».30. 
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mass flight from conflict. Only the French, tardily and somewhat reluctantly, made 
any alteration to the 1933 Convention and extended it to apply to these Spanish 
Refugees who were for this purpose defined as "persons possessing or having 
possessed Spanish nationality and with regard to whom it has been established that in 
law or in fact they do not enjoy the protection of the Spanish government. 1122 This 
was not an amplification of the treaty based definition as it was not done at the time 
of France's signature or ratification; it was a unilateral extension which does not 
affect the definition contained in the Convention. The extension was made in 1945, 
and protective action during the Civil War, which started in 1936, was slow and 
minimal. 
The origins of refugee law lie, then, in very specific definitions of groups of 
people from specified territorial or ethnic origins who had for unspecified reasons 
lost the protection of specitied states. The evolution of refugee law during the 
period from 1920 to 1950 was from these case-by-case developments towards an 
individualised definition of refugees who have left their unspecified country of origin 
due to the persecution of particular regimes. Over the years, the definition had 
taken on an ideologized nature, but continued to be influenced by the political 
context of the time of drafting. Acknowledgement of the contextual nature of 
refugee definitions is perhaps the most significant point, as the recognition of the 
influence of political events on the definition of refugees fleeing the crises of the 
moment leads us to question the changing context of involuntary migration in the 
1990s, and the need for parallel changes in, or extensions of definitional terms. 
2. THE PRESENT: the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and 
the Statute of the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
Modern Refugee Law is based on the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its amendments in the 1967 New York Protocol, as well as 
elements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law 
conventions. The treatment of refugees in the international community is also based 
Grahl-Madsen. oll.cit, p.l3 J. By decree No. 45-766 of 15 March 1945. 
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in the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
Grahl-Madsen refers to the Convention as "the 'Magna Carta for Refugees' 
and undoubtedly ... the international instrument of greatest consequence for the 
status of refugees in the world today. 1123 
The axis of the current discussion is the Convention definition of a 'refugee', 
which forms the basis on which states formulate their domestic definitions and 
decisions concerning the nature of the characteristics which need to be identified if 
the protection offered by asylum is to be granted. The Convention definition 
describes a 'refugee' as any person who:24 
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
Also included is any person WhO: 25 
has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 
1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 
and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the 
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization. 
Meanwhile, refusal of refugee status by the IRO "shall not prevent the status of 
refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this 
section ... 26 
Importantly, the Convention also points to the rights of those states according 
refugee status by defining the general obligations of those recognised. "Every 
refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in 
particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken 
for the maintenance of public order. .. 27 
Ibid., p.20. 
24 Convention. Article 1 A paragraph 2. 
25 Convention, Article 1 A paragraph 1. 
26 Convention, Article I A paragraph I. 
Convention. Article 2. 
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2.1 Dl'afting of the Convention: Limitations, Euro-centricity and the Cold 
Waa' 
The Convention marked the first broadening of refugee law from its previous 
confines of relation to only specific groups and territories. 
The drafting history and evolution of the Convention has been summarised as 
follows: 211 
The general tenor of the Convention's drafting history and subsequent 
evolution in practice may be summarized in three points, First, it 
maintained a strategically conceived definitional focus in refugee law: 
the principle of comprehensive humanitarian or human rights based 
protection for all refugees and similarly situated persons was rejected 
by a majority of states. Second, a universalist approach to refugee 
protection was defeated in favour of a Eurocentric legal mandate 
derived from a highly selective definition of international burden-
sharing. Third, and most important, states opted to take direct control 
of the process of refugee determination and have established an 
international legal framework that permits the screening of applicants 
for refugee protection on a variety of national interest grounds. 
Given the ideological divisions of East and West at the time of drafting, and 
the voluntary absence of the Soviet bloc from the conference of plenipotentiarie~, 
it is not surprising that the humanitarian and human rights concerns of the 
participants were strategically aimed at those wishing to flee from communist 
oppression, as well as those who had fled Nazi persecution during the Second World 
War: it was concern for the most apparent and immediate roots of refugee flows, 
along with a desire to assist those ideologically opposed to communism, and 
therefore of importance in terms of national interest for the Western, democratic, 
capitalist states, which permeated the limitations to be found in the defining of a 
'Convention Refugee'. These limitations are found most significantly in the 
geographic and temporal restrictions already referred to above, and also in the 
essential role given to the undefined term of 'persecution' as the root cause of forced 
~K Hnthl1way, Jaml!s C., 'A Rl!collsidl!ration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law', Harvard 
International Law Journal Vol.3l No.1 (1990) 1).144. 
~9 Sl!e Hathaway, Ihid., 1>.145. Hathaway descrihes how while they fell stateless persons should be 
assisted by UN, the socialist hloc objected to protection tor refugees, who they considered as "traitors 
who are refusing to return home to servl! their country with their ft!llow citizens"[Statement of Mr. 
Soldatov of the USSR in UN Doc. A/1682 (1950), Ihid., toot note number 102]. [NB Thousands were 
made stateless in the I 920s hy the emergellt USSR. I 
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migration. 
In considering the Eurocentric nature of the Convention it is important to 
note that not only did the Convention concentrate on European events, and those 
displaced by them, but of the 26 plenipotentiaries at the conference, 17 were 
European, and 16 of those were from the West of the descending Iron Curtain.30 It 
was not surprising that the original 1951 Convention had been Euro-centric given the 
nature of world politics at that time, including the scarcity of independent states in 
Africa and Asia. Considering political realities of the moment, this had to be so, 
and the Protocol formed one exercise in re-dressing this balance. 
The dateline of the Convention (Article 1 A (2) events occurring before 1 
January 1951) is signi ticant because of the contextual indication it gives of the 
desires of the Western governments to protect not only those displaced by the events 
and aftermath of the Second World War, but also those fleeing the Communist 
regimes of Eastern Europe. That is to say that in an environment of increasing 
movement towards regional integration in the West and increasingly cool ideological 
opposition to the regimes of the East, the European refugee situation was composed 
not only of those uprooted by the events of the Second World War, but also those 
fleeing the newly installed communist regimes. 
An indication of the acknowledgment of the Cold War ideological terms of 
the definition is to be found in a statement by Mr. Rochefort of France, a participant 
in the conference of plenipotentiaries:31 
[T]he detinition of the term 'refugee' ... was based on the assumption 
of a divided world. If, however, it was considered that a single text 
should cover both refugees from western Europe seeking asylum 
beyond the 'Iron Curtain' and refugees from the latter countries 
seeking asylum in western Europe, [it was unclear] what the moral 
implications of such a text would be. The problem of refugees could 
not be treated in the abstract, but, on the contrary, must be considered 
in the light of historical facts. In laying down the definition of the 
30 Delegates came from: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; Colombia; Denmark: Egypt: 
France; Federal Republic of Germany: Greece; Holy See; Iraq; Israel; Italy; Luxembourg; Monaco; 
Netherlands; Norway; Sweden; Switzerland (representing also Liechtenstein); Turkey; United Kingdom; 
United States of America; Venezuela; Yugoslavia. There were also observers from Iran and Cuba, and 
non-voting participants from UNHCR, ILO, IRO, the Council of Europe. A number of NGO 
representatives also participated as ohservers. 
31 Hathaway, op.cit., p.149, footnote number 123. [UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Status of Refll~~~s and Statd~ss p~rsons. UN doc. A/CONF.2/SR.22 (1951)1. 
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term 'refugee', account had hitherto always been taken of the fact that 
the refugees principally involved had originated from a certain part of 
the world; thus, such a detinition was based on historical facts. Any 
attempt to impart a universal character to the text would be 
tantamount to making it an 'Open Sesame'. 
34 
The Convention and its definition were not universal, in that they were not intended 
to apply to people from every part of the world, nor to people fleeing all situations 
which might result in forced migrations. Specifically, the intention was not to 
develop concern for flight from any armed international or civil conflicts which 
might occur, particularly because such conflict was, in the political context of the 
time, not expected. The Convention was to be used by the drafting Western states 
in dealing with arrivals from the East. Only with the purposeful addition of the 
New York Protocol in 1967 did those fleeing Africa and Asia, for example, gain the 
potential for recognition. With the removal of the geographic and time limitations in 
the Protocol, the universal possibilities of the originally Euro-centric Convention 
were, to some extent, realised. 32 This evolution was of a corrective nature, with 
the aim of making the Convention less European in the light of decolonisation and 
the new political climate, as well as mass movements, that brought about. The 
problem the Western states are faced with in the 1990s is that those fleeing eastern 
Europe are tleeing states of fledgling democracy, generally because of economic 
hardship or civil conflict. Those fleeing for the latter reason are the people who 
need protection, for similar reasons to those who received protection under the 
League of Nation's arrangements in the twenties and thirties, and those who did not 
receive protection at the time of the genocide of the Second World War. 
J~ See Ortiz Miranda. Carlos. 'Toward a Broader Detinition of Refugee: 20th Century Development 
Trends'. California Western International Law Journal, Vol.20 (1990) p.325: Also Aleinikoff, T. 
Alexander, op.cit., p.622. Article J of the Protocol states: 
1. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 
inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter detined. 
2. For the purpose of the present Protocol. the term "refugee" shall, except as regards 
the application of paragraph J of this article. mean any person within the definition of 
article I of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951 and ... " and the words ". . . as a result of such events". in article 1 A 
(2) were omitted. 
J. The present Protocol shall he applied by the States Parties hereto without any 
geographic limitation. save that existing declarations made by States already Parties to 
the Convention in accordance with article I B (I) (a) of the Convention, shall, unless 
extended under article I B (2) thereof. apply also under the Protocol. 
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2.2 Statute 
The mandate of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees is the one element of refugee protection established in the early 1950s 
which has evolved in line with the contemporary realities of displacement. 
On 3 December 1949, the General Assembly of the United Nations decided 
to establish a High Commissioner's Office for Refugees, and requested the 
Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC], amongst others, to put forward proposals 
for an appropriate definition of those migrants who would fall under the competence 
of this office. ECOSOC had already, in August 1949, established a committee to 
consider the possibilities of a Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 
report of which was adopted in August 1950, including a definition. The ECOSOC 
definition was restricted in temporal and geographic terms, as has been seen above. 
However, the General Assembly decided this was too limited, and removed the word 
'Europe' from the more general detinition it adopted for the Statute establishing 
UNHCR on 14 December 1950.33 This definition became: 
[Chapter II, 6] The competence of the High Commissioner shall 
extend to: 
A (i) Any person who has been considered a refugee under the 
Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the 
Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the 
Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the 
International Refugee Organisation. 
(ii) Any person who, as a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal 
convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable 
or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal 
convenience, is unwilling to return to it. 
Over the years, the mandate of UNHCR has evolved from this original statutory 
position, to cover the broader meaning of refugee. That is to say that besides 
covering individuals who have left their country due to a fear of persecution on 
33 Sec Grahl-Madsen. op.cit.. pp.i 03-4. 
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specified grounds, the mandate covers larger groups and categories who have 
crossed a frontier in search of protection. Since 1976 it goes further still to cover 
displaced persons, including the internally displaced.34 The mandate of UNHCR 
has been extended, through the requests by the General Assembly in 1957 for the 
use of the 'good oftices' of the High Commissioner to assist Chinese people who 
were fleeing to Hong KonglS and were considered 'refugees not within the 
competence of the United Nations'. In addition, ECOSOC Resolution 2011 in 1976 
"reaffirming the eminently humanitarian character of the activities of the High 
Commissioner for the benefit of refugees and displaced persons", explicitly approved 
assistance for displaced persons. 36 In this way concrete recognition was given to 
flight caused by armed contlicts and internal disturbances which had to a large 
extent superseded the temporal context in which the UNHCR Statute and the refugee 
instruments were drafted. 37 In other words, while not considered to be Convention 
Refugees and thus generally excluded from the possibilities of protection offered by 
the granting of asylum, those tleeing civil war are acknowledged as being deserving 
of the protection of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. A prima jacie determination can be made, and UNHCR assists those in 
need on the basis of an objective evaluation of the situation in the country of origin, 
a situation not dissimilar from the League of Nations period of de-politicised group 
determination. The major difficulty here is over the nature of this protection, when 
it must take place within the battle zone. 
2.3 Pel-secution: Relating the Definition to Civil War 
The concept of persecution was left undefined in the Convention as well as in 
34 ECOSOC Resolution 2011 of 1976 explicitly approved assistance to displaced persons. On this 
see Muntarbhorn. V.. 'Protection and Assistance for Refugees in Armed Conflicts and Internal 
Disturbances: Retlections on the mandates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees', International Review of the Red 
Cross, (July-August 1988) p.361. 
)5 Ogata, 'Rdugees: Lessons from the Past', The Oxford International Review, Vol.4 No.3 (1993) 
p.40. 
)6 ECOSOC Resolution 2011 (LX!), Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. 2028th plt:nary Illt!t!ting (2 August 1976). 
)7 See Muntarhhorn, op.cit., p.361 cHId Jackson, op.cit., pp. 410-411. 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where the right to "seek and enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution" is dec1ared. 38 However, the persecution 
in question is generally understood to be at the hand of the state of origin or of 
habitual residence. Restrictive interpretation and application of the Convention 
definition leads states to claim that flight from conflict does not stem from 
individualised persecution, and that those attempting to leave their country of origin 
to enter and seek asylum in other states are not Convention refugees and not in a 
position to receive the protection and rights which should be accorded to Convention 
refugees. The lack of definition of persecution (a term which is itself used to define 
refugeehood) provides scope for politically or ideologically influenced interpretations 
as each state formulates its own criteria for eligibility. Leaving persecution 
undefined also has the potential benefit of affording space for the flexibility of 
liberal interpretation and application, if other political circumstance permit this. 
However, as Goodwin-Gill has pointed out, the five grounds for persecution 
set out in the Convention have been correspondingly developed in the field of non-
discrimination. Hathaway, meanwhile, notes that it was to be expected that with the 
civil and political rights paradigm in its primacy at the time of drafting, the notion 
of marginalisation (leading to flight) would be described in terms approaching non-
discrimination. 39 The parallels between the Convention and non-discrimination are 
of interest as they demonstrate a further example of the significance of the context 
within which the definition was formulated. The five stipulated grounds upon which 
a well-founded fear of persecution leading to refugee status may be based reflect the 
reasons behind forced migration through history, from the expUlsion of the 
Huguenots on religious grounds in 1685 through the political flight of revolutionaries 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the migration of national minorities in 
the early twentieth century. However, the essential questions are whether the 
grounds of persecution, and the concept of persecution itself, incorporate fear 
engendered by a civil conflict, and whether fear of persecution due to membership 
of a particular group targeted in the course of war qualifies in terms of the 
38 Article 14 of the Uniwrsal Declaration of Human Rights. 
39 Goodwin-Gill, The Rdllgee in International Law, op.cit., p.26. Hathaway, James C., 'Re-
interpreting the Convention refugee Detinition in the post-Cold War era', in Baehr, P., and Tessenyi 
(eds.), The New Refugee Hosting Countries, (1991) p.42. 
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Convention definition. 
The conditions which generate a well-founded fear of persecution 
within an individual are commonly no more compelling than those 
which cause the flight of thousands from violence and civil unrest. 
Nonetheless, states are generally reluctant to grant permanent asylum 
to the latter, while they are more receptive to the former. 4o 
38 
States, being able as they are to lay down their own criteria for admission, view the 
fear instilled through contlict alone as insufficient grounds for the granting of 
refugee status, and asylum.41 The Council of Europe countries and USA in 
particular have held that persons tleeing armed conflict are not refugees in the sense 
of Article I A, Paragraph 2 of the Convention. However, such refugees do come 
under the extended mandate of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees.·n European states may now need to reconsider this position in the 
light of events in the early 1990s, particularly in former Yugoslavia. The focal 
point of discussion on persecution is the individualised nature of claims to refugee 
status under international instruments, and the distinction between restrictive and 
liberal interpretations of the Convention wording. 
The five defining categories of those fearing persecution who should be 
protected are all group categories. No one has an individualised race, nationality or 
religion. The individual's membership of a persecuted group may often be 
acknowledged as sufticient grounds for the granting of asylum. However, 
membership of a particular social group, religion or ethnic minority which may be 
persecuted during a conflict does not, under a restrictive interpretation of the 
Convention, go beyond being of minor significance to a claim of "well-founded fear 
of perseclltion" .43 One reason for this is perhaps the capacity for processing 
claims. The application of the Convention, that is the analysis of the relation 
between the subjective and objective elements of fear and persecution, is usually 
40 Goodwin-Gill, G.S., 'Nollrt'jolllt'I1It'llt and the new asylum seekers' in David A. Martin (ed.) Ih2 
New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s - the Ninth Sokol Colloquium on International Law, 
(Dordrecht: Martillus Nijhoff, 1988) p.108. 
41 This has been the position of EU Member States with regard to those tleeing the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia, as will be discussed bdow. 
42 See Jackson, op.cit., I>p.410-411; Goodwin-Gill, Refugee in International Law, op.cit. pp.17-18; 
Muntarbhorn, op.cit., p.361. 
43 See for example, Moussali, Michel, 'Ret1exions sur I'actualite de la convention de 1951 relative 
au statut des refugi~s', (Geneva: UNHCR 1988). 
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held to relate to the individual. If, under a liberal interpretation, membership of a 
group persecuted during a civil conflict was found to be sufficient grounds for 
recognition of refugee status, the numbers seeking admission would be far too large 
for individual analysis. Some contend that this is not how the Convention should be 
applied in such cases. Arguing that approaching the Convention as a document 
appropriate only to cases of individual persecution is open to question, Egan points 
out that the oppression the drafters of the Convention had in mind was generalised 
and group-defined. She continues by suggesting that a process of establishing that 
one was singled out for persecution denies the forward looking nature of the 
definition, which talks of "well-founded fear of persecution", that is a fear an 
individual may have because of the generalised oppression of a group to which he or 
she belongs. 4~ Such a liberal interpretation of the Convention might allow for the 
application of its detinition to those fleeing civil war, while the restrictive 
interpretation employed by Western states clearly does not. 
As Western governments persist in their restrictive interpretation and 
application of the Convention are changes to the detinition necessary to bring it into 
line with the changed circumstances of the early 1990s, or is it sufficient as it 
stands, as a cornerstone, which regional instruments should be brought in to 
complement? 
That the Convention is a cornerstone of refugee law, which retains usefulness 
as an almost universally accepted and acknowledged, if increasingly restrictively 
applied instrument is not to be ignored. However, as Goodwin-Gill has noted 
"[f]rom the onset it was recognised that, given its various limitations, the 
Convention definition would not cover every refugee. "45 In the 1980s and '90s, 
the appropriateness of the Convention as the sole instrument of international refugee 
law, and particularly the definition of a 'refugee' it upholds has been increasingly 
questioned. This questioning becomes particularly pertinent when one considers that 
the refugee crises facing Europe in the 1990s are most likely to arise from the 
aftermath of the collapse of the communist regimes in eastern Europe, the very 
44 Egan, SUS<ln 1., 'Civil War Refllg~~s and the issu~ of ·singling out" in a State of Civil Unrest', 
Discussion Pal)~r, Centre for R~fugee Studi~s and Centre for research on Public Law and Public Policy 
(1991) p.3. 
45 Goodwin-Gill. Th~ R~fllg~e in International Law. oJl.cit .• p.13. 
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regimes which intluenced the ideologically charged defining of a refugee in the 
context of the icy Cold War of 1951. Writing in the 1990s, it is interesting to 
compare the juxtapositioning of West European unity over refugee issues at the time 
of drafting of the Convention, and the positioning of the refugee debates of the last 
decade within the issues involved in the widening and deepening of European 
integration. Added to the more recent linkage of refugee issues and wider European 
politics is of course the role the fledgling democracies of eastern Europe might play 
in the future of the continent, including cross frontier migration. 
In concluding it must be noted that the definition of a 'refugee' in the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol offers a continuing solid basis for refugee protection. 
However, just as the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees has evolved to accommodate changing political realities, a similar 
evolution of state practice, symbolised and controlled by international legal 
instruments, may be necessary, desirable and possible. This evolution would need 
to take into account the ideological framework of the international system 
influencing forced migration; the nature of push factors; and the context within 
which migration takes place. Some evolution would appear necessary if those 
fleeing contlict en masse are to be protected by the international community in a 
humanitarian spirit. The concern is to establish where international instruments can 
develop in order to maintain, or, under the restrictive circumstances in place, even 
increase, levels of protection for those in flight from the post-Cold War malaise of 
civil contlict. 
3. THE FUTURE: Temporary Protection? 
The defining conditions of short term or group refugeehood are not 
established in the concrete terms of international legal or policy instruments, so it is 
necessary that the inclusion of temporarily protected 'refugees' in this chapter be 
speculative in nature. In speculating, however, one can note those elements of 
existing law and practice which might be relevant to a future definition, and examine 
both concrete and abstract proposals put forward by those handling crises arising 
from civil war which could lead to developments in this direction. 
"[T]emporary protection offers a means of affording protection to 
persons involved in large-scale movements that could otherwise 
Chapter J 
overwhelm established procedures for the determination of refugee 
status while privileging safe return as the most desirable solution to 
refugee problems. 1146 
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Many of the mass refugee movements of the 1990s may best be dealt with by the 
granting of temporary protection, in line with the minimum protection guaranteed by 
nonrefoulement, and in keeping with the notion of burden sharing.47 This concept 
is not new, although its widespread application if achieved might be.48 An example 
of historical precedent for the granting of temporary protection prior to a more 
durable solution realised through resettlement can be found in the protection 
thousands of Hungarian asylum seekers temporarily found in Austria and 
Yugoslavia, in 1956, with 170,000 of them being resettled elsewhere within eighteen 
months, as the situation in Hungary did not alter, and the burden became too great 
for those two states to handle.4 'J 
The first conceptualisation of the practice of temporary refuge came with the 
Vietnamese Boat People Crisis. The first mention of this concept in official 
documents came with Conclusion 15 of the Executive Committee of UNHCR in 
1979, which was concerned with the reception of Boat People in coastal states. The 
fluidity of the terms llsed is demonstrated in the progress from use of the words 
temporary refuge, to temporary asylum (that is the situation of the 'potential refugee' 
in the period up until the decision on an asylum application has been made) to 
temporary prorecrion, the term used in recent documents from UNHCR, which have 
abandoned temporary refuge, as not being a solid enough term. so 
A 1992 statement by the UNHCR has put its position as being that "persons 
fleeing from the former Yugoslavia who are in need of international protection 
~ UNHCR, Background Note, 'Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Former 
Yugoslavia', Informal Meeting on Teml)Orary Protection (Geneva, 21 January 1993). p.? Section III Note 
21. 
41 Burden-sharing is the concept whereby states should spread the financing and support of refugee 
crisis across the international community. It is referred to in the preamble of the 1951 Convention. 
41 Goodwin-Gill, Refugee in International Law, op.cit., p.lIS. "In fact, the practice of temporary 
refuge, of admission and protection (ie asylum) on a temporary basis hilS a long history, even if the 
attempt at conceptualisation is relatively recent." 
There is an account of this precedent in Chapters 8 and 9 on Austria and the UK respectively. 
so Seminar presented hy Gilhert Ja~ger. (it Th~ Refllg~e Studi~s Programme, Queen Elizabeth 
House, Oxford (19 January 1994). 
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should be able to receive it on a temporary basis. "SlOne response to the large 
flow of displaced persons tleeing the conflict in former Yugoslavia has been the 
Slovenian government's proposal for the formulation of a new definition of 
"temporary refugee". This would imply an obligation to provide humanitarian 
necessities and amenities in accordance with the temporary nature of the stay of the 
refugees, who, having been displaced by this type of aggression "wish to return to 
their homes. ,,52 
Variolls states have their own domestic mechanisms for dealing with 
categories of so called de facto refugees, that is "those persons who are refugees in 
a broader sense than that allowed for by the Refugee Convention, but who cannot be 
returned to their countries of origin for humanitarian reasons. ,,53 These are 
essentially political (rather than legal) categorisations of refugees who do not meet 
the legal requirements for the granting of Convention status. This exceptional form 
of protection tirst arose in the 1970s, as a response to the changing character of 
refugee movements. It comes under various titles, such as B-status; Humanitarian 
status; in the US it is called 'temporary protection' and in the UK, 'exceptional 
leave to remain'. eels states quite clearly that "Governments have argued that de 
facIo refugees do not fall within the provisions of the Convention, but are rather 
fleeing civil war or seeking economic betterment. ,,)4 Others see liberal 
interpretation of the Convention as the solution to the problem of de facIo refugees. 
Meanwhile, no international legal instruments to regulate state behaviour towards 
this category of migrants have been developed, a fact which Cels attributes to "the 
unwillingness of states to agree to additional obligations, the conflicting interests 
among states, and the absence of political commitment. .. 55 
There is a current, solid basis for temporary protection in nonrefoulement. 
SI UNHCR, International meeting on Humanitarian Aid for victims of the contlict in the former 
Yugoslavia, (Geneva. 29 July 1992), Section 5 Point 12. Undt!rlined in the original. 
$2 The Government of tht! Republic of Slovenia, 'Tt!mporary Shelter of Refugees from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the Repuhlic of Slovenia', ~iuhljana, (March 1993) 
S) Cels. Johan, 'Responses of European States to de facto Refugees, in Gil Loescher and Laila 
Monahan (eds), Refugees and International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.IS7. 
Ibid., p.192. 1 Emphasis add~d I. 
ss Ihid., p.202. 
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This is the element of the Convention which can be invoked to protect even those 
asylum seekers not covered by a restrictive interpretation of the Convention 
definition, and which all commentators insist must never be denied. s6 Article 33 of 
the Convention states that: 57 
1. No contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. 
This sets out the concept of nonrefoulement, that is the non-return of refugees to the 
country of origin, or any other state, while there may be threat to life or physical 
integrity. The principle of non-return has become an accepted element of customary 
international law for de facM as well as Convention refugees, and as such applies 
also to those fleeing civil war, as long as hostilities continue. This practice offers 
both the potential for and a basis to temporary protection, guaranteeing a "limited 
but fundamental protection, short of asylum, residence or other durable 
solution. It58. Meanwhile, the practice of nonrefoulement itself would be further 
strengthened if temporary protection were to be defined and codified, and further 
developed as a concept. If a state does try to return refugees to their state of origin, 
they must justify this action in the light of prevailing conditions in that state. 
Furthermore, if a state, by enforcing the safe third country principle,s9 begins a 
chain of return which ultimately results in the protection seeker being sent back to 
the country of origin, it is as responsible as the actual refoul-ing state for the 
breaking of this element of legal protection for asylum seekers.60 
56 See, tor example. Goodwin-Gill. 'Non-refoulement' op.cit.; Moussali, op.cit. p.2; Joly, Daniele 
with Clive Netterton, Refugees ill Europe, Minority Rights Group Report, (Nottingham: Russell Press, 
1990) p.8. 
Convention, Article 33. 
Goodwin-Gill, 'Nonretoulement', op.cit., p.105. 
59 The principle by which a state considers it appropriate to return an asylum-seeker to a state 
through which he or she transited and in which protection could, in the view of the returning state. have 
been sought and found in safety. See Chapter 5. 
60 Kjaerulll, M., 'Article 14', in Eide, A .• G. Alfredsson. G. Melander. L.A. Rehof and A. Rosors 
(eds.), The Universal Declaration ()f Human Rights: A Commentary, (Oslo: Scandinavian University 
Press, 1992) p.227. Goodwin-Gill. G.S., 'Editorial: Asylum: The Law and Politics of Change', 
International Journal of Ref\ll!~e Law Vol. 7 No.1 (1995) p.5 points out, with reference to the case of the 
Kurds in \lorth~rn Iraq in 1991 that "[tlhe responsibility for ensuring the conditions necessary for 
observance of the I/oll-refill/fellll'lII principiI! rl!stl!d with the international community as a whole." He also 
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3.1 A need f'Ol' change? 
Walter Kalin presents three arguments concerning the 1951 Convention.61 
The first, which he says is put forward by most Western governments, is that the 
Convention was adopted to resolve the specitic problem of the situation of remaining 
World War II refugees, and that application to new situations should be restrictive. 
The second argument is a call for new instruments to "overcome limitations of 
protection ... for humanitarian reasons." The third is an advocation of a liberal 
interpretation of the Convention, which is seen to still be a valuable instrument. 
A restrictive interpretation of the Convention definition does not allow 
protection to those fleeing civil war. The first argument presented by Kalin assumes 
no leeway for adaptation or broad application. ti2 The latter two arguments are 
deserving of attention, as a restrictive application has already been seen not to 
include those tleeing civil war, and it is clear that this argument will not allow for 
application to such crises. The potential usefulness of new instruments, be they 
regional or universal, broader application of the Convention and extensions to it, 
therefore deserve closer examination. 
3.l.A Broader Application'! 
" ... if the Convention is to remain meaningful to meeting the needs of 
modern refugees, and therefore to continue to play its important role 
of mitigating immigration control in instances of real and compelling 
threat to human rights, we must look to the core meaning of the 
Convention definition, and transpose that core meaning to 
contemporary reality. 1163 
While it seems that the Convention definition can provide a basis for modem 
refugee law, a need for a contextualised interpretation of the concept of persecution 
indicates that this is practical politics, providing a lesson for lawyers and others who would see 
international obligations in essl:ntially static or mechanistic terms. 
61 Kalin, Walter, 'Refugees and Civil Wars: Only a Matter of lnteq)retation?', International Journal 
of Refugee Law Vol.3 No.3 (1991) p.435. 
6~ This argument also denies the historical context of the ideological nature of the definition 
discussed above. 
63 HathawliY, 'Re-interpreting', op.cit., p.40. 
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and the grounds on which it is feared might be required if it is to retain its value. 
Reliance on a strict or historical interpretation will not solve the problems arising 
from the type of refugee crises emerging in the 1990s. The Convention originated, 
in part, from a humanitarian desire to assist human beings whose lives or physical 
integrity were under threat in their country of origin or habitual residence. This 
same principle could be used today in broadening a contextualised understanding of 
the Convention definition, and in complementing or completing it through the 
addition of other regional instruments. As T. Alexander Aleinikoff states, ..... the 
Convention remains the 'cornerstone' in the universal protection of refugees; at the 
same time, a complete edifice of international protection remains to be 
constructed. 11M 
3.1.8 Regional Instruments 
Aleinikoff also points to a future in which regional approaches to refugee law 
and policy may hold the key.65 In terms of refugee law, western Europe 
sometimes appears to be among the least committed of the regions to the original 
humanitarian underpinnings of the Convention.66 Recommendation E of the 
Convention state: 
"The Conference, 
Expresses the hope that the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees will have value of an example exceeding its contractual 
scope and that all nations will be guided by it in granting so far as 
possible to persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be 
covered by the terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it 
provides. " 
In line with this, it may be useful to expand on the basis provided by the universal 
Convention in the formulation of regionally appropriate mechanisms for refugee 
crisis management. 
One such regional instrument already exists in the form of the Organisation 
Aleinilwff, Ol).cit., p.625. 
65 Ibid., p.624. 
66 Ibid., p.623. 
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of African Unity Refugee Convention of 1969Y This includes those displaced by 
civil unrest in the category of refugee.6H It gives a definition in keeping with 
political reality in the region. During the Cold War, the Convention definition may 
have been sufficient for the types of regional refugee generating situations western 
European states faced. 6'J However, the contlict in former Yugoslavia and 
movements in the CIS and North Africa indicate that Europe faces, and will face, 
refugee producing situations which are not covered by a restrictive application of the 
Convention definition. The question is whether, when existing instruments are not 
being adapted to fit the new crisis, new instruments become necessary. While the 
Convention definition may remain a cornerstone to refugee law in the 1990s, it may 
be that Europe needs either a new (regional or universal) definition to deal with the 
modern political reality, or to establish new guidelines to allow for a more liberal 
interpretation of the existing detinition. 
There are, it must be said, potential problems arising from regional 
approaches. For example, they could be used as a basis for a reduction of support 
for refugees, particularly those from other regions, and could also result in 
derogations from universal norms due to claims of special regional needs or 
traditions. 70 These apprehensions lead to calls for a firm defence of the 
Convention as the absolute minimulll which states and regions might expand on, but 
must never reduce. 
The establishment of a detinition of who should receive temporary protection 
and a conceptual isation of sllch protection bring the advantages of ensuring 
admission and nonrefoulement, saving lives and increasing the pressure on receiving 
governments to find solutions to civil conflicts. The biggest questions are whether 
67 Th~re is also the Cartagena Agreement in Latin America, but it is not binding on governments. 
It offers a similar ddinition to the OAU Convention, including J>rot~ction for those fleeing civil war. 
Carte gena Dt!c1aration: La proteccion Internacional de los Refugiados en America Central. Mexico y 
Panama: Problemas Juridicos y Humanitarios: Memoria.c; del Cologuio. (Cartagena, Colombia: ACNUR/ 
Centro Regional de Estudios dd Tercer Mundo! Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1984). 
611 1969 OAU Convention Governing th~ Specific Asp~cts of Refugee Problems in Africa: 1001 
UNTS 46; text also in UNHCR. ColI~ction of International Instruments relating to Refugees (1979), 
Article 1. paragral>h 2. 
6\l The arrival of large numhers of migrants from the East was any way unlikely due to restrictions 
on emigration. 
'10 Se~ ego Aleinikoff op.cit.. p.624. 
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states have the political desire to extend, apply and adhere to international law in 
their admissions and asylum policies, and whether, in the context of civil war, the 
advantages of 'temporary protection' outweigh any limitations, such as a possible 
counter-balance of reductions in the granting of asylum and potential eventual 
involuntary repatriation. 
CONCLUSION 
The debate concerning definitions, while not solving refugee crises in and of 
itself, is neither redundant nor over. Refugee law evolved between the 1920s and 
1951 from lid hoc very specific, limited definitional terms, in need of constant 
revision and new instruments with each crisis as it arose, to a more general 
definition with universal potential although aimed at the individual. This allowed 
states to conform to an agreed standard of recognition, although interpretations of 
the definition vary and the universal focus has come to lie on sovereign restrictions 
on entry. The evolution of definitional scope of those agencies dealing in 
international protection has also evolved, not only in the years up to 1950, but also 
since. 
However, the 'universal' definition of a 'refugee' contained in the 1951 
Convention, and amended in the 1967 Protocol, while applicable to the crises of the 
time of drafting, and still useful, indeed essential, has not evolved into an instrument 
of protection commensurate with all political realities. It is doubtful that any 
definition satisfactory to all states could cover all possibilities. Citations of reports 
from the time of drafting, as well as Recommendation E of the Convention itself, 
show that those involved in the creation of modern refugee law had no desire for it 
to remain static, or be restrictive, denying protection to those in evident need. 
People who flee war are not automatically included in the scope of the Convention 
definition, although some commentators think the means and flexibility for liberal 
interpretation of this cornerstone of refugee protection are in place. At the same 
time, de facIo statuses are not applied broadly enough, nor well enough defined, to 
allow ample scope for the humanitarianly inspired protection or even admittance of 
those fleeing armed conflict. 
The UN standard of international legal definitions allows for the classification 
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of two out of three categories of refugees.71 Those who actively oppose the 
governing party or system of their country of origin, and are, as a result, persecuted 
(or likely to be perseclited) by that state and choose to escape are one category. 
Those who, because of their ethnic, racial or religiolls origins are targeted for 
persecution by the state are also included. However, the category of innocent victim 
is excluded, as is the group victim who is indiscriminately targeted in a war. Some of 
this latter category may squeeze into the second interpretation of the legal definition, 
or be politically detined as de facto refugees under some circumstances in some states. 
However, the victim groups, usually minorities or the stateless, do not fit the legal 
definition, and are often lucky to be categorised in the scope of the political notion of 
who a refugee is. They form a large constituency of protection seekers in times of 
social and political upheavals of the type Europe is witnessing in the process of re-
establishing itself at the end of the Cold War. Ideas of how to effectuate protection 
appear ever more sophisticated. However, for all the sophistication of concepts, the 
practical protection of the victim group is not a provable fact in 1995. Measures 
under the broad title of temporary protection have firm foundations. The bases of 
the potential for temporary protection lie in the spirit of humanitarianism, the concepts 
of international human rights law and the notion of nonrefoulement, as well as in 
notes issued by UNHCR and speeches made by members of governments of those 
states most heavily burdened by refugee influxes from former Yugoslavia in 
particular. 
There are valid arguments for why there should be changes in the definition of 
a 'refugee'. However, since states are restrictive in their application of, and often 
even reluctant to uphold, the conventions they have already signed on this subject, 
wide ranging changes might be unlikely. In any case rigid definitions have the 
potential for exclusion as much as inclusion, as is the case of the very Convention 
definition of a refugee on which this discussion centres. The most important point is 
that contextual flexibility and an evolution in refugee law and policy has been a norm 
of the twentieth century. That this norm should be broken with because a 'universal' 
standard was largely sufficient for Europe's refugee inflows over four decades, 
particularly when accompanied by adaptable humanitarian statuses over the latter two 
decades of this period, would be to deny the whole foundation upon which that 
standard was built. 





Protection can be interpreted as "the act of upholding fundamental human 
rights, such as the core rights declared in the covenants on civil and political rights, 
and on economic and social rights, "I and includes also the very specific right of 
nonrefoulement. The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme 
said in 1980 that those granted temporary refuge should enjoy "basic humanitarian 
standards of treatment".2 This might appear quite straightforward: protection means 
respecting human rights while treating a person in a humanitarian way. However, 
while humanitarianism informs policy making to a degree, domestic and 
international political and security concerns have even greater effect. 3 When 
establishing how, as well as to whom, protection is to be afforded, therefore, 
decisions are affected by questions which go beyond agreements on human rights 
standards. The dilemma comes when one stops to consider what 'human rights' are, 
who accords and upholds such rights, where the line between humanitarian 
protection and humanitarian assistance is to be drawn and the distinction between 
protecting a life in safety and giving a protected life a certain quality and dignity. 
1. Human Rights and Refugees 
The relationship between human rights and refugee or protection policies is 
threefold. Firstly, a person is defined as in need of protection (be they a refugee in 
the legal or the political sense) on the basis of persecution or the violation of their 
Helton, A.C., 'Displacc:ment and Human Rights: Current Dilemmas in Refugee 
Protection', Journal of International Affairs VoIA7 No.2 (Winter 1994) p.383. 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Conclusion 19 (XXXI) 
(1980). 
See Loescher, G., Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee 
Crisis, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) p.30. 
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human rights, including because of a conflict situation. Secondly, the upholding of 
human rights of forced migrants in their country of refuge is the expression of their 
protection. Finally, the re-establishment of human rights standards in the country of 
origin permits the possibility of return (whereas the non-re-establishment of human 
rights norms would indicate a need for longer term protection elsewhere). 
Although these connections would appear obvious, states and non-
governmental organisations have only recently established these links in their overt 
policy approaches. In the 1980s the United Nations, following initiatives from 
Canada and West Germany, linked human rights violations and mass exoduses, and 
began to promote international cooperation to avert new flows of refugees.4 
However, it often remains the case that human rights violations are only tackled 
once a refugee flow brings the situation in a given country to the attention of the 
international community. In other words, international or regional security concerns 
bring the attention of states to the violations by another state of the rights of its 
citizens. The human rights violations of themselves do not always seem to merit the 
concern of sovereign states over the actions of one of their brethren. 
Meanwhile, the cooperation of non-governmental organisations concerned 
with on the one hand human rights and on the other refugees has been highlighted as 
minimal. Human rights groups often "treat the protection of refugees as beyond the 
scope of their concerns" and refugee groups "ignore the reasons that people flee and 
[do] not give thought to ways to remedy those conditions".5 Neither of these 
positions is really acceptable and they underscore the compartmentalisation of rights 
issues. The situation prevails, as for example still, in 1995, the mandate of 
Amnesty International, perhaps the most prominent of human rights groups, 
concerning refugees focuses exclusively on non-return. However, a further 
concentration on the first category of human rights and refugee policy links, 
facilitating the early warning of rights violations prompting refugee flows, would not 
only allow states to address the conditions in the country of origin, but also to 
See for example Resolution 35/124 International co-operation to avert new flows of 
refugees, (II December 1980). Also, Coles, GJ.L., 'Refugees and Human Rights'. Bulletin of Human 
Rights: J. Human Rights and humanitarian law. II. Human rights and refugee law 91/1 (New York: 
United Nations, 1992) I1p.63-74. 
Refu~ee Policy Group, 'Refugees and Human Rights: a research and policy agenda'. 
(May 1989) 1>·16. 
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establish appropriate protection mechanisms and facilities in case an exodus did 
occur. 
Although attention to that first rights-refugees linkage has been limited, there 
has been even less consideration of the second link, that is the rights of those who 
are being protected. Goldman and Martin noted in 1983:6 
... little or no attention has been paid to the rights accorded these 
persons under international law, despite the fact that the worldwide 
refugee crisis and the plight of undocumented aliens are among the 
most serious human rights problems facing the international 
community today. 
In 1995, this situation remained much the same. There is of course a logical 
relationship between the rights violated causing a need for protection and the rights 
to be upheld during that protection. If the violation of rights causes a protection 
need, those same rights must be upheld for protection to be meaningful, otherwise a 
completely paradoxical system would evolve. The question is whether protection 
always must entail the guaranteeing of the full panoply of internationally recognised 
'human rights' or whether under certain circumstances some nuancing could be 
acceptable from both a political and humanitarian point of view. 
2. Human Rights and State Sovereignty: Refugees as Political 
Pawns 
Human rights became a recognised international issue area creating a form of 
regime in the late 1940s.7 In response to the most horrific experience of the human 
species, the genocide and extreme nationalism and racism of World War Two, the 
6 Kogod Goldman, Roh~rt and Scott M. Martin, 'International Legal Standards Relating 
to the Rights of Aliens and R~tilgees and United States Immigration Law', Human Rights Ouarterly, 
Vo1.S No.3 (Summer 1983) p.302. 
7 See Donnelly, J., 'International human rights: a regime analysis', International 
Organization, Vol.40 No.3 (Summer 1986). Krasner's detinition is, 'as always, the one referred to here: 
-International regimes are detined as principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actor expectations converge in a given issue area. - (Krasner, S.D., 'Structural Causes and Regime 
Consequences: Regimes as Inkrvening Variahles', International Organization, Vol.36 No.2 (Spring 1982) 
p.18S). Donn~lly's artic1~ ofti:rs a convincin~ argum~nt for the use of this tOI)ic of international relations, 
which is usually re~rved for the study of international organisations and political economy, in the field of 
human rights. Its application to the refugee tield should also not be excluded. See for example, 
Loescher, G .. 'The International Refuge~ Re~ime: Stretch~d to the Limit'!', Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol.47 No.2 (Wintu 1994). 
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United Nations drew up a list of the rights of individuals known as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In essence this summarised the horror just witnessed 
in a cry of 'never again'. K The notion that humans have rights to be respected by 
the sovereign states they have created does, of course, go much deeper than that. 
However the political reality is that after experiences which people never wanted to 
see repeated the force of humanity overcame the force of sovereign states and 
international political wiJl was sufficient to recognise that there had to be limitations 
to the power of governments exercising the sovereignty of and over the people. 
Philosophical debate opposes the concept of human rights to the notion of 
state sovereignty. Practice creates the same opposition. The philosophical debate 
would take us into the realm of rights as natural law, and the whole area of 
normative theories of international relations. In the context of this thesis, however, 
it is the practical conceptualisation of human rights in the late twentieth century and 
their application and limitation by sovereign states which is of most significance. 
Human rights delimit late twentieth century state sovereignty. At the same 
time, sovereignty, which is largely concerned with the perceived national interest, 
limits adherence to internationally recognised norms of respect for human rights. 
Sovereignty not only presents limitations to the guaranteeing of rights within 
different states, but also to the international enforcement of agreed standards. It also 
prevents any further substantial advances in this area. Essentially, the relationship 
between human rights and state sovereignty is something of a balancing act. 
[T]raditional approaches to asylum have been constantly 
complemented by flexible and innovative measures to balance the 
humanitarian needs of refugees with the political interests of states.9 
A lack of respect for human rights can lead to some loss of international legitimacy 
for the sovereignty of a state. However, the relationship does not often go so deep 
as to cause the complete alienation of a given political regime and the state it 
represents only as a result of human rights violations, although they may contribute 
to the degree of exclusion from international society. 
In the whole debate over the evolution of refugee law and policies in the 
s~~ Nohd, P., 'Blurr~d vision in the rich world and violations of human rights - a 
critical ass~ssm~nt of th~ human rights rdugee linkage', Bulletin of Human Rights, op.cit., p.7S. 
O~ata. S .• 'Rdllg~es: Lessons from the Pa. .. t' , The Oxford International Review, Vol,4 
No.3 (1993) p.41. 
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1980s and '90s some arguments have been put forward for an entire reformulation of 
refugee law either in human rights terms, or with a strong inter-state foundation, 
taking advantage of the rules of sovereignty, \0 Both suggestions contain certain 
risks, not only because states would never accept them, but because they could in 
fact damage the protection granted to those in need, Suggestions of a system of 
compensation as part of the inter-state process of protection entail the risk of 
refugees becoming even more the pawns of inter-state political games than they have 
always been. The notion that states of origin might be required to give financial 
compensation to states of refuge taking in those displaced by rights violations 
including conflict, raises all manner of security as well as moral questions, Some 
states might, for example, feel inclined to support opposition groups, not through a 
legitimate desire to see the overthrow of a repressive government but in order to 
cause an increased flow of refugees to be paid for by the state of origin, or some 
international fund set up for Stich a purpose, Meanwhile, formulating refugee 
policies entirely in human rights terms risks creating a weak assistance programme 
as all recognition of the need for protection would become based on policy 
interpretations of the essence of human rights perceived at the moment of possible 
violation. 
A more nuanced alternative to both suggestions would be found in the re-
thinking of protection needs in human rights terms with a respect for the sovereign 
position of states called on to protect. Such a system would determine the criteria 
under which policies would aim at levels of protection appropriate to the situation be 
they: protection and assistance in the country of origin; temporary protection in 
neighbouring states; short term protection further afield; the need for longer term 
protection and integration or the opportunity for safe return, 
3. The Essential Rights 
The list of documents detailing agreed 'rights' of individuals is very lengthy, 
As well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights it includes the Genocide 
10 See t()r ~xample, Hathaway, Le., 'Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection', 
Journal of Retill!~~ Stlldi~s, VolA No.2 (1991) and Garvey, J.I.. Towards a reformulation of 
International R~fll!!~~ Law', Harvard Intanational Law Journal, Vol.26 No.2 (Spring 1985). 
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Convention of 1948; the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951; the 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women of 1952; the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners of 1957; The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965; the International Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966; the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 
1979; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment of 1984; the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 
1989 and the (as yet much un-signed) Convention on Migrant Workers of 1990. In 
addition there are several regional documents such as the 1953 European Convention 
on Human Rights; the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE; the 1978 American 
Convention on Human Rights and the 1986 African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights. It would be impossible, and even unnecessary, to consider all of these 
documents here, as two 'universal' documents (the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and International Covenants and the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees) and one regional document (the European Convention on Human Rights) 
give a useful and sufficient basis to this listing and frame this discussion of the 
protection of displaced people. 
The key connection between human rights and refugee laws and policies lies 
in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration which states quite explicitly that everyone 
has the right "to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." As 
is the case in the 1951 Convention the exact meaning of 'persecution' is left open to 
interpretation, although it could be considered to mean the violation of other 
fundamental rights contained in the Universal Declaration. In addition, the right to 
seek and enjoy asylum from persecution is not limited by the Declaration to any 
grounds for that treatment. As many have noted, the drafting of this 'right' 
achieved little, as the correlative duty would have to be that of states to provide such 
asylum, and states had, and still have, no intention to assume such a moral 
obligation. II If we accept the contextual political reality of the formulation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights then Article 14 would indicate a response to 
the lack of available protection for Jews and others from the fascist regimes. Such 
protection was openly denied in the 1930s when European states announced after the 
II Sec, for example. Goodwill-Gill. G.S .• The Rcful!cc in International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1983) ".104. 
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Evian conference that many Jewish people trying to leave Nazi Germany were not 
deserving of protection and were in fact a disturbance to the economies and facilities 
of potential receiving states. 12 The holocaust is seen as the failure of the refugee 
protection arrangements of the League of Nations, and thus the cry of 'never again' 
naturally included a cry that never again would states deny protection to those in 
need. 13 The fact that fifty years on effective protection in other countries is denied 
to many thousands of people in similar circumstances in former Yugoslavia is 
perhaps an indication of the limited recall of political memory. The creation of 'safe 
areas' and offering of humanitarian assistance with limited protection certainly would 
not appear to be in keeping with the human rights Declaration. Indeed, attempts to 
create 'safe areas' could be said to effectively deny Article 14.14 However it could 
be considered as a nuancing of the right to the protection of asylum tempered by a 
regard for the sovereignty of states of the region, and a demonstration of the loss of 
sovereign integrity by the state of origin. The question remains to what extent this 
is the playing of the international political game of sovereignty through the (ab)use 
of human rights, and to what extent it is a sufficient guarantee of the post World 
War Two political desire to protect humans from a repeat of genocide. 
3.1 Nonreroulement 
If migrants claiming a justifiable need for protection arrive at the border of a 
state, a second important component of the rights involved in protection needs to be 
dealt with. Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees sets 
out the right to nonrefoulement, and in the European context this is supported by 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This concept applies in its 
purest interpretation only to those who can be recognised as refugees, not to asylum-
seekers or those who might be considered de faCIO refugees (as referred to in 
Chapter One) but it has developed, as Goodwin-Gill has put it: IS 
12 Loesch~r, B~Yllnd Chl1rity, op.cit., pp.44-5. Ml1ny of those att~mpting to flee were categorised 
as leaving for p~rson111 conv~ni~nc~. S~e the detinitions in Chapter I at notes 12 and 13. 
s~~ for ~xampl~ L()<!sch~r, ·lnt~rn'1tional Reti.lg~<! R~gime', op.cit., l)p.354-5. 
14 UNHCR, The St<tt~ lIf th~ World's Refugees: in search of solutions. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) p.53. 
IS Goodwin-Gill, op.cit.. p.115. 
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" ... to include non-rejection at the frontier, thus promoting admission, but 
there has been no corresponding development with regard to the concept of 
asylum, understood in the sense of a duty upon states to accord a lasting 
solution. " 
This concept has, however, had little progressive effect on respect of Article 14 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The development of the concept to 
include non-rejection of those who may not be admissible as refugees under the 
Convention definition, but whose return to the country of origin is unacceptable due 
to an obvious risk to their safety, for example in the case of civil war, is, however, 
a very important basis to protection, including, or even particularly, the development 
of notions of temporary protection. However, this right is seriously threatened by 
the adoption by developed sovereign states of the notion that some countries are 
safe, either as countries of origin or as countries of initial asylum. Through use of 
these principles people have, in the 1990s. been returned to countries where their 
safety cannot be guaranteed. In these cases, it is not only the ultimate returning 
state which is ethically, morally and legally responsible for the violation of the right 
to non-return, but also the country in which the application for protection was made, 
and which started the chain of return. 16 
3.2 Family Reunification 
One important civil right, that of the unity of the family, recurs time and 
again in debates on immigration and asylum policies. On the one hand allowing in 
even just the immediate family members of a protected person involves a potential 
quadrupling of the number of refugees. On the other hand restricting the access of 
the family of a person who has managed to reach a frontier means emotional trauma 
for all. The person who is in safety lives in uncertainty of ever seeing his or her 
loved ones again, not knowing the circumstances in which they are living, and 
indeed whether or not they are alive. The family left behind may also have no 
information on the safety of the escapee. If the family was part of the same group 
which reached safety there is little room for discussion. If their position is the same 
as that of the principal family member then they too are in need of protection. The 
16 Kjae!rum, M., 'Articl~ 14' in Eid.:, A., G. Alfre!dsson, G, Melande!r, L.A. Rehof, and A. Rosors 
(eds.), The! Universal lXclaration of Human Rights: A Commentary, (Oslo: Scandinavian University 
Press, 1992) p.227. 
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dilemma arises in situations where one family member has gone on ahead, trying to 
reach safety in order that the others (perhaps weaker family members) may follow in 
the certainty of reaching their safe destination fairly quickly. The same dilemma 
arises when governments evacuate injured people for medical treatment with the firm 
intention of returning them to their war-torn country of origin.17 Having family 
around in a time of pain and distress is a humanitarian comfort to the patient and the 
family; however they might not go back, and four or even two people not returning 
is statistically far worse in the policy-making eye than one non-returnee. However, 
if the situation means the evacuee cannot be returned, is it humane to restrict the 
entry of the family? 
The consideration of this issue takes place within the context of a Europe in 
which the families of guestworkers from the 1960s were becoming permanent 
settlers just as population growth in northern Europe started a rapid decline, and 
unemployment increased. This situation of a perceived increase in 'foreigners' at a 
time of relative socio-economic difficulty has had an impact on attitudes to migration 
and the whole idea of family Pe-unification"s 
Some governments solve this policy dilemma by boosting their intake of 
humanitarian cases (making them seem caring in the voters eyes) by taking in all 
family re-unification cases, but excluding additional principals. The European 
Commission has put forward the view that the success of integration policies can be 
very much affected by the approach to family re-unification. 19 As one possible 
outcome of temporary protection would be longer term protection and integration 
this is a view which must be taken into account. Whether integration be short or 
long term, in a first country of protection or a country of resettlement or indeed if 
there were to be re-integration into the country of origin, respecting family unity 
would facilitate the successful achievement of a satisfactory outcome. 
In many ways, this question of the right to family unity typifies the political 
17 Then~ is the suppleml:ntary dilemma here of evacuation versus the import of medical equipment 
and l)ersonn~1 to deal with more injured or ill people on the ground. 
18 Widgrl:n, J., 'International Migration: Nl:w Challenges to Europe', Migration News, No.2 
(1987) p.6. 
19 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Immigratiun and Asylum Policies, ICOM(94) 23 tinall (Brussels, 23 February 1994), 
paragral)h 74. 
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quandary over admission and the rights of those who are admitted. It raises the 
questions of human rights and numbers in a situation in which everyone, politician, 
voter, refugee advocate and refugee can imagine the distress of finding themselves. 
It also gives a striking example of the way in which government action can have 
both advantages and disadvantages for the host state and the refugee. 
Ultimately both humanitarian principles and political considerations would 
indicate that the right to family unity should be respected by all states, including in 
cases of temporary protection. Governments tend to fear that permitting a family to 
reside for any period of time in a state which offers good educational opportunities 
and prospects for children means they will never return. However this must be 
balanced by the notion that if return does become possible families could be just as 
likely to want their children to rebuild their country of origin free of the prejudices 
which divided it in the past. The fact that education and life away from the long 
lasting scars which living through the hatred of a war can inflict could playa role in 
freeing a region of its tensions should be one balancing element taken into account 
by policy makers. 
4. The Quality of Protected Life 
If people have the right to seek and enjoy asylum and the right, together with 
their family, not to be returned to a situation in which their safety is at question, 
then they already have the most essential basis to protection: life is protected. It is 
what protection entails beyond this fundamental feature which could be the most 
complex issue in evolving mechanisms. It is the issue which could raise the most 
controversy, because while nuancing the protection of life in the balancing act 
between humanitarian considerations and state sovereignty can really only go so far, 
the nuancing of the rights granted in pursuing a protected life raises the whole issue 
of whether all rights are for all humans or may be limited for non-citizens of the 
state in which an individual resides.20 
Many commentators insist that the rights listed in the International Covenants 
:!O We will not t!nter tht! disclIssion over the cultural relativity of rights as the discussion below is 
concerned soldy with Western states - the group of states often accused of imposing their values and 
rights on others. 
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are universal, pertaining to each individual through the fact of his or her human 
nature. 21 State practice is often found to be at odds with this claim. Other 
commentators see the international human rights movement as being 
based on the concept that every nation has an obligation to respect the 
human rights of its citizens and that other nations and the international 
community have a right, and responsibility, to protest if states do not 
adhere to this obligation.22 
This view leaves refugees and those seeking protection in a type of 'human rights 
limbo'. Having lost or refused the protection of their country of origin, they are, 
according to this latter way of thinking, in a right-less world. 
As a response to this type of situation, the 1951 Convention includes twenty-
two articles which detail the rights to be accorded by contracting states to refugees 
in their territory. In the areas of personal status, artistic and industrial property 
rights, access to courts, elementary education, employment remuneration and social 
security benetits the Convention stipulates that policy makers should accord refugees 
the same rights as those of nationals in the host country. In the areas of moveable 
and immoveable property, self employment and recognition of qualifications, 
housing, freedom of movement and fiscal charges, refugees are to be treated in the 
same way as non-refugee aliens. Employment and the right of association are areas 
in which refugees should, according to the Convention, be treated in the same way 
as foreign nationals generally, although any restrictions on employment should be 
removed after three years residence or if the refugee has a spouse or child with the 
nationality of the host country. 
Industrialised countries generally uphold all the rights of refugees in 
accordance with the Convention. The rights of asylum-seekers and people granted 
temporary protection are not, however, stipulated in any internationally agreed 
standard setting document. Those who argue that the rights detailed in the 
Covenants are for all people in all states would say there is no need to repeat these 
entitlements in documents aimed specifically at asylum-seekers or those granted 
temporary protection. However state practice does not acknowledge this 
~I See eg Kogod Goldman and Martin. op.cit.. p.303; Jack Donnelly. Universal Human Rights on 
Theory and Practice. (Cornell University Press: Ithaca. 1989) p.1. 
.,., BiJdcr, RichanJ R., 'An Ov~rvi~w of Intc!rnational Hlllnan Rights Law' in Hannum Hurst (ed.), 
Guide to International Human Rights Practice ledited t(lr the Procedural ASllects of International Law 
Institute in collahoratiun with the Im.:fnaliullal Human Rights UtW Group I. (Pennsylvania: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 1992) p.). 
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universality. For example, as a way of limiting the attractiveness of states to 
potential migrants who may use the asylum channel as a means of entry, states have, 
in the 1990s, been restricting the legal employment and social benefits available to 
asylum-seekers. 23 Meanwhile, UNHCR itself has suggested that the full range of 
refugee rights need not be open to people receiving temporary protection, although it 
appreciates the challenge this presents to human rights notions. 24 
One way to assess the question of rights and entitlements which are essential 
to all protection may lie in determining which are essential and which are, to an 
extent, supplementary. In the political climate of the time of document drafting it 
appeared essential for all people to have the full range of civil and political, 
economic social and cultural rights politically determined by sovereign states upheld 
internationally by those states. However, it is not clear that the different sets of 
rights (civil and political: economic, social and cultural) are part of a whole or 
distinguishable. 25 The fact that humans are humans and undeniably deserve to be 
treated equally has not changed. However neither has the fact that states are states, 
and in acting to uphold the sovereignty of their nation over a particular territory, 
governments sometimes see political advantages, and even what they might call 
necessities, in restricting the access and membership of outsiders. One could take 
the view therefore that the essential humanitarian position is to uphold the right to 
life in a secure situation. The quality of the protected lifestyle, however, while it 
should ideally be as high as the lifestyle of all other lives, might, for a limited 
period be restricted to certain minimum standards. Those minimum standards could 
certainly be exceeded. However, as long as a secure life was guaranteed, a certain 
amount of cultural and societal input could shape the exact nature of the limited 
protection. 
To ensure a secure life civil and political rights must be guaranteed. People 
must be protected from torture and slavery; they must be recognised as people 
before the law and have protection of that law, including access to legal remedies 
for the violation of their rights. They must have freedom of movement and 
13 For e:xample: the: British gove:rnme:nt annoullced the removal of all social security benefits for 
asylum-~e:ke:rs in Se:pte:mh~r 1995. 
UNHCR, State: of the: World's Re:fuge:es 1995, op.cit., (>.87. 
15 S~e, for cXallll)le, HUllt, P., 'Re:ciaiminl,! Economic, Social and Cultural Rights', Waikato Law 
Review, Vol. I (1993). 
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residence; protection of their privacy and family; freedom to participate in political 
life and to assemble and associate freely; their cultures, and religions must be 
respected. Above all they must be free to seek this protection, and not risk being 
returned to a situation of inherent un-safety. Such protection is cost free and policy 
options are limited.26 The protection of life itself has no major financial cost to 
states. However, in upholding economic, social and cultural rights there can be high 
costs, and many policy options. AJIowing aJI people to work, be educated, receive 
social security benetits when in hard times, guaranteeing food, clothing and housing, 
ensuring the availability of healthcare all have high costs, in financial and politico-
social terms, and involve many policy choices. Obviously some minimum standards 
are essential, otherwise the protected life would not be guaranteed to remain alive 
for very long. However, the differences between guaranteeing protected persons 
private housing, access to the labour markets and full social security benefits, or 
guaranteeing them a place in a centre for protected persons, where they are clothed 
and fed and given a little pocket money comes down to a difference in the quality of 
a life which has been saved. While ideally all people would be in the former 
situation from the beginning, this cannot be guaranteed in all states, including all 
European states. The political and economic climate might not allow certain states 
to give such favourable treatment to new arrivals, whose protected stay is anticipated 
to be of limited duration. To limit the quality of life for a certain initial period is 
surely a more humane strategy than to say that since no quality of life can be 
guaranteed the right to protection wi)) also be denied. 
5. Non-discrimination 
The civil and political rights outlined above are re-iterated in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This regional Convention is supported by both 
decision-making and enforcement procedures in the form of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights.27 However, as 
Plender demonstrates, the position of refugees in member states of the Council of 
See DOJlndly. 'International human rights: a regime analysis', op.cit., p(>.620-4. 
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Europe is not actually very favourable. 2& Among the civil and political rights of 
both the Universal and European Human Rights documents is the right to non-
discrimination. If the evolution of temporary protection for large groups fleeing 
conflict is pursued, great care must be taken that particular races, religions and 
national groups are not discriminated against. To avoid discrimination the tendency 
towards ad hoc policy decision making should be avoided. Establishing a formal 
mechanism which would be open to any group defined as fitting the criteria of a 
massive group forcibly displaced by conflict, regardless of provenance within a 
given region would avoid the possibility of suddenly deciding to protect one group 
amongst many. Maintaining universal protection for individual refugees alongside 
regional protection for groups whose tlight was induced by conflict would also avoid 
discriminating by only protecting people in need within the particular region. 
Spontaneous large group tlight does not stretch over continents, it rarely spills over 
national frontiers, in fact. 2'1 
CONCLUSION 
In balancing the values of state sovereignty and human rights there must be 
some pragmatic decision-making. Hathaway highlights two opposing views, one 
taken from Walzer, the other from Coles. 30 Walzer's position is a defence of the 
state's right to exclude strangers from membership. This position pursues notions of 
ethnic or ideological 'relatives' being reasonable candidates for admission, and 
ultimately membership of the 'club' .31 Coles' position as described by Hathaway is 
rather that the refugee needs 'meaningful protection' until membership of the state of 
21 Plendcr. R., 'Pr()hl~lns raised hy c~rtctin asp~cts of the Jlr~s~nt situation of refugees from the 
standpoint of th~ Europ~an Convention on Human Rights', Council of Europe - Human Rights Files, 
No.9, (Strashourg. 1984). 
:!9 Organised resettlement of large groups has in the past taken place accross continents, and the 
focus here on regional temporary prot~ction in no way constitutes a suggestion that in some cases this 
might not be desirable and lI~cessary in the future. A major example is that of the Vietnamese, when 
resettlement was organis~d to assist hoth the refugees and Asian states. 
:10 Hathaway. op.cit.. pp.124-5. Walzer. M .• Silheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and 
Equality. (Oxford: Blackwdl. \985). Col~s. unpublished document cited by Hathaway a.<; 'Placing the 
Refugee Issues on the New International Agenda' (1990). 
31 Willur. Ihid .• )lp.35-36. 
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origin can be resumed.32 Hathaway views temporary refuge in situations in which 
human rights abuse is not intractable as bringing suspicion on the moral claim of 
refugees to integration in a new community. He also sees the need to develop a 
mechanism which would oblige states to protect temporarily, pending return, which 
he sees as the only outcome to temporary protection.33 
On the question of meaningful protection or new membership, temporary 
protection should, in fact offer the possibility of both. Meaningful protection should 
be pursued, followed by membership if necessary and desirable. For protection to 
be meaningful it must first assure safety, and subsequently offer a quality and 
dignity appropriate within the society in which it is being guaranteed. For most 
European states this might mean initial shelter and nourishment within the limited 
environment of a reception centre, but it will ultimately, after a maximum of three 
years,34 include the entitlement to legal employment and private housing, with both 
the duties and rights of membership of the society of the state in question. While 
the moral claim to integration of the refugee may be suspicious in a term of limited 
protection of short duration, the claim to an ultimate right to integrate as the 
duration of protection is extended should not be dependent only on the situation in 
the country of origin being intractable, but also on how long it takes for it to be 
settled. Refugees may not be able to claim an immediate right to integrate, but 
states should likewise not impose a duty of integration, just as they should not force 
return. One cannot enforce exclusion in readiness for return. One can also not 
enforce inclusion in a determination that return will never be possible. 
If we extend Walzer's analogy of the state as a club, the concept of 
temporary protection could be seen as the loaning of players. Players on loan are 
usually brought in to benefit the club. Temporary protection's immediate benefit is 
to the 'player', through the safety achieved. There are, however, benefits to the 
protecting state. Temporary protection could facilitate opportunities for conflict 
mediation and resolution. While guaranteeing full social security benefits to new 
large numbers of people and sheltering them would be costly, protracted monitoring 
Hlithaway, op.cit., 1'.125. 
33 Ihid., PI). 125-7. 
34 In lin~ with Convention retC!rellces to employment r~stnchons. Although in general civil 
contlicts continue t()r lon~t'r than thrt't' years, such a period affords the opportunity of reflection and 
judgement of tht' situation tor hoth r.:fug.~t's and states. 
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and peace-keeping or peace-enforcement together with genuine in SilU protection 
would also be costly in financial and man-power terms, and risk the lives of troops 
called on to serve in such circumstances. Financial burden-sharing also costs. 
Ultimately, these loan-players could boost some economies, and boost morale and 
the 'feel-good factor' accompanying the humanitarianism of saving lives. 
The formulation of standards for temporary protection should be flexible. 
Such protection must protect lives, and guarantee safety, and as such it must uphold 
all civil and political rights. The tlexibility could be shown on the level of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Over time these must also be guaranteed, to 
the same extent to which they are assures for citizens, because over time the 
temporariness of protection gives way to a fullness of membership in society. 
Initially however, so long as life and security are maintained, states and their 
societies could be permitted some leeway in the policies detailing how they shelter, 
feed and employ those they are protecting. Where to pose a time limit, and how to 
balance a level of integration with the maintenance of a desire to return are positions 
on which real difficulties lie. Human rights lobbyists may not agree with this 
lessening of universal standards of certain rights. However the essential is surely to 
protect the right to life, within the political context in which the world finds itself. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 
EUROPEAN HANDLING OF 
PROTECTION ISSUES 
There are three European organisations in which progress in regional asylum 
matters could be anticipated. These are the Council of Europe, the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU).' 
Between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, migration and, particularly, asylum questions 
were broached in all of these forums. All the emerging groups concentrated on the 
situation of the moment, a fact retlected in their labels as 'ad hoc working groups' 
and 'processes'. 2 However, any concrete changes can only be acknowledged within 
the European Union, which is also the organisation with the strongest foundations of 
commitment to and machinery for joint actions. 3 
The handling of migration policies in a supra-national context is a particularly 
sensitive issue. Admission and inclusion are viewed as strong symbols of 
sovereignty. That such policies might become part of supra-national decision-
making is an anomaly to some. However, in creating supra-national structures 
which remove many inter-state barriers, as well as if one simply acknowledges the 
reality that people move and their movement across frontiers logically has 
international implications, keeping migration policies in the domestic arena 
Other international tora have also been the scene of discussions of European policy coordination 
particularly from 1989 to 1993. These include the Inter-governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee 
and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia. For a thorough overview of the various 
organisations and their overlapl)ing, as well as distinctive, features in this period see Stanton Russell, 
Sharon and Charles B. Keely, 'Multilateral Diplomacy to Harmonize Asylum Policy Among Industrial 
Countries: 198-1994' in Rogers, Rosemarie and Sharon Stanton Russell (eds.), Toward a New Global 
Refugee Regime, (Forthcoming 1995) (mimeo, cited with permission of authors). 
Ibid., p.12. 
In 1989, the European Communities' 'Coordinators' Group' saw the Communities' own ad hoc 
group, the Council of Europe or UNHCR as the only possible tora for harmonisation. See.I!!i!!.., p.19. 
In an article entitled 'Detining II European Immigration Policy', the Director General with responsibility 
for Justice and Home Affairs in the Secretariat General of the European Commission, Adrian Fortescue, 
also defines 'European' in this case as limited to the Member States of the European Community, "since 
no other major grouping has really made a collective attempt jointly to define something which might 
deserve the name of an 'immigration policy' as such.' Fortescue, A" 'Detining a European Immigration 
Policy', (Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, October 1993) p.33. 
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ultimately becomes both illogical and counter-productive.4 The European Union is 
the group of states which is bringing down most political, military and economic 
barriers in Europe. Collectively, the Member States form a powerful body in global 
relations and negotiations. All of these factors point to the will and strength for an 
evolution in migration and protection policies in Europe originating in the EU, 
although it may go further either through the exercise of the Member States' 
pressure in other organisations, or through a geographical widening of the Union.s 
As creating and implementing policies aimed at refugees and migrants 
requires political choices and ethical judgements associated with sovereignty and the 
national identity even interpretations of long-standing international agreements can 
vary widely from one state to another. These variations occur according to political 
systems, culture and perceived national interest. As EU Member States try to 
integrate in these latter areas, they are also working to harmonise their asylum and 
migration policies, including interpretation of the Convention definition. However, 
perhaps because they are not yet quite integrated, differing policies are continuing to 
emerge, exemplified by temporary protection strategies in response to displacements 
from former Yugoslavia. 
1. The OSeE 
The OSCE provides a forum where European human rights and cooperation 
on security issues are fundamentally linked, not only in Europe but on a trans-
Atlantic scale. Its membership also covers those areas in Europe where transborder 
and ethnic contlicts are more likely to erupt - including the Balkans and the 
Caucasus. A Swedish paper presented at the 1993 Office for Democratic Institutions 
In response to the desire for a removal of customs barriers for trucks travelling between their 
territories, initially five but later more of the EU states formed a sub-grolll>, Schengen. which has also had 
to address the migration question in removing these barriers. 
Paragraph 37 of the Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, [COM(94) 
23 final). (Brussels, 23 Fehruary 1994) states that: 
Achieving and implementing a common policy will not be possible without greater 
reliance on legally binding instruments, procedures to ensure uniform interpretation of 
those common rules and the development of common policies in relation to areas of both 
suhstantive and procedural law that have not yet been addressed (some of which will 
prohahly prove to be the most sensitive). 
Chapter 3 67 
and Human Rights (ODHIR) Seminar in Warsaw raised the issue of temporary 
protection as a potential component of a necessary European regional solution -
having noted the other existing regional solutions.6 This paper suggested that the 
then CSCE offered the advantage of being a forum with an international framework 
within which security aspects of the problem could be dealt with.7 Officials at 
ODHIR confirm, however, that "nothing new has been done within the CSCE 
framework", and indicate an opinion that, due to the heavy burden of other concerns 
related to security and the human dimension, as well as to internal structural 
difficulties and problems of co-operation with other international institutions, the 
organisation would be reluctant to undertake any 'paper' obligations. 8 
Undoubtedly the OSCE could offer several positive advantages in the 
broadening of a regional 'refugee solution' including a mechanism, or even 
Convention, of temporary protection. However it is currently seriously hampered 
by its novice status on these matters (having only broadened its scope to include 
them in 1992), an apparent shortage of expert staff on this subject, and also, 
potentially, by the very breadth of its membership. 
Institutions within the OSCE framework focus on security issues, democracy 
and human rights and ethnic minorities. All of these issues are related to notions of 
temporary protection, in terms of the causes of flight and solutions, including both 
return and integration. However, work goes on around the subject, rather than 
focusing on the central ground of short term protection. As such, the OSCE's 
primary role could be one of broader facilitation and implementation of measures 
surrounding protection when necessary, rather than that of focusing on the actual 
protection issue. 
While non-European states may still be necessarily included on questions of 
security, it is doubtful that a truly regional refugee policy could be established with 
the inclusion of non-regional players, involving as it does the question of close 
Addr~ss by Mr Erik Lempert, Permanent Under-Secretary, Ministry of Culture and Immigration, 
Sweden. 
Ju:;t as overall migration policies, and particularly those addressing root causes) need to be 
integrated with d~velopment policies. foreign policies. demograllhic policies etc, temporary protection and 
broader asylum policies need to be integrated with peace plans. and security and human rights policies, 
especially with regard to return as wdl as to humanitarian assistance and the establishment of safe areas 
during crises such that in the former Yugoslavia. See Part Two below. 
Mr Jacek Paliszewski (24 August 1994). 
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collaboration within a limited area. In addition, the US has been vehement in its 
reluctance to broaden its own regional refugee policy in line with other participants 
in the Organisation of American States, and refused to countenance signing the 
Cartagena agreement. It would thus be highly hypocritical for it to join in the push 
for innovations in European refugee policy, particularly as a more liberal European 
policy would have the potential complementary effect of limiting the number of 
Europeans finding themselves in need of international protection who might even 
attempt to arrive in the North American states. It is also unlikely that states which 
face ethnic tensions in the post-Cold War era would sign up to any agreement by 
which they would be in the frontline of offering protection for those fleeing 
neighbouring states, with which they may themselves have border or ethnically 
inspired quarrels. 
2. The Council of Europe 
Action on the subject of temporary protection within the Council of Europe, 
beyond support for recommendations by UNHCR and EXCOM (the Executive 
Committee of the High Commissioner'S Programme) is difficult to discern. 
According to the Secretary of CAHAR (Comite ad hoc d'experts sur les aspects 
juridiques de I'asile territorial, des refugies et de apatrides)9 UNHCR is, in fact, the 
forum in which things not only are happening but should happen in this area. The 
internal, CAHAR, opinion is that no document on this subject can be drafted in the 
context of the Council of Europe, that governments should apply EXCOM 
resolutions and that they should refer to UNHCR and its inter-governmental 
consultations on temporary protection. JO In 1993, particular reference was made by 
the Council of Europe advisors to EXCOM Resolution 15 of 1981 concerning the 
situation of asylum seekers in situations of large scale influxes. The essential 
inference is of an internal Council of Europe view that no regional solution can or 
9 Ad Iwe Comlllitt~~ of exp~rts on I~gal aspects of territorial asylum. refugees and statelessness. 
Although within the framework of the Council of Europe, CAHAR consists of international law experts 
who meet in their own Cal)acities, not repr~~nting th~ir countries of origin. 
10 lntervi~w with Mr Geza Tessenyi, Administrator in th~ Dir~ction of Legal Affairs, Secretary of 
CAHAR, and Council of Europe Secr~tariat Representative at UNHCR meetings on temporary protection 
(8 September 1994). 
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should be developed concerning mass influxes and that support for the resolutions of 
the 'universal' body, no matter how old those resolutions may be, is the best way 
forward. The other obvious inference is that 110t much has changed with regard to 
temporary protection over the last decade and a hal f, and that we need to ask 
whether developments are necessary now. The Council of Europe paper at the 
CSCE/ODHIR Seminar in Warsaw made reference to the need for an improved 
definition of temporary protection and harmonisation of schemes, but its action 
seems to be that of stepping back from this debate and supporting other major 
players. The Council of Europe suffers or benefits from a breadth of membership 
incorporating a number of east European states, which gives it similar difficulties to 
the oseE. II It seems likely that the political will of the major players in all the 
European organisations lies in pressing forward within the narrower, and it must be 
said more secretive, circles of the EU rather than in pushing for action in the bigger 
(in terms of membership) organisations. 
3. Schengen 
In June 1985 an agreement was reached between Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands to remove controls at common frontiers. Signed 
in the Luxembourg town of Schengen, this became known as the Schengen 
Agreement, and the states (a sub-group of the EU) as the Schengen Group. The 
Agreement was not prompted by migration concerns but by commercial traffic 
queues at customs posts, seen as wasteful to any level of economic integration. 
However, if free movement of goods is allowed between states, then people will 
pass with the goods, and so controls on the people need also to be lifted. Removing 
checks on the movement of people between states raises questions of security. 
These questions include concerns over the movement of illegal immigrants, who 
having passed the outer-most frontier would face no more controls within a broad, 
multi-state area. 
The group was joined in 1990 by Italy, 1991 by Spain and Portugal and 1992 
by Greece. In June 1990 a Convention on the Application of the Schengen 
II Since) 990. the membership of the Council of Europe has increased to 38 states. The latest 
'recruits' were Ukraine and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 9 November 1995. 
European Handling 70 
Agreement was signed, which this time included provisions for handling asylum 
applications by the states concerned, and, similar to the Dublin Convention, 
determines which state has responsibility. 
In many ways, the Schengen process is an experimental laboratory for further 
cooperation on freedom of movement among the whole membership of the EU. 
Austria has sought to join the group, although the UK, Ireland, and (for a more 
limited future) Denmark remain outside the group. The issues dealt with by the 
Schengen documents also mirror those discussed in the same context in the Union. 
Beyond the concerns of the Dublin Convention these include visa restrictions, carrier 
sanctions and an Information System. 
Visa restrictions are a very difficult subject where refugee movement and 
protection are concerned. Refugees and others in need of protection are often 
fleeing a government or a conflict. In the former case they cannot always apply for 
the correct travel documents as this would mean informing the persecutors of their 
desire and plans for tlight. In a conflict situation, foreign embassies often close 
down, so any application for a visa mllst be made after crossing at least one 
international frontier. Frontline states often will not allow passage to people without 
proof of onward movement. 
There is an increasing tendency for governments to fine airlines on which 
immigrants without the correct travel and entry documents have arrived. This 
means that airline staff have to do the work of immigration officials, checking the 
passports and visas of all passengers to avoid heavy fines on the company for which 
they work. Even immigration service staff are often not sufficiently trained to make 
correct judgements on the protection needs of individuals. Airline staff are certainly 
not trained to spot genuine cases, and are left with the impossible choice of believing 
a story and risking a tine as the price of saving a life, or making the morally 
difficult choice of refusing travel to a person claiming they will be killed if they 
remain in the country of origin. Anecdotal evidence suggests that all of these 
measures are backfiring as some travel operators and airlines charge elevated ticket 
prices which include the cost of the fine so that illegal immigrants (most often 
economic migrants rather than refugees) manage to arrive at their chosen destination 
and plead their case. 
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The Schengen Information System is designed to: 12 
maintain public order and security, including state security, and to 
apply the provisions of this Convention relating to the movement of 
persons, in the territories of the Contracting Parties, using information 
transmi tted by the system. 
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It allows states to enter and read reports on individuals, including the issuance of 
visas, residence permits and any criminal record they may have according to the 
domestic legislation of the state making the report. Differing levels of data 
protection exist in each of the states, so entry of an individual's data into the system 
will depend very much on the regulations of the state in question, although entry 
into the system will affect the person's ability to move within the whole Schengen 
area. The concern is that those most likely to suffer from this system are third 
country nationals residing in the Schengen territory and asylum applicants. I] 
A further similarity between Schengen and the future of the EU on 
immigration matters is the establishment of readmission agreements with east 
European states. An agreement signed with Poland means that as of May 1991, 
Poland will readmit its own nationals or people who having transited its territory 
arrive in the Schengen area but do not have a visa for any Schengen state. In other 
words, Poland has become a virtual border guard between the eastern limits of the 
EU and further eastern European and Asian states. 
Implementation of the agreements was due to take place in April 1995, and 
did so, although the tirst six months did not give a particularly smooth 
demonstration of how progress can be made. Italy was unable to implement the 
agreement at the same time as the others due to a need to upgrade the domestic 
computer system used by the police authorities. There were technical difficulties 
with the equipment used at Schiphol Airport in the Netherlands to allow people 
travelling between Schengen states to gain access to the normally controlled area 
without needing to show their passports. 14 There were political difficulties for 
some countries. For example, France decided at the last minute that it would delay 
12 Sch~n!:!~n Conv~ntion, Articl~ 93. 
13 Mahmood, S., 'Th~ Sch~llg~n Information System: An Inequitable Data Protection Regime', 
International Journal of Refllge~ Law, Vo!.? No.2 (1995). 
14 A card mllst he inserted in a revolving gate typ~ machine, and the distribution of cards and 
information on use for (lass~ngers was not always clear. 
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implementation for six months, expressing last minute concerns about the trafficking 
of drugs within the territory and illegal immigrationY However, the first 
experiments of a mini-Europe without frontiers were set in operation, and the true 
implications for protection seekers, within the wider framework of concerns and 
limitations, will be discovered as time goes on. 
4. The EUI'opean Union 
From the adoption of the Single European Act, in December 1985,16 it was 
clear that some form of cooperation on the subject of entry to the territory of the 
Member States of the [then] European Community by citizens of non-Member States 
had to be entered into, as the abolition of internal frontiers and free movement of 
persons became defined goals. 17 
The tirst piece of relevant administrative machinery put into place on a joint 
basis was the establishment, by the Ministers responsible for Immigration, of an 'Ad 
Hoc Immigration Group' of senior officials in October 1986,,8 As the senior 
officials representing Member States in meetings of this group usually came from 
Justice and Home Affairs or Foreign Ministries, it was natural that many of their 
meetings followed on from other meetings they participated in as the 'TREV! 
Group'. However, contrary to the mistaken belief of many journalists and 
academics, questions of Immigration and Asylum were never part of the mandate of 
the TREVI Group. I~ This Ad Hoc Group, like the TREVI Group met behind 
Barb~r, Tony, 'EU's hord~r-fr~~ zone hohhl~s into place', The Independent, (1 July 1995), p.9. 
16 The Single European Act came into effect in September 1987. 
17 Article 7a of th~ SEA (ex-8a EEC) commit .. the Community to the creation of an area without 
internal frontiers, with an internal market which shall coml>rise "an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, perSOIlS, services and capital is ensured". (Article 7a of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community). 
18 At that point. the European Commission's role in discussions was minimal, and only a very small 
department in the Secretariat G~nc:ral dealt with the whole area of Justice and Home Affairs. The timing 
of the creation of the lui hoc group was midway between the signing and entry into force of the SEA. 
19 The TREVI Group was concerned with matters of judicial and police co-operation on questions 
of terrorism, drugs etc. The title of the group was not an anachronym liS commonly believed (it was 
thought by many to stand for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence International [or according to 
some accounts Immigration rather than International D. See among others for the error made on this 
subject, Loescher, G. 'The European Community and Refugc:es' International Affairs, 65 (1989). For 
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closed doors, and indeed much of the EU work on immigration and asylum is still 
carried out in this secretive manner, in spite of the spirit of greater openness which 
is hoped for by many outsides and, to an extent, encouraged by some within.20 It 
assisted in the drafting of the tirst two results of cooperation on immigration and 
asylum issues: the Dublin Convention and the Convention on External Frontiers. 
The latter Convention, which comes within First Pillar matters and on which the 
Commission can make directives, ran into difficulties between Spain and the UK on 
the question of Gibraltar, but was resllscitated by the Commission with a 1993 
Communication.21 The activity of the Commission on this issue indicates a 
potential for forward movement and sensitively diplomatic role on migration matters. 
Beyond being the tirst situation in which a central non-governmental body (the 
Commission) will put forward a list concerning which nationals require a visa to 
entire the entire territory of the EU, this Convention also includes many of the 
details of the Schengen Agreement on a wider scale, sllch as carrier sanctions. 
4.1 The Dublin Convention 
The Convention determining the State responsible for examining an asylum 
request or Dublin Convention, signed in June 199022 aims for a harmonisation of 
member states' asylum policies, in order that asylum-seekers make their applications 
in only one state. The state in which an application should be considered is 
clarification 011 the: distinct nature: of the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration see Benyon et al, ~ 
Cooperation in Europe: an Investigation. (University of Leicester: Centre for the Study of Public Order, 
November 1993). Additional confirmation of the non-TREYl status of the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration 
was ascertaine:d in interviews with II numher of representatives of the European Commission. 
:!II One example of somewhat gre:ater openness was the June 1994 International Conference hosted 
by the Hellenic Institute of European Studies, and sl)Qnsored by the European Commission in 
Vouliagmeni. Greece, entitled Immigration and the European Union: building on a comprehensive 
approach, and attended by (selected) academics, as well as representatives of International Organisations, 
NGOs. Membu States and the Commission. 
2\ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament: (1) Prollosal for a decision. based on Article K3 of the Treaty on European 
Union estahlishing the Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member States; (2) 
Proposal for a regulation. based on Article IOOc of the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
determining the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of II visa when crossing the external 
borders of the Me:mhc:r States COM(93) 684 tinal (Brussel:;. 10 December 1993). 
:!1 Except hy Denmark which signed and ratitied in June 1991. 
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determined by the criteria laid out in Articles 4 - 8 of the Dublin Convention.23 
The efficiency of the proposals is doubted: 24 
an effective common body of relevant rights, duties and privileges in 
the area of immigration control cannot be properly achieved while 
there remain significant differences in the procedures for realising and 
applying any common body of rules. 
Amnesty International called for no implementation of this Convention until it could 
be ensured that effective measures and safeguards were in place, so that all 
procedures and international protection standards would be equal. 25 
The Convention is not (in November 1995) in force, as some states have not 
yet ratified it.26 The new Member States (Austria, Finland and Sweden) ratified 
the Dublin Convention as part of their accession agreements. In addition, its actual 
effect on what might eventually be a Union-wide asylum policy is somewhat 
unknown. It is an inter-governmental Convention, drafted before the coming into 
being of the European Union, and the creation of the so-called Third Pillar. It is 
possible that the Dublin Convention. if implemented. could have great import for 
temporary protection. and vice versa. The Dublin Convention is intended only for 
application to asylum claims, so if temporary protection were to become a status 
with distinct procedures for which protection-seekers could make a request separate 
from regular asylum processes it would not be applicable unless altered. The major 
concern of human rights groups and other observers of this political process is that 
procedures differ so markedly that allotting an applicant to one particular state has 
an element of a lottery and could be unfair. The grounds on which this objection to 
the Dublin Convention in relation to asylum claims is made remain valid for 
23 In order these criteria are: Family re-unification; possession of a valid residence permit or visa; 
irregular entry from a non-Member State. unless HI>plicatioll was made to another Member State within the 
previous six months; le~al entry to a Member State where no visa is required; initial lodging of an asylum 
application. 
24 Jim Gillespie. RelJOrt on Immigration ~iI1d Asylum Procedure and Aopeal Rights in the 12 
Member States of the European Community, (London: Immigration Law Practitioners' Association. March 
1993) p.7. 
25 Amnesty Internatiunal European Communities Project. EUROPE: Harmonisation of Asylum 
Policy, (November 1992). 
~6 Germany's decision and prm;edures for ratification came with the beginning of its Presidency of 
the European Council in July 1994. It had previously heen eXI>ected to be the last state to ratify. Both 
the Netherlands and Spain may face substantial difficulties in ratifying the Convention. Dennis de Jong, 
Advisor to the President - Immi~rati()n and Asylum. Secretariat General Directorate F (18 October 1994). 
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temporary protection. As a bare minimum, the possibility of and procedure for 
admission and recognition as a person in need of protection must be coordinated if 
protection in a frontier-free European Union is to be a viable act. Other European 
states have expressed interest in a parallel convention, allowing them to join in this 
process of distribution of claims, and discussions are under way with central and 
eastern European States. If the determination of which state must process protection 
claims broadens, so must the coordination of policies to guarantee the standards of 
admission criteria and the protection received. 
4.2 Maastricht and the Third Pillar 
The framework for intergovernmental cooperation in the fields of justice and 
home affairs is set out Under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. This same 
Title establishes a 'third pillar' of the European Commission to work on the relevant 
fields and to operate with a shared right of initiative alongside Member States with 
the possibility of adopting joint actions, joint positions and conventions27 , but not 
(yet) the exclusive right of initiative or the right to adopt directives and regulations 
as is the case of the First Pillar.2K The fields included within this broad area are 
immigration and asylum, drugs and judicial cooperation. This collection of policy 
areas once again links migration to the secrets of the defunct TREVI group. 
S~~ Articles K.3 and K.4 of the Treaty on European Union. 
28 According to Article K.9 of the Treaty on European Union. "[t)he Council, acting unanimously 
on the initiative of th~ Commission or a M~mber State. may d~cide to apply Article lOOc of the Treaty 
establishing the Europc:an Community to action in areas ret~rred to in Article K.I(l)to (6) ..... These areas 
include Asylum policy; rules governing the crossing of external horders and controls thereon; immigration 
policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries. Article lOOc of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (ins~rted by Article G(23) TEU) states that the Council will determine the third 
countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the 
Member States. voting unanimollsly on a proposal from the Commission. or in the case of sudden and 
imminent mass intluxes on a qualitied majority vote on a recommendation from the Commission, when a 
visa requiremc:nt may b~ introduced for a period not exceeding six months. That is to say that the 
Commission would have powers exceeding an equal right of initiative in the drawing up of and proposals 
for visa lists. and if Article K.9 were to he implem~ntedt would have similarly extended power in other 
areas too. In Declaration (No. 31) on asylum attached to the Final Act of the TEU. it is declared that 
"the Council will also consider. by th~ end of 1993. on the basis of a report. the possibility of applying 
Article K.9 to such matters lie asylum policies)". Such a report was written [SEC(93) 1687 final) 
(Brussels. 4 Nov~mber 1993), which, not surprisingly as the TEU had only been in effect since 1 
November rather than I January 1993. considers that the time is not yet right to propose the application of 
Article K.9. hut that the '1uestion should he re-examined in the light of experience. Some within the 
Commission see advantages in transt~rring only certain dements of asylum and immigration policies -
particularly the d~vdopmellt elelllents of the root callses approach. 
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All of the work done within the framework of the European Communities 
and European Union so far points in one essential direction: Harmonisation.29 
According to the REPORT from the Ministers responsible for immigration to the 
European Council meeting in Maastricht on immigrarion and asylum policy, 
harmonisation is seen as "not ... an end in itself but as a means of re-orienting 
policies where such action makes for efficiency and speed of intervention" .30 The 
1994 Communication describes harmonisation as usually being understood to mean 
the development of common rules and practices,31 and goes on to say that this 
process is still at a preliminary stage, although according to the 1991 work 
programme signiticant results should have been achieved in this area by the end of 
1993. "The present stage of the process could therefore best be described as 
approximation rather than harmonisation of immigration and asylum policies. "32 
The means to and substance of migration policy coordination need to be 
understood within the context of the political and economic climate. This climate is 
fuelled by the impact of European integration, economic recession, high 
unemployment and the perceived high cost of refugee care, plus misplaced anxiety 
over potential East-West migration and actual large intluxes from former Yugoslavia 
and substantial attempted outflows from Albania and other eastern European states. 
From 1993, the work programme included discussions within the sub-group 
on asylum, K.4 Committee and Steering Group I, on the harmonisation of the 
interpretation of the detinition of a refugee to be found in the 1951 Geneva 
29 Work within othl:r tora also points towards harmonisation, as is detailed by Stanton Russell and 
Keely, op.cit.. Two yean; after the coming into force of the Treaty on Eurol>ean Union, the Council has 
adopted some 50 recommemlations, resolutions or conclusions, although it has adopted only two joint 
actions and the text of one convention and taken UI) no single common position. Among the 
recommendations, resolutions and conclusions (which instruments were all available before the Treaty) are 
a Resolution on Minimum Guarantees for Asylum Procedures [5354/95 ASIMM 70, 9 March 1995), a 
Conclusion of the Form of !ttis.\·('z-p(lsser for the transfer of an asylum applicant from one Member State 
to another, a Conclusion on the: Standard form tor determining the state responsible for examining an 
application for asylum and a Conclusion on the Commission Communication on Immigration and Asylum 
(all 20 June 1994). Some of the others are related to movement of people although not l>rotection as such. 
For a full list of actions by the Coullcil in this area see AI>pendix IS of European Commission, 
'Intergovernmental Cont't:rence, 1996: Commission Report for the Retlection Group' (Luxembourg, May 
1995), and p.5t. 
30 Ad Hoc Group Immigrati()n, REPORT from the Ministers respon!lible for immigration to the 
European Council meeting in Maastricht on immigration and asylum policy, (Brussels 3 December 1991) 
SN 4038/91 (WG 930) annex - detailed note, p.ll. 
)I 1994 Communication, op.cit., paragraph 33. 
l2 Ihid., paragraph 34. 
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Convention. One difficulty of such harmonising of interpretations is that a 
foreseeable outcome would be the conclusion of a document which finds a form of 
words indicating a harmonised interpretation of Article 1 A of the 1951 Convention, 
but which in turn has 15 interpretations arising from it as time goes on. In the 
meantime, the Member States would still have as many un-harmonised policies as 
there are members, and be in a position of implementing an eventually ratified 
Dublin Convention, where asylum seekers qualifying for application to more liberal 
states gain access to the entire EU territory, while those who are forced to apply to 
states with more restrictive policies are turned away. In the event, the process on 
reaching some sort of agreement took until November 1995, indicating the 
difficulties states have in tinding common understandings of the meanings of the 
Convention's terms. The eventual outcome was a non-binding document suggesting 
a basic understanding, but which is of no weight whatsoever in altering the 
processing of applications. In addition, absolutely no attention has been paid in this 
process to the "Possible Measure" put forward under Paragraph 9 of the 1991 
Communication from the Commission of the right of asylum which suggests that:33 
there should be harmonisation of the rules on de facIO refugees, who 
are not covered by the Geneva Convention; the question whether they 
can be allowed to stay in the Community - temporarily - on 
humanitarian grounds other than those set out in the Geneva 
Convention should not depend crucially on the place where their 
application is examined 
and yet, one major European humanitarian crisis later, it largely does. In the 
meantime. in the period from 1991 to 1993, spurred on by the growing body of 
conventions and agreements calling for policy harmonisation, states began legislative 
and regulatory programme to re-shape their asylum procedures. Although some 
informal assessment of each others' policies may have occurred on the sidelines, 
these programmes were all enacted by individual states within their own sovereign 
capacities. All states have made some legislature and/or policy changes in the early 
1990s, including on temporary protection. All of them have made their changes 
independently of each other. 
33 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the right of asylum. (Brussels, II October 1991) ISEC(91)1857 final), pp.6-7. In 1991, the 
Commission issued two separate communications. one on asylum the other on immigration. By 1994 it 
had been decided that if a comprehensive apl>roach W<lS to be t<lken to migration the two categories could 
no longer he divided, in spite of the large differences between people in need of protection and those in 
search of ~colloillic hett~nnent. 
European Handlillg 78 
In the meantime, the spontaneous groupings of the early 1990s had, by 1994 
given way to more firmly established groups and committees, or been abandoned in 
the face of failure over former Yugoslavia. 34 
4.3 The Edinburgh Conclusions 
In December 1992. The Conclusions of the British Presidency in Edinburgh 
noted that preparations enabling freedom of movement as set out in the Single 
European Act had not gone according to schedule. Further work, especially on the 
Dublin and External Frontiers Conventions, and a European Information System 
similar to the Schengen System, would be necessary to achieve such freedom 
without endangering public security or compromising the fight against illegal 
immigration. Welcoming the Resolutions agreed to in London in November 1992 on 
Manifestly Unfounded Claims and Host Third Countries, and stressing the need to 
fight racism and xenophobia in a unifying continent, including protection for and the 
integration of legal immigrants. the Conclusions contained a declaration of 
principles. In this Dec/aration on the Principles (?f Governing External Aspects of 
Migration Policy the European Council noted the importance of analyzing the causes 
of flight and removing them. Migratory movements towards the Member States 
should, it was said, be reduced by the preservation of peace, resolution of conflicts, 
respect for human rights, creation of democratic societies and spread of liberal trade 
policies. These measures were considered necessary to prevent the potential de-
stabilising effect of uncontrolled migration, and to prevent the integration of legal 
immigrants being made even more difficult. The measures could, it was suggested 
be enacted through a coordination of foreign policy, economic cooperation and 
immigration and asylum policies, for which a framework was made available via the 
Treaty on European Union, in particular Titles V and VI. While supporting 
UNHCR's caBs for allowing people, by the use of aid and assistance, to remain 
close to their homes, the Council of Ministers noted that such assistance should not 
prejudice the availability of temporary protection in Member States for particularly 
needy cases. These points were set out in a list of principles for the guidance of the 
Community as a whole and the Member States in their respective spheres of 
14 Stanton Russ~1I and Kl!dy. op.cit.. p.36. 
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competence. Included as a guiding principle was the aim of increased cooperation in 
response to the "challenge of persons tleeing from armed contlict and persecution in 
former Yugoslavia." The intention of relieving this situation by supplying 
accommodation and subsistence including:35 
in principle the temporary admission of persons in particular need in 
accordance with national possibilities and in the context of a 
coordinated action by all the Member States. They reaffirm their 
belief that the burden of financing relief activities should be shared 
more equitably by the international community. 
These Conclusions laid out a path of good intentions, pointing towards a holistic 
approach to the broad spectrum of migration related issues and indicating an 
acknowledgement of the need to strengthen protection while being self-
congratulatory on restrictions enacted in the calise of closing asylum channels to all 
but the most needy. However, the on-going contlict in the south of the 'unifying 
continent' either proved too much for the resolve of those creating these aims, or the 
aims were never set in a high enough position of strength to be accomplished in the 
face of political realities beyond EU borders. The idealism of some elements of a 
holistic approach, and the pragmatic need to reinforce others has been demonstrated 
by the turn of events. The Edinburgh Conclusions offered some starting points in 
the creation of a wider and stronger approach to migration and protection. The 
1994 Communication from the Commission on Immigration and Asylum Policies 
sees a non-governmental institution of the Union pushing to continue the process 
initiated by inter-governmental cooperation. 
5. THE WAY AI-IEAD'! 
The February 1994 Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies outlines the need for a 
comprehensive approach which addresses the key components of an effective 
immigration policy as: action on migration pressure, particularly through cooperation 
with the main would be sending countries, control or management of immigration 
and integration of legal immigrants. It emphasises the need for the integration of 
3S Conclusions of rile President:\, - EtiinburRIl. (/2 December 1992): ISN 45192) Annex 5, Part A 
xvi,8. 
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immigration and asylum policies with external policies, a re-newed focus on root 
causes approaches36, a desire for greater availability of accurate information, and 
repeats the call for harmonisation. 
In addition the necessity for the development of schemes for temporary 
protection and the need for solidarity in support of Member States in the front line 
(that is burden sharing) is highlighted. The crisis in former Yugoslavia which "has 
produced large-scale movements of people forced from their homes by developments 
which do not fit patterns with which Western Europe is familiar or equipped and 
which require new and tailored responses,,37 is acknowledged as the inspiration 
behind this need. The Communication also outlines the Commission's concern that 
the contents of the provisions for temporary protection vary from state to state and 
that secondary rights also di ffer considerably. It calls for the addressing of the 
issues of temporary protection and temporary absorption problemg38, saying that: 39 
it would be possible to build on this experience [of the former 
Yugoslav crisis] and harmonise these schemes with a view to 
elaborating a uniform European scheme for temporary protection. 
Such a harmonisation would avoid the redirection of this type of 
migratory tlows on the basis of differences in national legislation. It 
would also guarantee a minimum level of protection to the persons 
concerned, irrespective of the Member State offering this protection 
and includes "harmonisation of the schemes for temporary protection" as Point 9 in 
its 32 point framework for action. 4u The Communication picks out the common 
features of Member States' temporary protection schemes (that they are set up for 
mass intlux situations only; that asylum applications for those receiving such 
protection, while they may be submitted, are not being dealt with; that programmes 
for return and re-habilitation are being soughttl and outlines the questions the 
Commission sees a need to address when considering a harmonised approach (how 
to identify situations requiring such a scheme; the rights to be accorded those who 
See Part 2 below. 
37 1994 CommullicatiOll, op.t·il.. pantgraph 22. 
31 Ihid .• paragraph 92. 
39 Ihid .• paragraph 93 .. 
Ihid., l>p.4I-44. (Summary: A New FraJllework for action by the Union). 
41 Ihid .• p<1ragraph 24. 
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have been granted such protection; the period of time after which longer term 
permission to stay needs Lo be granted).42 
The view in the Commission appears to be that immigration policies, and 
asylum policies in particular, need to turn away from their reactive style, and 
become pI'o-active: in the manner of all good boy scouts and girl guides, the time 
has come to 'be prepared'. This realisation was long overdue, and a significant 
advance in attitude on this policy would be demonstrated if the responses to crises 
such as that in former Yugoslavia would be drawn on in formulating policies in 
advance of further crises, which it must be hoped, though can hardly be expected, 
may never happen. The responses to this crisis, however they be analyzed, 
harmonised and approximated should provide the basis for responses to possible 
future mass influxes of a similar or indeed quite different kind. 
5.1 Reception in the region of origin 
Beyond the work of the European Commission on the future of European 
protection, some Member States have been active in other fora in promoting 
discussions of future options. One example of this is a tentative Dutch proposal, 
first raised by the then Dutch Secretary of State for Justice, Aad Kosto, in 
November 1993 at the fifth Conference of European Ministers Responsible for 
Migration Affairs in Athens. The proposal is that reception and protection in the 
region of origin be considered as a future means of combining the wishes to permit 
people to remain as close to their homes as possible, to protect, and to try not to 
attract large numbers of immigrants, including protection seekers, to west European 
countries. The proposal received its first consideration in an Inter-governmental 
Consultations working paper in 1994, and discussions and reflections are on-
going.43 
There are two components to the suggestion. The first is that all processing 
of asylum claims would be carried out in the region of origin, at facilities 
Ibid., paragraph 94. 
43 Secretarial of the Inter-governmental Consultations 011 Asylum. Refugee and Migration Policies 
in Europe. North Amc:rica Hill! Australia (lGC). 'Working Paper on Reception in the Region of Origin' 
(GenevH. Septemhc:r 1994). 
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established in states neighbouring the refugee-producing state. The second is that 
'Internationally Protected Areas' would be established, again in neighbouring states, 
with land leased from the host state and protected and assisted by the EU, or 
possibly the UN. 
There are manifold concerns about protection scenarios such as those 
envisaged in the 'Reception in the Region of Origin' concept, as well as many 
perceived advantages. The idea is far from being adopted. In many ways the 
suggestions reflect US experience.4~ In 1994 the US used interception and initially 
ship-board processing for Haitians, although after being overwhelmed, and criticised 
by UNHCR, the processing was later moved to Guantanamo, a US base in Cuba. In 
Guantanamo, a form of 'safe haven' was also established to temporarily protect 
Haitians in flight. When, two months after the major outflow of Haitians, Cubans 
also began what looked likely to become a massive outflow towards the US, the 
Americans were ready to use the haven established in Guantanamo to shelter them 
until a solution was found. There are several points to be made on the American 
experience which would reflect on Europe's ability to proceed with similar plans. 
Firstly, the US did not return or expel Haitians or Cubans who reached US 
land, but picked them up at sea. They were not technically, therefore, responsible 
for a violation of Article 33 of the 1951 Convention concerning nonrefoulement. 
Secondly, when the US asked other Central American states to assist by leasing land 
for safe havens under US protection, they were met with a wall of sovereign 
rejection, in spite of the large tinancial gains and good will to be earned from 
permitting such tenancy. Thirdly, the US idea was to "create a mechanism in which 
the boat people themselves are encouraged to decide whether the need for protection 
or the desire to immigrate is the primary motivation" .45 The policy for Haitians 
caused the numbers to drop, and in the American opinion, allowed sufficient 
protection to those who really needed it. The majority of the 22,000 Haitians who 
were protected in Guantanamo returned to Haiti after the restoration of the elected 
government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The solution permitting return was also in 
44 R~f~rr~d to in IGC, Ihid.. Also st'~ McKinley, Brunson, 'Safe Haven: Lessons Learned', 
Remarks made to the Churdle!s Com1l1ission for Mig.rants in Europe DialogUe! Meeting on Safe Haven in 
Brussels (23 June 1995). IBrunson McKinley is S~nior De!(luty Assistant Se!cretary in the Department of 
State Bureau of Pupulation, Refugees and MigrCltionl. 
45 McKinleY, Ihid., (l.5. 
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American hands, and is a fourth feature of the US policy. In the two cases of safe 
haven use by the US in 1994 there was an 'end strategy'. The US offered 
temporary protection, within its powers, outside its territory, in situations in which it 
had a clear vision of the operation it could undertake to solve the cause of 
movement, and with a strong rating of its potential for success. The migrations may 
have driven the desire to effect a solution which permitted return. However the 
protection, and the type of protection, were only undertaken with the near certainty 
that a rapid and satisfactory outcome could be achieved by the protectors in the field 
of the cause, which would involve the repatriation of the majority of the protected. 
In Europe's and the EU's search for a model of temporary protection and a 
regional strategy to cope with forced migrations there must be an assessment of 
Europe's potential of enacting effective protection, while upholding its Convention 
commitments. There must also be consideration of whether the migrations and need 
to protect, along with other contributory factors, such as disgust at human rights 
violations and desire to see democratic equality for all including minority groups, 
would enable the EU and other Europeans to bring about an end to the causes of 
migration. In considering such possibilities all manner of particular characteristics 
such as geography, the breadth of political systems and cultures, military capabilities 
and future tranquillity for nations in close proximity must be taken into account. 
CONCLUSION 
The OA U Convention and Cartagena Declaration offer regional additions to 
the essence of the universal Convention. It would appear that the time is right for 
Europe to follow these other regions and formulate regional methods of dealing with 
its regional crises. If adding to the basis provided in the Convention includes the 
addressing of mass influx situations by avoiding individualised procedures, but 
maintaining these for those individuals who require a permanent status then it should 
be seen as a positive step to establish regionalised approaches to regional problems 
within the regional tradition. For example, African states talk of a tradition of 
'solidarity' between the peoples, regardless of artificial boundaries, and the OAU 
has developed a Convention which allows protection for those fleeing the type of 
situation it tragically finds itself faced with on a frequent basis, and a way of 
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offering protection without challenging the position of the state or government of 
origin. Europe prides itself on its humanitarian tradition, and is facing increasing 
ethnic and territorial tensions. There is scope in the current situation for the 
development of a European regional approach in the manner of its traditions, dealing 
with its current tragedies. In other words there are different ways in different 
regions for different (or similar) problems to be dealt with in an appropriate manner 
with the eventual aim of achieving the same result - protection for those people who 
cannot find it in their state of origin but need to turn to, or are turned out to, the 
wider regional or international community. 
The model a European mechanism of protection might take is as yet unclear, 
and a number of imaginative possibilities are emerging. The outcome may be an 
amalgamation of various forms of short term protection, to suit the situation at hand. 
What is quite clear is that a non-governmental supra-national body is unlikely to be 
used as a central system for assessing European asylum and protection claims. 
Some form of national control is most likely to persist for the foreseeable future. 
However, through agreements, be they multi-lateral conventions or bi-Iateral 
coordination or simply uni-Iateral responses or complements to the policies of 
neighbours, cooperation on procedures for admission and ultimately the measures of 
protection are probable given the integrationist climate. Discussions and collective 
thinking on the issue has already achieved a move towards a comprehensive strategy 
to migration issues. 
There is undoubtedly still a need for an overarching universal system 
providing a complement and background to the types of regional systems which 
might develop. This universal system would logically be necessary not least for 
those situations where individuals and even large groups need, because of fear of 
persecution, or as their only hope of receiving protection, to migrate between 
regions. However, it is perhaps essential for an evolving mechanism of temporary 
protection to be grounded in a regional system in part due to its limited duration 
(whatever the outcome may be) and anticipated limited geographical scope, and in 




The history of refugee protection in Europe, and indeed globally, shows both 
a potential and necessity for contextual reformulation and evolution. The 1951 
Convention provides a solid foundation to international protection with universal 
understanding for individual refugees under circumstances of a well-founded fear of 
perseclition on particular grounds. However, the interpretation and use of the 
Convention by the majority of states does not make room for the protection of large 
groups or the understanding of contlict as a form of persecution. Throughout the 
twentieth century mass movements originating in and around the European continent 
have initially met with restrictions. Often these barriers have been excused by the 
economic situation of western Europe or accusations of tlight motivated by self-
betterment because recent experience had involved large influxes of economic 
migrants. The forced displacements of the 1920s and 1930s and '40s were first met 
with such barriers. However, either through the establishment of new organisations 
offering some semblance of control over the movements, or through a horror at the 
results of non-protection, the responses on those occasions were developments in the 
protection regime, including expansion or refining of contemporary notions of those 
in recognisable need of protection and the development of new mechanisms of 
protection. 
The tirst half of the 1990s has included one major crisis within Europe, and 
several 'minor scares'. The possibilities of more migration crises are constantly 
visible on Europe's eastern and southern fringes. The initial reaction to the new 
major crisis was restriction. Limitations were already being developed due to rising 
numbers attempting to flee to Europe from other regions, as well as internal 
integrationist concerns. However, in the face of the Yugoslav crisis some 
imaginative developments have indeed been forthcoming, from various states with 
some similarities. 
Part Three of this thesis is a case study of the temporary protection 
mechanisms in four European states, and Part Two expands on the 'new' models of 
protection emerging in the 1990s. It has been demonstrated in Part One that there is 
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a strong historical background to contextual developments in refugee definitions and 
protective practices. In the ideal world all those suffering in their home country 
would be protected by stronger, democratic, willing states, while the oppressive 
regimes were ousted allowing for safe return. In the real world only a limited 
number of people achieve protection away from their homeland, and few 
displacement provoking situations can be instantly eradicated. However in the real 
world, both legal and political detinitions of those in need of protection could, in 
contemporary circumstances, be expanded to include those displaced by conflicts and 
the internally displaced. Such developments have taken place in Africa and Latin 
America. Released from the ideological opposition of the Cold War into the fever 
of ethnically and religiously inspired re-organisation, contemporary Europe is 
reconsideri ng its protecti ve stance. 
The Times of 31 July 1951 1 talked of a concerted international effort 
resulting in a form of words to serve the immediate purpose. In an integrating 
European Union, with the desire to uphold basic human rights, the immediate crises 
forcing movements towards its frontiers must be met with a concerted international 
effort if they are to be handled within the tradition Europe has created for itself. 
When it was beginning its integrationist path confronted by communism to the east, 
western Europe created the Convention definition which still stands as a solid 
foundation to all refugee protection. When Europe was releasing its colonies it 
acquiesced to the reality that a broadening of that foundation was required to cope 
with the emergent crises in a decolonised world, with African and Asian states 
searching for their independent directions. Africa accepted the political reality of its 
conflicts and expanded its definitional criteria and basis for solidarity and the non-
politicised nature of protection. Europe has changing political realities, and in the 
context of its own regional and wider international relations, the seeking of new 
directions for protection to manage the contemporary struggles within its reality is 
the historically contiguous path. Within the context of the EU and the wider 
cooperation on this subject under the umbrella of UNHCR progress and imaginative 
suggestions for comprehensive action have been put forward. 
Th~ Tim~s. (31 July 1951) p.7. T~xt cit~d in Chapter I at Nott! 4. 
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SITUATING TEMPORARY 




In Part One the background to discussion of temporary protection was 
developed. In Part Two, temporary protection will be situated within the new 
conceptual and practical approach to displacement situations being formulated by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organisation for 
Migration and the European Commission. An analysis of temporary protection from 
this perspective is used to demonstrate that, as a regional response to crises arising 
from displacements of populations due to armed conflict, this type of protection can 
playa mediating role on both the practical and conceptual levels of a comprehensive 
approach. 
Until the late 1980s, major mass-displacement crises which caused flight 
towards the states of Western Europe, or called for resettlement programmes from 
the developing to the industrialised world, such as Vietnam, were handled as they 
arose, as isolated incidents, or dealt with by application of the Convention definition 
under domestic law and practice, or by the according of lesser, humanitarian or de 
facto statuses. I With the end of the Cold War, and re-emergence of long-
suppressed ethnic tensions and nationalist tendencies in and around Europe, the 
handling of mass-displacement crises effecting this region is in the process of a re-
evaluation. 2 Since the late 1980s the contemporary validity and relevance of the 
1951 Convention definition has also been much questioned.3 The search for 'new' 
solutions to the 'new' crises, or perhaps the re-adaptation of 'old' solutions to the re-
emerging 'old' style crises, has led many to the conclusion that the logical way to 
handle displacement situations is to take what has become known as a 
'comprehensive approach'. Such an approach, spanning all types of migration, 
See UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: the challenge of protection, (penguin: 
Middlesex, 1993) pp.I-14 tor It description of such programmes as were established, such as CAP for 
Vietnam. 
2 See I!'g Suhrke, Astri, 'Towards a comprehensive refugee policy: Conflict and refugees 
in the post-Cold War world' in Bohning, W.R., and M.-L. Schloeter-Paredes (eds.) Aid in place of 
migration?, (International Labour Oftil:e: Geneva, 1994) and UNHCR, Ihid .. 
See Chapter I. 
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involving intra- and inter- organisational and government cooperation, and stretching 
from the origins of migration through intermediate and long term solutions, going 
from the causes to the consequences of migration, is more holistic in nature and 
sounds very straightforward and 'common sensical'. However, because it takes into 
account a whole range of practical policy applications and conceptual and 
philosophical questions it is both highly complex and highly controversial at every 
level of discussion. 
One aspect of comprehensiveness is the notion of beginning from the concept 
of the prevention of tlight. In part this can be explained as finding its roots in a 
desire for people not to be forced to migrate. It could, however, also be said to 
stem from the notion that states have a right no to have migrants (or refugees) thrust 
upon them. States have duties towards their citizens, that is one basis upon which 
the modern system of governance is premised. They also, through the creation of 
alliances and agreements, have duties towards other states. Those states or 
governments which cause flight, through persecution or conflict, are violating the 
rights of their citizens by forcing flight. They are also encroaching upon the rights 
of other states to which victims will flee - whether individual flight is intended by 
the state or simply a bi-product of other policies and actions. However, the states 
towards which refugees turn have also established certain standards with regard to 
the acceptance of immigrants and human rights. Calls to close borders, and uphold 
the sovereign right of the state, are often associated with right-wing, xenophobic 
attitudes, and shouted down by those with a more liberal or humanitarian standpoint. 
However, the maintenance of protection within a comprehensive approach must 
admit that in order to realise a responsibility to protect, the right of states to protect 
their sovereignty, including the final decision on membership of society, has to be 
acknowledged. Therefore, a comprehensive approach including protection will 
involve elements of protection in the country of origin and neighbouring states, as 
well as protection in more distant, and perhaps less involved and/or wealthier states. 
Visions of a 'comprehensive approach' have come from many sources. Both 
James N. Purcell, the Director-General of the International Organisation for 
Migration and Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
referred in the early 1990s to the need for more holistic strategies in dealing with 
the general "problem" of migration, calling respectively for a "dynamic, 
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multifaceted development oriented approach" and an "outward-looking 
comprehensive and concerted refugee strategy for Europe".4 Mrs Ogata in two 
1992 speeches5 identified five key elements in such a strategy: protection; 
distinction between refugees and migrants; greater assistance to refugee 
programmes; prevention of refugee flows; public information, and referred to a 
three pronged strategy of prevention, preparedness and solutions. The view of 
the High Commissioner was echoed by EXCOM6 in its forty-fourth session in 
October 1993. An internal EXCOM document presents a lucid description of what a 
comprehensive approach to migration should involve:? 
In the broadest sense, a comprehensive approach is one in which a 
variety of different but concerted measures are brought to bear in an 
effort to break the cycle of exile, return, internal displacement and 
exile. The ultimate goal of sllch an approach is to promote the overall 
stability of the society and respect for the rights of its citizens, 
including refugees and returnees, and thus to remedy the factors 
causing displacement. The maintenance of peace and security, the 
promotion of economic and social development, and respect for 
human rights must be considered essential elements of any fully 
comprehensive approach. More narrowly, the concept can be 
understood in terms of both the actors (governmental, inter-
governmental and non-governmental, as well as affected communities 
and individuals) and components (political, peacekeeping, 
humanitarian, human rights, developmental). 
The High Commissioner was encouraged by EXCOM to consult with states, 
international organisations and regional bodies on the possibilities for additional 
measures in specific areas with complex problems of coerced population movements. 
Purcell, James N., Jr., Director-General, International Organisation for Migration, Opening 
Remarks, Ninth 10M St'fllinl,r on Migl'llrion: SOl/th-North Migrtltion. 29 Int. Mig. 157 (1990) - cited by 
Goodwin-Gill. Guy S., (for UNHCR and 10M). 'Towards a Comprehensive Regional Policy Approach: 
the case for closer inter-agency cooperation', Paper presented to the Human Dimension Seminar on 
Migration. including Refugees and Displaced Persons, Warsaw, (20-23 April 1993) p.8. 
The speeches referred to were made in The Hague and at Graz. They are cited by Goodwin-
Gill. Ibid., p.9, and also available on the UNHCR Documentation Centre's World Wide Web site at 
http://www .unicc .org/unhcrcdr/. 
6 The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. 
7 Executiw Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Internal document, (May 1994). 
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All these points were re-iterated in General Assembly resolution 48/116.8 
Further notions of, and variations on the theme of, what a 'comprehensive 
approach' should involve were given by (for example) Goodwin-Gill on behalf of 
10M and UNHCR. 'J The theme was also very strongly brought out in the European 
Commission's 1994 Communication to the Council and European Parliament on 
Immigration and Asylum Policies.1U In that document the comprehensive approach 
was divided into three thematic areas: action on migration pressure; action on 
controlling immigration in order to keep it within manageable structures; action to 
strengthen policies for legal immigrants. 
It appears from these variolls descriptions that there are three essential levels 
within a comprehensive and cooperative approach. These are firstly, that it covers 
all the different categories of migrants (illegal or irregular immigrants; economic 
migrants; rural - urban migrants; internally displaced; de facto or humanitarian 
refugees; the temporarily protected; refugees and even potential migrants). 
Secondly, that it includes cooperation on the subject of all categories and at all levels 
of response between national governments, regional organisations and international 
organisations (inter-governmental and non-governmental), as well as between various 
departments in complex, multi-faceted organisational and governmental structures. 
Thirdly, a comprehensive approach involves all kinds of response - preventive, 
protective and palliative - to each category of migration, and is to be implemented in 
cooperation by each type of organisation. 
However, while a comprehensive approach must cover all categories of 
migrants, there mllst, in order for comprehensiveness to be achieved, be a holistic 
approach suitable for each category and each flight provoking situation, since the 
Goodwin-Gill lists an eight point 'activities approach'. This involves: 
1) Effective protection of rethgees 
2) Effective management of migration 
3) Contributing to democratic and economic development 
4) Effective action against clandestine migration and exploitation 
5) Effective imph:mentatioll of international standards 
6) Eft~ctive response to humanitarian emergencies 
7) Effective prevention 
8) Int<mnatiun 
10 European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on 
Immigration and Asylum Policies, ICOM(94) 23 finalj, (Brussels, 23 Fehruary 1994). 
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ultimate cause of tlight will largely determine the action to be taken at each level, 
and affect some of the political and legal variants concerned. 11 In the case under 
study here, the category of migrant is those in need of protection due to armed 
conflict. Of course, the calise of the conflict, and the true reason for flight can be 
varied - but the outward manifestation of final push factor which we are concerned 
with here is an armed contlict situation. So, our first task is to analyze the approach 
to be taken when flight is ultimately provoked by a situation of armed conflict in the 
state of origin. Secondly, our concern here is to investigate response mechanisms 
and to locate temporary protection within the range, and along the scale of responses 
to an armed conflict type flight provoking situation. Finally, we are interested in 
the type of response generated by, and cooperation between di fferent levels of 
organisation (including national governments) a discussion which should assist in 
furthering the discllssion in Chapter Three over regional approaches to refugee 
crises. 
The approach taken here will be one of thematically examining the response 
mechanisms at the various stages in a conflict provoked flight situation, considering 
the practical and conceptual implications of each level and step in the response 
process, assessing the links between the various possible responses, and analyzing 
the benetits of a comprehensive coordinated response over a fragmented organisation 
by organisation, situation by situation approach. This thematic approach will 
include the following elements of a comprehensive preventive and protective 
approach: 
II It must of course be recalled that the causes of Hight are very rarely easy to pinpoint, and it may 
be a result of a number of overlap push and pull factors. However, in the case here, as in others, one 
over-riding factor lIlay be isolated as 'the tinal (and crucial) straw'. 
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1) Root causes Prevention 
2) Safe areas/ humanitarian intervention 
3) Temporary protection/ burden-sharing Protection 
4) Asylum 
5) Return/ repatriation 
6) Resettlement Durable solutions 
7) Integration 
Part Two is divided into three chapters along these thematic lines. Chapter 4 looks 
at root cause approaches to migration. Chaptel' 5, the axiomatic chapter, turns to 
protective measures. Chaptel' 6 examines the notions of 'desirable, durable' 
solutions as the end points of a period of protection.'2 
12 See Thorburn, Joanne, 'Transcending Boundaries: Temporary Protection and Burden-sharing in 
Europe', International Journ;ti of Refugee Law, Vol.? No.3 (1995). 
Root cause approaches 
Chapter 4 
ROOT CAUSE APPROACHES· 
For all their variations, all the lists put forward about the elements of a 
holistic cooperative strategy involve the idea of preventing flows, otherwise known 
as taking a 'root causes approach'. Indeed, taking the thematic approach to the 
handling of migration flows, it is logical to start at the root of the flow. Tackling 
the causes of flight could not only prevent forced movements but also permit safe 
return following a period of temporary protection, thereby upholding the human 
right to protection and also the interests of host states. The major concern is how to 
tackle the causes of a displacement, whilst upholding current legal and normative 
values.2 
Any explicit movement towards tackling the root causes of either voluntary 
or involuntary migration would also put migration policies generally into a new 
phase of development. While inevitably handled within a foreign, as well as 
domestic, policy context, and while often the pawns in political 'games' (particularly 
those of the 'sending' state), migration and asylum policies have always been part of 
other policies. Zolberg ef ol demonstrate the mystification and politicisation of both 
refugee policies and their humanitarian motives with reference to various cases 
throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. A shift to a focus on the use of 
other policies to tackle the root causes of migration would be a significant admission 
that migration and refugee issues had moved into the realm of so-called 'high 
politics'. The fact that this shift has not become obvious perhaps signifies that the 
on-going use of the movement and displacement of people in conflicts such as that in 
This chapt~r is based on th~ author's article 'Root Cause Approaches to Forced Migration: Part 
of a Comprehensive Strategy? A Eurol)ean Perspective', Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol.9 (forthcoming 
1996). 
2 This chapter takes account of the current normative debate in international relations and politics 
literature (See for example Brown, C., International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches, 
(Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992); Frost, M., Towards a normative theory of international 
relations: a critical analysis of the JlhilosOl)hical and methodological assumptions in the discipline with 
proposals towards a substantive normative theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) and 
Walzer, M., Sphclres of Iustice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). 
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former Yugoslavia has not moved migration to the higher agenda. However, as 
displacements such as those in and around Bosnia Herzegovina become threats to 
regional security. and above all threats to the politicised humanitarianism which has 
become the emphasised motivation behind major elements of crisis and conflict 
management (for example, the establishment of so-called 'safe areas'), it is perhaps 
time to explore the nature of this approach. The arrival of root cause approaches on 
the political agenda is being heralded by bodies such as the European Commission3, 
even if its lack of tangible political interest (perhaps due to its nature of having long 
term aims and effects rather then immediately obvious ones) is as yet preserving its 
discussion for academic debate. 
1. PREVENTION 
The word 'prevention' as used by UNHCR and EXCOM usually refers to 
what might be seen as the next step of a comprehensive approach, humanitarian 
intervention, 'safe areas' or, 'prevenrive proTeCTion '.4 The addressing of the root 
causes of 'refugee problems' is seen by EXCOM to lie clearly with governments, 
with UNHCR able to play only a very limited role. The very attempt to distinguish 
between forms of 'prevention' indicates, however, that a root causes approach to 
forced migration is very nuanced, and easily shades into early protective measures. 
During the eighties and early nineties there has been a growing realisation 
assistance and political efforts must extend far beyond charitable and 
humanitarian concern, and that strategies and anticipatory foreign 
policies that deal with the root causes of the refugee problem have 
See Commission of the European Communities, Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, (COM{94) 23 final), (Brussels, 23 February 1994); 
Perrakis, S. (ed.), Immigration and European Union: building on a comprehensive approach (Athens: 
EKEM and AnI. N. Sakkoulas, 1995) [Proceedings of the international conference with the same title, 
held under the auspices of the Greek Presidency and with the support of the European Commission in 
Vouliagmeni, Greece, June 19951· 
See for example. Fre1ick. B., '·Preventive Protection" and the Right to Seek Asylum: A 
Preliminary Look at Bosnia and Croatia', International Journal of Refugee Law, VolA No.4 (1992) and 
Adelman, H., 'Humanitarian Intervention: the case of the Kurds', International Journal of Refugee law, 
VolA No.1 (1992). 
Loescher. G., Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Globa! Refugee Crisis, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993) p.184. 
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world today. 
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In other words, in the search for long term stability, it has been realised that 
prevention is a key - and that the only way to attempt to prevent flows of refugees is 
to attempt to cure the causes of their tlight. 
Rogers and Copeland refer to prevention as "the elimination of the causes -
such as human rights violations or civil wars - that force persons to flee".6 They 
rightly say that prevention should occur before forced migrations occur, but, as has 
been noted, a root causes approach shades into other prevention methods, namely 
those to stem the flows once they have started. There are, therefore, two levels at 
which the root causes of forced migration might be addressed. Firstly, in 
anticipation of poten tial migratory flows, and second I y, once such a flow has 
commenced. The boundaries between these two levels are not clear, and similar 
practical and conceptual difficulties arise at both stages. 
2. ELEMENTS OF ROOT CAUSE APPROACHES, AND 
THEm HISTORY 
Zolberg el af trace the origins of the root cause debate in the UN system to a 
"heated discussion in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee in 
1980. ,,7 The discussion was sparked by Western initiatives within the UN to censor 
Cuba and Vietnam for their encouragement of mass exoduses. This discussion was 
followed by a report on mass exoduses for ECOSOC, under the auspices of the 
former High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadruddin Aga Khan, in 1981, and five 
years later by a report on "International Cooperation to Avert new Flows of 
Refugees" issued by a Group of Experts, established by a resolution of the General 
Assembly. At the same time, outside the framework of the UN, an Independent 
Commission on International Humanitarian Issues was formed (in 1983), and a 
report by that Commission was issued in 1986. The Commission was co-chaired by 
Sadruddin Aga Khan and the Crown Prince of Jordan Hassan Bin Talal. The 
6 Rogers, R. and E. Copeland, Forced Migration: Policy Issues in the Post-Cold War World, 
(fufts University, 1993) p.121. 
7 Zolberg, A., A. Suhrke and S. Aguayo, Escape from Violence: contlict and the refugee crisis in 
the develOJ)ing world, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p.258. 
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outcome of both reports was that human rights abuses, poverty and inequity needed 
to be tackled. However, both concluded by emphasising the need for "better 
management of asylum policies, relief assistance and [the] search for 'durable 
solutions' in the form of permanent settlements in a host country, or repatriation" as 
refugees would continue to arrive in large numbers.s That is to say that a 
comprehensive approach would be necessary, and that tackling the causes of 
migration, where they are visible, will not always be sufficient, even if the means 
available to tackle them ever proved strong and broad enough to overcome the 
causes of flight, or to stop the human urge to migrate. 
As for the elements of a root causes approach, they are varied, and cover 
many aspects of international relations and foreign policy. As well as measures to 
avoid forced displacement, these include ways of preventing unregulated or illegal 
economic migration. When considering the root causes approach, we cannot 
consider only measures such as preventive diplomacy, which are directly related to 
the cause of migration (armed conflict) being dealt with in this thesis. Here an 
overlap of policies must take place on two levels. Firstly, in attempts to prevent the 
degeneration of a situation into contlict, as well as active diplomacy and negotiation, 
other measures sllch as aid and development assistance may be necessary. This will 
involve addressing the causes of voluntary migration, and ultimately may also result 
in the prevention of forced migration. A second overlap of policies occurs once 
contlict has broken out, or is perceived to be imminent, as preventive diplomacy 
comes to the fore, followed in recent cases such as Bosnia and Iraq by some level of 
humanitarian and/or military intervention. It is then that the overlap between the 
root causes approach and 'preventive protection' becomes apparent. 
The measures usually classed as constitutive elements of a root causes 
approach, then, include (to prevent forced migration) the promotion and monitoring 
of human rights; preventive diplomacy; conflict resolution; (to prevent both forced 
and voluntary migration) efforts to strengthen national laws and institutions; (to limit 
voluntary migration and perhaps, indirectly, eventual forced migration) the 
promotion of sustainable development; international aid; and the dissemination of 
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information and public education. 9 However, tackling the ~ root causes of a 
conflict, which could be centuries old often cannot be even (realistically) envisioned. 
In the meantime, attempts to offset ethnic or nationalist divisions with efforts to 
encourage economic development, by trying to open lip markets or enrich less 
developed and emerging states, are unlikely to be immediately, and in a practical 
sense, effective. This is due in the first instance to lack of funds, and secondly to 
the mismanagement of available resources. Indeed attempts to enrich could simply 
become measures of funding conflict, or of funding flight. 
The practical tackling of migration causing factors poses particular difficulties 
in terms of the formulation of policies, their implementation and the 'coercing' of 
states from which migratory flows originate into following the 'rules'. One major 
effort in this direction has been undertaken in the CSCE Charter of Paris of 
November 1990, which recognises that participating states should not pursue policies 
which lead their citizens to seek safety, refuge and livelihood elsewhere in an 
unregulated manner, and that countries which have difficulties in meeting the needs 
of their people should receive assistance from the international community. Such 
assistance would be both to the benefit of the people in the states of origin, and in 
the interests of other states wishing to avoid migration towards their borders. 
However, the effective achievement of these goals is, as Goodwin-Gill points out, 
threatened by ever increasing gaps in living standards, and imbalances between 
development and population growth. to It is equally threatened by the maintenance 
of ethnic hostilities, expansionist tendencies and the reluctance to let go of, or enter 
into peaceful negotiations over, the secessionist regions of some signatories (for 
example Russia and the conflict in Chechnya). 
9 See Goodwin-Gill, G.S., (for UNHCR and 10M), 'Towards a Comprehensive Regional Policy 
Approach: the case tor closer inter-agency cooperation', Paper presented to the Human Dimension 
Seminar on Migration. including Refugees and Displaced Persons. (Warsaw 20-23 April, 1993) p.33: 
Rogers and Copeland. op.cit., p.121. Rogers and Copeland note the Ito date) ineffectiveness of early 
warning, and the example of the PHARE Democracy Programme of the European Union as an example of 
effective public educatioll. Gilhert oft~rs a more precise example of possible measures to tackle root 
causes in his advocation of a restraining of the arms trade, Gilhert, G., 'Root Causes and International 
Law: Refugee Flows in the 1990s', Netherlands Human Rights Quarterly, 4. 
10 Goodwin-Gill. Ibid .• p.29. 
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3. A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
The European Commission in its 1994 Communication puts forward a 
coordinated plan of action for its Member States' governments. This provides an 
interesting case of the inter-related elements of both the root causes and wider 
comprehensive approaches within organisations. The Commission sees 'action on 
migration pressure' as requiring the integration of immigration and asylum policies 
into the Union's external policies, and as potentially including action at various 
levels in areas sllch as trade, development and cooperation policies, humanitarian 
assistance and human rights policies. This leads to certain institutional questions. 
The Communication classes as main migration inducing pressures: the human 
rights situation; the political situation; economic disparities; demographic factors; 
and environmental factors. In order to tackle these push factors the Commission 
sees a need for coordinated action in the fields of: foreign policy; trade policy; 
development cooperation; and immigration and asylum policy. In support of this 
approach it cites the 1992 Edinburgh Conclusions, in which the European Council 
adopted a Declaration on Principles Governing External Aspects of Migration 
Policy. 11 An important additional element of a root cause approach, currently the 
topic of much debate both in the Commission and elsewhere, is the need for systems 
of early warning, followed by preventive diplomacy. In this context the European 
Commission, supported by the European Parliament is looking into the potential of a 
'European Immigration Observatory', and other institutions, such as UNHCR are 
setting lip their own systems. 12 
However, involving other policy areas so directly in one component of a so 
called comprehensive approach at European Union level provokes institutional 
questions for the Union, and queries over the position of Member States. 
II See Chapter 3. 
12 It has yet to be proved that early warning of 'refugee crises' can be very effective, beyond of 
course the fact that whenever one hears of connict in any region through the media it is natural, and 
usually correct, to assume that a mass tlow of civilians is on the move, either within the state of origin, or 
towards and across borders. Projects are being carried out in and with the support of various fora 
including UNHCR's Documentation Centre and the European Commission. A Pre-feasibility Study on a 
Possible Future European Immigration Observatory (Luxembourg: Ofticial Publications Office of the 
European Union, 1994) was presented to th~ International Conti::rence 'Immigration and the European 
Union: building on a cOlllpr~hensive approach', June 25-28, 1994. 
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3.1 Institutional difficulties •• " 
Since the ratification of the Treaty on European Union in November 1993, 
the European Commission operates under a three pillar system. The first pillar, 
including areas such as external economic relations, trade and development 
assistance has an exclusive right of initiative and the right to adopt directives and 
regulations. The second pillar, involving the search for "a common foreign and 
security policy" , sees the Commission "fully associated" , but without any 
implementational or directing role, as the positions to be taken by the Member States 
are to be coordinated and defined by them at Council level. 13 Meanwhile, the third 
pillar, which involves cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs, 
including immigration and asyluill policies has a shared right of initiative alongside 
Member States and the possibility of adopting joint actions, joint positions and 
conventions. 14 
Separating issues related to the asylum and immigration question would 
perhaps result in the first pillar Directorates-General of the Commission acting 
specifically in order to reduce migration pressures. This could give rise to a 
situation in which a component of immigration and asylum policy, a matter in which 
the Commission has only a shared right of initiative, was being handled for the 
Union via Commission directives and regulations. Such a system of managements 
would be outside the perceived borders of state sovereignty, of which an essential 
feature is held to be the right to control admission to state territory and membership 
of the state citizenry. 
3.2 ..• and no."mative questions 
If, on the other hand, the aim were to have development, assistance and trade 
programmes which were not aimed specifically at reducing migration, but rather 
were covertly influenced by distinct immigration and asylum policy departments, 
myriad ethical questions would arise. The major ethical question to be posed, 
regardless of the means of (to put it simply) dividing the labour, would be how one 
13 Tr.:atyon Europt:ltn Union, Titl~ Y. 
14 TEU, K3 and K4. 
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could justify the use of policies to prevent migration, that is to prevent exit from the 
country of origin. If policies were aimed 'only' at upholding human rights, for 
example, then most people would label them 'good'.as Once the aim rather than 
the (perhaps fortunate in some people's view) by-product becomes the prevention of 
migration, the percentage of 'bad' votes would rise dramatically, because the aim 
would involve the violation of the right to leave, even though it upheld the norm of 
the state's right to control entry and membership. 
This raises the question of humanitarianism as the emphasised motive for 
refugee policies. The normative justification for the use of a root cause approach to 
any type of migration would have to be that the aim was to allow people greater 
ability to choose whether to stay or move, by enhancing their potential to stay. In 
the case of forced migration in particular, there would also need to be a 
demonstrated moti ve of general preven tion of death, destruction and the other 
horrors of contlict, and not just a desire to stem immigration numbers. Indeed, in 
this case, the further steps of the comprehensive approach outlined above would 
need to be accepted, admitted to, and kept open. 
3.3 Ol'ganisational pl'oblcms 
Finally, if a way around these institutional and normative difficulties were to 
become evident, then any sharing out of duties would involve a level of intra-
organisational coordination and cooperation far greater than that which has yet been 
perceived in the European Commission. '6 In addition, taking the issue of tackling 
root causes of forced migration onto the higher political agenda because of the 
migration element, would require deep political will on behalf of the governments of 
the Member States. There would need to be strong commitment and desire to link 
foreign policies to migration issues, rather than states finding themselves facing 
migration 'problems' as a direct or indirect result of their foreign policy approaches. 
I~ See, tor example, Gilbert, op.eit., 1'.4. 
16 
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causes approach to immigration and asylum issues were to be kept within the third 
pillar, the Member States would have to agree unanimously on every use of foreign 
policy, development assistance or other policy for this purpose. Under Title V of 
the Treaty of European Union joint actions may currently be agreed to by a qualified 
majority, although the conditions surrounding a decision to vote in this way rather 
than to unanimity apparently make it unlikely that the qualified majority rule would 
be used anywayY Furthermore, the Commission would be required to coordinate 
its actions both within and between Directorates General and the Secretariat General 
to ensure that there would be no overlap, and that operating procedures would be 
efficient. 
However, as both asylum and immigration issues and foreign and security 
policies remain matters for intergovernmental cooperation, the combination of these 
policy issues, or perhaps more accurately, the acknowledgement of their linkage and 
the decision to coordinate usage of policy making tools, with a view to the overall 
effect of policy determination, would not be impossible. To make it possible would 
require political will of all Member States, not only to make this policy linkage in 
dealing with the causes of forced migration, but also in further recognising the need 
for a Union wide approach to protection and popUlation issues generally. A 
particularly pertinent question when thinking about this linkage is to address 
situations where mass influxes of displaced persons in need of international 
protection, either into the European Union itself, or into its immediate neighbours, 
might constitute a challenge to regional peace, security and stability. 
In Council discussions following the publication of the Commission's 
February 1994 Comlllunication some guarded interest is reported to have been 
expressed in addressing root causes. The Barcelona 'Mediterranean' Conference of 
November 1995 was perhaps a first step in this direction. However, no full-scale 
action plan for the addressing of the root causes of migratory flows, and in 
particular forced displacement, has (as of 1996) been adopted by the European 
Union Member States. Meanwhile, papers presented to the European Commission 
sponsored conference 'Europe and Immigration: building on a comprehensive 
approach', and discussions which took place in that meeting, including on the 
17 Edwards, G. and S. Nuttall, 'Common Foreign and Security Policy', in Duff, A., J. Pinder and 
R. Price (eds.), Maastricht and beyond: building the European Union, (London: Routledge, 1994) p.96. 
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subject of the possible establishment of a European Immigration Observatory, where 
accurate information would be collected and potential policy directions formulated, 
demonstrated that the path forward on the subject of a root cause approach is neither 
straight nor smooth. However, from the holding of such a conference, and from 
presentations by Commission officials, it seems that the Commission has a strong 
desire to forge ahead in its thinking on this issue, either isolated or within the 
framework of a 'comprehensive approach'. 
4. THE PROBLEMS OJ;""' APPROACHING ROOT CAUSES 
The prevention of forced, and indeed unforced, migration, is hardly problem-
free. Collinson perceives tive major problems with the root causes approach within 
European Immigration and Asylum Policies, and these deserve some attention. 18 
She sees it as an approach which is founded in defensive thinking, and, since it is 
treated as another 'solution', reactive in nature. Its use to prevent migration is, she 
says, impossible, due to the complexity of the problem, the competing interests 
which lie at the heart of these matters and the unpredictability of migratory pressures 
and situations causing displacement. Finally, she finds a normative problem in the 
notion that this approach encourages - ie that migration can and should be prevented. 
Collinson is quite right to be sceptical about the effectiveness of a root causes 
approach as a solution to migration 'problems', and in her difficulties with its 
implication that all migration can and should be prevented. As has been shown in a 
work edited by Sarah Spencer, immigration can, and should, be seen in a positive as 
well as (or instead ot) negative light, as without migration our societies would no 
longer be involved in a cultural-evolutionary process, and would become static. 19 
However, Collinson is mistaken in assuming that all elements of a root 
causes approach are reactive and defensive. This criticism could possibly be made 
of using this approach on the second of the two levels on which it could operate -
after flight has begun. However, prior to displacements occurring it can be seen as 
18 Collinson, Sarah, B~yond Borders: West European Migration Policy Towards the 21st Century, 
(London: RIIA! Wyndham Place Trust, 1993). 
19 Spencer, S .. (ed.), Strangers and Citizens: a positive approach to migrants and refugees, 
(London: Institute of Public Policy Research/ Rivers Oram Press, 1994). 
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an active stance, particularly if the country of origin were, as is suggested by the 
European Commission's Communication, to be involved in the process from the 
beginning of its operation. 
As well as the institutional difficulties for the European Union, an effectively 
implemented root causes approach poses broader practical and conceptual 
difficulties, including those raised by Collinson, but which, it is suggested here, in 
fact centre on one of the key elements of the approach - intervention. 
4.1 Intel'ventioll 
While the international community would have several tools at its disposal in 
attempts to address the causes of migration generally before it occurs, intervention in 
a situation which is causing or perceived to be about to force flight has to be a 
central feature of any discussion on the ways to tackle forced displacements. 
'Intervention' is often taken as a broad term, and, for example, prior to a situation's 
degeneration to the point of tlight producing conflict could be said to encompass 
economic sanctions, a control on the import of arms to the state(s) in question, 
conditionality (economic and political assistance and understanding in return for 
protection of human and minority rights) or, in a more positive sense, the provision 
of development assistance. These forms of intervention, hand in hand with 
diplomatic negotiations to resolve a flight provoking situation should be exercised 
before stronger intervention could ever be contemplated. If these means of conflict 
or crisis resolution fail, the attention of international debate inevitably turns to 
stronger forms of intervention. Indeed, the generic term inrervenrion has become 
more strongly associated with either military intervention (participation in a conflict 
aimed at its resolution) or humanitarian intervention (the provision of aid and 
defensive protection to vulnerable populations within a given territory). The type of 
intervention which would be necessary to tackle the causes of forced migration, and 
prevent such movements or permit return, would be military intervention, with a 
humanitarian aim and component. 
During the Cold War period, intervention was generally opposed, and seen in 
a negative light. However, a new movement towards an emerging norm of positive 
intervention can be said to have been occurring during the early 1990s. From this 
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perspective, intervention would be seen "as a positive means to resolve conflict and 
protect human rights of vulnerable citizens" .20 One group of such vulnerable 
citizens are those who, if intervention were not to occur, would become refugees. 
In a 1994 article, Astri SlIhrke sees the likelihood of greater efforts being made in 
the post-Cold War world to 'avert' flows. She sees intervention as an on-going 
phenomenon, continuing on both the regional and collective (UN) level. However, 
as she points out, it is, and will be, easier to obtain international agreement to aid 
refugees than to address the causes of the outtloW.21 
Suhrke uses three cases to demonstrate this point, those of the Kurdish 
situation, the situation in Myanmar and the situation in Haiti (in 1991). In the first 
instance, which she describes as being met with "incomplete activism" by the 
international community she demonstrates that a highly interventionist refugee 
policy, departing from the principle of providing asylum outside the state, was left 
in uncertainty by the failure to tackle the root causes of the long standing Kurdish 
struggle. 22 In the second case, she demonstrates the near paralysis of the UN, 
many states, particularly in the Asian region, holding back because of shared 
problems of ethnic minorities, and a fear of intrusive external pressures in their own 
affairs. Finally, the Haitian case shows a situation where a regional (OAS) root 
causes strategy was developed, without accompanying protection mechanisms 
including "the option of temporary asylum",2l 
As Suhrke rightly points out, "the principle of non-interference remains the 
obstacle - and may in fact have been strengthened in the post-Cold War world as 
many countries, particularly in the developing world, fear a more assertive UN or 
regional bodies. "2~ An additional problem with this approach is that of 
jurisdiction, and whether one can intervene early enough to prevent migrations -
even if justification for intervention due to such a motive can be found. It is often 
1O Shaq>, Jane M.O., 'Appeast)mellt, Intervention and the future of Europe'. in Freedman, 
Lawrence (ed.), Military Interventiun in European Conflicts, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) p.37. 
21 Suhrke, A., 'Towards a comprt)hensive refugee policy: Conflict and refugees in the post-cold war 
world' in Bohning, W.R. and M.-L. Schloeter-Paredes (eds.), Aid in place of migration?, (Geneva: 
International Labour Oftice, 1994) 1>1'·26-8. 
Ihid., 1>·27. 
Ihid., 1'.28. 
24 Ihid., p.28. 
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the case that intervention, if it is to take place, comes after the crisis has started. 
Sharp uses a set of five preconditions associated with just war doctrine to 
establish the justification of intervention, defined as ending a war on behalf of 
others. 25 These preconditions dictate that an operation, which must be aimed at a 
just cause, and conducted under a competent authority, should be undertaken only 
after attempts at resolution through peaceful means have been exhausted, with a 
sense of proportion and discrimination, and only if success seems likely. Michael 
Walzer, meanwhile, offers a (revised) 'legalist paradigm' summarising the theory of 
aggression with six propositions.26 This holds that there is an international society 
of independent states which has a law establishing the rights of its members, and 
which places the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty above all 
other rights. Within this established system, any use of force or imminent threat of 
force by one state against those supreme rights constitutes aggression and is a 
criminal act, which justifies two kinds of violent response: either a war of self-
defence by the victim, or a war of enforcement of international standards by 
(an)other state(s) together with the victim. According to Walzer'S original paradigm 
only aggression can justify war, although he revises this to allow that violations of 
human rights within a state, promotion of overwhelmingly supported secessionist and 
self-determination movements, and the countering of prior intervention can justify 
war. 
Neither of these classifications of criteria for just war or intervention includes 
direct reference to forced population movements as a justification for such action. 
Looking beyond these sets of preconditions, however, and into the debates 
surrounding intervention in the 1990s, we find, as Sharp indicates, a set of at least 
three dichotomies which need to be addressed involving the intrusive and improper 
nature of intervention as opposed to its more recently acknowledged positive and 
affirmative aspects, and the question of unilateral or collective intervention,21 A 
further dichotomy, and the one which is of interest here, is that between the 
protection of state values and the upholding of human values - understood as 
recognised norms of human and minority rights. On this level determinations must 
25 Sharp, op.cit., "".34-5. 
26 Walzer, M., Just cmd Uniust Wars: a moral ar!!um~llt with historical illustrations, (New York: 
BasicBooks, 1977) [S~colld Edition 1992) pp.61-3; 85; 90; 108; 121. 
27 Sharp. op.cit., p.34. 
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still be made, as the examples used by Suhrke referred to above indicate. All three 
examples show state integrity over-riding human values in the outcome if not the 
initial desires of the interventionist strategies. 
The most recent case of justified (and justifiable) intervention in the Gulf 
War clearly was a demonstration of the international community's willingness to 
intervene to protect the territorial integrity of a state (Kuwait), particularly when 
other interests were also benetited.2t! The initial lack of intervention in Bosnia 
Herzegovina also shows that in spite of humanitarian level justifications, the absence 
of demonstrable state level justifications for intervention (as well as political 
divisions and indecision) holds back the international community from real 
responsive action of this type. Sharp points to the genocide occurring in Bosnia 
Herzegovina as a wrong, and as a circumstance which cannot justify passivity. She 
offers strategic and deterrent arguments for intervention in this case, not least of 
which is the upholding of the European ideal of pluralistic and multi-ethnic states 
and regions within the continent.2~ Relating intervention to the addressing of the 
root causes of forced migration, the question has to be whether such arguments can 
also lead one to use the human rights and minority rights abuses demonstrated in the 
forced displacement (as distinct from genocidal) aspects of 'ethnic cleansing' as 
justification for military intervention. Furthermore, it is necessary to ask whether 
forced displacements and the destruction of multi-ethnic statehood as potential causes 
of regional instability and insecurity are reason enough, motivation enough or 
justification enough for intervention. 
If the answer to this is yes, then the next question is whether a distinction can 
or should be made between forced movements which can be contained and absorbed 
by other pluralistic and multi-ethnic states of the region, and those which might tip 
the balance of already delicately equilibrated ethnically mixed states, and where the 
line is drawn. If containment of the situation within this fine balance is not possible, 
the question becomes that of whether states should use this humanitarian justification 
for intervention if they could in fact spread the protection 'burden' further afield. 
The problem comes down to whether using forced migration to justify intervention 
would be for the human right of people to remain in their homes and country of 
28 WalZl!r, Just and Unjust Wars. op . .:it., Prt:face to the: 1992 I!uitioll. 
Sharp. 0IJ.l:it.. pp42-3. 
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origin or for the states where protection would be sought to use their sovereign will 
to deny protection within their boundaries, by involving themselves in the 
displacement-provoking contlict. This difficulty is not easily resolved, for while 
state use of intervention to uphold the sovereign right to territorial integrity of 
aggressed states might be quite readily justifiable, its use to uphold human and 
minority rights within a state or states at war cannot be seen as absolute or 'pure', 
without resolving the following dilemmas. Would the motive of military 
intervention justified in humanitarian terms, with the aim of addressing the root 
cause of tlight, be that of permitting people to remain in their homes in safety or 
preventing people from arriving to seek protection in other states? Can it be 
considered that there is a primacy in human rights terms of being able to remain 
over being able to seek protection elsewhere? Finally could military intervention, 
which inevitably would threaten the lives of the civilians in whose name it was being 
carried out, actually be given humanitarian justification? 
In the light of action by the UN and NATO in Bosnia Herzegovina in 
September 1995 one perhaps also needs to consider the multiplicity of motives 
bringing about the delayed use of long-threatened intervention to uphold rights and 
halt massive movements of populations, caused by the shelling of besieged cities and 
the overthrowing of nominal 'safe areas'. While protection may be claimed as the 
ultimate objective, the hesitation to carry out threats until the point where 'face' may 
be lost, and the very legitimacy and existence of such organisations themselves 
might be called into question, points to a need for stronger advance policy making 
on situations where interventionist strategies might be appropriate. This hesitancy 
also demonstrates the need to take into account the fact that the timing and type of 
intervention is crucial if the aim is to limit forced displacement, rather than to 
provoke further movements through international action. 
While humanitarian concerns about forced displacements could eventually be 
used in conjunction with other security and sovereignty arguments to justify 
intervention in a contlict, the dilemmas surrounding this issue are likely to mean that 
it could never be the sole justitication for such action, and that displacement issues 
will not advance so far on the political agenda to give any likelihood to the 
possibility of intervention to prevent migration. Any direct tackling of the root 
causes of migration would therefore have to remain within the weaker interventionist 
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realm (sanctions and development assistance) where the moral dilemma exists, but is 
perhaps not such a forceful issue. At the same time, such measures cannot be 
expected ever to fully deter forced migrations (or voluntary migrations) and so other 
elements of a comprehensive approach, including effective protection, asylum and 
immigration policies. must still be enhanced and developed. 
5. AIl\1S AND HURDLES 
To summarise, root cause approaches to migration issues have a twofold aim, 
and a double practical and conceptual hurdle to overcome. The morally justifiable 
aim of such approaches is that of resolving the causes of the necessity of flight: 
human rights abuses; ethnic and civil tensions or conflicts; wars and development 
problems, before they begin, or very soon afterwards. However, not only is there a 
need for both the ability and the political will to intervene in this way, but the 
motivation of so acting needs to be questioned. If it is wholly for the sake of those 
people whose lives would be put at risk were these causes of flight not addressed 
then many would say this approach was laudable. If the motivation is rather as a 
part of restrictive asylum and protection policies within the potential receiving states 
then, from a human rights perspective, it cannot be so easily justified. 
In this context one should note the comments made by the High 
Commissioner in Bonn in June 1994,30 to the effect that the challenge is not how to 
keep people away, but rather how to control refugee and migratory flows in a way 
which upholds basic human rights and humanitarian principles, and how to meet the 
needs of victims world-wide as well as the concerns of the states and communities 
which receive them. Tackling root causes is, she said, in this context, essential. 
The obvious inference is that if the tackling of root causes is in the context of 
preventing the flight of those in need of protection in order to uphold state 
sovereignty through restrictive asylum policies, it is far from a desirable action. As 
Gilbert points out "[p]reventive action should not be aimed at keeping refugees out 
of Europe, but should be undertaken for humanitarian considerations, even if the 
Availahle on the Internet at http://www.unicc.org/unhcrcdr/. 
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former may be an incidental result. ,,31 The motivating force of restricted asylum 
is, however, understandable and justifiable from a primacy of state sovereignty 
perspective, and (perhaps worryingly) it seems that the prevailing view is becoming 
one in which the migration aspect of potential crises is seen as a useful contribution 
to overcome political obstacles with regard to measures in the context of preventive 
diplomacy. 
Simultaneously, there is a difficulty from the state sovereignty perspective in 
that intervention and interference in internal state affairs, by the international or 
regional community, would become necessary. The current norm is one of non-
intervention, so for a root causes approach to work effectively this solid basis of the 
international law of states, and UN Charter, tinds itself in a questionable position, 
open to re-negotiation, particularly on the issue of the contribution which the 
prevention of forced displacements might make to the creation of a migration 
oriented humanitarian justitication for intervention in conflict. Suhrke's statement of 
the re-affirmation of the principle of non-interference is probably correct, however, 
Loescher is surely equally correct in his assertion that "it is time for a major debate 
about how the UN, regional bodies, and states can effectively intervene in internal 
conflicts. ,,32 Such a debate is necessary if the root causes approach is to become an 
effective element, at both levels described, within the comprehensive approach. 
CONCLUSION 
In an effective comprehensive strategy towards migration flows, including 
forced migrations, attempts at prevention have to be a key first step in at least the 
thought processes of policy making. Addressing the question of prevention on its 
two levels, before migration occurs and after it has begun (in order to stem further 
flows and allow return) requires both active (or pro-active) and reactive policies. 
However, on either level, a careful distinction has to be made in what is motive and 
what is by-product. A moral stance on asylum and immigration policies would not 
find justification for the violation of the right to freedom of movement, or the right 
31 Gilbert. op.cit.. p.414. Gilbert goes on to cite the situation seen following the Gulf crisis, and 
activated for the Kurds and later in the Bosnian crisis: "In the wake of the Gulf Contlict, the British 
government spoke of setting up sat~ zones throughout the world where rllfugees might flee, but the 
unstated aim was to d~ny those r~fllget:'s the challl·e of applying t(lr asylulll in Europe." 
32 LOesch~r, op.cit" ».196. 
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to seek and enjoy asylum. A position which permitted the maintenance of the ability 
to choose whether or not to move, by attempting to ensure that conditions in the 
country of origin made the option to remain (in safety) possible, and upholding the 
right to seek and enjoy asylum of those who, for legitimate reasons, could not stay 
in the country of origin would, however, tind both legal and moral justification. In 
particular, using a root cause approach to migration to justify an interventionist 
policy would create a very precarious position. 
Within a comprehensive approach, which is by its very nature multifaceted, a 
root causes approach offers a layered series of policies of which the aim should be 
to improve conditions in states of origin, a by-product being that emigration from 
those states towards the developed world may be reduced, or indeed potentially that 
immigration and emigration would become complementary. Whatever happens, 
though, the other components of a holistic plan of action, especially protective 
policies, must not be ignored, and should continue to be developed to address the 
contemporary situation. 
The case of the European Union's approach to immigration and asylum 
policies, and particularly the role of the European Commission in inter-governmental 
and inter- and intra-organisational cooperation, demonstrates that the practical 
implementation of a root causes approach, even if conceptual hurdles can be 
overcome, is not exactly plain sailing, particularly where political will might be 
lacking, or hesitant, due to the very complexity of the issues to be addressed and the 
overlapping of motivating forces. 
Although it is practically and conceptually very difficult to imagine the root 
causes of all migration flows, and especially forced migration flows resulting from 
long-term ethnic tensions, being successfully and effectively tackled, as one 
component in a comprehensive approach it is to be applauded particularly for the 
potential it offers of broadening government understanding of the phenomenon of 
migration, and in the long term for the creation of more effective policies. 33 
However, even if part of creating a comprehensive approach to forced displacement 
involves the tackling of the causes of the flows once debate on the overcoming of 
the barriers highlighted above can begin (and shows results), protection is always 
going to be absolutely essential. 
)) SI!I! Collinson, op.cit .. p.55. 
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THE PROTECTIVE APPROACHES I 
To be effective refugee policy must encompass adherence to existing legal 
obligations, have a strong moral basis and set out from the assumption that all 
forced migration scenarios are manageable in one way or another. If policies aimed 
at resolving flight provoking situations fail, or displacements occur anyway, refugee 
policies must involve the ability to protect. The moral basis to the entire refugee 
issue involves the upholding of human rights and dignity, and is standardised by 
international legal obligations established in a number of documents. Those 
documents do not, however, express any obligations with the regard to how 
protection should be enacted. In order to manage evolving crises, protective 
mechanisms have spread from the basis of protection aimed at integration to involve 
a search for protection aimed at permitting a resumption or an evolution of the 
situation prior to tlight, highlighting return as the solution of priority. Forms of 
protection which might be categorised as 'more limited' than established asylum and 
integration have therefore been formulated within the 'comprehensive approach'. 
The assessment of limitations rests on the level they achieve in offering asylum in 
terms of protection rather than in terms of integration. In fact as forms of 
protection, in view of the wider picture of the developments of societies and 
international relations, mechanisms other than the regular asylum-integration practice 
of the twentieth century may prove to be broader and stronger mechanisms than the 
integrationist bias to asylum which is being challenged. 
Elements of Chapters 5 and 6 and the Conclusion to Part Two are taken from the author's article 
'Transcending Boundaries: Temporary Protection and Burden-sharing in Europe" International Journal of 
Refugee Law, Vol.? No.3 (1995). 
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1. Preventive Protection: 'safe areas' and humanitarian 
intervention2 
While UNHCR does not actively take part in 'root cause approaches', it does 
claim a role in prevention activities, as it considers that: 3 
Humanitarian assistance itself can play an important role in 
prevention. The negotiations involved in delivering assistance may 
create an opening for dialogue, drawing antagonists into discourse 
with external observers in a way that allows the international 
community to exercise some restraint on refugee-producing behaviour. 
The enactment of 'preventive protection' in terms of permitting people, through 
assistance measures, to remain close to their homes and ultimately return, has not 
been successfully conceptualised or achieved. Such protection policies are very 
much a reaction to restrictions on entry and asylum. The practical manifestation of 
this preventive idea which has emerged in the 1990s is the creation of 'safe areas'. 
This policy attempt has not succeeded in preventing displacements even if it has to 
some extent prevented movements beyond the country or immediate region of origin. 
Meanwhile, aid, the key element in this approach, has become increasingly 
politicised.4 In addition, while attempts to keep people close to their homes may 
have resulted in a reduction in the number of potential refugees (those who have left 
their country of origin) who actually become refugees, this has been matched or 
exceeded by rising numbers of internally displaced people. There is no international 
agency with a mandate to enact protection of the internally displaced. Their 
protection by the international community, in cases where the protection of the home 
government is as lacking as if they had left the country, also raises significant 
2 In ord~r to limit this study to the ~ssential element of protection, the focus will be on the security 
and intervention components, not on questions concerning the tYlles of aid (food, shelter, medicines) or 
their actual delivery and distribution. Although the provision of effective assistance is the ultimate aim of 
many forms of humanitarian intervention, it cannot be achieved without protection of overall safety. 
UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: the challenge of protection, (Penguin: Middlesex, 
1993) p.129. 
4 See tor example Loescher, Gil. Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global 
Refugee Crisis, (Oxtord University Press: New York, 1993) p.28. 
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questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity.s 
1.1 Practical attempts to create 'safe areas': Iraq and Bosnia Herzegovina6 
Adelman points to three 'traditional' refugee solutions, and the reason for 
which they could no longer stand the test of the practical situation in early post-Cold 
War displacement situations such as that in northern Iraq.7 The three traditional 
solutions are: resettlement abroad; settlement in countries of first asylum; 
repatriation. A similar rationalisation could be made in the Bosnian case. 8 
In the crisis of the Kurds in northern Iraq, resettlement was not considered a 
viable option because of the large numbers involved, the lack of political will to face 
an evacuation and the fact that resettlement would play into Saddam Hussein's 
hands. Turkey, which would have been the first country of asylum, was adamantly 
opposed to playing such a role unless the protection would be temporary, with 
resettlement in third countries guaranteed. Such a guarantee was not forthcoming. 
Meanwhile, 'repatriation' assumes that the displaced are refugees, of either a 
Convention or de faCIO nature, and have crossed an international boundary to seek 
protection. The Kurds did not fall into this category, as Turkey had closed the 
border to them, and they were still in their country of origin. In this case, U[t]he 
legal fiction that the internally displaced were not 'refugees' within the responsibility 
of the international community could no longer be sustained. 119 Adelman's use of 
the term 'refugee' is somewhat dubious, since even those who seek a redefinition of 
See Deng, Francis M., Protecting the Dispossessed: a challenge for the international community, 
(Washington DC: Brookings, 1993) and UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: in search of 
solutions, (New York: Oxford University Press. 1995) especially 1>1>40-41. 
6 The same terminology was used to describe US protection of both Haitians and Cubans at the 
Guantanamo base in CubH. However. there are substantial differences between the protection by the US 
in those cases and that referred to in and around Europe. In particular the US case involved US 
protection. not an internationHI effort and the protection was in a place already under US jurisdiction. 
7 Adelman. Howard. 'Humanitarian Intervention: the case of the Kurds'. International Journal of 
Refugee Law. Vol.4 No.1 (JHlluary 1992) p.9. 
Although the three traditional solutions could. in fact. have been applied in Bosnia Herzegovina, 
had the political will been there and had the mediating proposal of temporary protection for those 
displaced by this cont1il:t actually been pursued as was suggested by UNHCR and the Slovenian and 
Croatian governments. 
9 Adelman, op.cit., p.IO. 
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the term 'refugee' maintain the essential notion of a frontier having been crossed in 
the course of flight. 1U 
Resettlement faced similar problems in the Yugoslav situation, particularly 
due to the practice of 'ethnic cleansing'. In addition, west European governments 
did not want the political problems of mass evacuation and the resulting Bosnian 
diaspora that could create. II The first countries of asylum, Slovenia and Croatia, 
were giving a temporary refugee status to the displaced, and requesting burden 
sharing after receiving a certain number. The refusal to share the onus resulted in 
these states beginning to deny entry to others. Repatriation of those who did leave 
was not possible as ethnic tensions persisted, there were commitments not to return 
displaced persons to a war zone (which the whole of Bosnia Herzegovina was 
categorised as (2) and anyway there was no recognised or defined pOlria to which 
people could be repatriated. 
In spite of the long history of international cooperation on the subject of 
refugees, the claimed right of sovereignty had long prevented the international 
community from intervening in what were considered the domestic affairs of other 
states, and thus from protecting those displaced people who had not crossed a 
border. 13 Humphrey, citing a history of politically motivated humanitarian 
interventions in the nineteenth century, points to a twentieth century desire for non-
intervention in similar cases where "the conscience of mankind" was shocked by the 
10 See, for ~xample, Hathaway, James, The Law of Refugees Status (Butterworths: Toronto, 1991); 
Ortiz Miranda, Carlos, 'Toward a Broader D~finition of Refug~e: 20th Century development trends', 
California Western International Law Journal Vol. 20 (1989-1990). Adelman himself refers to this fact, 
using it to point out that the ultimate point of referenc~ in th~ international refugee regime is sti)) the 
sovereign state. Ihid. p.lO. 
II lnt~rview with Andrew Cunningham, British Home Office, 18 November 1994. 
12 Cunningham, Ibid .. 
13 See, for example, Loescher, op.cit., p.30. In spite of the us~ of this cloak of sovereign rights, 
the roots of intervc!ntion by the United Nations for certain humanitarian reasons - notably self-
determination - are traced back to 1960, and the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerned with Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations hy Adelman. However, he suggests that these two documents still clung to the 
superiority of territorial integrity over People's right to self-determination, hut that the principle of non-
intervention is supported by the qualifying of it as hut subject to states "conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of c!qllal rights and self-determination of peoples". 
Protective Approaches 116 
treatment of certain groups within their own states. 14 He also doubts that the 
United Nations Charter authorises the use of force for the purposes of humanitarian 
intervention by the UN or any of its organs. The exception clause in Article 2(7) of 
the United Nations Charter is that the principle of non-intervention by the UN in 
"matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state ... shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. ,,15 Chapter 
VII refers to "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and 
acts of aggression", the existence of which is to be determined by the Security 
Council, as are the recommendations and measures to be taken for the restoration of 
international peace and security.16 
The fact that a mass exodus may take place is increasingly seen as a threat to 
regional and international peace and security. The defensive measure of 
humanitarian intervention is, therefore, coming to be seen as the most appropriate 
first response. I? Although sovereignty is still recognised as a cardinal feature of 
the contemporary and international political legal system "the legal and political 
arguments against UN intervention are no longer unassailable".18 
The debate over the meaning of state sovereignty is most keenly highlighted 
when one considers that in the space of just six months in 1991 
The same countries that had fought a war to protect the principle of 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, now challenged the 
sovereignty of Iraq by intervening in a matter of ostensible domestic 
jurisdiction, and in a way that could potentially lead to the 
14 Humphrey points particularly to Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Humphrey, John P., 'Foreword' in 
Lillich, Richard B., (ed.) Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, (University Press of 
Virginia: Charlottesville, 1973) p. vii. 
U Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I, Article 2, paragraph 7. 
16 Ibid., Chapter VII, Article 39. 
17 Cunningham, op.cit .. 
II Loescher, op.cit., 1'.182. See Suhrke, Astri, 'Towards a comprehensive refugee policy: Conflict 
and refugees in the post-Cold War world' in Bohning, W.R., and M.-L. Schloeter-Paredes (eds.) Aid in 
place of migration? (International Labour Office: Geneva, 1994) p.28, for contemporary reservations to 
interference. (Also Chapter 4). Somalia broke new ground because the intervention did not require the 
prior consent of an established government or national authority in the country of destination for the (US) 
troops. 
"While it is still unlikely that the international community would be prepared to 
intervene in all cases with humanitarian aid the civilians against the express wishes of a 
government, the previously held notion of inviolable state sovereignty is increasingly 
called into question. " (Loescher, p.183) 
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disintegration of the territorial integrity of Iraq.19 
The Kurdish nationalist movement is one of the oldest in the world, dating 
back to the 1880s. The major cause of tlight for Kurds in the twentieth century is 
their widespread persecution by the four states throughout which they are spread 
while they strive for a Kurdish state. 20 In April 1991. repeated repression by the 
Hussein regime in Iraq, following the 1988 gassing of thousands of Kurds in the 
same area, forced thousands to flee towards the Turkish and Iranian borders. 
Turkey saw this as a deliberate attempt by Iraq to create a mass exodus, with the 
aim of ridding its northern territory of an unwanted minority. Turkey, itself in 
conflict with its own Kurdish minority, closed the borders and refused to allow 
access to protection, both in terms of asylum procedures and physical assistance 
within Turkey.21 
Two attempts to respond took place in Iraq. both of which are 
comprehensively described by Adelman. 22 In summary, one was a UN effort, 
brokered by Sadruddin Aga Khan, which Adelman describes as not really 
intervention. 23 This agreement was for the whole of the Iraqi people, and to take 
place with Iraqi support and assistance in implementation, and for this reason is 
19 Adelman, op.cit., 1'.4. 
20 See Adelman, Ihid., p.6. This root to the 'refugee problem' has in no way been tackled. See 
Chapter 4 and Suhrke's position that the approach to the plight of the Kurds in northern Iraq was one of 
and active and innovative regime providing relief and protection, which, however, was not followed by a 
comprehensive refugee policy, as the aid function lacked a political counterpart to address the root causes. 
Suhrke, op.cit.. 
21 See Adelman, op.cit .. Also, Kirsci, Kemal, 'Provide Comfort and Turkey: Decision Making for 
Humanitarian Intervention', Kent Pallers in Politics and International Relations, Series 3, No. 3 
(University of Kent: Canterhury, 1993) which describes the creation of the zones and international (though 
particularly Turkish) decision making on this process, although the lise of the meaning of refugeehood and 
refugee law is somewhat debatable in this paper. 
It should be noted that on signature of th~ Convention Turkey restricted apl>lication of the Convention 
definition to those coming from Eurolle under Article I B and expressly maintained its geographical 
limitation upon acceding to the 1967 Protocol. (Annex lV, UNHCR, Handbook on I>rocedures for 
getermining refug~e status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Geneva, 1979) p.87. 
II Adelman, op.cit.. 
23 Ibid., p.19. Adelman uses the term 'humanitarian intervention' to mean "the us~ of physical 
force within the sovereign territory of another state by other states (Jr tile United Nations for the purpose 
of either protectio" or tile prcwision of emergency aid to the population within that territory.· ie the 
purpose must be overtly humanitarian, what ever other self-interests are involved, and the purposes must 
be protection or relief - or both those. He sees the agents of the intervention as either the UN or other 
states. The tool will always include the use of military force, otherwise it is not intervention. (p.IS). 
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assessed as unlikely to be impartial, or to lead to any substantial measure of 
protection. The second effort was initiated by the UK and France, and eventually 
led by the US. It was multilateral, and its major problem lay in the search for 
justification within international law. Resolution 688 went some way towards 
providing this. Its support could, however, only be implicitly relied on, as it did not 
call for intervention or the use of force to protect the Kurds, but rather condemned 
Iraq for its repression of the Kurds, and the consequent mass exodus, as a threat to 
the peace and security of the region. It called for the provision of humanitarian aid 
and the urgent addressing of "the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi 
population" through all resources at the disposal of the Secretary Genera1.24 
Both plans were flawed. The UN plan could not be impartial, nor could it 
protect, and the US led plan could not find legal justification. However, the end 
result of initial intervention by the allies and their replacement by a UN guard was a 
first attempt at collective action under Chapter VII to protect regional peace and 
security when it is threatened by an outpouring of persons in need of international 
protection. 
The next occasion on which the international community felt it necessary to 
intervene for humanitarian reasons was in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
According to UNHCR estimates there were, by 12 November 1992, 740,000 
displaced Bosnians and 70,000 people displaced by the earlier conflict in Croatia on 
the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina, and 725,000 Bosnians elsewhere in former 
YugoslaviaY By far the largest number of displaced and refugees were in the 
country where fighting, indiscriminate bombing and shelling were going on daily. 
Living conditions in Bosnia Herzegovina at the end of 1992 were described as 
deplorable, with inadequate housing, no heating, a shortage of basic necessities, and 
insufficient humanitarian aid for those in need.26 
UNHCR had emphasised the idea of 'preventive protection', meaning the 
attenuation of the causes of displacement so that people may remain in their homes 
24 Resolution 688 (\99\), adopted by the Security Council at its 2982nd meeting on 5 April 1991. 
See also Loescher, op.cit., 1'.183. 
25 Please note that the use of statistical data here is for cOIllI)arative purposes only. Bosnians here 
indicates persons lIormally resident in the Repuhlic of Bosnia Herzegovina, regardless of ethnicity. 
26 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Rapporteur; Mr. Fluckiger, Report on the situation 
of the refugees and displaced persons in former YugoslaVia, Doc. 6740 (19 January 1993). 
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in safety and dignity. It was stated that: 27 
the [UNHCR] Working Group [on International Protection] considered 
prevention to be an umbrella term covering activities both to attenuate 
causes of departure and to reduce or contain cross-border movements 
or internal displacements. Prevention is not, however, a substitute for 
asylum; the right to asylum, therefore, must continue to be upheld. 
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Slovenia pressed for the creation of 'safe areas' within Bosnia Herzegovina, similar 
to those created in northern Iraq a year earlier.2~ Mrs Ogata, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees herself said that the safe haven idea would be "difficult 
to implement" in Bosnia Herzegovina?1 
Direct arrival at the borders of and admission to western European States was 
almost impossible for the average Bosnian civilian, and many who did make it, 
outside government quota schemes, were reportedly returned to the country of first 
asylum, usually Slovenia, Croatia or Hungary.3o In calling for the return of these 
displaced persons to so called 'safe areas' in Bosnia Herzegovina, the Slovenian 
government stated that: 31 
the implementation of [this] principle [of safe areas] shall be without 
prej udice to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political 
independence, security and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The Slovenes, backed by the Croatians, proposed the establishment of 'safe areas' 
largely as a means of shifting the political and economic burden of the large 
numbers of displaced Bosnians, which they were sustaining with little or no financial 
or practical support from the international community. They were supported in this 
effort by the British and French, who at that time had taken in fewer than 3,000 
displaced persons between them. Arguments for resettling people away from Bosnia 
'XI Ogata, Sadako, Unit~d Nations High Commis.'1ioner for R~fugees, 'Note on International 
Protection', suhmitt~d by th~ High Commi!lsion~r, Executiv~ Committee of the High Commissioner's 
Programme, Forty-third lI~lIsion: UN doc. AlAC. 96n99, (25 August 1992). 
~ Frelick, Bill, '"Preventive Protection" and the Right to Seek Asylum: A Preliminary Look at 
Bosnia and Croatia', International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol.4 No.4 (1992) pp.441-442. 
29 The Economist, 'The search for a safe haven in the Kingdom of Death', (21-27 November 1992) 
p.47. 
30 Amnesty International, Report on the Former Yugoslavia, (29 July 1992). lEUR 48/WU 05192 
EXTERNAL]. 
31 Government of the Repuhlic of Slovenia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Proposals concerning 
measures for the voluntary return home of the displac~d persons and refugees from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina', (Geneva. 29 July 1992). 
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resolutions 781 (9 October 1992), 786 (10 November 1992) and 816 (31 March 
1993).36 Resolution 836 also extended the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR)'s mandate37 
to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to 
promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than 
those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and to occupy some key points on the ground. 
Paragraph 9 authorised the use of force in self-defence 
"in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties 
or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate 
obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of 
UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys." 
Furthermore, Member States were permitted to take action, including airstrikes, in 
support of UNPROFOR's defence either unilateralIy or through regional 
organisations (ie NATO) under the authority of the Security Council and "subject to 
close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR. 3~ 
In Resolution 836 the Security Council therefore provided a mandate, based 
on the self-defence of UNPROFOR, for the protection of the 'safe areas'. It also 
reaffirmed the temporary nature of the safe areas, and called for further 
contributions of forces from Member States. However. its preamble hinted at the 
differences in perception of what safe areas where intended to mean as it noted that 
the decisions taken were in line with the fact that the Security Council was 
"convinced that rrearing the towns and surrounding areas [Sarajevo, Bihac, 
Srebrenica, Gorazde, Tuzla and Zepa] as safe areas will contribute to the early 
implementation of [the objective of a just and lasting political solution]. ,,39 
In April 1994, while the above mentioned towns and their surroundings were 
being treated as 'safe areas' they were in fact not safe. The conflict in and around 
those areas, including the practice of ethnic cleansing was continuing. Indeed, with 
assaults on the town of Gorazde, the policy of 'safe areas', and its failure in this 
situation, was calling into question the very credibility of the United Nations. By 
36 Resolution 836 (1993), adopted by the Security Council at its 3228th meeting, on 4 June 1993. 
37 Ihid., paragraph 5. 
3. R~solution 836, paragraph 10. 
39 Emphasis add~d. 
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November 1994 the real need to actively protect 'safe areas' within Bosnia had 
become more than apparent with Serb shelling of the town of Bihac from airfields in 
Krajina, then a Serbian majority area within Croatia. One of the major needs to 
protect the area was, however, in the (reported) words of UN Special Representative 
Yasushi Akashi, that "the UN could be considered incompetent and spineless" if it 
did not act.4U This position again shows the statist perspective as superior to 
normative considerations, and demonstrates the difficulties organisations face when 
trying to cooperate on these sensitive issues, even if the major players in each of the 
organisations involved are the same. It also exemplifies the difficulties of 
governments in alliance working together when they have differing interests at 
stake.41 In the meantime, UNHCR's own position was compromised at every turn 
as it had to make deals with the belligerents in order to deliver just a fraction of the 
aid which was left after bartering.42 
In July 1995 the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, two of the UN 
declared 'safe areas', were captured by the Bosnian Serbs. In security terms the 
enclaves had apparently been secretly written off for months, and the possibilities for 
removing them from the UN strategic perspective and re-grouping to defend the 
mainly unitied Muslim held territory had been considered.43 In the event the UN 
did not need to face the anguish of openly giving up the areas without provocation. 
It did, however, suffer badly in the international public relations stakes by seeming 
to pull out so readily in the face of Bosnian Serb fighters surrounding first 
Srebrenica and later Zepa. The actual sequence of events and motives which led to 
the fall of the two towns, and the non-use of airstrikes or other effective self-defence 
measures by UNPROFOR may never be known. In June 1996 serious political 
questions were still being asked in the European Press, and the finger of blame was 
being pointed in new directions. The fact that the areas fell, and proved to be 
40 Bellamy, Christopher and Emma Daly, 'Nato jets blast Serb aIr base in Croatia', ~ 
Independent, (22 Novemher 1994), p.l. 
41 See, for example, Marshall, Andrew, 'Big Powers riven by splits over crisis in Bosnia'. lli 
Independent, (25 November 1994) p.12. and The Economist, 'Time to get tough?' (26 November 1994) 
p.22 . 
.. ~ Loescher, Oll.cit., p.30. 
43 Sheridan, Michael, 'UN peace-keepers "set to regroup around Sarajevo''', The Indel)endent, (13 
July 1995), p.3: Eager, Charlotte. 'UN plan tor retreat from 'safe areas' raises fears of Bosnian 
bloodbath', The Ollserver, (21 May 1995), p.16. 
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unsafe is central to discussion of whether protection ill situ, as an alternative to 
(short-term) exile, is a manageable policy option for any state or organisation to 
adopt. 
The repeat of humanitarian disaster for civilians who had been led to believe 
that they were secure through international protection demonstrated the humanitarian 
failings of the 'safe areas' concept. 30,000 displaced people made their second or 
third journey into the unknown, from the 'safe area' of Srebrenica, assisted on their 
way by the Bosnian Serbs and the UN. They arrived at unprepared camps in the 
Tuzla area, one of which was pointedly described as a "temporary camp which looks 
more like Africa than Europe. 114~ Between ten and twenty thousand more, mainly 
men and young boys but also young women, had left in what was described as a 
"fighting withdrawal". These were people who did not trust to their safety in the 
organised withdrawal because they were men of military age or women with partners 
still involved in the fighting. Some of these people made it to Tuzla, but many 
thousands remained unaccounted for. 45 
Besides demonstrating the lack of protection in the original enclaves, this 
episode showed gaps in the procedures and capacity to cope with a loss of the 
nominal protection provided. There were no aid agencies at the Tuzla camps to 
assist the displaced on their immediate arrival. There was confusion between the 
Bosnian 'Muslim' government and UNHCR over who was to take charge of 
relief.46 As a result of this initial confusion there was more preparation for those 
forced to flee Zepa later that same month.47 
44 Bellamy, Christopher, 'Refugee women ·see menfolk shot"', The Independent, (16 July 1995), 
p.17. See also Bellamy Christopher, Tony Barber and Donald MacIntyre, 'Serb attacks pile on the 
misery', The Independent, (15 July 1995), p.1. 
45 Bellamy, Christophu, 'He's coming, he just hasn't arrived yet', The Independent: Section Two, 
(21 July 1995), PI>.2-4. See also Bellamy, Christopher, '20,000 still missing in "zone of death"', The 
Independent, (17 July 1995), p.S. Satellite photographs and eyewitness accounts suggested a massacre of 
at least three thousand people buried in mass graves in Srebrenica. 
46 Radolillvljevic, Zoran. 'Muslims' tlight brings no escape from despair', The Independent, (l5 
July 1995), p.S. 
47 Borger, Julian, 'Aid workers plan for new refugee flood', The Guardian, (19 July 1995), p.ll. 
The fall of these 'safe areas' was rapidly followed by Croat victory in the Krajina. forcing 120,000 Serbs 
to flee the area, mostly heauing either for Serbia or for Bosnian Serb strongholds. See for example, 
Helm, Sarah and Emma Daly, 'Croat forces "just hours" from victory', The Independent, (7 August 
1995), p.l. 
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1.2 Pl'actical and conceptual difficulties: I'ealism and the moral dilemma 
Undoubtedly, the policies and practice of 'ethnic cleansing' made assistance 
in the flight of civilians from their homes more questionable than might otherwise 
have been the case. In assisting movement from areas being 'cleansed' humanitarian 
organisations and Western governments might be seen as taking part in the 
'cleansing process', thus violating the rights of the civilians involved. On the other 
hand, the rights of those same civilians were hardly being upheld when the 
belligerents could and would forcibly remove them, destroying homes and torturing 
or killing the occupants."'x As the Bosnian President himself said, "There are 
worse things than ethnic cleansing and that is ethnic killing. ,,49 While 'safe areas' 
could perhaps work in some situations, their ineffectiveness in the case of Bosnia 
Herzegovina gives rise to a whole host of difficulties. Not least of these is the 
moral contlict over appearing to comply with 'ethnic cleansing', or encouraging or 
even forcing people (through the lack of available and practical options) to remain in 
the conflict area and face the possibility of death. In addition, the failure of the 
policy of 'safe areas' highlighted the apparent European desire not to take in 
refugees, matched by a Bosnian and Croat desire to keep people in place to carry on 
the fight. 50 Besides undermining the 'safe areas' concept, the ruthless practice of 
'ethnic cleansing' frustrated any notions of allowing people to remain close to their 
homes in safety, as suggested by the UNHCR notion of 'preventive protection' .51 
Conceived in military terms, but used to infer a humanitarian protection, 
'safe areas' themselves become strategic targets for one side in a conflict. When 
.8 UN High Comlllission~r for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, said in a 1992 article in "Die C" that the 
flight of refugees "seems not to be just th~ r~sllit but the goal of the fighting" (cited in Helsinki Watch, 
War Crimes in Bosnia, (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 1992) 1'.141. Helsinki Watch points out that 
sending humanitarian aid stops neither indiscriminate artill~ry attacks or "ethnic cleansing" (p.IS3). To 
quote a New York Times article, 'The Well-Fed Dead in Bosnia': "What good will it do for [Bosnians] to 
have food in their stomachs when their throats are slit". 
49 Bosnian state television interview with President Alija Izetbegovic, in which he put forward 
proposals to evacuate the wounded, elderly and ill from Zepa, in order to avoid a repeat of Srebrenica. 
Cited in 'Bosnian president defends plan to negotiate with Serbs for evacuation of Zepa enclave', The 
Guardian, (19 July 1995), p.l1. 
~ In tact, if it really wished to prevent ethnic cleansing, the international community would have 
had to intervene politic~\l and militarily in the internal affairs of Bosnia Herzegovina; this would run 
contrary to positions Ull state sovereignty that still carry considerable weight. 
~I UNHCR, State of the World's Refugees (1995), op.cit., p.50. 
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surrounded enclaves become such targets, the protectors may find it to their own 
strategic advantage to surrender the area. In the Bosnian case, two months prior to 
the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, the UN was said to be considering withdrawal from 
the enclaves which had come to be seen as lOa legacy of a different period of the 
war": once the Bosnians had an army and a few military successes, the need to 
protect the territory of the mainly Muslim government was no longer seen as 
essential. 52 This is to view the area as territory to be strategically protected, not as 
a haven in which people can find safety. and clearly demonstrates the problem of 
'safe areas' as a concept for refugee protection. If protecting the civilians was 
paramount the areas could not be discussed in terms of a legacy with no further 
strategic value until the strategy of finding peace and permitting return had been 
accomplished. This was clearly not the framework within which withdrawal from 
the eastern enclaves was being discussed in Mayor even July 1995. 
The practical problems involved in this type of protection are evident and 
manifold. Staff of agencies are beaten, arrested, kidnapped and killed and the 
agencies themselves are perceived to be working for governments or rebel groups, 
and thought to have hidden religious and political agendas. 53 Also, there is the 
obvious question of what constitutes 'safe' and how safety is to be assured or 
maintained. 'Safe areas' have been difficult to establish in Bosnia Herzegovina due 
to the extreme volatility of the situation accompanied by a lack of political will to 
become involved in the conflict itself. In Iraq, while the creation of the areas was 
operationally easier, it is not clear for how long or on what basis they can continue 
to be protected. Such factors as developments in the country of origin and the 
capacity and will of the international community to act are to a great extent 
unpredictable, and vary from situation to situation, thus making a consistent policy 
of humanitarian intervention, and the establishment of protective zones or safe areas, 
52 Un ofticial in Sarajevo cited by Eliger. Charlotte, The Observer, (21 May 1995), op.cit .. 
53 Loescher. op.cil.. p.29: "In fact. governments have heen tightening their controls on aid 
agencies, attempting to inl'orporate them into ofticially managed programs that benefit only their own 
supporters. Throu),!hollt the: Thiro World and most recently in parts of ex-Yugoslavia, agencies have been 
excluded from war zone:s - in part to d.:ny slIPJ)osed civili,\Il supporters of rebel groups or ethnic 
minorities food or medical aid. and in great measure to prevent independent observers from becoming 
witnesses to the brutal human rights violations perpetrated on non-combatants." 
Protective Approaches 126 
difficult to uphold.>! 
Meanwhile there are conceptual difficulties centring on the oppositions of 
sovereignty and human rights or statist and normative arguments. UNHCR sees 
some recent developments such as aid corridors and humanitarian cease-fires, as 
respecting sovereignty, and it sees practical and legal reasons for continuing, "when 
possible, to honour sovereignty". 55 It sees protection and assistance as more likely 
to succeed if affected governments have consented to humanitarian intervention. 
But, in times of civil war, while it sees a need to cooperate with all those who 
control access to the people in need of aid and protection, such cooperation should 
not, it says, be seen as legitimation.56 Loescher takes the position that sovereignty 
carries with it certain responsibilities of states towards their own citizens, and sees 
this notion as bolstering the grounds for humanitarian intervention to provide relief 
and protection. 57 
Sovereignty does not mean that a state can behave in any way it wants 
toward its own citizens without consequence; in fact, the most 
elementary justification for the modern state is its ability to provide 
reasonable security for its citizens. 
This stance echoes the UNHCR claim that states which have joined the UN, signed 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ratified Humanitarian Law 
instruments "have in the process accepted certain legal obligations to permit and 
facilitate humanitarian aid. This is not an infringement of their sovereignty but an 
exercise of the responsibilities that go with it. IIS~ This position encompasses a 
54 Collinson S., Beyond Bordt!rs: West Eurollean Migration Policy Towards the 21st Century 
(London: RIIA I Wyndham Place Trust, 1993) makes the interesting Iloint that ·without any basic 
framework tor action, thero~ is II danger that preventive and protective activities will depend increasingly 
on differential political and economic interest, as was the ca.o;e in Europe during the first half of this 
century." pp.77-78 and in a footnote adds that "a Resolution on ' Certain Common Guidelines as Regards 
the Admission of Particularly Vulnerable Groups of Pe:rsons form the Former Yugoslavia' issued by the 
EC Ministers responsible tor Immigration at Copenhagen in June 1993 is reminiscent of the group specific 
(and thus variable) re:sJlonses of the League of Nations during the: inte:rwar period.' This position should 
be compared to the Ilosition taken at the end of Chapter I of this study, where it was seen that the 
evolution towards mechanisms of tempor<try protection lIlay entail just such a reversion to nationally 
specific detinitions of those who qualify tor temporarily protected status, and the position in Chapter 2, 
where the nature of such speciticity with regard to the right of non-discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality wa." questioned. 
55 UNHCR, State of the World's Refugees (1993), op.cit., p.74. 
S6 UNHCR, Ihid., pp.74-75. 
57 Loescher, op.cit., 1'.183. 
n UNHCR, State of the World's Refugees (\993), op.cit., p.75. 
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notion of the inseparability of the rights and responsibilities of sovereign states. 
However, UNHCR acknowledges that international consensus on humanitarian 
intervention is unlikely to emerge soon: S9 
Whatever the eventual outcome of this debate, recurring humanitarian 
emergencies have undoubtedly focused attention on the question of 
how far the relief of human suffering can and should be subject to 
national boundaries and the consent of governments. 
Adelman develops a theory justifying restricted humanitarian intervention in 
restricted circumstances, which does not challenge the sovereign rights of the state 
with regard to the rights and entitlements of its citizens, or its territorial integrity.60 
He maintains the state as the actor in the international system, but limits its 
jurisdiction. One of his major justifications for this position where refugee law is 
concerned is that, due to the concept of non-refoulement, a state has restrictions on 
its sovereign right to control membership and admission, and "to maintain its own 
ethical position and ensure its sovereignty, the asylum state is entitled to intervene 
andl or call on others to assist it to intervene to prevent a mass exodus. 116\ 
This position takes as its basis the one upon which the modern theory of the 
state was constructed - the obligation to provide protection - a position which 
permits a restricted right to intervention "to be recognised only in cases where the 
state both fails to protect its own citizens and that failure jeopardises the peace and 
security of other states. "62 It is a justitication of intervention built on current ideas 
of inter-state relations, not radically new concepts or distinctly moral influences as 
Human Rights advocates propose. 
Adelman sees the statist or realist position as still being the base of 
international relations with regard to displacement. Falk presents a different 
UNHCR, Ihid., p.74. 
60 The limitations Addman Jluts on int~rvention are: 
1) It is only to IHovide relief and protection 
2) It is only to he used when coercive force is used \0 provoke mass tlight of a minority popUlation 
3) It is only to he used when such mass tlight threatens peace and stability of region. 
4) It must be authorised by the state whose security is threatened or by Security Council. 
5) Intervention must be followed by the installation of an 'international police force'. 
He does concede that there are risks even to this restricted position in that is could be open to abuse, and 
its use could in some cases contribute to the causes of mass tlight. op.cit., PI>.29·31. 
61 Ihid., p.38. 
62 Ihid .. 
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position. He sees a confusion in so-called 'World Order thinking' between five 
intersecting dimensions of concern: the geopolitical; the statist; the normative; the 
logistical and the psychological. His overall position is that "sovereign rights are 
definitely giving way to human rights .. but not if geopolitical calculations favour 
deference to sovereignty ... 63 He sees the normative challenge to the statist position 
in these matters as not yet authoritatively resolved64 , and that the "political 
atmosphere is favourable, as never before, to weighting the balance of international 
law in favour of humanitarian intervention as authorised by the UN and other 
international institutions ... 65 The geopolitical factors in the Middle East could be 
said to have put sovereignty considerations above the human rights elements in the 
motivation of western states to intervene and create 'safe areas'. The passive or 
laissez-faire geopolitics in former Yugoslavia can also be seen to have subordinated 
the normative position in Bosnia Herzegovina.66 The creation of 'safe areas', and 
the intervention needed to enact such a policy lowers levels of respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states which are violating human rights and 
causing mass exoduses. 
However, Falk's position could be 'turned on its head', and if we consider 
that sovereignty is being challenged, through intervention, only where self-interest is 
involved (eg in terms of oil; the economy; regional peace and security or the risk of 
mass exodus). Realism and sovereignty may appear to be giving way to normative 
positions on the issue of humanitarian intervention. Rights can hardly be said to be 
upheld, however, when the risk of death or serious injury is constantly present 
because the effective protection of a 'safe area' is politically undesirable. They are 
also being denied when freedom of movement and the right to seek and enjoy 
asylum in other countries are effectively being curtailed. Adelman's position of a 
statist justification for humanitarian intervention can thus be taken a step further (or 
from a normative view point a step backwards). It could be said that the only 
63 Ihid., p.34. 
64 Falk. Richard. 'Human Rights. Humanitarian Assistanc~. and thl! Sovereignty of States' (Chapter 
One), in Cahill. Kevin M. (ed.) A Framl!work tilr Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian 
Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters (Basic Books and the Joint Council on Foreign Relations: New York, 
1993) p.35. 
Ihid .• p.40. 
66 Ihid .• p.3l. 
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motivation for states seeming to give way to the human rights lobby by nominally 
protecting certain areas where massive human rights abuses are taking place is to 
uphold their own sovereign right to avoid mass intluxes. Large arrivals would force 
states into an ethical quagmire as they battle with the concept of non-refoulement 
and its self-imposed qualification on this aspect of sovereignty, although they do not 
wish to allow in a tlood of displaced people. 
Under these circumstances the most practical means of tlight is to head for 
neighbouring states. However, the mass intluxes this creates have also and 
inevitably been problematic, and have lead to the conceptualisation of a long 
practised means of protection on a temporary basis.67 
The cases sludied demonstrate the ineffective functioning of the concept of 
preventive protection wht!n put inlo 'practice'. At origin, the notion of permitting 
civilians the option of remaining at, or close to, their homes appears laudable, from 
the perspective of both human rights and humanitarian law. From the perspective of 
receiving states it must also appear useful in limiting the numbers seeking admission 
and asylum. However, in practice this concept appears to have the use of a denial 
of the right to leave, thus violating the rights codified in the instruments mentioned 
above. In order to be effective this concept would require a reconsideration of the 
norms of respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs, in order for 
the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the safety of civilians to be assured. The 
concept of 'safe areas' can, in its practical application, be seen to be fraught with 
political and ethical dilemmas which cause it to be considered inappropriate to crises 
such as that in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
67 Th~y hav~ also lead to imaginative suggestions for different types of internationally protected 
areas in stat~s neighbouring a contlict area already referred to in Chapter 3. Since those ideas remain in 
the consultation stages and have not heen devdoped in practice they will not form part of the discussion of 
the practical approaches. See Secretariat of the Inter-governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees 
and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia, 'Working Paper on Reception in the 
Region of Origin' (Geneva, 1994). 
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2. Temporary Protection and Burden-sharing 
2.1 Temporary Protection 
If the first two elements of the comprehensive approach have proved 
impossible to implement or ineffective the result will undoubtedly be the exodus of 
civilians. They will inevitably head towards the closest border to them, or the 
easiest frontier to cross. 
Like other elements of the comprehensive approach temporary protection is a 
multi-faceted, relatively un-tried6ll (at least in the western world) and only recently 
conceptualised approach to mass influx situations. 
UNHCR advocates the use of this type of protection because it c1aims:69 
[T] protection offers a means of affording protection to persons 
involved in large-scale movements that could otherwise overwhelm 
established procedures for the determination of refugee status while 
privileging safe return as the most desirable solution to refugee 
problems. 
Temporary protection as a practical solution to refugee crises, and in 
particular the situation caused by sudden mass influxes has a long history.7o 
Perluss and Hartman, writing in 1986, saw the emergence of what was then known 
as 'temporary refuge' as a typical example of a customary norm in international law, 
and described it evolving as "the practical solution to situations of mass influx of 
61 Only with th~ crisis r~~ulting from the contlict in former Yugoslavia is a formalised mechanism 
of temporary prot~ction b~ing put into the asylum and immigration legislation of some European states, 
and then the tUrin it tak~s dift"t:rs enormollsly from state to state. This will be the subject of Part Three of 
the current work. In this section temporary protection will be discussed in more general terms, and the 
concern will b~ to plac~ it within the context of a compr~hensive approach. [It should at this point also be 
noted that very little work has heen done on this subject outside of UNHCR and the individual ministries 
dealing with immigration and asylum in those states which have altered their laws to include this type of 
protection in the scope of their procedures.' 
69 UNHCR, Background Note, 'Comprehensiv~ Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Former 
Yugoslavia" Informal Meeting on Temporary Protection (Geneva, 21 January 1993). p.7. Section III Note 
21. 
70 In tact, all protection was, if one follows strictly the line of the Convention, intended to be 
temporary - h~nce th~ c~ssation clauses (Article I C of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees). State practice (and a lack of political will and resources for tinding those Whose period of 
protection should hav~ I:~ased du~ to a change of circlllllstances in the country of origin) has turned 
traditional asylum into a Pt'l"IlIlIfll'f/( refugee solution, especially in western states. 
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civilians fleeing internal armed conflict. 1171 Notions of short term protection in 
mass influx situations were originally referred to as 'temporary asylum'. After 
lengthy debate in the thirtieth session of the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner for Refugees in 1979 it was decided to drop the term 'asylum', as it 
gave the impression of, and potential basis to, a watering down of traditional 
asylum. The term 'temporary protection' has emerged more recently. 72 The word 
protection has more positive implications in terms of rights accorded to those being 
protected over the negative implications of the seeking of 'refuge'. (The debate is 
now rather over the word 'temporary' - being qualitied as provisional or conditional 
in the 1994 Dutch legislation). Perluss and Hartman traced the first granting of 
temporary refuge to 1936, when France and Britain provided safe haven to persons 
fleeing the Spanish Civil War, for the duration of the contlict.73 Further historical 
examples of the practice include the temporary asylum offered in November 1956 by 
Austria and (to a lesser extent) Yugoslavia to 200,000 persons fleeing the 
unsuccessful October uprising in Hungary. This protection was offered for 
approximately nine months, by which time the majority of those who had initially 
fled to the two neighbouring states were resettled in other western European states 
and North America, settled in Austria or had returned. In 1968 Austria again 
offered a similar type of temporary asylum to people fleeing the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. 
Later examples come mostly from Africa and Asia, where localised, regional 
protection was offered to the large number of persons displaced by the conflicts of 
the post-colonial and Cold War period.74 Western states received relatively few of 
those persons in tlight from sllch contlicts, and those who did arrive at distant 
destinations usually entered the normal asylum procedures, which from the late 
1970s onwards became increasingly over-burdened as other immigration channels 
were closed off. Mechanisms for coping with 'large influxes' of persons not 
71 P~rluss, D~borah and Joan F. Hartman, 'Temporary Refuge: Emergenc~ of a customary norm', 
Virginia Journal of International Law (SI)ring 1986) p.580. 
72 Cf. Llica., D., 'Questioning Temporary Protection, together with a Select~d Bibliography on 
Temporary Refugdfemporary Protection', Int~rnational Journal of Refugee Law Vol.6 (1994) p.535. 
73 Perlllss and Hartman. oJ).cit.. p.559. 
74 The OAU CUl1wntiol1 was desigl1~d for this purpose. 
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meeting the Convention criteria in Europe had been developed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, de lacw, humanitarian statuses, offering what Gallagher et al describe 
as 'safe haven', "intended to provide humanitarian relief from deportation for non-
refugees of national concern. ,,75 The same writers note that "[t]o a large extent 
they [the policies of temporary safe haven] were intended to benefit fellow 
Europeans, but at the present time these mechanisms serve a much wider range of 
persons, from all parts of the world. ,,76 This is ironic, given that now it may be 
s~n that sllch mechanisms are specifically not benefiting fellow Europeans partly 
because of perceived 'bad experiences' through non-return and the difficulties of 
integration and xenophobia where earlier groups of non-European de facto refugees 
were concerned. 
Two important points should be noted here. One is the West's early 
criticism of the government of Thailand, for insisting on keeping the Cambodian 
displaced in camps close to the border, and within easy range of Vietnamese 
artillery. Perluss and Hartman see this as "illustrating that the core of the norm is 
the right to physical security of the group tleeing the contlict. ,,77 Given more 
recent developments putting the west European states in much the same position as 
Thailand found itself in in the 1970s this position seems very hypocritical, when the 
majority of displaced persons in Bosnia Herzegovina, being 'protected' in so-called 
'safe areas' in the country of origin, are well within the range of artillery of all sides 
in the conflict. Secondly, the experiences of Southeast Asian and African states 
brought early calls for a sharing of the burden of protection - calls which were 
largely left unanswered. In addition, Western states soon began to hesitate over the 
emergence of a norm of temporary protection. 7M 
The conceptualisation of the term, temporary protection, in spite of the long 
history of the practice, only came about in the 1970s with the Vietnamese Boat 
People Crisis, and, in fact, the first mention of this concept in official documents 
7S Gallagher. D .• S. Forhlls Martin. & P. Weiss Fag.:n. 'Temporary Sati:l Haven: the need for 
North American - European Responses'. in LOllscher and Monahan (eds.), Refugees and International 
Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990),1)·340. See also. Cels, Johan. in the seune volume. 
76 Ibid., p.344. 
77 Perluss and Hartman. op.cit., p.563. 
78 Ibid., 584. 
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comes in Conclusion 15 of the UNHCR Executive Committee in 1979, which was 
concerned with the reception of Boat People in coastal states.79 During the early 
1990s the validity and potential of temporary protection as a vital feature of 
international protection as a whole gained much ground. Indeed, a 1992 Statement 
by the UNHCR put its position as being that "persons fleeing from the former 
Yugoslavia who are in need of international protection should be able to receive it 
on a temporary basis. 11[(0 Meanwhile, one response to the large influx of displaced 
persons fleeing the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina has been the Sloven ian 
government's proposal for the formulation of a new definition of "temporary 
refugee". til This implies an obligation to provide humanitarian necessities and 
amenities in accordance with the temporary nature of the stay of the refugees, who, 
having been displaced by connict or aggression, maintain the desire to return to their 
homes. 82 
While there are no definitions of the criteria for establishing who might 
become a 'temporary refugee', there are the various domestic mechanisms for, and 
categories of, so called de facto refugees. t<3 Arising in the 1970s as a response to 
the changing character of refugee movements, there are various titles for these 
categories, such as B-status; humanitarian status; and 'exceptional leave to 
remain'.114 These types of status, together with the basis for non-return (and thus 
the logical extension of some form of protection) offered by the concept of 
79 Executive Committee of the High COlllmissioner's Programme, Conclusion No.IS (XXX) 
Refugees without an Asylum Country 1979 30th Session. At its 31 st Session, in 1980, the Executive 
Committee endorsed COllclu)lioll 19 (XXXI) Temporal)' Refuge aftirming the need for the "humanitarian 
legal principle of ncm-r<-!olllelllt'llf to he scrupulously ohserved in all sitmltions of large influx", stressing 
the exceptional character of temporary refuge, and recognising that temporary refuge needed defining and 
further examining. 
10 UNHCR Backgruund Note, 'Comprehensive response to the Humanitarian Crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia" Informalnh:eting on Temporary Protection (Geneva, 21 January 1993). 
.. Siovenian Govc:rnmt'nt, 'Temllorary Shelter of Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
Republic of Slovenia', (~iuhl.iana, March 1993). 
I:! See for example, Grahl-Madsen, A., The Status of Refugees in International Law, (Leiden: 
A. W. Sijthoff, vol. I, 1966) pp. 78-9. 
13 The currently established (and 'establishing') mechanisms of temporary protection in a number of 
European states are tu be analyzed in great depth below. These hunHlllitarian statuses are the same as 
those referred to by Gallagher el (/1. up.cit .. 
14 See Cels, up.cit.. 
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nonrejoulel17C'l1l, as set out in article 33 of the 1951 Convention, offer a starting 
point for, and some sort of history to the concept of temporary protection, in spite 
of this latter never having been defined or institutionalised on a regional or global 
level. 85 
2.2 Temporary Protection during the fOl'mel' Yugoslnv cdsis 
The most common perception of European immigration and asylum law prior 
to the crisis in former Yugoslavia was one of restriction and deterrence, Western 
Europe was expecting mass influxes of East Europeans as the Berlin Wall came 
down, bringing COlllmunism with it, and documents such as the Dublin Convention 
(between the 12 Member states of the European Communities) gave rise to concern 
over fairness with regard to admissions policies.t<6 During the early stages of the 
Bosnian crisis, the advice given in at least two Council of Europe reports87 was that 
the European states should accept more asylum-seekers, and give them a minimum 
of temporary protection as, "the neighbouring countries ... will have further 
difficulties in accommodating further influxes of Yugoslavs, unless international 
organisations and the other European countries provide appropriate assistance."S8 
Yet, as the contlict progressed, visa restrictions were imposed by EC 
Member States on citizens of some of the former Yugoslav republics, including 
Bosnia Herzegovina. While the use of flexible visa policies might undoubtedly 
allow for greater control, in terms of establishing that people do indeed come from 
the place they say they come from, it is very difficult to see how these particular 
IS See for example Perluss and Hartman, op.cit., p.572; Goodwin-Gill, G.S., 'Nonrefoulement and 
the new asylum seekers' in David A. Martin (ed.) The New Asylum Seeker~: Refugee Law in the 1980s -
the Ninth Sokol Colloyuium on International Law, (Dordredlt: Martinu!! Nijhotl', 1988). 
16 1990 Dublin Convention Determining the StHte Re~ponsihle for Examining Applications Lodged 
in One of the Memher States of the European Community. CONY/ASILE, (1989); text in International 
Journal of Refugee UlW, Yol.2 (1990) (>.469. See tor example Gillespie, Jim, Report on Immigration and 
Asylum Procedure and Appeal Rights in the 12 Memher States of the Eurol)ean Community (London: 
Immigration UlW Practitioners' Association, March 1993). 
ff7 Council of Europ~, Parlillm<,ntary Assembly, Committee on Migration, Refugees and 
Demography, Rapporteur; Sir Juhn Hunt, 'Crisis in Yugoslavia: Displaced Population', Strasbourg (6 
December 1991) and Council of Europe, Rapporteur; Mr. Fluckiger, 'Repurt on the situation of the 
refugees and displac~d p~rsolls ill form~r Yugoslavia', Doc. 6740 (19 January 1993). 
88 Council of Europe (1991), Ihid .. 
Chapter 5 135 
visa policies could achieve this aim; many embassies in Sarajevo closed, Croatia 
refused entry to those who could not offer documentary proof of proposed onward 
movement, and the visa requirement effectively meant further restrictions on flight 
for those not determined by international organisations as being particularly 
vulnerable and included in the quotas for evacuation. Visa policies also resulted in 
an even greater burden on neighbouring states, limiting the availability of temporary 
protection both in those states and further afield.II'J 
The argument for the establishment of a mechanism of temporary protection 
in Europe has been eloquently put forward by Gil Loescher:'Jo 
By sealing all escape routes and means of refuge, European 
governments are trapping refugees and displaced people in besieged 
cities and regions and placing them in the crossfire between warring 
forces. The consequence of ethnic conflicts unfolding in ex-
Yugoslavia and in parts of the former Soviet Union, where expulsion 
and "ethnic cleansing" are the central objectives of the conflicts, have 
brought home the urgency and importance of both providing 
temporary safety and of keeping alive the notion of return. A new 
European refugee regime should allow for temporary sanctuary, 
followed by voluntary return in safety and dignity. 
Most of those fleeing the civil war in Bosnia Herzegovina appeared to desire 
to return to their homes after the conflict.91 They did not want or need asylum in 
the traditionally perceived sense of permanent or long term protection, but rather a 
place to shelter from the violence, in order still to be alive to rebuild their homes 
and country once a solution has been fOlllld. 'J2 To oblige people to face death 
daily, constantly to see devastation and destruction around them, is both inhumane 
19 See Marx, R~inhard, 'T~mporary Protection; Refugees from the former Yugoslavia: international 
protection or solution oriented approach?', (London: European Council tor Refugees and Exiles, 1995) 
p.9. 
90 Loescher, G., op.cit. 1).164. The situation in the t(mner Soviet Union, even in the Chechen 
conflict, could not be descrihed liS 'ethnic cleansing' in the sens~ of the actions in former Yugoslavia, but 
the idea that such lUI ohjective could emerge in other ethnically-based conflicts is not redundant. 
91 Such desires were expressed to immigration staff, international organisations and non-
governmental organisations in the early stages of the crisis. Since then, with the period of exile 
lengthening, and integration hecoming a natural process, many are less sure of their desire to return, or of 
their ability to do so. llntl!rviews with officials in thl! British Homl! Office; Dutch Justice Ministry; Office 
of Immigration and Refugees, Slovenia. See also Morokvasic, M., 'Yugoslav Refugees, displaced persons 
and the civil war', Reful!e: The Canadian Periodical on Refugees, VoLll No.4 (May 1992) 5-6 and The 
Government of the Repuhlic of Slovenia, 'Temporary Shelter', op.cit .. 
92 This statement assumes a solution satisfactory to all sides, which does not result in any ethnic 
group without a home, hecoming what might be described as a European Palestinian problem. 
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and demoralising. If the long term aim of protection in such a situation is for the 
people concerned to rebuild their homes and lives and economy in the state or states 
which emerge, then the long term solution to such displacement crises is unlikely to 
be assisted by the creation of so-called 'safe areas' that are in fact difficult or 
impossible to protect, or by over-burdening nascent states. It is likely rather to lie 
in finding a swift and acceptable solution, and in the meantime, the supporting of 
both the people who will rebuild states, and of those states where the burden of 
protection is the greatest. 
The policy of EU Member States was that those tleeing the conflict, other 
than former detainees, those who had been injured or were ill and could not be 
treated locally and those who were "under a direct threat to life or limb and whose 
protection cannot otherwise be secllred,,1)3 were to be considered as manifestly not 
falling into the category of refugee, and as sllch not admissible to regular asylum 
procedures, even if they managed to arrive at the borders of Member States. Marx 
sees the failure to develop temporary protection policies in the case of former 
Yugoslavia as attributable to the lack of genuine agreement on burden-sharing 
between EU Member States and the inability of those same states to solve the 
conflict:'.I4 
Considering the primary political character of temporary protection on 
the one hand and the obvious political inability, leaving aside doubts 
about the willingness, of the international community to solve the 
contlict in former Yugoslavia on the other hand, it is hardly justified 
to raise ambitious expectations with respect to this model as a solution 
oriented approach. 
Before the displacements from former Yugoslavia, however, no temporary 
protection or burden-sharing mechanisms had been developed in Europe. All the 
measures implemented were ad hoc, and while they provide indications of what 
should be developed to cope with future similar crises, there is still no effective way 
to assess the effectiveness of a uniform or coordinated scheme. Moreover, the 
orientation of temporary protection policies should be seen in terms of a short-term 
and intermediaTe solution only - leaving the way open to the whole range of long and 
9J Conclusions on P~()pl~ Disl)lac~d by th~ Contlict in the Former Yugoslavia of the Meeting of the 
Ministers Responsihle for Immigration (London. 30 N()vell1b~r - I Decemher 1992). 
94 Marx, op.cit., p. 7. 
Chapter 5 l37 
medium term solutions available to all concerned, with the cooperation of all the 
actors involved. 
The European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, meanwhile, noted that 
"many of the persons seeking asylum from the ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia 
would probably fulfil the criteria for being granted refugee status according to the 
1951 Geneva Convention. ,,~.~ The fulfilment of those criteria would have to be 
assessed by the receiving states, and would clearly depend on the restrictiveness of 
their application of the individualised approach. That those fleeing fear persecution, 
of either a group or individual nature, cannot be doubted in the light of reports of 
conditions suffered by civilian parties of all three sides involved in the conflict. 
This clearly demonstrates the restrictive nature of the application of refugee law to 
mass groups tleeing armed contlict as discussed above, and indicates that traditional 
asylum was not viewed as a suitable solution for those fleeing Bosnia Herzegovina. 
It also shows that in order for humanitarian protection to become a reality, a 
mechanism offering regularization, rights and security to individuals who have fled a 
conflict situation is needed, and that this could be found in the development of 
temporary protection. 
The bases needed for this development of protection are present, but as this 
link in the chain of a comprehensive approach is yet to be fully developed or 
properly implemented in Europe, one needs to ask whether re-definition and re-
focusing for specific cases is possible. 
2.3 Burden-sharing 
A further notion which the handling of the 'refugee' crisis of former 
Yugoslavia has brought to the fore is that of burden-sharing. This concept also has 
several levels of meaning. It could be the sharing of the burden of physical 
protection of displaced persons, resettled, perhaps through temporary protection 
schemes, from states neighbouring the conflict area to those further afield, although 
usually still within the same region. Alternatively, it could imply financial 
assistance to those states close to the conflict area which continue to bear the 
9S European Consultation on Refllg~es and Exil~s, 'ECRE position on policy aspects of the 
European response to the ~ll1ergcncy in former Yugoslavia', (II August 1992) 2(v). 
Prorecril'e Approaches 138 
physical protection burden. In a situation such as that in former Yugoslavia, this 
form of burden-sharing could include development and infrastructure-type incentives 
for poorer states. In the case of Bosnia Herzegovina this would include Slovenia, 
Hungary and, more problematically due to its role in the causes of displacement, 
Croatia. Such assistance may have the further advantage of increasing acceptance of 
the refugees who thus bring some benefits with them, and contributing to a wider 
comprehensive approach by reducing the causes of economic migration. Again, in 
the context of a group of states, such as the EU, such burden-sharing could imply 
the spreading of either the physical or economic burden through the Union.96 
The roots of notions of burden-sharing can be found in the preamble to the 
1951 Convention, where paragraph 0 recommends that,'I7 
Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that 
they lICf ill cOllcen ill a Irlle .\piril (l il1lemmiol1l1/ co-operlllion in 
order that these refugees might find asylum and the possibility of 
reset tIe men t. 
More recently, the then High Commissioner for Refugees Jean-Paul Hocke 
suggested in his opening remarks to the UNHCR Executive Committee in 1986 that 
there was a need for "the industrialised countries [to] share the burden of accepting 
those ... who seek asylum outside their regions. ,,'J~ In their examination of the 
emerging norm of 'temporary refuge' Perluss and Hartman suggest that burden-
sharing and this short term form of protection are closely tied, and that in fact the 
obligation to provide temporary protection should be contingent on the establishment 
of effective burden-sharing mechanisms. 99 They see this contingency as arising 
from the obligatory nature of the norl11, because, IOU 
... if the granting of temporary refuge is no more than a simple 
voluntary act of charity by the refuge state, there is no particular 
reason other states should be obliged to come to its assistance with 
96 See the COlllmission of the European Communities, Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament un Immigration and Asylum Policies, ICOM(94) 23 tinal) (Brussels, 23 February 
1994) paras. 98 - 10 1. 
1951 Conventiun Rdating to the Status of Rdug~es. Pr~amhle, Paragraph D., (emphasis added). 
y¥ Jean-PaUl Hock~, UN High Commissioner for R~fugees, opening remarks to the thirty-seventh 
session of EXCOM, 6 Octuhu 1986, cited hy Gallagh~r er ai, up.cit.. p.340. 
99 Perluss and Hartman, op.cit .. p.587. 
100 Ibid., p.588. 
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material support. I f, however, the state of refuge lacks free choice 
because it is constrained by an international norm requiring that it 
grant temporary refuge, its moral claim to burden-sharing from the 
non-refuge states is a powerful one. 
139 
Basing their comments on reports at a series of UNHCR Executive Committee 
sessions, Perluss and Hartman describe the suspicions of states of the intrusion such 
a mechanism as burden-sharing might make on territorial sovereignty, and explain 
the international community's refusal to recognise burden-sharing as a precondition 
to temporary refuge as stemming from "a candid recognition that no mechanisms 
exist, or could be easily created, to make sllch a precondition viable". Finally they 
conclude that burden-sharing was rejected due to a sense that it would weaken rather 
than strengthen temporary refuge as a binding norm by providing hard-pressed states 
of first refuge an excuse for non-compl iance.101 
The discussions at that time were concerned with sharing the burden of 
displacement crises across regions - and western states were rejecting the notion of 
sharing the burden of protection in crises in Africa and Asia. However, the position 
on burden-sharing appears not to have changed even when the crises of displacement 
are within Europe. The states most affected by the former Yugoslav crisis, and 
offering temporary protection see burden-sharing as a necessary accessory to this 
mechanism, states further atield maintain the position of the intrusion of the concept 
on their sovereign rights to control admission, and present normative reasons for 
their position. The normatively based rejections of certain elements of the burden-
sharing concept are still strongly represented in recent debates on the subject, but 
powerful arguments may also be made for the position that the inclusion of some 
aspects of the burden-sharing approach in new mechanisms for protection for those 
fleeing contlict would in fact strengthen the effectiveness of this practice. 
One could question the reason for which any state feels a responsibility either 
to accept refugees or to assist fellow states when they find themselves under 
seemingly immense pressure due to the number of arrivals seeking protection. The 
European Council on Refugees and Exiles has emphasised the opinion that sheer 
numbers, rather than the calise of flight should activate a mechanism of 
101 Ibid., 588; based Oil reports from 30th, 33rd, 34th, 35th sessi()ns of the Executive Committee. 
Protective Approaches 140 
responsibility sharing among states. 102 However, the political will of states being 
so often expressed in terms of the defence of their interests means that the notion of 
responsibility and a duty to share a burden is more likely to be encouraged through a 
highlighting of the causes of tlight, particularly if they involve persecution (as 
during the Cold War period when refugee status was largely accorded as a response 
to a vote against communism) or conflict in the region, which their is a desire to 
contain and resolve. Does sympathy with a cause of flight actually instill a sense of 
responsibility, or accord to the neighbouring states a right for their reponsibility to 
be shared? That is a difficult question to answer, however, a willingness to act, 
including to protect or share the burden of protection, would seem most likely to be 
motivated by a sense of responsibility to honour commitments made, and to 
strengthen international or regional sOlidarity. This was more visible in migration 
crises such as that of the Hungarians in 1956 where there was a strong ideological 
commitment and point to be made, than in the case of the former Yugoslavs in the 
early 1990s. 
2.4 BUI'den-shal'ing and the fomlcr YUgOShlv cl'isis 
The first calls for burden-sharing in the Bosnian case came from the nascent 
states of Slovenia and Croatia, with later calls for consideration of this concept 
coming from Sweden and Germany. 
The contlict in Croatia itself had caused the displacement of over 600,000 
people, half of whom remained within Croatian territory. By the end of 1992, there 
were 618,000 registered displaced persons in Croatia, at least 324,000 of whom 
were from Bosnia Herzegovina. (To the 4.7 million Croatians, this was the 
equivalent of Italy taking in 7 million refugees, or Germany 10 million.) The 
majority of these displaced persons were housed by members of their families or 
friends, receiving little or no tinancial support. According to the Croatian 
authorities, the cost to the Croatian government of sheltering those with no relatives, 
and of humanitarian assistance additional to that received from outside, totalled $100 
million per month in 1992, and a 'Report on Problems of Displaced Persons and 
Ill:! ECRE. Position of the European Coullcil on Rdil!,!ces lind ExileS on Sharing tll(' Responsibility: 
Protecting Retilltt'es allti Displaced Pe,.,\'o/l.~ ill ,lie Context of Large Scale Arril'{lls. (London, March 
1996). 
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Refugees in the Republic of Croatia' by the Croatian Vice Prime MinisterlO3 
formed a request for financial burden-sharing by the European Community and other 
states, which has met with no response. 
To the end of 1992, the financial burden of supporting the 49,000 registered 
and more than 25,000 unregistered displaced persons in Slovenia, many sheltered by 
families as in Croatia, had amounted to $250 million. Some aid had been received, 
but comparatively little in relation to expenses. Those families housing refugees 
were described as already on the edge of the "existential minimum" .1')4 Tensions 
between the displaced, who now made lip more than 3 % of the population of 
Slovenia, and those with whom they were staying were mounting, and thus pressure 
to move more people into communal shelters was rising. Capacity, however, was 
exhausted. Slovenia, a new state, with its own economic and political difficulties 
was helping Bosnia Herzegovina and its refugees to bear the burden of its conflict: it 
appealed for burden-sharing. 
In March 1993, Slovenia indicated its opinion that "[t]he war in the Republic 
of Bosnia Herzegovina has brought a new dimension to the problem of refugees not 
provided for by legal acts". 1U5 The Slovenian government pointed out the 
difficulty that in strictly legal terms, the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention 
on the Status of Refugees were 
"inadequate in the case of an exodus provoked by military aggression, 
when people nee an area of conflict to save their lives without thought 
to improving their living conditions or finding employment in a 
foreign country. till"" 
In response to this, the Slovenian government proposed the formulation of a new 
definition of "temporary refugee". The texts of the documents from the Croatian 
and Sloven ian governments cited above imply that temporary protection can only be 
provided by local states with restricted resources for a limited length of time. An 
103 Vice Prime Minister Mate Granic MD, PhD. 'Report on Prohlems of Displaced Persons and 
Refugees in the Republic of Croatia', (\ 8 November 1992). 
11M Minislry of Foreign Affairs, Ortice for Immigration and Refugees in Slovenia, 'Information on 
the refugee problem in the Repuhlic of Slovenia' (15 February 1993). Daily care was cited as costing $8 
plus there was expenditure 011 urgent lIlt:dical care of $ J.5m per month, necessary repairs to collective 
centres etc. 
lOS Slovt:lliali GIlVt:rI1lllt:llt, 'T~lllp()rHry Shelter', op.cit .. 
106 Ihid .. 
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historical example is again provided by the 1956 Hungarian crisis. 170,000 of the 
refugees temporarily protected in Austria and Yugoslavia were resettled elsewhere 
within eighteen months, as the situation in Hungary did not alter, and the burden 
became too great for the states of first refuge to handle. Beyond a certain time (to 
be determined on a case by case basis), either financial or practical burden-sharing, 
in the form of economic assistance or temporary protection in states away from the 
immediate locality, must come into play, or local states will be forced to do as both 
of these states have done, and prevent more persons in need of protection from 
entering thei r terri tory. 
A more recent example of such a situation is that of the Kurds of northern 
Iraq who were prevented from entering Turkey in 1991, and for whom 'safe havens' 
were established. ItO 
Pol icies which prevent displaced persons from seeking protection are 
effectively equivalent to rejbulemellf, for which responsibility might be said to lie 
not only with those states returning the displaced, but also with those apparently 
unwilling to share the burden. This contravention of one of the fundamental 
principles of refugee protection embodied in the Geneva Convention gives added 
weight to the arguments for the formulation of means of burden-sharing, on both the 
physical and financial levels, to be included in the development of an internationally 
agreed and respected programme of temporary protection. 
Within western Europe, calls for burden-sharing can be traced to a resolution 
of the European Parliament in March 1987 which advocated a sharing of the 
financial burden of refugees between Member States, and, after the movements 
within and from former Yugoslavia had begun, the Conclusions of the meeting of 
the Council of Ministers of the European Community in Edinburgh reaffirmed the 
belief that the burden of financing relief activities should be shared more equitably 
by the international community, but did nothing to affirm the act. 
In the Council of Europe too, calls for burden-sharing have emerged. At a 
Vienna Group meeting in Athens in November 1993, Sweden tabled a resolution 
aimed at fairer burden-sharing with respect to assistance and admission of refugees 
from former Yugoslavia, and a recommendation of the same group at its Strasbourg 
meeting in January 1994 spoke to the need to encourage collective cooperation in a 
IU1 s~~ S~ctioll 1 of this chapkr. 
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spirit of solidarity between states. 
Meanwhile, a major feature of the programme of the German Presidency of 
the European Union (July to December 1994), was discussion on the wording of a 
potential resolution on burden-sharing. The German proposal involved the use of 
indicative figures, based on the size of the population of Member States, the size of 
their territory and the amount of their Gross Domestic Product, all as a percentage 
of the Union total, leading to figures guiding the percentage number of people from 
a mass influx of displaced persons which each state should take. This indicative 
figure would be modified according to the Member State's contribution to peace-
keeping forces and its particular use of foreign and security policy measures in the 
country of origin. 1lI~ The reaction from other Member States was sceptical, not 
surprisingly since the proposing state is the one whose burden would be relieved by 
the institution of such a mechanism. whereas others would find themselves faced 
with more persons in need of protection. 
The German proposal also faced problems because it involved the movement 
of people. The objecting states use human rights arguments against coerced 
movement with which to reject this call. Other states seemed to consider that if 
there has to be some form of burden-sharing it should be tinancial only, and tailored 
to meet the situation.1l1'1 
The calls from Slovenia and Croatia, and the recurrence over time of the 
debate over burden-sharing. demonstrate the fact that some sharing of responsibility 
is needed at some level. The calls from smaller, new and less-developed first host 
countries (as well as from larger more liberal states) bring forward the question of 
whether there could be both a normative and statist argument for suggesting that 
states should in fact feel an obligation, not only to the displaced as human beings, 
but also to those states which are over-burdened by displaced persons. The 
normative argument would be supported by the position that forcibly moving the 
people, albeit for protection purposes, would be questionable from a human rights 
perspective and that one way of upholding their right to non-return and protection, 
including the possibility of easy return once the situation has changed, would be to 
financially assist in the continuation of protection for the necessary period. The 
108 See 'Bonll w<lnts EU tu share refugee load', The Guardian, (5 July 1994), II. 
1Cl'J Author's interviews with particip<lllts in Council Working Group Meetings. 
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statist argument would tind support in upholding the right to control admission, as 
people would not be arriving at the borders of one's own (distant) state because their 
level of protection would be sufficient in countries close to the state of origin (thanks 
to financial assistance and logistical support), and because the development and 
integrity of the tirst country of asylum would also be supported. 
However the primary arguments for burden-sharing lie in support of the 
principle of nonrefoulement and in its necessity as an accompaniment to a firmly 
established norm of temporary protection. No"refoulement is an essential and very 
widely accepted and supported concept in international protection which tempers 
claims to sovereign rights over admission, and offers a valuable safeguard to not 
only refugees but, through its wider application, to all displaced persons who have 
managed to cross an international frontier. Refoulement, even by proxy, is to be 
avoided at all costs. Thus, the principle of first country of asylum, and other recent 
restrictive developments in asylum policies need to be brought into question. Some 
of the results of these restrictive policies, potentially fatal to the up-rooted people, 
could be avoided through the development of temporary protection mechanisms. 
However, this mechanism, to be fully effective, must be accompanied by pragmatic 
burden-sharing. It must also include a willingness to keep borders open and allow 
protection to those who seek it, a guarantee which was not respected in the case of 
former Yugoslavs. This lack of respect for open borders has led UNHCR to have 
reservations over the practice of temporary protection by western states, even if it 
supports the humanitarian principles at the foundation of the concept, and the 
concept itself, if correctly implemented. 110 
4. Asylum 
The concept of asylum has a history spanning at least 3,500 years, yet its 
status in international law and politics is highly ambiguous. III "There is a gap 
between the individual's right to seek and enjoy asylum and the state's discretion in 
110 UNHCR, Stalt! oftht! World's Refugt!es (1995). op.cit., p.89. 
iliOn the history of asylum see Grahl-Madsen. op.cit.j UNHCR. The State of the World's 
Refugees (1993). op.cit.. 
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providing it. ,,112 The nature of who is to be considered, in legal terms, to qualify 
for refugee status has undergone much change during the twentieth century. 1\3 
The traditional solution to displacement questions during the first seventy years at 
least of this century (and for centuries before that) was asylum. Historically, asylum 
meant the granting of refuge, although it originally had the double meaning of "a 
place or territory where one is not subject to seizure by one's pursuers, or ... 
protection or freedom from such seizure"II-t. It is now lIsed in the latter sense in 
international law, wi th protection and freedom related to some geographical location. 
With the growth of nation-states asylum developed (particularly during the mid-
eighteenth century) to mean the granting of protection, and the heart of asylum in 
the twentieth century is "protection granted to a foreign national against the exercise 
of jurisdiction by another state".115 It also includes the accordance of rights within 
the protecting society, and the type of protection involved in the grant of asylum 
varies from state to state. 116 
Asylum is not an obligation inherent in international refugee law. In spite of 
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, states are under no 
international obligation to grant asylum.117 Indeed attempts to introduce a notion 
of an individual right to be granted asylum have always met with opposition and had 
to be abandoned. I IX Any right involved in the granting of asylum belongs to the 
liZ UNHCR, Ihid., pp.32-33. S~c: Chapt~r 2. 
liS See Chapter I. 
114 Grahl-Mads~II, Atl~, The Status of Refugees ill IlItt!rnational Law, Vol. II 'Asylum, entry and 
sojourn' (Sijthoff: L:iden, 1972) 1)·3. 
liS Goodwin-Gill, G.S., The Rc:fugee in International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) p.102. 
See also Grahl-Madsl!lI, Ihid., p.4. 
116 See Hailhrol1ner, Kay, 'Th.: ri~ht to asylum and the future of asylum procedures in the European 
Community', International Journal of Rdilgee Law Vol.2 No.3 (1990) p.347. Also, ICMPD, 'A 
Comparative Analysis uf Entry and Asylum Policit!s in Selected Western Countries' (Vienna, May 1994) 
and la Cour Bm.ltcher, Anne, Jane Hugh.:s and Vagn Klim Larst!n, 'Legal and Social Conditions for 
Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Sd~cted Eurol)c:an Countries', (Copenhagen: Danish Refugee Council, 
February 1993). 
117 Goodwin-Gill, up.cit., (1.104. 
118 See Kjaerulll, Mart.:n, 'Article 14' in Eide, Asbjorn, Gudmundt!r Alfredssoll. Goran Melander. 
Lars Adam Rehor and Allan Rosors (.:ds.), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; a Commentary 
(Oslo: Scandinavian Univc:rsity Press, 1992) pJl.219-220 for a descril)tion of efforts in the drafting of 
Article 14 and subsequently in the Declaration 011 Territorial Asylum and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
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state, not the individual, and the corresponding duty is that of respect for asylum, 
once granted, by other states. The institution of asylum has been strengthened by 
regional as well as universal instruments (eg the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and the OAU Convention) but there is still no acceptance of an international 
obligation. 119 
While other protective concepts have been entering the practice of the 
international handling of displacement crises, the nature of the fundamental 
protective solution, asylum, has been evolving. State practice, particularly in 
western, developed states, has been altering to narrow the notion of who may be 
granted asylum, and what asylum means. Among the developments of recent years 
are the promotion of the concepts of manifestly unfounded claims, concurrent with 
accelerated procedures, carrier sanctions, safe country concepts (both of origin and 
first asylum) and stricter visa policies. 
Since the 1950s, the assessment of asylum claims has been carried out on an 
individualised basis, as asylum-seekers need to demonstrate their personal fear of 
persecution in the state of origin in order to be accorded refugee status and the full 
protection of the asylum state. According to the 1951 Convention, refugee status is 
to endure until Stich a time as the cessation clauses come into effect. 12o In other 
words it is to be of a temporary, limited term, nature. In practice, however, even 
when circumstances would allow for cessation of protection, western states have not 
put these clauses to work, generally tinding it too expensive and (for humanitarian 
reasons) politically unpalatable, to organise deportations. 121 As the Convention 
119 Ibid.,l>p.106-107. 
This situatioll leads olle to ~Iuestion whdher hllll/lIll rights stem from the ta~t of being human, or from 
citizenship. See also Hailhronner, op.cit., 1>.354. Even the 1951 Convention does not confer the 
obligation to accept refugees, only not to return them. 
120 The cessation clauses are to be found in Article 1 C of the 1951 Convention. It is stated that the 
Convention shall cease to I1Jlply if a person has voluntarily re-avaih:~d himself of the protection of his 
country of nationl1lity; has re-acquired his nationality if it was lost; has a new nationality; has returned to 
his country of origin; th~ circulllstances in connection with which he was recognised as a refugee have 
ceased to exist. 
121 Cunninghl1lll, up.cit.. S~e Hailhronner. Kay, uJl.cit., p.348 (where he discusses how negative 
results in complicated proct!dures often have no real bearing on the chances of a I>erson remaining in West 
Germany, or Western Europe gent!rally) I1nd Hailhronner, Kay, The concept of 'Safe Country' and 
expeditious asylum procedures: 11 western European Perspective', Internationl1l Journal of Refugee Law 
Vo1.5 No.2 (1993) p.33, whl:'re it is daimed that an estillll1ted 80 per cent of rejected asylum seekers stay 
on, whether or not tht'y recl:'ive a residence permit, and that anyw<ly they often are accorded a 
humanitarian statlls, sinl'l:' it is considered that during procedures which Can take years a certain level of 
integration has tl1kl:'n place, 
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was mainly aimed at those fleeing communism in eastern Europe, it was always 
assumed, and for almost forty years was held to be the case, that return would not 
be appropriate. Asylum has essentially come to be seen as a pemwnenl solution to 
refugeehood. 
3.1 Restrictions challenging asylum 
The granting of refugee status implies the acceptance of an asylum 
application, and accords full rights and entitlements. State practice of the 1950s and 
'60s led to asylum in western states being granted fairly liberally. The number of 
asylum-seekers arriving was, for a variety of reasons, relatively limited compared 
with the totals from the latter half of the eighties onwards. Asylum policies then 
went hand in hand with relatively open immigration policies, as an increase in 
population was often seen as a positive input in the context of economic 
redevelopment after the second world war. 122 With the economic crises of the 
1970s came a desire, cited as a need, to limit immigration generally. As regular 
immigration and 'guest-worker' channels were gradually closed down, the number of 
migrants continued to rise. Those who might earlier have been able to honestly 
apply to immigrate to western states for economic reasons were forced to start 
claiming asylum for political (often false) reasons as the only means of entry. As 
western governments realised this was happening, they increased their restrictive 
application of the 1951 Convention and domestic asylum laws, in order to combat 
what were seen as abuses of the asylum system. 12l While asylum is a distinct 
element of overall immigration policies it was for some time (in Europe) confused 
with more general policies aimed at controlling the movement of people. The result 
of this confusion has been a restrictive turn in asylum policies alongside restrictions 
in immigration generally. 
The restrictions on asylum led to the apparent abandonment of refugee 
In The positive rt!ct!ptiun of asylum c1aimallts, including a waiving of immignltion regutations in 
some instances was evident in the 1956-7 case of the Hungarians. See Cha1>ter 9 for an account of the 
employment opportunitit!s created fur Hungarians in the UK. 
123 See for exampk Amnt!sty International. 'Ellrope: the need for minimum standards in asylum 
procedures'. (Amnesty Internatiollal EU Association Brussels. June 1994) p.1. and Hailbronner, 'Right to 
Asylum', op.cit.. p.344. 
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protection as an exceptional element of general immigration control. According to 
Shacknove the restrictions on asylum can be seen within two overlapping categories, 
control and containment, which provide a useful starting point for analysis. 
Restrictions used to control or prevent arrival include visa, passport and frontier 
regulations; the extension or re-introduction of carrier liability;124 quota admissions 
and orderly departure programmes. 125 Meanwhile restrictive policies aimed at 
containment also involve visa requirements and carrier sanctions as well as the 
return of asylum seekers to so-called 'countries of tirst asylum' and the creation of 
safe areas and humanitarian intervention. 126 
Restrictions preventing arrival, and policies of safe areas and humanitarian 
intervention have already been addressed in this chapter. The two other restrictive 
approaches to the handling of asylum claims were the subject of resolutions of the 
European Communities' Council of Ministers in London in December 1992. 
The 'safe country' notion has two manifestations. One is the classification of 
countries of origin as safe, and the second is a similar categorisation of 'safe' 
countries which were transited en route to the state in which asylum is sought, or in 
which protection had already been received. The reason for the former notion is to 
demonstrate, without further individually based investigation, that a person could not 
have had a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin because 
persecution apparently does not take place there, or at least that there was an 
internal flight alternative. 127 It is thus assumed that applicants from such countries 
are abusing the system to avoid strict immigration controls. The use of the latter 
notion of 'safe country' is not in line with spirit of the Convention, which does not 
stipulate the territory in which an application mllst be made. It is, however, a result 
of the process of territorial integration of European states, and as a consequence 
presents a certain need for harmonisation of admissions policies and procedures. 
The notion of 'safe countries' is an essential element of accelerated 
124 See Chapter 3 Oil Scht'llgt'n. 
125 Examples of these are the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chil1!t and some of the 
mechanisms estahlished till' Bosnians, for which see Part Three. 
126 Shacknove. Andrew. 'From Asylulll to Containment', The International Journal of Refugee Law, 
Vo1.5 No.4 (1993) p.516. 
127 Hailhronner. 'Safe Country'. ojl.l·it.. 
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procedures. These are aimed at clearing the backlog of asylum cases built up since 
the 1970s as the number of applicants has increased throughout Europe. The 
enormity of the individualised case load is overwhelming the procedures and 
threatening to undermine the possibilities for generous policies. Ironically, it is also 
leading to the ultimate granting of humanitarian statuses even for those whose claim 
is found to be baseless, as their extended period of residence during procedures 
means they have established family ties or built up other reasons giving rise to 
compassionate recognition. 
There are several problems surrounding these notions. Firstly, how is 'safe' 
to be defined, and who is to determine whether or not a state is 'safe'. This 
difficulty has already been referred to in the context of labelling nominally protected 
areas as 'safe' in situations of humanitarian intervention for assistance purposes. 
(,Safe areas' in Bosnia Herzegovina could not reasonably have been considered as 
internal tlight alternatives to which those who had tled the country could be 
returned.) 
How should assessments of safety be carried out? Should only the reports of 
a state's diplomatic mission in a given country be consulted, or should more 
independent media and human rights groups' reports also be used in assessment? If 
lists of 'safe countries' are being drawn up, how often should they be re-evaluated? 
Switzerland had the situation of Algeria being on its safe country list and having to 
adapt this when civil strife became very marked from 1992.12K 
Some countries could undoubtedly be considered 'safe': an asylum-seeker 
from Sweden pleading to enter the Netherlands, for example, would be greeted with 
great scepticism. However, listing the EU states, the US, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand as 'safe' would not be very restrictive, as the numbers applying for 
asylum from those countries over the period of a decade could be counted on one 
hand. It is when lists start to include countries from which there are considerable 
numbers of applicants, but which might generally be safe that difficulties arise for 
the asylum-seekers, human rights groups and ultimately governments. For example, 
Romania in 1995 might be considered quite 'safe', and many Romanians seeking to 
enter EU states as asylum-seekers might well be more accurately described as 
128 Hailhwnlll!r, 'Safl! Country', op.cit. p.50. Hailhronnl!r pointli to this examl>le as demonstrating 
the tlexibility of thl!s~ polil:i~s. Oth~rs douht that rapid tll!xihility might alwayli be demonstrated. 
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seeking economic betterment. However there have been reports of persecution of 
homosexuals and gypsies in that country. So a blanket refusal to consider cases 
where the country of origin is Romania could mean a refusal to examine a genuine 
case. 129 Under some circumstances it would be too simplistic to say a country is 
safe. 
While attempting to streamline procedures by evaluating some countries as 
'safe', there is no simultaneous attempt at rationalising the protection system by 
deciding that certain countries are 'unsafe' .130 Such a determination would also 
speed up procedures, since the initial decision on admission could be made for an 
entire group, with individualised procedures to decide on specific cases coming at a 
later date. 
Designation of 'safe countries of origin' presents signiticant difficulties. The 
determination of 'safe tirst host countries' or 'safe third countries' poses other 
problems. Within a group of states such as the EU, determining which state is 
responsible for deciding on a claim, sometimes because it was the first host, has 
some logic. The deciding state is potentially going to permit access and residence to 
its own territory accompanied by the eventual possibility for the successful claimant 
to move within the entire EU territory. What is more, there is a certainty that all 
states involved in such an agreement as the Dublin Convention have a certain set of 
standards in their procedures and protection. However, there are no such guarantees 
in the case of other states, and establishing that they will give sufficient assessment 
to a claim and maintain full adherence to all elements of international agreements on 
refugees and human rights may not be evident. Furthermore, considering any state 
as a safe first port of call in a mass influx situation and the return of all protection 
seekers to that state reinforces the need for some sort of burden-sharing. A 
perfectly safe country can become an unsafe place to which to return protection 
seekers if it is likely, due to a sense of over-crowding with refugees or a sense of 
129 What is mor~, placing Romania on a list would nut dramatically alter the numbers of applicants 
who needed full Jlroc~dur~s. This could only he signiticantly reduced by considering such countries as Sri 
Lanka, from which there are si~niticant numbers of applicants as safe, even though parts of the country 
continue in 1995 to rel)eat the descent into a state of war. 
no Amnesty International point out that from their assessment of cases in the UK, after the 
introduction of 'sat~ third ~'ountry' practil'e with th~ 1993 Imllligration and Asylum Act, the use of the 
principle has proved ~ostly, and be~n ndther fast nor productive. All it has achieved is a heightening of 
hardship for those who tall within its SCOI)e. Amn~sty InterllCitional , Playing Human Pinball: Home 
Office Practice in 'Satt: Third Country' Asylulll Cases, (London: Amnesty International, 1995). 
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the unfairness of shouldering the entire burden, to begin programmes of refoulemem 
or to close its borders to further people in need. 
3.2 The challenge of hannonisation 
It was in this climate of restrictiveness that the development of harmonised 
policies on immigration generally and also asylum in the European Communities 
(and later the European Union) beganY' In many instances, the (as of 1995 far 
from completed) programme of harmonisation has come to be seen by many as a 
search for the lowest common denominator. 132 The discussions since 1993 have 
been observed and commented upon by UNHCR, although they are not a formal 
party to the agreements reached. All texts emerging from the EU on asylum matters 
contain paragraphs concerning the continuation of respect for international 
instruments, in particular the obligations of the 1951 Convention. However some 
texts have not appeared to meet those strict standards. I3J What is more, the 
harmony reached has been of a non-binding variety, permitting the continuation of 
divergent policies, law and practice. 
Hailbronner suggests that the reason for the low level of achievement lies in 
the fact that refugee policy affects both foreign and domestic affairs, and is 
determined by ideological and political factors. 1.1-1 It is true that the formulation of 
refugee policy is both intluenced by and exercises intluence on the domestic political 
climate and the operation of foreign policies, including those towards European 
partners. As the line between European policies as part of the domestic or 
international agenda thins the formulation of refugee policies needs to be 
increasingly intluenced by the wider regional aspects of its creation and 
implementation. The search to harmonise in Europe is not only aimed at achieving 
See Chapter 3. 
131 See ego Hailhronner, Kay, 'Right to Asylum', op.cit., p.3S2. Hailbronner discusses the 
European Parliament's criticism of the coordination of asylum policy which has been that "European 
coordination of asylum law implies rtlducing. individual rights to thdr lowest common denominator, and 
denying access to refugees in contradiction to the humanitarian tradition of Europe." 
133 Amnesty International (1994), op.cit.. 
134 Hailhronller, 'Right to AsylulIl', op.cit., pp.346-7. Hailhronner supports this statement with the 
fact that attempts to I.·reate HII ohligation to Hdmit refugees in all forH have failed, from the Geneva 
Convention onwards. 
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a concrete obligation towards refugees, but also towards creating and fulfilling 
obligations towards partner states. Those latter obligations have thus far been seen 
in terms of restricting the obligation towards refugees in order to control admission 
and keep numbers down on behalf of the entire EU. The need to harmonise to 
create a concrete and humanitarian obligation to admit and protect refugees has been 
overtaken by restrictiveness. The burden-sharing debate, together with the human 
rights agenda, demonstrates a need to consider wider positive duties and to tum the 
focus away from the restrictions which are threatening the nature of asylum. 
Restrictions also have the consequence of legitimising intolerance and 
bringing anti-immigration politics into the mainstream debate.135 Many refugee 
provoking crises are roo led in some form of intolerance. Promotion of tolerance 
can be seen as a method of prevention. Tolerance is, however, also an integral 
component of effective asylum and protection. DC, The creation of a refugee policy 
involves compassion, an element of tolerance and a level of state interest. As 
regions and the world become more integrated and cooperative on various levels, 
there is some need for a reduction in the nationalistic perspective in the creation of 
refugee policies. m The ongoing search for limitations is seen as a major 
challenge to the nature of asylulll in the late twentieth century. 
3.3 Whel'e does the I'eal challenge lie? 
Goodwin-Gill has pointed to the major challenge to asylum as emanating 
from the inertia of institutions rather than the restrictive measures of states. m 
The restrictions imposed by states create much of this inertia, as without state 
willingness the institutions operated with the support of those same states cannot 
evolve, develop or adapt themselves, or their rules and standards. Without 
consensus on an obligation towards refugees, which, Goodwin-Gill forecasts is 
135 S~e for ~xlimpl~, Geddes, Andrew, 'immigrlint lind Ethnic Minorities ad the EU's Democratic 
Deficit', Journal of Common Mlirket Studi~s, YoU3 No.2 (June 1995) p.207. 
136 Goodwin-Gill, G.S., 'Editorial, Asylum: Th~ Law and Politics of Change', International Journal 
ofRefug~e Law, VoL7 No.1 (1995) p.17. 
137 T~itelhlium, Michliel S., 'Right versus Right: Immigration and R~fug~e Policy in the United 
States', Foreign Affairs Vol.59 No.1 (Fall 1980) p.46. 
138 Goodwin-Gill, 'Editorial', op.cit., p.9. 
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unlikely to emerge, a re-evaluation of the meaning and direction of asylum is 
needed. The requirement is a shift towards asylum as protection and away from 
asylum as integration. In other words, there is a need to see protection as 
paramount in refugee policies, not long term integration. Offering asylum has 
evolved away from an offer of protection towards an offer of a new and settled life 
over the last decades. We need now to either re-consider asylum as short-term 
protection, or to recreate forms of short-term protection and admit that what we now 
know as asylum means integration. If the latter course is adopted then measures 
focused on groups and individuals, on crises which are foreseen to be limited and 
those which have no imaginable ending in the short-term could be separated and 
dealt with concurrently in different ways. By distinguishing the elements of a 
holistic refugee policy and admitting to a comprehensiveness in approach the longer 
term success of over all refugee policies as protection could be more secure. 
CONCLUSION 
It is possible that a comprehensive refugee protection policy, resting on 
existing international legal obligations, with a strong moral basis and involving a 
notion of manageability, could challenge both the nature of asylum as integration and 
the institutions which support that notion. However, the challenge which evolution 
towards such a policy presents need defeat neither asylum practices nor existing 
institutions. Institutions can and should adapt. UNHCR's mandate has evolved 
since 1950, and its role in protecting the internally displaced as well as refugees is 
one of the biggest questions hanging over the evolution of institutionalised protection 
in the 1990s,'lY The challenge to asylum is a challenge to find protective 
mechanisms which deny integration as the only resolution to forced migration, but 
which both include the notion that return is not the only imaginable outcome and, as 
a consequence, retain asylum as integration for certain cases. 
In protection terms the role of 'safe areas' in upholding human rights and 
dignity must be questioned. The concept's basis in existing legal obligations is new 
and evolving, but it clearly does not maintain any level of upholding a right to seek 
and enjoy asylum in other countries. Its moral basis might similarly be suspect. 
Il9 S~t: Dellg. op.l.'il.. pp.12-13. 
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The implementation of this policy without clear back-up from other protective 
measures or guaranteed security and strategic planning which assures the safety of 
those seeking safety also limits the scope of manageability and control. In certain 
'right' circumstances policies of internal protection for those refused entry to 
neighbouring or more distant states should be developed. In order to have a morally 
based, legally sound protection policy which allows effective management, however, 
it is the policy and concept of temporary protection which should be given most 
attention. Such a policy must not challenge asylum practices, but rather build upon 
them to guarantee safety and humane living conditions to the majority of victims and 
not the politically selected few. Those who need to should continue to receive, from 
the time of their arrival, the support of the longer term protection offered by 
Convention status and asylum accompanied by clear integration strategies. 
Temporary protection should be developed to support the standards of 
nonrefoulement, non-discrimination and fundamental human rights, including family 
unity. It should be developed as a position which both mediates between limiting 






While being a refugee should be a lempol'{Jry state of affairs, there is 
a real danger of refugee situations and the problems of refugees 
becoming institutionalised and of people remaining refugees forever. 
The foremost challenge facing the international community today is to 
reverse this trend.· 
There are commonly perceived to be three routes to the goal of those who become 
refugees remaining so for the shortest possible time. These are return or 
repatriation; resettlement in a third country and integration in the first host state.2 
These outcomes would apply to all forms of displacement, be it internal or across 
international frontiers, and originally considered as temporary protection or as 
asylum. 
The three solutions were originally based on an exile oriented approach. 
While the emphasis was formerly on integration or resettlement, during the 1980s in 
particular the foclis shifted towards vO/UI1I{JI)1 repatriation.] This coincided with a 
shift in thinking away from an exile-centred approach towards a refugee-centric one: 
repatriation is claimed to be the preferred scenario not only of host states but also of 
UNHCR Note Oil International Protection, Eltecutiv~ Committ~~ of th~ High Commissioner's 
Programme, 37th Session IA/AC.96/6801 (July 1986). 
2 Newland detines these routes as: voluntary repatriation; settlement in the country of first asylum 
and resettlement in It third country. (Newland, Kathle~n, Refugees: The New International Politics of 
Displacement, (Washington: Worldwatch Pap~r 43, March 198\). It should b~ noted here that the vast 
majority of the research in this area has been don~ on a country by country basis, with little work on the 
broader meanings of the concepts - particularly in the politics and international relations field. 
Of cour~ there is always the question, 8ft~r contlict situations, of whether the use of the words 
'return' and 'repatriation' is appropriate, since even if borders remain th~ same after a conflict, the 
previous homeland is no longer the same, and there is rar~ly a situation of actually achieving the UNHCR 
ideal of refugees returning to thdr own former homes villages and land. (Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner's Programme, 36th session IA/AC.96/663 I (July 1985». However, the notion as 
addressed here is that of a departur~ from the host state to the general area or t~rritory which the 
displaced person was forced to flee. Bach realistically claims that th~ new emphasis on the desirability of 
repatriation has come about becaus~ return "somehow rt!prt!sents a denial of the entire refugee 
experience." Bach. Robert L. 'Third Country Resettlelll~nt' in Loescher, Gil and Laila Monahan, 
Refugees and International Relatiolls, (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1990) p.313. 
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refugees themselves.4 With the end of Cold War bi-polarity the shift in approach to 
refugee crises is continuing towards an emphasis on the state of origin, with 
resolution of contlicts, change in governmental regimes, moves towards democracy 
and the upholding of human rights being promoted as ways of preventing forced 
movements in the first instance and permitting return as a consequence. One highly 
pertinent question in this shift of emphasis is whether the focus on the voluntary 
element of return could be diminished, further removing the exilic bias and placing 
more and more of a burden on states of origin to protect their own peoples. 
Of these three solutions return or repatriation is often considered to be the 
most desirable. The assumption is that return to the state of origin, or the state(s) 
that territory has become, following the conflict which caused the flight, allows for 
the most satisfactory resumption of the previous 'normality'. 
Goodwin-Gill notes that:' 
For example, 
Return is the objective to which international law aspires; it derives 
from the conception of nationality in international law, being 
coterminous with the notions of attachment and belonging; and is 
supported by the concept of fundamental human rights; now including 
the positive legal implications of the right to development. 
Legally, the nationality of a refugee remains that of his or her state of origin until 
naturalisation takes place, unless the group is made stateless by the country of 
origin. Even with the granting of Convention refugee status andl or long-term legal 
residence, most host states require residence of at least tive to ten years before the 
granting of citizenship can occur. 6 In the case of temporary protection 
naturalisation is not an open prospect, and the notion of attachment and belonging is 
assumed to remain with that state. The attachment envisaged is often to the country 
of origin in conditions of peace, and over time can become an attachment to an 
4 UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees: III search of solutions, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) p.82. 
Goodwin-Gill, Guy, 'Voluntary Repatriation: Legal and Policy Issues', in Gil Loescher and Laila 
Monahan (eds.), Refugees and International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) p.270. 
6 While the Convention is silent on the subject of integ.ration Article 34 is entirely concerned with 
the legal process of naturalization: 
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite 
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as tar as possible the charges and costs of such 
proceedings. 
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idealised vision of what the state was or could be.7 Generally speaking, however, 
those fleeing armed conflict fall into Kunz's "majority-identified reactive fate-
groups" that is to say refugees who are "firm in their conviction that their opposition 
to the events is shared by the majority of their compatriots" and who flee 
reluctantly, without a solution in sight, in reaction to a situation they perceive to be 
intolerable. II 
In addition, the right to return, enshrined as it is in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights!! can only be said to be upheld when there is a real possibility to 
return, in safety and with all other human rights upheld. In other words the flight 
provoking conflict needs to be settled and its causes buried. Return would also be 
the solution posing the fewest problems from the point of view of the sovereign 
integrity of host states, as no integration or assimilation of a new minority group is 
necessary. However, when considering the outcome of a period of protection one 
must allow for the fact that for some groups and individuals 'return' may be 
impossible, as it could essentially mean going to a new state of persecution due to 
the make up of the resulting state(s) and the outcome of the conflict. For this reason 
resettlement and integration mllst also be considered as positive outcomes of the 
period of refugeehood. 10 
While it has been widely assumed that return or repatriation is the only viable 
end to a period of temporary protection, the linkage of the word 'temporary' should 
be considered as related not to the period of stay, but to the type of protection. 
Such thinking would indicate that the protection is of a non-durable type, and that a 
7 See Bach, op.cit.. Some might argue that if the attachment to the state of origin were really 
strong, than the people in question would have remained to tight for thdr homeland. There is. however. 
a big difference between a sense of belonging and a willingness to risk one's life in a war one may view 
as senseless. This is particularly the case in an ethnic contlict, where those who flee may not sympathise 
with the instilled ethnic hatred and strong nationalism, or may be those whose families are ethnically 
mixed. 
Kunz, Egon F., 'Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory', International Migration Review, 
Vo1.l5 No.1 (1981) I>p.42-44. 
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A 
(111), 10 December 1948, Article 13 (2), 'Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own. 
and to return to his country'. 
10 This argument has heen made in Thorburn. Joanne, 'Transcending Boundaries: Temporary 
Protection and Burden Sharing in Europe', International Journal of Refugee Law, Vo!.7 No.3 (1995). It 
must be considered, however, that the psychological identification of the self as a refugee is most likely to 
continue under circumstances in which a person is still in exile, unless and until a high degree of 
integration takes plact'. 
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durable solution needs to be found. While return is certainly a strong candidate for 
the desirable outcome of such a period, as it satisfies both the human rights 
questions and the integrity of the host state's sovereign right to control membership 
of its society, it could equally prove that resettlement or integration would be as or 
more desirable both for the displaced group and for the state or states in question. 
1. Return/ Repatriation 
There are a number of significant questions to be considered when examining 
the question of return or repatriation in the light of a discussion of the evolution of a 
mechanism of temporary protection. These include whether the according of 
temporary protection might assist in motivating 'spontaneous' return if that is 
constantly considered to be the final goal of the period of flight, admission and 
protection. Could a consciousness of th is ul ti mate scenario encourage the 
organisation and planning (by the individual, the host state and UNHCR) of return, 
and discourage the growth of attachment to, and integration in, the host state?" 
Alternatively, might the knowledge that return is an inevitable criteria for the short-
term protection received result in an instinct for over-hasty return? (that is return 
before the situation has really improved, leading perhaps to the re-displacement of 
the individuals or groups involved.) Would the lack of integration cause a state of 
'limbo' and loss of dignity for the refugee? Who is to determine when a state is 
safe enough for return, and is there a minimum period of time which should elapse 
between a cease-fire, peace treaty or change in situation and the return of those who 
were forced to flee'? What happens to those who still fear return or simply do not 
want to go? What happens if control of the specific territory which people fled has 
changed hands under a settlement? These are some of the questions which the 
protecting states and former Yugoslav republics were, under the guidance of 
UNHCR, beginning to address in January 1996. 12 The initial idea seemed to be for 
the internally displaced to be re-housed or to return to their place of origin within 
II This is pointed to as one of th~ p~n:~iv~d advantages of It:mporary protection by UNHCR. 
although it also points to a M~d to r~-examin~ th~ asslIllIption tl1:1t this is n~cessarily always the case. 
State of the World's R~ful!ees. (1995) ol).cit., pp.87-94. 
12 UNHCR hosted a me~ting. on the suhject in Geneva on 16 January 1996. 
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Bosnia Herzegovina first. Following that those who had fled to neighbouring states, 
particularly Croatia and Serbia should return, and finally those in more distant states 
should repatriate. Whether this organised phasing of return can occur or not is a 
story which remains to unfold. The extent to which people and governments might 
assume their roles in this strategy is questionable, as personal desires of the 
displaced people, dislike of the territorial divisions of the peace accord and fear of 
return may remain. 
The major question is, of course, that of whether a definition of the duration 
of 'temporary' is necessary, in terms of a number of years, and how such a 
definition could be developed. Deciding how long a situation of short-term 
protection is to last before becoming more long-term if return was not possible 
would be a delicate political task, balancing concerns for the protected persons' 
rights and psychological well-being with sovereign concerns over the possibility of 
the stay becoming permanent. It would also involve consideration of the role of the 
same state's conflict prevention and resolution measures in conjunction with 
international partners. 
This non-exhaustive list of questions does not give rise to immediate or 
obvious answers, not least because the situation of a mass influx of people in need 
of protection has not yet been met by a ready established mechanism for providing 
only temporary protection. However, they guide the discussion which follows. 
Reference has already been made to the lack of confidence in western 
European states that return would be the ultimate scenario in the Yugoslav crisis. 
Both Croatia and Slovenia acknowledged in the early days of the conflict that the 
solution of many problems posed by the refugee crisis lay with the resolution of the 
conflict. However, a Slovenian report states that: \3 
since the situation does not indicate an early end to hostilities, it is 
necessary to seek solutions to alleviate the consequences within the 
given framework. We would like to emphasise in particular that the 
activities of the entire European Community, and above all the 
countries to which refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina have fled, 
should concentrate on the creation of conditions for an early return of 
temporary refugees to their homeland where they could resume their 
normal life. 
13 Republic of Slovenia, 'Temporary Shdter of R.:fugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 
Republic of Slovenia' (Ljubljana, March 1993). 
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The underlying question in the concept of early return is whether it can be justified 
while there is any possibility that sniper fire and shells might continue to rain down 
indiscriminately in the very country to which the 'temporary refugees' are desired to 
return. In order for the UNHCR standard criteria of return in safety and in dignity 
to be kept, it would be necessary for the conflict to have been resolved. 14 Indeed, 
return would be part of, and an indicator of the cessation of hostilities. However, 
UNHCR acknowledges that "in several countries, the return of refugees is an 
essential part of the transition to peace, rather than simply a result of it. "IS It 
would thus not be viable for protection, and assistance, to cease with return. 
Protection against the re-emergence of tighting, or persecution due to residual 
hostility, would have to be maintained. Also, the assistance of the international 
protection regime in the material aspects of re-building homes and the state and the 
psycho-social re-building of the sense of community and civil society would be 
required if re-patriation were to be successful. 16 
1.1 Voluntal'Y andl 01' safe l'etUl'''? 
In civil war cases the vast majority of those who flee do not wish to do so, 
but are forced to do so, and the initial feeling, which may diminish over time, is one 
14 UNHCR's pr~-conditions for rdurn. taken from UNHCR, Durahle solutions, EXCOM 36th 
session (AlAC.96/663 I (July 1985) ~nd cited by Cuny, Fred ~nd Barry Stein, 'Prospects for and 
Promotion of Spontaneous Repatriation' in Loescher. Gil and Laila Monahan (eds.), Refugees and 
International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)p. 296 arc: 
First and foremost, it Illust be voluntary... Secondly, there Illust be clear and 
unequivocal agreement between the host country and the country of origin both on the 
modalities of the movement ~nd the conditiolls of reception; thirdly, it is vitally 
important that returnees be: allowed to return to their pl~ces of origin • ideally to their 
own former hom~s, their villages, their land. 
U UNHCR, The St~te of the World's Refugees: the ch~lIenge of protection, (Middlesex: Penguin, 
1993) p.I03. Also, Cuny, Frederick C., Barry N. Stein and Pat Reed, (eds.) Repatriation During 
Conflict in Africa and Asia, (fexas: Centre tor the Study of Societies in Crisis, 1992) p.1S. 
Today, most voluntary rel>atriations occur during contlict, without a decisive political 
event such as national independence, without any change in the regime or the conditions 
that originally caused tlight. Countless individual refugees ~nd sizeable groups of well-
organised refugees return home in the face of continued risk, frequently without any 
amnesty, without ~ repatriation agreement or program, without the permission of the 
authorities in either the country of asylum or of origin, without international knowledge 
or assistance, and without an end to the conflict that caused the exodus. 
16 The 'Iuestion of the length of time for which protection of returnees should last is also open to 
much debate, not lea:;t due to the question of dependency on external help and the relative merits of self-
sufficiency in completing ~ I)ositive return scenario. 
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of a desire to return. However, the voluntariness of return is an important point 
which must be examined in the context of temporary protection. 
The scepticism of Western governments is heightened by the view that many 
refugees do not return to their country of origin. In 1939 John Hope Simpson wrote 
that: 17 
Deliberate repatnatlOn on a large scale is scarcely relevant in a 
discussion of practical instruments of solution. In predictable 
circumstances voluntary return of refugees to their home countries 
will occur on so small a scale as to not affect the refugee problem 
itself. The possibility of ultimate repatriation belongs to the realm of 
political prophecy and aspiration, and a programme of action cannot 
be based on speculation. 
However, discussing primarily the situation in the Third World, Cuny and Stein 
claim that substantial repatriation does take place, but that it is masked by the many 
who remain as refugees. In substantiating this, they cite research by Gervaise 
Coles: 18 
If, however, a broad interpretation is given to embrace all forms of 
displacement, particularly those as a consequence of armed conflict, 
serious internal disturbance, or famine or drought, this view is the 
reverse of the truth. In regard to displacement generally, return is, on 
the whole, the rule rather than the exception. 
The major difficulty here is that while Cuny and Stein note that Simpson is talking 
about those fleeing religious or ethnic strife, and Coles about those fleeing armed 
conflict, the situations the international community is faced with in the 1990s 
combine these two elements. Protection during the Cold War often assumed that 
return would be impossible, in particular to the communist states of East Europe, 
and progress towards an upholding of the right to return was frustrated, not least by 
the emphasis on the importance of the right to leave. 
We are left to query the importance of the elements of voluntariness and 
spontaneity in return. In addition, we need to assess the 'double-edged paradigm 
shift' noted by Chimini towards preventive protection l9 and obligatory return, in 
17 Hope Simpson. John. The Refugee Prohlem: Report of a Survey (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1939), cited by Cuny and Stein. Oll.l~it .. p.293. 
18 Coles, Gervaise. 'Voluntary Repatriation: Recent Developments' Year hook 1985 (San Remo: 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law. 1985), cited in Ibid .• p.294. 
19 See Chapter 5. 
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which the major criterion becomes safety rather than willingness and desire to go 
back on the part of the displaced person. 20 The evidence Chi mini gives for this 
paradigm shift comes from two UNHCR related documents. The first, dating from 
1985 states that:21 
The repatriation of refugees should only take place at their freely 
expressed wish; the voluntary and individual character of repatriation 
of refugees and the need for it to be carried out under conditions of 
absolute safety ... should always be respected. 
The second document says that "the relative weights of voluntariness of return and 
guarantees of safety upon return may need to be measured against one another.'022 
Chimini sums up his argument by saying: 23 
It is my view that to replace the principle of voluntary repatriation by 
safe return, and to substitute the judgement of states and institutions 
for that of refugees, is to create space for repatriation under duress, 
and may be tantamount to violating the principle of nOI1-re!oulement. 
Once this space is created it will be difficult to stop other negative 
practices like withdrawal of rations and services, restricting income 
generating opportunities, limiting freedom of movement and 
association, etc. in the state of asylum. 
The principle of nonrefoulement (or non-return) IS held to be the fundamental right 
of refugees, the basis for temporary protection and "the minimum content of asylum 
which is required by international law. 1124 Given this, the question is whether 
states should actively encourage return. Both the negative aspects of host state 
encouragement of return cited by Chimini, and the positive elements of 
encouragement such as cash incentives and re-development assistance can be seen as 
to some extent removing the voluntary aspect of return. Emphasising the positive 
assistance in the homeland rather than focusing on a withdrawal of protection in the 
1O Chimini, B.S., 'The Meaning of Words and the Role of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation'. 
International Journal of Rdhg~e Law, Vol.5 No.3 (1993) p.445. Chimini sees the motivation for 
'encouragement', 'promotion' or 'tacilitation' of return is often the lack of burden-sharing - states can't 
keep up the burden for long. He also notes (p.447) that in 1992 20% of UNHCR's Kenya budget was 
spent on creating a 'preventive zone' in regions of Somalia bordering Kenya, because Kenya threatened to 
return Somalis if no lmrden-sharing occurred. "Thus, conceptually sl)eakinl.l, preventive protection and 
involuntmy refurn cam~ to he linked to the detriment of the principle of protection.· 
21 EXCOM 36th session, conclusion 40 (XXVI) 1985 cited hy Chimini, Ibid., p.454. 
22 UNHCR Working GraUl) on International Protection (cited by Ruiz - World Refugee Survey 1993 
'Repatriation: tackling Protection and Assistance concerns') Chimini, Ibid., p.454. 
2.3 Chimini. Ihid .• PI).454-455. 
24 Goodwin-Gill. op.ci!., p.260. 
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host state would certainly be the more humanitarian path. Chimini sees the issue as 
one of potential danger in that refugees could be encouraged to return, and express 
their wilIingness and desire to do so after UNHCR and host state information 
campaigns, but in fact return to a place where contlict is only in abeyance rather 
than where it is eradicated. 25 
This question comes down to a challenge not only to the bases of 
international refugee law, but also to a test of the very notions of nationality, 
belonging and attachment. The position expressed above in the context of the 
offering of protection to those whose flight is caused by armed conflict was that in 
the spirit of the upholding of human rights and with humanitarian goals in sight, 
protection should be offered. However, that protection should, initially, be of a 
temporary nature, as the situation could change, and the need for protection of the 
group (though not of every individual within the group) could be of limited duration. 
The granting of such protection would mediate between the recognition of the rights 
of the displaced persons and the sovereignty of the host state. The position 
expressed by Chi mini (and others) is that while individuals have a right to return to 
their state of origin, they should not be coerced, encouraged or assisted to do so. 
They should return only if they so desire. Past experience in western Europe would 
seem to indicate that policies which contain no element of a requirement to return 
once the situation allows it lead only to a reluctance to grant protection to other 
groups who may need it at a future date. It is precisely because very limited 
numbers of de /aclO refugees from the developing world, who fled conflicts with 
varying underlying causes (including colonialism), have returned to their states of 
origin from the developed world that western European governments do not believe 
in the idea that temporarily protected persons from former Yugoslavia will return 
even if conditions allow them to do so. It is believed that having experienced the 
standard of living, education and economic benetits of the West people will remain, 
even illegally, but probably with humanitarian statuses. 26 
25 Chimini cites the example of Afghanistan. where international contlict in the 1980s was masking 
the internal strifll app<trent in the 1990s. op.cit., p.455. 
26 It should be borne in mind that those who tled former Yugoslavia did, in the main, enjoy a 
standard of living cOIDI)arable to that which they would have been able to achieve in western Europe 
during three years of IHotection. Many of those who were ahle to tlee were professionals, and their 
standards were reduced hy having to arrive in cellIres with two or three t~unilills in each room, with no 
clothing etc. See for eXl1J1lllle a VPRO (Vrijzinnig. Proteshmtse Rlillio OlllfOIlP - the liberal Protestant 
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The question really has to become one of whether in order to permit the 
development of policies of temporary protection for potential future crises a certain 
'duty' to leave has to be attached to the right to receive protection for the period 
necessary. If it was found that such a duty to leave, in conditions of safety and 
dignity, would be a necessary factor in the future protection of victims of conflict 
then the subordination of individual willingness to return to the criterion of safety 
may indeed need to occur, with a significant reason being the possibility that return 
would allow for future protection, when and if other cases of mass influx arise. 
Chimini concludes his article by saying that: 27 
only when these words [facilitation, promotion, encouragement] are 
looked at in the backdrop of the paradigm shift taking place, and the 
restrictive practices which have all but become the norm in the 
developed world that they can be given content. In general, the 
concern today is less with the refugee community, or for that matter 
with the host countries, which in the case of 90 per cent of the 
world's refugees is the developing world, but with the need to ensure 
that refugees do not disturb the peace of the developed world. In 
other words, the developed states will attempt to give these words 
expansive meaning for it would help them to contain the problem in 
the developing world. While voluntary repatriation is perhaps the 
ideal solution, its idealness should not be the pretext to coerce 
refugees to go back to situations from which they fled in the first 
place. 
The whole notion of safe return, however, must revolve around the fact that the 
situation is safe - and therefore not the situation from which the refugees fled in the 
first place, and that for an initial period at least protection within the state of origin 
must continue. 28 
1.2 Political pl'oblcmatics 
It must be recalled that in recent decades "[v]oluntary repatriation [has been] 
Broadcasters) documentary s~ries in the Netherlands on the livt:s of two female refugees and their children 
from arri val in that country. 
TI Chimini. op.cit.. p.458. 
28 See. for example. Goodwin-Gill. op.cit .. p.282. Goodwin-Gill asks who is to protect returnees 
after repatriation and for how long. His answer is that UNHCR should - but that the length of time 
should be on a cas~ by case hasis. 
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the durable solution least effectively promoted by the international community" ,29 
and that the only international legal instrument concerned with refugees in which 
voluntary repatriation tigures is the OAU Convention. 3u The decade from 1985 to 
1995 saw a new emphasis on fe-integration and rehabilitation needs in the country of 
origin: a change from the days of transporting refugees back to the homeland and 
expecting them to fend for themselves. 31 Cuny and Stein also note that promotion 
can be dangerous, due to the charged political atmosphere. Loescher meanwhile 
describes repatriation as dependent32 
for its legitimacy and effectiveness on conditions in the home country 
and on the refugees' willingness to return. In past decades, large 
numbers were repatriated following the sllccessful conclusion of wars 
for national independence against Western colonial powers. The 
reduced tension between the two erstwhile superpowers during the 
1990s and their disengagement from several major internal and 
regional conflicts that generated huge numbers of refugees in the past 
have opened up opportunities for the termination of conflicts and for 
the arresting of refugee flows. 
He goes on to say, however that the revival of deep-rooted nationalist, religious and 
ethnic contlicts complicates return for many III the South in particular, and to 
describe damaging effects of long-term stays in camps which were meant to be 
temporary. He contrasts the massive amounts of money spent on fuelling Cold War 
conflicts, with 'lukewarm' and 'modest' responses to helping to finance return, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes, and, like Cuny and Stein, describes 
the ultimate problems of return - or not - as political, not logistical.33 
Newland too describes voluntary repatriation as: J4 
ideal for both the refugees themselves and for the countries and 
Cuny and Stein, op.cit., p.311. 
30 OAU Conv~ntion Articl~ 5: "Thtl tlssemially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected 
in all cases and no rd'ugee shall he r~patriated against his will.· 
It figures also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see nottl nine abow). It is also interesting 
to note that th~r~ is no separat~ section in the Eurol)eclll Commission's 1994 Communication on the subject 
of return, in spit~ of this policy document's advocacy of some timn of temporary prot~ction. 
31 UNHCR, State! (If the! World's Ref\lg~~s, (1995) op.cit., p.47. 
32 Loescher, Gil, Beyond Charity: International Coop~rl1tion and the Global Refugee Crisis, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993) p.149. 
33 Ibid., p.150. 
34 N~wlalld, IIJl.cit., p.14. 
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institutions that work with them. Logistically and psychologically it is 
the easiest solution, but politically it may be the most difficult. It 
requires as a starting point that the problem that drove the people 
from their homeland be resolved. Material support for the returnees 
may also needed [sic], at least until they can reestablish their liveli-
hoods. 
166 
The political difficulties LO be faced in the return of protected people to their country 
of origin are manifold. There are the problems to be faced in the host country - due 
to sentiments of racism and xenophobia displayed by the host population (and 
electorate) it might be politically expedient to encourage and promote return. 
However encouraging return prior to the establishment of genuinely safe conditions 
could lead to cries from the same population of human rights abuses. As well as 
violating human rights, the forced repatriation of an unwelcome population to a 
newly recognised state could result in new calls of abuses of that state's integrity. 
In the meantime, assisting former temporarily protected persons to re-build their 
lives and re-integrate can cause tension between returnees and the population which 
did not flee, but stayed (through their own will or through having nowhere to flee to 
once doors were closed) and lived through the contlict. In order to avoid as many 
of these political di fficuIties as possible, cooperation between the states and 
international organisations involved needs to focus on the political ramifications of 
return on alI concerned, as well as the logistics of organised movement and exercises 
such as re-housing and re-building. In addition the root causes of the initial 
displacement need to be addressed and resolved35 and finally the political settlement 
of the conflict must not be jeopardised through the return movement, but rather 
ways must be fOllnd to make return of those who fled the cementing of the new 
situation, and an enhancement of it. 
1.3 Return as the only outcome of tempol'lll'Y pl'otection? 
In his disCllssion of the language associated with return, Chi mini notes that 
debate over temporary protection is taking place in Europe and that obligatory return 
is seen as the foundation upon which such protection will be granted in cases of 
3S See Chapter 4. 
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mass influx.36 
While in the case of temporary protection the notion of 'safe return' 
has been advanced in order to increase protection to those who do not 
have it today, especially refugees from the former Yugoslavia, the 
content of ' safe return' is open to many objections. There is not yet 
any specitication of the conditions and standards which must be met 
before obligatory return can be pursued. Equally worrisome is the 
fact that the decision of the concerned state is to be final even as it 
consults with UNHCR. Finally, there is the problem of dual 
standards. While voluntary repatriation would be the standard in the 
rest of the world, safe return would be the norm in Europe in so far 
as mass influx situations are concerned. In the circumstances, it is to 
be expected that host states in the developing world will also want to 
embrace the notion of safe return, with serious implications for the 
principle of protection. 
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This quotation raises two major questions. Firstly there is the question of the 
assumption that return is presumed to be the only viable or suitable conclusion to 
temporary protection, and secondly the question of the voluntary versus obligatory 
nature of return - a question which requires, as Chi mini suggests, serious 
consideration in an evaluation of the potential of a mechanism of temporary 
protection for those t1eeing armed conflict. 
Chimini is quite correct when he says that the encouragement given to 
Western states, by UNHCR and others, to provide temporary protection to those 
fleeing the contlict in former Yugoslavia was that the protection would be only 
temporary, and that return would be the almost inevitable result. 37 However, many 
governments maintained a constant scepticism on this latter point. 38 So, while the 
very nature of the notion of temporary protection has come to involve a concept of 
the requirement of return, it could be suggested that future mechanisms, offering 
temporary protection in a spirit of humanitarianism, might involve the idea of three 
possible durable solutions - return, resettlement and integration - with the former 
potentially being seen as the most desirable, although the others should not be 
16 Chimini, op.cit., pp.454-5. 
)7 See, tor exallll)k, UNHCR, 'International Meeting on Humanitarian Aid for victims of the 
Conflict in the Former Yug()slavia (Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in the Former 
Yugoslavia (HCR/IMFY/1992/2», and European Community, 'Conclusion on People Displaced by the 
Conflict in the Formc:r Yll~()slavia', (London, 1992). 
38 Interviews with Andrew Cunningham (British Home Oftice) and Dennis de Jong Secretariat 
General of the European COlllmission). 
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considered entirely undesirable. 39 
The varying schemes being established in Europe imply a long-term aim of 
return, but the test they offer is perhaps not the same as the outcome of a pre-
established mechanism might be. In spite of individual desires for return appearing 
strong amongst those who ned former Yugoslavia, and the hope of governments that 
repatriation would be the outcome, the precise necessity of return was not a pre-
established element of the ad hoc procedures of their night or reception, but was left 
implicit. In whichever way the questions raised in discussions concerning the 
promotion of return are eventually answered, the possible alternative and permanent 
solutions of asylum and integration in the first country of asylum or resettlement and 
integration in a third state, must never be rejected by host state or refugee. Indeed 
the UNHCR Background note to the informal meeting of 23 March 1994 notes that 
in two of the major host countries "the vast majority of cases from Bosnia [have] 
either [been] recognised as refugees under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol, in one country, or [been] granted humanitarian status, in the other. 1140 In 
this same note, the requirement of well planned return programmes, as well as a 
measure of pragmatic flexibility in according more secure status to those whose exile 
has already proved to be rather too long-term to be labelled 'temporary', is 
registered. This notion of long-term planning, together with a degree of flexibility 
is undoubtedly essential in any mechanism to be developed. 
1.4 The en"'y indications rOl' I'ehu'n fOl' Bosnians: the Dayton Agreement41 
The linkage between return and rehabilitation is strengthened by the full 
39 For t:xamplt: tht: Dutch sch~lIl~ of provisional prott:ction, to bt: discusst:d at length in Part Three, 
includes II progr~ssiv~ IIj()V~ towards int~grati()n ov~r a p~riod of thret: yt:ars, after which time a 
permanent resid~nct: p~rlllit would he granted. 
40 UNHCR Background Note, (March 1994) o(l.cit., p.7 paragraph 24. 
41 The document resulting from the Proximity P~ace Talks hl!ld at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
Dayton, Ohio, from Novembu I to 21 is rt!ferred to by various names. It consists of a General 
Framework Agrl!t:m~nt with ell!ven ann~x~s. Initiallt:d in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in 
Paris of 14 Decl!mber 1995. it has not been registl!rl!d as a tr~aty by thl! UN. It ha. . however, been 
circulated as a UN document, on 30 Novembl!r 1995 under thl! heading Get/eml Fl'lImelVork Agreement 
jor Peace ;n Bo,\"II;a alltl Ht'I"Zt'gOl·;tla. As a UN document it bears the Gl!neral Assembly document 
number AI501790 and Security Council document number S1I995/999. In this tt!xt the document will be 
referred to as th~ Oayllln Ag.reeillent. 
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implementation of temporary protection policies which include return after the 
resolution of a contlict. In the Bosnian case, the right of return for refugees and 
displaced persons has been included as an ambitiolls element of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement of 21 November 1995. European policy-making for reconstruction of 
Bosnia Herzegovina was underway as the agreement was being initialled, including 
ideas for rebuilding infrastructure and houses in such a way as to bring the 
communities together again.42 The right of return was being seen as a key to any 
reconstmction aid, including the right to return to the area (and house) one left, 
regardless of which ethnic grouping was to be in control of that area.43 The EU 
was to hold a money-raising conference within weeks of the implementation 
conference in London on December 8, 1995. However, the date set by the 
European Commission of 20 December was rejected by EU foreign ministers as 
being "too early", with concrete projects and tinancial targets not yet identified.44 
Great scepticism over the eventual return of the refugees persisted with the initialling 
of the Dayton Agreement. 45 
The return of refugees and displaced persons is one of the key components of 
the outcome of the Proximity Talks which took place at the Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base, Dayton, Ohio from November 1 to 21, 1995. Annex 7 is devoted to 
agreements on the return of refugees and displaced persons, and the issue also enters 
other areas of the agreements made. In Annex 3 (Elections), Article IV states 
tha('6 
The exercise of a refugee's right to vote shall be interpreted as 
confirmation of his or her intention to return to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. By Election Day. the return of refugees should already 
42 UNHCR sugg~sted in its 1995 r~p()rt on Th~ Stat~ of th~ World's R~fug~~s, Ol).cit., that some of 
the difficulties it faced in creating contidenc~ after a cont1i1:l were du~ to the UN role as peacekeepers 
overseeing a p~ace accord (p.I07). In thel Bosnia Huzelgovina eaSel NATO will be performing the role of 
peacekeeper, so it will ht! intt!resting In s~~ if this facilitatt!s or halllp~rs UNHCR's role in return and 
rehabilitation. The British Overseas D~vd()pm~nt Administration announced an allocation of £20m for 
reconstruction in Bosnia Oil 18 Decell1h~r 1995 (BBC, Radio 4 News, 18 December 1995). 
43 Helm, Sarah, 'EU dr<allls of rehuilding a waf-Iurn IlInd', Thel Indtm<ndent, (24 November 1995), 
p.14. 
44 Helm, Sarah. 'EU delays meeting on r~constructi(Jn', The IlldepelJllI~nt, (5 December 1995). 
45 Ibid .. 
46 Dayton Agr~~m~nt, Annex 3 lu th~ Gen~ral Fram~work Agreement (Elections), Article IV: 
Eligibility, I: Votus. 
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be underway, thus allowing many to participate in person in elections 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Annex 4 (Constitution) Article II (Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) 
paragraph 5 (Refugees and Displaced Persons) establishes that: 47 
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to 
their house of origin. They have the right, in accordance with Annex 
7 to the General Framework Agreement, to have restored to them 
property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 
1991 and to be compensated for any such property that cannot be 
restored to them. Any commitments or statements made under duress 
are null and void. 
The ideal of return to hOllies (?lorigin is repeated in Article I paragraph 1 of Annex 
7 (Refugees and Displaced Persons).4X The same paragraph notes that: 
The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important 
objective of the settlement of the contlict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Parties [The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska] confirm that 
they will accept the return of such persons who have left their 
territory, including those who have been accorded temporary 
protection by third countries. 
Paragraph 2 states that the Parties will ensure that refugees and displaced persons 
can return in safety, "without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or 
discrimination, particularly on account of their ethnic origin, religious belief, or 
political opinion." These conditions describing the safety to be guaranteed to 
returnees largely mirror the detining characteristics of a refugee according to the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. They also broadly describe the 
conditions of insecurity under which the refugees and displaced persons fled, yet 
those people were mostly not accorded Convention status, but a temporary protection 
the final phase of which should be return according to the conditions expressed in 
the Dayton Agreement. 
Those conditions of return are further described as being with a free choice 
of destination, and no pressure to remain in dangerous conditions; with respect for 
family unity and with accurate information on conditions in the country provided by 
the Parties prior to return (Article I, paragraph 4). The actual process of return is 
• 7 Ibid., Annex 4 (Constitution) Article \I paragraph 5 . 
48 Ibid., Annex 7 (Refugees and Disl>lal'ed PerSOlls), Chapter I (Protection) Article I (Rights of 
Refugees and Displaced Persolls). 
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to follow a programme coordinated by UNHCR in consultation with the Parties and 
host countries, including priorities for "certain areas and certain categories of 
returnees. 1149 Economic, political and social conditions which are conducive to 
voluntary return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons are to be 
created by the Parties within their territories. 5u In addition short-term repatriation 
assistance is to be provided to all returnees who are in need, in accordance with the 
plan developed by UNHCR" and a Commission for Displaced Persons and 
Refugees is to be established with the task of deciding on claims for property or 
compensation for property which cannot be returned. 52 
The plan worked out by UNHCR was outlined by the High Commissioner, 
Sadako Ogata, on 16 January 1996. It is a three step, phased programme, giving 
priority to the approximately one million displaced still inside Bosnia Herzegovina, 
followed by the estimated 670,000 who were in other former Yugoslav Republics 
and finally the approximately 700,000 refugees and temporarily protected in other 
(mainly west European) states. Mrs Ogata reportedly expressed the hope that some 
870,000 people would return during 1996. She also urged European governments to 
continue temporary protection until it was clearly safe for people to return: S3 
Let liS make sure that the promise of peace signed in Paris is 
becoming a reality on the ground before we take a step that will affect 
the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, who have already 
endured enormous hardships in the past. 
UNHCR estimated that it would need to raise $400 million to finance its 1996 
programmes in former Yugoslavia, including the cost of providing food and 
humanitarian aid, but excluding return transportation and resettlement grants, which 
host countries were being requested to provide.54 
Central concerns over these ambitiolls plans lie with the notion that return to 
49 Ibid., Annex 7, Chapter I, Article I, paragraph 5. 
Ibid., Articl~ II (Crt!ation of Suitahlt! Conditions fur Rdurn). 
~I Ibid., Articl~ IV (R~patriati()n AssistHn~·~). 
52 Ibid., Chaptu 2 (Commissioll tor Displact!d Pt!rsons and R~fugt!t!s), particularly Article XI 
(Mandate) and Article XII (Proc~edings before the Commission). 
S3 Willi:uns. Frances, 'UN plans to return over 2m Bosnians to h()mt!s', The Financial Times, (17 
January 1996) 1)·3. 
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the exact house from which people had fled would be possible, or that many 
displaced people would tind that desirable. It is far more likely that compensation 
will be sought and those who do 'return' will go to areas which are now governed 
by their own ethnic authority. Indeed the ethnic partitioning of the country was 
increasing during the early months after the signing of the Agreements, as, for 
example, thousands of Serbs left Sarajevo suburbs to avoid coming under the 
authority of the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina government, rather than of the 
Republika Srpska. 55 There are also concerns over the implications of taking part in 
the elections, in which voting would be the expression of a desire to return, and 
could be used as pressure for return to take place sooner rather than later. 
In addition, assistance in reconstruction and the development of economic 
capabilities in Bosnia Herzegovina must take place, and have a long-term 
perspective, for there to be genuine encouragement for the voluntary return of the 
temporarily protected. The inclusion of 'return of refugees' as in the General 
Framework Agreement and its development in Annex 7 of the Agreement, offers 
both a means by which to assess the progress in this manifestation that peace is 
working, and, through mal-interpretation, a reason for European governments to 
take the initiative in encouraging, facilitating and even forcing the return of those 
from Bosnia Herzegovina who received temporary protection. The calls for return 
began within days of the initialling of the Agreement, with German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl announcing that the 400,000 people who had received protection in 
Germany (by far the largest group in any European state) must return as soon as 
possible, with the winter of 1995-6 being lIsed for planning the operation. 56 
Money for reconstruction and assistance to returnees would form part of the plan, he 
suggested. An alternative strategy was put forward by the Dutch in January 1996, 
by which people could return to Bosnia Herzegovina for a trial period, to assist in 
reconstruction and see how life would be for them in their country of origin, Their 
visas for a return to residency in the Netherlands would remain valid for an 
55 See for example, Mdiljevic, Asim, 'Divided we stand', Warreport, NoAO (London, April 1996); 
Reuters, 'Bosnian Serb Speaker al,peals to Serbs not to leave Sarajevo' (24 January 1996); Reuters, 
'Senior Ofticial warns most Serhs may leave Sarajevo' (5 Fehruary 1996), 
56 'Bonn seeks return of 400,000 refugees', The Daily TelegrHph, (25 November 1995), p.l3. 
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unspecified limited period. 57 This type of arrangement demonstrates the 
psychological as well as political battle which mllst be waged to achieve the optimal 
result for all concerned. 
The return of the refugees to Bosnia, and indeed the return or re-housing of 
the internally displaced, will be a test of the strength of the peace agreement. The 
outcome of the protection phase is inextricably linked to the outcome and resolution 
of the cause of tlight. Bosnia Herzegovina represents a challenge to the international 
refugee regime, not only in terms of how to protect the victims of 'ethnic cleansing' 
but also because the consequences of 'ethnic cleansing' are to be seen in the 
resolution of the contlict, dividing a so-called whole state into two ethnically led 
regions - one a republic the other a federation. Return will not take place overnight. 
The gradual return of the refugees would be a sign that the deal struck was a 
successful one. 
One concern for the broader picture of the development of temporary 
protection has to be that if the agreement reached in Dayton holds, and the violence 
ceases, but refugees do not return, governments will be persuaded that their 
scepticism was well placed, and the evolution of temporary protection policies as 
contingency planning for future crises will be halted. UNHCR's suggestion that 
developing temporary protection mechanisms will encourage generosity could be 
proved wrong if the 'temporariness' of the protection is not substantiated by large 
numbers returning to a peaceful state. 5K How to encourage and assist return in 
safety, and guarantee security in the long-term might be a greater, and more 
important challenge than including the notion of return in the peace agreement 
suggested. 
2. Resettlement 
Return or repatriation is not, and should not be, the only possible goal or end 
result of a period of, and policy of, temporary protection. The 'temporary' nature 
of the protection implies only that the currenr '/orm of protection is to be of a short-
51 De Volkskrant, 'Bosniers mogen terug met hehouu vall verblijfsrecht', 31 January 1996, p.8. 
(Bosnians may return with their right to stHy intact). 
S8 UNHCR, StHte of the World's Refugees, (1995) 0!l.l·it., 1'.87. 
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term nature. It is a protection which is provisional, and contains an element of 
conditionality. It rests on the condition that the situation in the host country has not 
altered in such a way as to make the possibilities for return in safety and dignity, by 
spontaneous or organised means, so favourable that voluntary return is to be 
supported, encouraged and facilitated. If, however, the condition upon which the 
temporary protection rests is sustained for a period of time which can no longer be 
considered as short-term, then other non-temporary (or at least less temporary) 
solutions need to be considered. While return is certainly one of these it need not 
be the only one, and resettlement and integration should also be considered as 
legitimate outcomes of a period of temporary protection. 
According to UNHCR, II [r]esettlement in third countries is offered to no 
more than 0.5 per cent of the world's refugees. 115'1 It has come to be seen as a 
solution of last resort, and only ten states have regular resettlement programmes.60 
It is a complicated and expensive operation, but one which is, nonetheless, vital if 
the potential of refugee protection is to be fully realised. The impact of some 
resettlement cases in the 1970s and '80s was negative, and it has gradually become a 
more selective process. hi In recent decades, resettlement has been presumed to 
mean the transfer of refugees from developing tirst host countries to developed third 
countries, that is from countries in the region of origin of the crisis to the Western 
states. However, as Loescher notes, "faced with economic difficulties and growing 
popular xenophobia, Western nations are much more reluctant to admit large 
numbers of people who are not easily admissible. ,,62 These difficulties are not only 
met by the imposition of restrictions on the entry of those seeking non-Convention 
statuses, but also a reluctance to undertake to resettle those who have found shelter 
in local states, and in the context of a European crisis, this reluctance to face the 
resettlement issue translates into a reluctance to respond to caIls for physical burden-
59 UNHCR, State of the World's Refugees, (1993) 0ll.cit., 1>.104. 
60 UNHCR, Stat~ of th~ World's Refugees, (l995) op.cit., p.92. The ten states are: Australia; 
Canada; Denmark; Finl.11ll1; th~ Ndherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Sweden; Switzerland and the US. 
61 In the Bosnian I:lISe, individual refugees with high c:dul:atiollal 'Iualiticatiolls have, according to 
anecdotal evidelll:e, heen r':l:ruited from Slov.:nia lind Cro01ti01 to go to st:trt it new life in Canada and the 
US. 
62 Loescher, illl.l·it., p.148. 
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sharing. 63 If the role of resettlement is to be developed in conjunction with the 
concept of burden-sharing it must proceed in a way which does not increase the risk 
of restrictions on numbers in states of first asylum, but rather encourages those 
states to be more generous in the knowledge that their generosity will be supported 
by more distant states when the numbers or length of stay become objectively too 
much to be managed by neighbouring states. 
In many ways, just as return is seen as the most desirable solution, third 
country resettlement is, as Bach suggests:~ 
considered by most international agencies and observers, if not by 
refugees themselves, to be the least desirable solution. The further 
refugees are moved, the less likely they are ever to return home. And 
to return is the cherished goal. 
Resettlement could, for this very reason be viewed almost as a defeat of temporary 
protection, as it would be seen as a durable solution, leading to integration in a third 
state, one step further from the homeland, especially since the initial programmes of 
temp0rlllY protection would have been ended. 
However, in the sense that it could fulfil the practical side of burden-sharing, 
resettlement could be considered as a part of, rather than solution to temporary 
protection. 6:l Resettlement plans could be part of a temporary protection scheme. 
States close to the borders of the state in which a displacement-provoking crisis 
occurs could be encouraged to protect the displaced in the first instance with the 
promise of resettlement further afield if an early solution was not found or numbers 
increased dramatically. However, as was seen in the work of Perluss and 
Hartman,66 Western states were reluctant to share the burden or to participate in 
massive resettlement programmes to assist the developing world in the 1970s, and 
63 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the notion of burde!n-sharing. 
64 Bach, o!l.cit., p.313. UNHCR, State of the World's Refugee!s, (1993) Ol).cit., p.45. describes 
repatriation as: 
often the Ie!ast s<ttistitcwry solution to a refugee problem because of the difficult cultural 
adaphltions involved. It is normally turned to only as a last resort, When there is no 
other way to guarantee protection and safe!gllard hUlllltll rights. 
65 This was the case! in the major historical e!xaml>le of such protection in EurOI)e ie. the case of 
Hungarians who initially tle!d to Austria and Yugoslavia in 1956. The! most successful large-scale 
resettieme!nt case!s we!re! thOSe! at the e!1ll1 of World War Two, ctllU the re!-Iocation of hundreds of thousands 
of Indo-Chinese Boat People in the I 970s. 
66 Perlllss, Dehorah and Joan F. Hartman, 'Teml)orary Refuge!: Eme!rgence of a customary norm', 
Virginia Journal of Internatiollal Law, (Spring 1986). Cited at 1e!llgth in Chapte!r FiVe!. 
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more recently in the case of Turkey's response to the movement of Kurds in 1991, 
Western states demonstrated that they are unlikely to offer guarantees of 
resettlement, even when the crisis is in their midst. 67 Without such guarantees, 
however, as Newland points out, "some countries undoubtedly would refuse to allow 
refugees to claim even temporary asylum, as has happened in Thailand, Malaysia, 
and, reportedly, Honduras. "M 
The primary defence given for this position by Western states is that sharing 
the physical burden (resettling populations) would involve the violation of the right 
to freedom of movement. This defence is very difficult to deny. However, it is 
possible that there would come a point where an evaluation of the qualitative 
differences between the violation of the freedom of movement (for example from a 
'safe area' to an international frontier) and a violation of the right to life, might have 
to be made. If the aim of states (other than the state of origin) during a crisis of 
mass forced displacement was to offer (all be it limited) protection to, and uphold 
the right to life of, the greatest number concern for the violation of the freedom of 
movement of the displaced may need to be subordinated to the greater claim of the 
right to life, particularly in situations where local states begin to return displaced 
people when they feel they can no longer cope.6'J 
The primary humanitarian 'nip-side' argument to this is that certain cases, 
especially those of family re-unification, could require resettlement (of family 
members from their tirst country of asylum to the state in which other members of 
the family have found refuge) in order to respect the right to family life. In the 
Bosnian case many families have been split up, even between western European 
states, and face great challenges in achieving re-unitication, and thus the resettlement 
67 See tor example AdehmlO, Howard. 'Humanitarian lnlt~rvention: the case of the Kurds', 
International Journal of Refugee Law; Vol.4 No.1 (1992). 
61 Newland, op.cit., p.21. NB Newland describes 'international solidarity' - essentially burden-
sharing, as involving material sUI)I>ort - eg money, supplies, I)ersonnel and tnlllsportation equipment [for 
setting up camps and running them I. which can only he provided Itt the invitation of the host government; 
bi-lateral aid; and tht! assistal1l:e of voluntary, private organisations. She notes thltt Western states are the 
top aid givers. It should perhaps also he noted that western states physically protect least refugees region 
by region. 
69 As noted in Chapt~r S. most states and commentators agree that tinancial burden-sharing, 
avoiding resettl~m~nt. allowing th.: displac~d to remain as close as possihle to their country of origin (with 
the aim of return in mind) and permitting the host states to hear the hurden is preferahle to forced 
resettlement. 
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of one or more members. 70 
Organised resettlement, like organised return, involves the co-operation of 
UNHCR, and the two states involved. Thus, discussions on the subject of 
resettlement also bring us back to the question of the sovereign right to control entry 
to the state already referred to in Chapter 5. In the case of resettlement, the 
exercise of this right is perhaps under the greatest possible control by the distant 
state, as its participation in an organised programme is a pre-requisite of mass 
resettlement. 71 
Being held to be the least desirable outcome of a displacement situation, and 
thus the least desirable outcome of a temporary protection scheme, it is unlikely that 
resettlement of masses of people displaced by armed contlict would ever be 
effectively promoted. However, even as a last resort solution it is an option that 
must be maintained, particularly within regional mechanisms where it eventually 
could form an integral part of the burden-sharing required to resolve the problems of 
neighbouring states if a contlict has lasted for a number of years, making imminent 
return ever more unlikely. Whether displaced people can eventually return, are 
resettled or remain in their first country of asylum, however, an essential element of 
the desirable ending of their plight must be their integration within the society in 
which they ti nd themsel yes. 
70 See Family Reunification tilr Rdugees in Europe, International seminar, 15-17 May 1993 
Helsingor. Denmark, urganised hy the Danish Centre tor Human Rights and the Danish Refugee Council. 
under the auspices of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (COI)enhagen: The Danish Refugee 
Council 1993). In a suhmissiun to the seminar entitled The Family and International Law, Peter J. van 
Krieken (Head of UNHCR's Peshllwllr Oftice, timnerly Deputy Regional Representative of UNHCR 
Regional Office in Stm·kholm, cuvering, Nordic and Baltic countries) suggests that an analysis is needed of 
a restrictive apl)roach to family reunitication, 
"but it could well be submitted that th~re is II wide-spread feeling that once families 
have ben reunited, it will he very difticult to conh:mplate or even implement (voluntary) 
repatriation of a whol~ family to the country of orig.in once the circumstances there have 
improved to such an extent that more or less normal life back home would be possible. 
It could IIlso he suhmitted that a restrictive reunitication policy is meant to stem the 
intlux, to give some 'negative' signals." p.30. 
71 Of course, limited Ilumhers of individual refug~es may altempt to cause th~ir own resettlement by 
fleeing the country of tirst asylum and arriving at the horders of a third stllte. In such l\ situlltion they 
would, in the early 1990s almost inevitably he returned through polici~s (If "Safe First Countries" as 
described in Chapter 5. 
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3. Integration 
Some of the temporary protection mechanisms introduced in Europe involve 
plans for gradual integration, preparing for a situation where return appears to 
become impossible, or where the length of stay makes a lack of integration into 
society an unnatural occurrence. Integration into the society in which one lives is at 
least a natural desire, if not always quite a natural phenomenon. 
3.1 Semantics: Integration, assimilation and accultumtion 
Due to the marked contrast, though semantic similarities, between the terms 
involved (particularly between integration and assimilation), our tirst concern has to 
be with the definitions of the terms to be used, and with the value attached to the 
various forms of acculturation. 
definition of integration" as:72 
Barbara Harrell-Bond offers a "very simple 
a situation in which host and refugee communities are able to co-exist, 
sharing the same resources - both economic and social - with no 
greater mutual connict than that which exists within the host 
community. 
She immediately rejects this detinition herself, saying it would not stand up to 
detailed analysis, since access to resources may be unequal, one group may be 
exploited by another and conflict within the host society may have increased due to 
the pressure of the greater numbers brought about by the refugees' presence. The 
important thing to note, however, is that integration happens not only to the refugee, 
but also to the host community. Amongst the mass of complex definitions of 
what integration, assimilation and other terms associated with the relationship 
between refugees (and migrants or minority groups generally) and host, or dominant 
groups, the clearest and most logical position is that of the social-psychologist John 
Berry. He defines acculturation, of both the individual and group, as "culture 
change that results from continuolls, first hand contact between two distinct cultural 
n Harr~II-B()nd, Barhara E., Imposinl! Aid: <."1Ilt'rgt'llI:y assistanc<." to refugees, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986) p.7. 
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groups. ,,73 This definition implies a situation of mutual cultural exchange between 
dominant and non-dominant groups, although as Berry notes, the major changes are 
in the minority (migrant) group, resulting from the influences of the majority (host) 
group. When in the situation of encountering a new societal environment, groups 
and individuals tend to adapt. Adaptation is detined by Berry as "the generic term 
used to refer to both the process of dealing with acculturation and the outcome of 
acculturation. ,,74 There are various strategies for dealing with adaptation described 
as adjustment (changes made by the incoming group or individual to increase the 
'fit' with the new environment - the most common phenomenon); reaction (changes 
involving retaliation against the new environment - not often successfully engaged 
in) and withdrawal (changes to reduce the pressures of the environment, in a sense, 
removal from the adaptive arena. This is often not a real possibility).75 
Berry uses the following model to give dichotomous answers to the questions 
of whether the cultural identity and customs of the minority group are viewed by 
individuals within that group as of value and something to be maintained, and 
whether the same individuals should seek relations with the larger society. There 
are a number of variables in the model, including the nature of the dominant group; 
the nature of acculturating group; the modes of acculturation (there are four in the 
model) and individual factors sllch as demographic, social and psychological 
characteristics; pre-migration experiences; prior cultural knowledge and encounters; 
age; gender; marital status and social supports. 
73 Berry, I. W., 'Acculturation and Psychological Adaptation: a conceptual overview', in Berry, 
l.W. and R.C. Annis (eds.). Ethnic psychology: Rt!search and practice with immigrants. refugees. native 
peoples. ethnic croups and sojourners: sdected mtpers from a North Ameril'an Regional Conference of the 
International Associatioll for Cross-Cultural Psychology, (Swets and Zeitlinger: Amsterdam, 1988) p.41 
7. Ihid., 1'.43. 
75 Ibid., p.43. 
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FOUR MODES OF ACCULTURATION76 
Ouestion 1 
Is it considered to be of value to 




Is it considered to be of value YES INTEGRA TION ASSIMILA-
to maintain relationships with TION 
other groups? NO 
SEPARATION MARGINAL-
ISATION 
Within this model assimilation is detined as: 
relinquishing one's cultural identity and moving into the larger 
society. It can take place by way of absorption of a non-dominant 
group into an established dominant group, or it can be by way of the 
merging of many groups to form a new society, as in the "melting 
pot" concept. 77 
Integration: 
implies some maintenance of the cultural integrity of the group (that 
is, some reaction as resistance to acculturative pressures) as well as 
the movement to become an integral part of a larger societal 
framework (that is some adjustment). Therefore, in the case of 
integration, the option taken is to retain cultural identity and move to 
join with the dominant society. In this situation, there are a number 
of distinguishable ethnic groups all cooperating within a larger social 
system.7!1 
When there are no substantial relations the group controlling the situation (dominant 
or non-dominant) determines the option - and this results in either separation (a 
pattern imposed by the non-dominant group) or segregation (a pattern imposed by 
the dominant group). 
Marginalisation meanwhile is difficult to detine precisely, because it is 
16 Ibid., p.45. 
11 Ibid., p.45. 
18 Ibid., p.45. 
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accompanied by a good deal of collective and individual confusion and stress. 79 
It is characterised by striking out against the larger society and be 
feelings of alienation, loss of identity, and ... "acculturative stress" .... 
Groups lose cultural and psychological contact with both their 
traditional culture and the larger society (either by exclusion or 
withdrawal). 
181 
The model can be employed at four distinct levels. These are the national policies 
of the dominant group or larger societies; for the acculturating groups use to 
articulate their wishes and goals; for individuals - in order to assess attitudes in non-
dominant group and to assess individual attitudes in the dominant group - about how 
others should acculturate. 
Berry points out that those whose involvement is involuntary such as refugees 
and native peoples find more difficulty in the acculturation process than voluntary 
migrants. and he suggests that "those only temporarily in contact and who are 
without permanent social supports (eg sojourners) may experience more problems 
than those more permanently settled and established (eg ethnic groups). ,,~() He also 
suggests that there are many differences between the dominant groups, for example 
between pluralist and homogeneous societies. In addition he notes that individuals 
experience the stresses of acculturation in different ways. 
In a critique of Berry's work, Kuhlman claims that this model is too limited, 
as, he suggests, interaction between groups and interaction within one's own group 
in attempts to maintain the minority culture, are not different things but closely 
related - particularly in the temporal sense of contact in the one group taking away 
time from contact with the other.!!1 Kuhlman claims this sense of limited contact 
with two groups causes the model to lose its meaning. 
I would suggest however, that Berry's model gives us the clearest sense 
possible of what integration means or should mean. If the refugee or member of the 
non-dominant group is in contact with both his or her own cultural group and 
others - both the dominant and other non-dominant groups in the same society - then 
those groups must also, on a reciprocal basis be in contact with the refugee group. 
79 Ibid .• 1'.45. 
80 Ihid., p.46. 
81 Kuhllll<lll. To III , 'Th~ E\:ollomi\: integ.ratioll of r~fug.~~s ill d~vdoping countries: a research 
model', Serie R~seardl Memoranda, (Vrije Universit~it Amsterdam. Faculteit der Ecollomische 
Wetensch:tppen en E':olloillctrie, 1994) (>.6. 
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Thus, the criterion of effect on all groups within the host society is met. The 
temporal limitation in contact in fact proves that integration is occurring as the 
groups mix, and come to an understanding with and of each other, while maintaining 
elements of their distinct idelllities. 
Having established that integration involves the maintenance of the cultural 
identity of the refugee group while it simultaneously comes into contact with the host 
group, and mutual contact and understanding is established, it is important to 
mention the types of societies into which integration is more commonly possible. In 
developing countries, with fragile economies and often domestic ethnic tensions, 
which can be exacerbated when the immigrant group upsets an already delicate 
balance, integration is not likely to be promoted by the host government. Rather it 
is likely that the emphasis will be put on motivating and supporting the desire to 
return. In developed countries, particularly economically strong, pluralist societies, 
there is likely to be more chance of integration, through or in spite of the 
governments own policies. Kunz, describes hOW~2 
overpopulated or demographically self-sufticient countries are less 
likely to accept large numbers of refugees. Becallse they are not 
particularly anxious to retain and assimilate new arrivals they are less 
likely to press the refugee to abandon a home oriented outlook and 
activities. Being more complete, more mature and self-assured, such 
societies are usually more tolerant and more willing to offer the 
refugee a sanctuary without forcing the adoption of their particular 
way of life. Great Britain, Switzerland, France, Belgium and Holland 
have traditionally shown such a tolerant attitude to political refugees. 
Research by Steen into the situation of Tamil (de facto) refugees in the UK 
and Denmark has supported this view. It was found that the Tamils in the UK, 
where there is seemingly no policy of integration as such, were actually "more self-
reliant, ambitious and determined" than those in Denmark, who were involved in 
Danish Government and Refugee Council operated training schemes and 
programmes, aimed at their greater integration. 113 Steen does not suggest that 
leaving refugees to help themselves is the best integration policy. Rather she 
submits that too much assistance, ignoring the needs and desires of the refugees in 
the aim of creating an idealistic integration policy for them, does not really work. 
KlInz. op.cit.. p.48. 
83 Steen. Ann Bdinda. 'R~fllg~~ R~sdtl~ment: D~nlllark and Britain COml)ared', RPN: Refugee 
Participation Network. 14 (January 1993) pp.8-11. 
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The integration, whether with an assimilationist or ll1ulti-culturalist bias, of 
new refugee groups renews the question of policies on minorities for the host 
societies. One way of tackling the causes of flight is to try to encourage a 
democratic handling of 'old' minority issues within states in such a way that 
minority and majority groups can co-exist peacefully, with full recognition of rights 
for all. Integration of refugees, particularly when it emphasises the multi-cultural 
co-existence of communities, creates 'new' minorities in host states, some of which 
are already struggling to cope with existing minority Issues. Some states work 
through active programmes to integrate new minorities into the social structure of 
societies. Others adopt a more /{lissez-/aire approach. M Active programmes may 
in fact result in the dissolution of the ethnic culture and identity of the immigrant 
group over generations. However, they also olTer greater opportunities for wider 
policy harmonisation between the means of encouraging or facilitating integration 
and education and information for aJl in society aimed at minimising or avoiding 
racial tensions. Temporary protection policies in some European countries have 
included a phased approach to integration, aimed at regulating its progress to 
maintain the spirit of hope for return rather than a permanent stay. 
3.2 Intcgration of mignlnts in Em'OI)C, uud the link to tempol'ul'Y pl'otection 
In its 1994 Communication, tbe European Commission describes integration 
as allowing people to live 'normally' .~S Such a situation can, it suggests, be 
achieved if the state provides resources, such as language courses; housing; 
education; vocational training and if the immigrants demonstrate a willingness to 
adapt without losing their own cultural identity, accepting the equal obligations that 
accompany the accordance of equal rights in their host state. In other words, the 
Commission seeks integration not assimilation. To achieve successful integration of 
114 Se~ Stanton Russt'li. Sharon and Ch:1rIt's B. K~ely. 'MlIltill1t~ral Diplomacy to Harmonise 
Asylum Policy Among Industrial Countries: 1984·1994. in Rogers. Ros~mari~ and Sharon Stanton 
Russell, (eds.). Toward a New Glohal Rd'ugt'e R~l!ime (F()rthl'ollling. 1995) IMime:o: cited with the 
permission of the: authorsl· Tht' UK oft~rs an almost uniqut! examplt' of th~ ItI;.\'se .. ja;I'(, tll>proach. which 
as Stanton Russell and Keely point out. and as is reinl\)r~cd ill th~ Cl1St' studi~s helow. th~ rest of Europe 
is unlikely to follow. 
85 Europel11l COlTlmission. Communication to the Cuull..:il and th~ European Parliament on 
Immigration amI AsvlulTI Puli..:it's. ICOM(94) 23 tinall. (Brussels. 23 F~hruary 1994). 
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current and future legal immigrants, including creating the right climate of 
acceptance in society for possible future mass intluxes of refugees, the Commission 
highlights the need for the monitoring and development of integration policies, and 
for awareness of the political sensitivity of this area. It divides integration policies 
into four areas: the improvement of the situation for third country nationals legally 
resident in the European Union; the creation of the right economic and socio-cultural 
environment~ the meeting of information needs and promotion of dialogue; 
combatting racism and xenophobia. 
In order to improve the situation of legally resident third country nationals 
the Commission suggests that the prospect of security and permanent residence status 
are essential. Without this, uncertainty will, it says, permeate all other aspects of 
integration policies. In particular it highlights the need to reassess the status of 
family members whose status currently often remains dependent on the main 
immigrant, regardless of situations of death or divorce, and for generations who may 
in fact have been born and brought up after migration, but who have not become 
citizens of the state in question. Besides this, it puts forward the need for a 
reassessment of the question of free movement within the Union for resident third 
country nationals, which is currently permitted only between the Schengen states, 
including movement for the purposes of economic activity. 
The creation of the right economic and socio-cultural environment for 
integration of migrants is, it is suggested by the Communication, made difficult for 
several reasons. For the migrants themselves, employment is often hampered by 
inequality of qualifications, the precarious position of industries traditionally 
employing immigrants, poor language abilities, and, generally disguised, 
discrimination in recruitment. In addition, housing and healthcare problems faced 
by nationals and immigrants alike hamper the creation of a more open environment, 
as does the lack of education and training - particularly for older immigrants. 
Bohning also suggests a need to move towards regulations based on three key 
features in the attempt to integrate those who are already in Europe. 86 These 
features are non-discrimination, the maintenance of cultural identity and 
demarginalisation. He also suggests the need for permanent residence status for all. 
116 Bohning. W.R .• ·Intt!grlition lino immigrlition Jlr~ssurt!s in w~stern Europe', International Labour 
Review Vol. 130 No.4 (1991). 
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In associating these to the concept of temporary protection an obvious tension 
arises. 87 The conceptual di fficulty the Commission and Member States face when 
addressing the need aJlQ desire of humanitarian categories of refugees for limited 
protection is mirrored in the suggestions for improving the conditions in EU 
Member States for third country nationals. The long standing notion in Europe is 
that after arrival migrants have a diminishing desire to leave, whatever the cause of 
their flight. Concurrently, it is held to be morally complex to support, encourage or 
facilitate return to a state from which a person has fled, and where standards of life 
may be more demanding than in the place where protection was sought and 
offered. 11K These suggestions for facilitated integration retlect the will to support 
human and minority rights and combat racism and xenophobia cherished as 
European values in the late twentieth century. It is difficult to say whether such will 
for smooth integration, including proposals for immediate reference to permanent 
residence, would in fact facilitate the position for protected persons or the wider 
community. The desire for integration in terms of an acceptance and understanding 
of all cultures concerned and an ability to co-exist harmoniously surely assists all 
concerned: the push towards permanency of a situation might actually produce 
greater tension for persons wishing to keep their will to return to the country of 
origin, and assist in its re-establishment after a period of conflict or tension might 
not in fact be as positive as it tirst appears. 
That temporary protection policies, like all refugee policies, should involve 
non-discrimination and promote the maintenance of cultural identity and 
demarginalisation during and after the initial protection period is not disputed. 
However, the idea that there might be any more than a promise for eventual 
permanent residence if the situation in the state of origin does not alter to allow 
return within a specified period challenges the very notion of offering a period of 
short-term protection. If all those who receive any sort of protection were to be 
17 
.. 
Temporary Jlrot~~·tiun lIl~aSllr~s should r~slllt in allY of the 1()lIg~r term 'ideal' scenarios of 
return, reselll~lll~nt and i\lt~grllti()lI. Th~ initial pt'ritlll of prol~ction in a host statl: should, under 
temporary prot~clion, h~ cOllsidt'rt'd short t~rm by hoth protect~d and protector. That the total 
period of stay must be teml)()rary ne~d not ht' considered I:ss~ntial. See Thorburn, Joanne, 
'Transcending B()undari~s: Temporary Protection and Burden-Sharing in Europe', International 
Journal of Refllgt'~ Law, Vol.7 No.3 (1995). 
S~e Chimini. 8.S., 'Tht' M~aning of Wurds lind the! R()I~ of UNHCR in Voluntary Repatriation', 
Jnternational Journal of R~flll!t.'~ Law, Vol.5 No.3 (1993). 
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instantly offered a permanency of status, the chances of encouraging future 
generosity would soon dry up. In the zeal for reducing racism and xenophobia 
policy-makers should recall the merits of maintaining the potential for return within 
a certain period, rather than cutting off that chance forever. 
However, even in a situation of temporary residence, the ability and right to 
work, receive education and training, and keep 'human dignity' alive through such 
measures is an essential feature of positive protection. That immigrant groups who 
might be within a society for only a limited period should be accepted and integrated 
is surely a positive aim for all sides. 
In general terms, influxes of refugees are regularly seen in a negative way in 
the developed world as they so often stoke feel i ngs or fears of racism and 
xenophobia. KIJ This impression of racism towards migrant groups, even towards 
political and forced migrants, has lead to restrictive asylum and immigration 
policies. However, Spencer describes the British government policy of recent 
decades of "no integration without limitation" as in fact creating a public sentiment 
of racism rather than to responding to one.'J\J She describes how immigrants are 
blamed for unwelcome social change and socio-economic problems, when the 
problem is, \11 fact, fuelled by discrimination and restrictiveness in immigration 
policies.91 As well as the portrayal of economic migrants as the harbingers of 
socio-economic problems and social ills'!2, refugees are, she says'JJ 
19 UNHCR ill Stat I.' of tht! World's R~fu\!~l's, (1993) op.cit., Ilol~s tht! irony that while human 
intoleranc~ is tht! major caust! of most rd'uge:t! t1ows, th~ prote:!ctioll of tlwst! rd'ugt!t!s e:!lsewhere is blamed 
for new racial pre:!judict! and the risl' of xe:!nophohia. (p.58). 
90 Spenct!r, Sarah, Thl' Implicatiuns of Immigration Policy for Racl' Re:lations', in Spencer, Sarah 
(ed.), Strangers and Citize:ns: a positiv~ alll)roach to migration ami refug~t!s (London: IPPRI Rivers Oram 
Press, 1994) \>.307. 
91 Ibid.. 1'.3 10. In fa~·t, SI)e'nct!r says, it is "as a rt!slIlt of discrimination in the labour market, 
[that) skills and t!xl)t!rie:ncc are lost to thl' British l'conomy,· 
9:! St!t!, 'Immigration: A Commitment to Australia: The Rt!(>ort of th~ Committee to Advise on 
Australia's Immigration Pulicit!s' IFitzge:rald rt!portl. (Callherra: Australian Gov~rnml'nt Publishers' 
Service 1988), cite:d hy Ihid .. 
93 Ihid., (>.316. This distinction in portrayal can be picked u(> ~vt!n from UNHCR's publicity in 
Western Europe. In 1992-93 tht!ir 'advertiselllents' inv()lv~d pictures of famous refugees, such as 
Eillste:!in, and noted that this distinguisht!d 'AIl1t!rican' scie:ntist was a "~fllg~e. 1994-95 advertisements 
from UNHCR Oil CNN and in nl'wspapt!rs show Sl'e:Ilt!S of 'Playmohil' dolls - asking who is the refugee -
and pointing out that it is the one who has nothing in his hands. The public is asked to give him 
something to make:! him happy. In the: light of the: l'OIllIlle:nts hy Spe:ncer. this could he seen as rather a 
regressiVe:! campaigll from the: standards of the: Einskin one', or as a rdll'ctiun of tht! nt!l'd to pamper to the 
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portrayed either as vulnerable dependents in need of our help (and 
resources) or as scrollngers who defraud social security. We could 
instead be informed of the skills and experience which they bring, 
from which in the long term we shall benetit. 
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The key surely must be that if 'we' (and the refugees) are to benefit from the period 
of time during which we come into contact, whether it be long or short, in the 10ng-
term it would be to everyone's benetit for inregrarion (but not assimilation) to take 
place. Even during a period of temporary protection some measure of integration 
(contact with the host group while the culture of the country of origin is maintained) 
must be beneticial. Its benefits would include the achievement of a positive 
environment during that particular time; the maintenance of good relations whether 
the group is forced into longer exile or returns; permitting, encouraging and 
enhancing prospects for return both through tile maintenance of tile home culture 
during exile and through the experience the refugees have of integration with groups 
whose life experience differs from their own - which may after all be the case after 
return too; and to permit an atmosphere in which future forced mass movements if 
they occur will be treated in a humanitarian spirit. 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter it has been demonstrated that while return to the country of 
origin, in safety and dignity, can perhaps be considered the 'best' solution to 
displacement crises it should not be considered to be the only result of a period of 
temporary protection, and it should not be pursued blindly without acknowledgement 
of the rights and continuing protection need of the groups and individuals concerned. 
While the voluntary component of the refugees' return was seen to be a 
desirable element, and indeed often considered essential, it was suggested that in fact 
return might al most be seen as a duty, upon which a right to temporary protection 
could rest, once conditions of safety could be seen to prevail, and with the 
protection of international organisations sllch as UNHCR and 10M, as well as the 
assistance of NGOs, all supported by the host states. In considering the coercive 
elements of the encouragement and promotion of return, it was noted that these 
measures, while they should not become forceful, do in fact have a role to play in 
image the West has of rl!fu/!t't's ill order to /!I!I their l:ompassioll and dOll<lliOlls. 
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keeping the desire to return alive, and thus encouraging the upholding of the right to 
return enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The other desirable and durable solutions to a period of temporary protection, 
resettlement in a third country, and permanent settlement in the first country of 
asylum, it was suggested, should always be kept alive as viable if less desirable 
options. Integration is a particularly necessary component of the 'comprehensive 
approach' as some level of integration is necessary for the refugee and host groups 
to co-exist during the period of temporary protection, as well as beyond that if 
necessary either in the first host state or a third state, or indeed upon return to the 
country of origin. In all three of these situations the refugee faces potential 
problems, above all racism. The political difticulties associated with the three 
durable solutions are those which, at this end of the approach, need the most 
detailed, and delicate handling, particularly if a further displacement situation, and 
the protection difficulties that entails, are to be avoided. As UNHCR says:94 
[Refugees] do not invite racism. On the contrary. they are the 
principal victims. 
94 UNHCR. Stat ... of th ... World's R ... fug ...... s. (1993) op.l·it.. p.59. 
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CONCLUSION 
Within the context of a thematic comprehensive approach to forced 
migration, temporary protection forms an axis around which other measures turn. If 
the causes of flight could not be managed to prevent exodus in the first instance it 
can offer a means of protecting de facto refugees while further negotiations or 
intervention to solve the violence and conflict take place, making return a realistic 
possibility for many. It could develop into a mechanism which encourages host 
governments to act swiftly and conscientiously to solve a crisis causing spreading 
instability, although it did not have this effect in the Yugoslav case. l In protection 
terms, short-term policies, well coordinated and including a spreading of the 
'burden' could provide a practical and conceptual balance between protection in 'safe 
areas' and the seemingly longer term commitment of the granting of refugee status 
and accompanying asylum. 
The concept of temporary refuge, in the context of large-scale influx, 
thus stands paradoxically as both the link and the line between 
peremptory, normative aspects of non-refoulement and the continuing 
discretionary aspect of a State's right in the matter of asylum as a 
permanent or lasting solution.2 
In order to demonstrate the mediating and intermediate nature of temporary 
protection and burden-sharing in the handling of displacements a useful model can 
be developed. If one imagines a spectrum, on the one hand taking a philosophical 
or conceptual line spanning the full recognition and upholding of all human rights 
and the full upholding of the sovereign right of states to control admission and 
membership it is possible to envisage temporary protection as mediating the 
opposing claims during an intermediate period. This position finds support in the 
work of lohn Vincent. In discussing humanitarian intervention he correlates the 
duty of states to intervene for humanitarian reasons with "the right on the part of 
UNReR, The State of the World's Refugees: in search of solutions, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995) p.90. 
2 Goodwin-Gill, G.S., The Refugee in International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) p.12!. 
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individuals everywhere not to be treated outrageously. 113 In asking why the rules of 
international society should be modified to admit the right to life he argues that 
changes should be made because of the commitment to human life. The value of 
human life should not, he says, "be diluted by the mere boundaries which human 
beings happen to have constructed against each other. 114 The boundaries to 
membership set up by human beings thus need to be modified to allow for the 
temporary admittance and protection of human beings whose lives are at risk, 
allowing time for policy formation leading to longer term solutions. 
Meanwhile, another spectrum spanning the practical measures taken to 
protect persons no longer protected by their state of nationality or habitual residence 
(that is our thematic 'comprehensive approach'), would see a line drawn between 
protection in 'safe areas' and integration in a state of asylum or resettlement. 
Temporary protection and burden-sharing would form the transitional links in this 
chain of responses. This would constitute a balanced approach, as in a situation 
where policies addressing root causes had failed, and policies of humanitarian 
intervention and 'safe area' creation had proved inoperable, temporary protection 
could first be assured in the region of origin, backed by financial burden-sharing and 
by the guarantee of resettlement for a further intervening period or more long term 
protection if such a step became necessary. 
The concept and practice of temporary protection could satisfy the major 
requirements of all sides, offering protection but not full membership, permitting the 
individuals to seek and receive protection, without hastily or unacceptably 
transgressing the boundaries of state sovereignty. 
To summarize, many of the displacement crises most easily envisaged in and 
around Europe in the post Cold War 1990s may be best dealt with by the granting of 
temporary protection, 10 line with the minimum protection guaranteed by 
nonrefoulements, and in keeping with the notion of burden-sharing. The 
Vincent, R.J., Human Rights and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, (986), p.I25. 
5 The concept of non-rejoulement has been expanded in customary international law to include the 
non-return of those who do not faU under the Convention's definitional criteria, but who nonetheless are 
acknowledged to be in need of international protection. See for example Goodwin-Gill, G.S., 
Wonrefoulement and the new asylum seekers' in Martin, David A., (ed.), The New Asylum Seekers; 
Refugee Law in the 19808 - the Ninth Sokol Colloquium on International Law, (Dordrecht: Martinus 
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consequences of restrictive refugee and immigration policies and strict interpretation 
of the 1951 Conventi6n definition of 'refugee', together with the erection of barriers 
to entry and the containment of forced migration in countries or regions of origin 
can be lethal for those up-rooted in places such as former Yugoslavia.6 A 
mechanism of temporary protection, together with appropriate burden-sharing 
measures, is urgently required in Europe to complete and link the elements of a 
comprehensive approach and thus permit more success in handling future 
displacement crises than has been the case so far. The focus of temporary 
protection should not lie on the length of stay being short term, but on the period of 
this minimal form of protection being of limited duration. This period should offer 
safety to the displaced, and a time for reflection for them, the host states and other 
supporting states, international and non-governmental organisations leading to a 
search for satisfactory outcomes. The result could be the resolution of the causes of 
flight and safe return to, and re-integration in, the area from which people had been 
displaced. Alternatively it could be longer term protection and integration in the 
host state or a state of resettlement. Even after the end of the temporary protection 
period, however, eventual safe return should be a goal and a hope which is kept 
alive. 
Nijboff, 1988). 
6 See for example Loescher,G., Beyond Cbarity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee 
Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Shacknove, A., 'From Asylum to Containment' -' , 








From the whole of Yugoslavia by summer 1995 estimates on the number of 
the pre-war population of 23 million people who had emigrated during the four years 
of conflict ranged from 3.5 to 5 million. I In July 1992 it was already estimated that 
2.3 million people had been displaced. The war in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Bosnia Herzegovina had, up to summer 1995, caused the displacement of 
approximately 2.3 million people, of whom 1.3 million were still within Bosnia 
Herzegovina, many in the besieged enclaves or 'safe areas'. 500,000 displaced 
people were in Serbia and Croatia, and the remaining 500,000 were in other, mainly 
European, states. 2 Those who reached areas beyond the states of former Yugoslavia 
were assisted in arriving there by UNHCR organised quotas and evacuations, 
through spontaneous arrival, resettlement, or because they already resided in those 
other states, for employment or study purposes, prior to the break up of former 
Yugoslavia and wars in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina.3 
What follows is a study of the reception and protection of those persons who 
arrived at the four selected states during the period of 1991 to 1995, that is from the 
time the conflict and displacements started until the point at which field research for 
this thesis was carried out in summer 1995. The end point of this research coincides 
with a period of displacements through 'ethnic cleansing' on a scale which had not 
been seen since the first year of the crisis, and renewed calls for protection places in 
'Nations on the move', The Economist, Vo1.336 No.7928 (19-25 August 1995). 
2 Ibid.. Statistics taken from the ICMPD 'Newsletter on Bosnia and Herzegovina', Issue No.1, 
December 1994 also suggested 2.3 million displacements within and from Bosnia at that time. In July 
1995, 120,000 of those who had already been displaced once were left to their own resources, and to the 
mercy of Bosnian Serb 'ethnic cleansing through mass murder or further displacement in the fallen 'safe 
areas' of Srebrenica and Zepa. ['Victims of Bosnian Realpolitik', The Economist, Vo1.336 No.7924 (22-
28 July 1995) p.37.] 150,000 Serbs were also forcibly displaced from the Krajina by Croat forces. 
['Croatia's Blitzkrieg', The Economist, Vo1.336 No.7927 (12-18 August 1995) p.31.) UNHCR made a 
request in the first week of August 1995 for 5,000 new places for temporary protection outside Bosnia 
Herzegovina for those fleeing the fallen 'safe areas' and an eventual potential capacity of 50,000 for those 
fleeing the Krajina region. [,Britain asked to let in more Bosnians', The Guardian, (31 July 1995) p.7.] 
As of 24 July 1992, Germany had accepted 200,000; Hungary 60,000; Austria 50,000; Sweden 
44,000; Switzerland 12,200; Italy 7,000 and the UK 1,100. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, (Washington: Human Rights Watch 1992) p.141. 
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western Europe from UNHCR. 
The four states to be looked at in this study are the Netherlands, Austria, 
Slovenia and the United Kingdom. These states have been selected as essentially 
representative of the European handling of the crisis. However, one of the points to 
be made is that on the question of temporary protection there is no fixed pattern of 
development of either policies or legislation. The cultural and societal variations 
between European states have made their mark on this flexible approach, in 
particular on the strategies for the integration of the temporarily protected. 
The selection of these states as subjects of this case study was made on the 
following lines. Three of them are Member States of the European Union, and as 
such involved in all the processes of harmonisation. Arising at a time when 
Member States were beginning their process of harmonisation of asylum policies, 
one might imagine that there was broad scope for the development of a coordinated, 
EU policy on temporary protection as a new element of those policies. However, in 
reality, each state came up with its own range of mechanisms and provisions on 
every detail of short term protection. As a consequence, this plethora of schemes 
may ultimately result in a policy area with major harmonisation problems in the 
future. One of the selected states, Austria, is however a very recent Member, 
having acceded only in January 1995, and therefore its handling of this crisis took 
place in an atmosphere of prospective membership of the Union, with all the 
apparent restrictiveness that Union's Members had been developing. Slovenia 
meanwhile, as will be seen in Chapter Seven, is developing its policy lines with 
membership of the European community (and potentially the EU itself by 2020) very 
much in mind. 
While none of the selected states border on Bosnia Herzegovina, Slovenia as 
a fellow former Yugoslav republic is very much in the frontline, both of the 
displacement crisis and as a gateway to the EU, and Austria is the first EU port of 
call for many migrants, not only from Bosnia Herzegovina, but also from other 
Central and East European States. The states closest to the crisis have, perhaps 
logically, borne the greatest weight of the displacements, particularly as the general 
assistance of earlier crises, such as Hungary in 19564 has not been in evidence, and 
as policies of containment: keeping people close to their place of origin to facilitate 
4 See Chapters 8 and 9 below. 
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return have become more popular. Ulrike Davy points out that figures given by 
newspapers towards the start of the crisis (in July 1992) demonstrated that in 
general, the closer a state was to the crisis, the higher the number of 'refugees' 
arrived at its borders. 5 She puts this down to visa restrictions imposed by more 
distant states. Her point is interesting, however the reasons for this distribution may 
go further than she suggests. For example, Germany and Sweden can be 
distinguished as being higher up the list than would be expected if only proximity 
was to be taken into account. Other factors must surely have played a role. These 
could include their relatively liberal policies and in Germany's case the large number 
of guest workers whose situation and reason for being in Germany changed with the 
degeneration of the situation in their country of origin into conflict. In addition, 
there was the policy of keeping people as close to their place of origin as possible to 
facilitate return, a policy practised by all European states, and emphasised by 
UNHCR. It is noticeable that the new states, which had been part of Yugoslavia, 
and in most cases were still to some degree involved in the conflict or in supporting 
one or other party within Bosnia, with their own interests in view, had become home 
to significant numbers of displaced persons, including their own internally displaced. 
It is however, in the context of burden-sharing, interesting also to note that the 
distribution of the displaced payed no regard to the size of the host state or its ability 
in economic and social terms to cope with such large influxes or movements. 
According to the New York Times, Croatia admitted 630,000 persons due to the 
fighting in the former Yugoslavia (although it is not clear how many of these were 
internally displaced); Bosnia-Herzegovina had 593,000; Serbia 375,000; Germany 
200,000; Slovenia 66,000; Hungary 60,000; Austria 50,000; Sweden 44,000; 
Macedonia 31,000; Switzerland 12,000; Italy 7,000; the Netherlands 3,400; 
Norway 2,000; the United Kingdom 1,300.6 
Slovenia has the additional attraction of offering a case where absolutely no 
Davy, Ulrike, 'Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina: are they genuine? A closer look at the 
asylum practice in Austria and Germany', Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Vol.18 No.1 (Winter 1995) 
p.131. 
6 'Yugoslav refugee crisis Europe's worst since 4Os', The New York Times, 24 July 1992, p.l. 
The Independent of 27 July 1992 puts Switzerland's figure at 40,000 and Italy's at 2,000. 'Britain 
attacked for ignoring Bosnian refugees' p.l. As ever statistics are rarely precise or fully comprehensive 
in migration matters, but these figures perhaps allow for some comparative judgement of relative 
proportions. 
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asylum or aliens legislation was in place before this crisis, so every development, 
while coloured by historic ties and future hopes, is a clearly new step, untinged by 
past migration patterns. 
Finally, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom offer examples from 
opposing ends of the EU spectrum on asylum and migration. The Netherlands is a 
traditionally liberal, humanitarian state where asylum matters are concerned, while 
the United Kingdom has a reputation for restrictiveness, especially in connection to 
sending-countries with which it has no cultural or historic links. 
Part Three of this thesis is divided into four chapters, each dealing with one 
state. Each chapter will begin with a summary of the position on temporary 
protection in summer 1995. The position as it developed during the early days of 
the crisis will then be described, followed by an analysis of the new policy and legal 
developments. The reception and integration arrangements and enacting of policies 
in each state will then be discussed, including the matters of cost, humanitarianism, 
social acceptance and overall restrictions. The limited notions of eventual return 
will be discussed and then each chapter will tum to European coordination and 
burden-sharing from the point of view of each state in the light of its own domestic 
actions and legislation. Chapters 8 and 9 on Austria and the UK also include a 
historical perspective through a brief study of previous cases of practical short-term 
protection and burden-sharing. Although the structure of the four chapters is 
roughly uniform, they are in no way intended to form the type of formal survey 
offered in documents such as the periodic UNHCR Surveys on Temporary 
Protection, precisely because such readable surveys already exist. 
The four chapters are based on interviews carried out with officials of the 
ministries concerned with these policies, with UNHCR staff, with representatives of 
the relevant non-governmental organisations and academic institutes, and with people 
working in reception and centralised accommodation facilities. In the case of 
Slovenia, there is also a first hand account of collective centres visited during the 
course of this research.7 The accounts given here are the result of my own 
perceptions from what they told me, and what I saw in each country, as well as 
references to official documents from each state's government, from UNHCR, and 
7 None of the people interviewed will be quoted directly, althougb a list of their names and 
positions is to be found in the first section of the Bibliograpby. 
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the limited number of relevant academic reports which have appeared on this subject 
to date. 
Two major themes will form the core of all four chapters. Firstly, there is 
the ad hoc nature of policies on temporary protection and secondly, the cultural and 
societal basis of those developments which have occurred. On the first point, it will 
be seen that if laws have been created, as is the case in three of the four states 
considered here, then their creation has been for the purposes of regularising the 
situation of the displaced persons, for their own and the host populations' sakes, and 
of creating rules around which the ad hoc policies which may be needed in future 
crises can be based. That is to say that flexible policies have been concretised into 
relatively fixed laws, in order to give a solid basis for future political flexibility" 
As Kratochwil points out:9 
While policy, even if cast in rule form, is designed to guide 
inferences towards a goal, leaving the relevant decision-maker with a 
great deal of discretion as to the time, place and mode of 
implementation, legal rules "provide relative firm guidance not only 
with respect to ends but also to the means to be adopted" to the 
contexts or settings of application, and to admissible and inadmissible 
exceptions. 
I would take this one further step to say that the relatively firm guidance offered by 
legislation can offer a firm foundation for future policy flexibility, not straying too 
far from the established rules but allowing adaptation. The lack of that firm 
legislative basis may lead to disarray and confusion over what are admissible and 
inadmissible exceptions to the rule form-cast policy. 
Three of the four states, Austria, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
gave full Convention refugee status to some arrivals from Bosnia Herzegovina, 
• Fisk, Robert, 'Zagreb ensures Serbs will never see their homes again', The Ind!pendent, (1 
September 1995) p.l0 reports that the Zagreb authorities are said to be drawing up a new "temporary 
management of abandoned property law·, because it wants to control the property of Serbs who fled the 
Krajina region. An example of policy becoming law. Poole, Teresa, 'So many women, so little time', 
The Independent Section Two, (1 September 1995) p.2 cites a participant of the UN women's conference 
in Beijing saying, "Although many countries have passed good legislation, there is still an extremely big 
gap between what the legislation says and reality.· This is a demonstration of how laws do Dot really 
affect the social reality. 
9 Kratochwil, Friedrich V., Rules, norms and decisions; on the conditions of practical and legal 
reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
pp.206-7. [The citation used by Kratochwil is from Gottlieb, G., 'The nature of International Law: 
Towards a second concept of law' in Black, Cyril and Richard Falk, (eds.), Tbe future of the International 
Legal Order, Vol.4 (princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972) p.332]. 
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particularly the earlier arrivals whose coming preceded the creation of new 
legislation. This seemingly arbitrary granting of Convention status with all its 
attendant rights has led to calls of unfairness of treatment from some quarters, and is 
a question which will be treated in the chapters to come. In general, however, in 
these states and others, Convention status has not been granted to persons fleeing 
Bosnia Herzegovina.10 It is precisely as a means of offering a formalised and 
legitimised status that these ad hoc policies, and eventual legislation, have been 
created. 
On the second point, the conclusion will be that however much Europe may 
be 'European', the situation of each state vis ~ vis migration remains, however 
slightly, different. These differences are based, for example, on structural variations 
on the level of the state decision-making apparatus and of civil society, and on 
divergent humanitarian traditions, and attitudes towards both immigration and 
emigration. It is not the intention to start analyzing cultural and societal variations 
between states, but rather to suggest that such variations lay at the root of 
differences in refugee integration and settlement policies. It is the differences in 
these policies which will be set out in the four chapters. 
The Conclusion to Part Three of the thesis will involve a discussion of the 
scenario of the asylum-shopper. The possibility of a refugee selecting the state 
which might offer him or her the type of protection and lifestyle which would suit 
him or her best will be investigated. The conclusion includes this notion for a 
variety of reasons. One is to demonstrate the ridiculous nature of the idea that a 
person genuinely in need of protection to save his or her life would spend time, 
before flight, investigating the options and shopping around for the best deal. The 
second is to show that the major reason there is an idea that they could do this is the 
vast difference between policies of European states. A third reason is to show that a 
European level fixing of the nature of entitlements and opportunities of lifestyle in 
the host state could be detrimental not only to the society of the host state but also to 
the refugee. 
10 In her work on the genuineness of asylum claimants in Austria and Germany, Ulrike Davy has 
found that usually one o( four reasons is given for denial • that the reason for flight was that of the 
general state of war in Bosnia Herzegovina (ie that there was no individual targeting), that expUlsions or 
ethnic cleansing was not directly attributable to the state, that any harm inflicted was not for one of the 
reasons delineated in Article la of the Convention or because the punishment prompting flight was 
delivered for legitimate reasons such as draft dodging. See, Davy, Ulrike, op.cit .. 
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Migration towards the EU caused by the break up of former Yugoslavia 
seems to demonstrate that the political and economic situations and positions of 
receiving states are not yet sufficiently convergent for an entirely uniform 
mechanism of temporary protection to be suitable. lI Rather, the conclusion of this 
case study will be that the Bosnian displacement crisis has shown the urgent need for 
policy formulation on a European level with regard to minimum standards and 
guarantees of the protection of civilian lives. The formulation of a flexible 
European policy on temporary protection should include the capacity for, on the 
agreement of the ministers responsible for immigration, a regional acknowledgement 
that a case requires short term protection away from the state in which conflict is 
taking place. It should also determine how the capability to cope with that 
protection on the financial and human-capacity levels should be distributed. 
However, regional regulations (or even guidelines) on standards of entitlements and 
the extent of integration of the temporarily protected into society, could not, it is 
suggested, be reasonably worked out. Indeed trying to focus on the details of the 
entitlements of the protected rather than on the protection of their lives might be the 
stumbling block over which a regional temporary protection policy could fall. 
II Geddes makes a link between the economic logic of interdependence which encouraged the 
creation of a single market and the pressure to restrict immigration into the EU once that single market 
with free movement of EU citizens was established. See Geddes, Andrew, 'Immigrant and Ethnic 




TEMPORARY REFUGE IN SLOVENIA 
1. The situation in Summer 1995 
The first reading of a draft law on temporary protection in Slovenia was 
passed in early March 1995. The second reading, as of August 1995 in a revised 
draft form according to the Parliament's initial conclusions, was expected to pass 
within a few weeks. The Slovene government's intention is twofold: they wish to 
legalise the existing situation of people from Bosnia Herzegovina who have been in 
Slovenia during the period since the start of the conflict in 1992 with legislation that 
could, in future, be used to protect other groups as designated by a governmental 
decree. 
According to May 1995 data from the Office for Immigration and Refugees 
of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 21,500 'refugees' from the Republic 
of Bosnia Herzegovina had found temporary shelter in Slovenia (which has a 
population of 2.2 million), but it is a number which changes daily, through third 
country resettlements, the arrival of family members, and even return. 1 As many as 
170,000 people from Bosnia Herzegovina have sought protection in Slovenia at some 
point between 1992 and 1995. Slovenia is one of the very few states to point out the 
ethnic composition of the people it is protecting from the conflicts in Bosnia 
Herzegovina in its reports - perhaps because, after its own recent independence 
struggle, it is still anxious to distinguish itself and its people from others who existed 
together in what was Yugoslavia.2 Throughout the existence of Yugoslavia, 
'A Cry to the World', Office for Immigration and Refugees of the Government of the Republic 
of Slovenia Qune 1995). The figure for 31 December 1994 was 23,000 according to 'PersoDS under 
Temporary Protection in the Republic of Slovenia', Office for Immigration and Refugees; the Government 
of the Republic of Slovenia, (undated mimeo). 
2 In other available documentation, only Austria (as well as Slovenia) has statistics on ethnic make 
up of displaced people from Bosnia Herzegovina, although this is not in Austrian government papers, but 
in a report from ICMPD, 'Background Data on Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the C.B.I. 
States', March 1995. 77% of the people from Bosnia Herzegovina in Slovenia are Bosnian Muslims, 17% 
are Bosnian Croats, 2% are Bosnian Serbs, and 4% are classified as 'other'. In Austria the figures are 
62%, 13%, 16% and 9% respectively. 
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Slovenia had tried to maintain a distinct identity, retaining its culture, language, 
literature and its economic strength.3 
All people from Bosnia Herzegovina in Slovenia as of July 1995 were on the 
temporary protection scheme. No applicants had yet ever been recognised as 
refugees in Slovenia, from any country or for any reason, although in July 1995 
there were seventy or so cases in the Convention procedure. Many applicants of 
various nationalities apparently leave the country before a decision is taken. From 
late 1992, only humanitarian and family reunification cases have been legally 
permitted to enter Slovenia from Bosnia Herzegovina, although inevitably many 
'illegal entries' have been made.4 These entries to Slovenia must be dealt with, as 
people cannot be returned to an acknowledged war zone, however, many people 
from Bosnia Herzegovina are probably not registered with either the government or 
the Red Cross. The statistics may well alter dramatically once registration 
procedures in line with the new legislation get under way. UNHCR's activities in 
Slovenia have largely been within its self-defined role as bridges builder between 
refugees and the newly independent state, although in January 1995 it already 
considered standards there as corresponding to the rest of Europe.s 
2. Before Summer 1995 
Prior to its declaration of independence in February 1992, Slovenia, as part 
of former Yugoslavia, had no legislation of its own on asylum and immigration or 
indeed other matters. Its legislators' and practitioners' experience of and familiarity 
with the Yugoslav asylum system was minimal, not least because Yugoslavia, in 
spite of its presence in the conference of plenipotentiaries negotiating the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its proximity to crises such as that 
of Hungary in 1956, was not an immigration or protection country, but rather a state 
See, Glenny, Misha, The fall of Yugoslavia: the third Balkan war, (London: Penguin, 1992) 
p.86; Cviic, Christopher, Remaking the Balkans, (London: Pinter/RIIA, 1991) pp.69-71. 
4 It is estimated that over a thousand people from Bosnia Herzegovina entered Slovenia in 1994. 
S 'Interview: Cengiz Aktar is the new chief of the UN Mission in Ljubljana', Daily News, 4 
January 1995, p.4 (Unofficial translation). 
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of transit.6 Slovenia's entire experience of refugee and asylum policies and 
legislation therefore consists of its practical management of the displacement crisis 
thrust upon it in the earliest days of independence, as the wars in Croatia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina escalated and endured far longer than Slovenia's own ten day conflict 
with the JNA.7 
The Office for Immigration and Refugees (OIR), an independent professional 
service of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, established by governmental 
decree started operations on 1 July 1992, by which time 70,000 people were 
registered as 'protection seekers' in Slovenia.' Its tasks, according to the decree, 
include the monitoring of problems concerning immigration and refugees; 
preparation of proposals and initiatives for solving such problems, including visa 
policies; organizing collective centres and other types of accommodation for 
'temporary refugees' 9; supervision of health screening procedures for 'temporary 
refugees', asylum seekers, political refugees and other immigrants; organizing the 
repatriation of 'temporary refugees' and the resettlement of political refugees; 
preparing proposals for the treatment of immigrants and refugees and proposals 
6 During the Hungarian crisis of 1956, Yugoslavia played a somewhat dubious and shady role. On 
5 December, 1956. it was reported in The Times under the headline 'Return to Hunpry of Refugees' that 
the Yugoslav government was returning refugees to Hungary, having never given them any status, and 
without disclosing the numbers involved. The following day, the same newspaper. under the heading 
'Refugees who wish to return' reported that the Yugoslavs had said they would act in accordance with 
international rules on the right of asylum. and with the wishes of the refugees. The numbers involved 
were still unknown, but small groups of Hungarians were arriving at western embassies in Belgrade to 
request visas. On 7 December the UK Foreign Office expressed concern that Yugoslavia had forcibly 
returned still undisclosed numbers of Hungarians, in organised hand overs on two separate occasions, and 
at two separate crossing points. during the previous week. On 8 December The Times (,Yugoslavs begin 
repatriation of refugees') reported that 141 adults plus some children had been repatriated from Yugoslavia 
in two handovers, while 300 had chosen to go on to other countries. It commented that it was very 
difficult to understand the secretive attitude of the Yugoslavs compared with the openneu of other states. 
7 INA - the Yugoslav National Army. See Cohen, Lenard I., Broken Bonds; The Disintegration 
of Yugoslavia. (Boulder: Westview, 1993) for an account of Slovenia's movement towards independence, 
declared on Iune 26 1991, and the build up to, and early months of, the break up of Yugoslavia. as well 
as notions of Yugoslavism. See also Glenny, op.cit .. 
Statistic found in Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, (Washington: Human 
Rights Watch 1992) p.I40. 
9 The Government of the Republic of Slovenia used the term 'temporary refugees' to describe 
those people from Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina who were seeking and receiving temporary shelter in 
Slovenia from the start of the crisis until mid 1994. The terminology was then altered to talk of 'people 
receiving temporary refuge', largely because the term 'temporary refugee' raised so many eyebrows in 
international circles. As seen above, Convention refugees are, due to the very nature of the Convention, 
meant to be in a temporary situation, until such a point as cessation can take effect, but to actually add the 
adjective 'temporary' to the legal term 'refugee' raises too many status related questions. 
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concerning the standards of services in homes for refugees and collective centres; 
setting up an information service for asylum seekers, 'temporary refugees' and 
political refugees in Slovenia; issuing publications and other information material; 
organizing the training of professionals working with refugees and asylum seekers; 
and performing professional tasks connected with examining complaints of those 
who were denied refugee status. In particular the Office took over the 
accommodation of and assistance to 'temporary refugees' from Croatia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina from the coordination group of the Republican headquarters for civil 
protection within two months after this decree came into force. It cooperates 
directly with UNHCR, and with other international, state and non-governmental 
organisations. 
This Office is one of the few government departments in Europe to openly 
point to the distinction between Convention refugees and those coming from a 
conflict situation such as that in Bosnia Herzegovina as a 'legal void':o In 
attempting to fill this void, it prepared the draft law on temporary asylum which in 
1995 at last began its journey through Parliament, to regularise the situation of those 
Slovenia accepted even without a legal framework. The law had been in drafting 
since 1993, and the exact cause of the slowness in procedure is unknown." 
People who receive the ad hoc temporary protection get healthcare, live in 
collective centres (of which there are twenty six) or with 'host' families - although 
those housed in the latter way are being pushed by their relatives to enter centres as 
finances are low. Care and maintenance of temporary refuge seekers from the 
beginning was shared between governmental bodies and the Red Cross of Slovenia 
and other non-governmental organisations (Caritas, the Slovene Foundation, Most 
and others).12 Accommodation in collective centres is organised by OIR, and 
10 'A Cry to the World', oo.cit .. 
II Cohen describes the problems Slovenia had in its transition from an authoritarian one party 
system to democracy. Politicians were not used to being in political parties, or to allegiance to their 
party's policies. Also, people were habituated to examining the personality of the policy maker rather 
than analyzing policies. This caused -a pattern of chaotic decisionmalcing and endless parliamentary 
disputes. - Cohen, op.cit., pp.27S-6. 
12 Of the Slovene NGOs only the Slovene Foundation proved both willing and organised to discuss 
this subject during field work. Other Noos which were contacted expressed interest and willingness to 
talk, but on arrival turned out to have abruptly moved offices, or all staff were away - usually on overseas 
visits to conferences etc. OIR staff say this is unsurprising as there are repeated difficulties in 
communication and cooperation with the Noos. 
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before them was dealt with by the civil defence authorities, while NGOs provide 
assistance to those in private accommodation, and give psycho-social support to 
those in need. All expenses have been covered by the government and donations 
from International Organisations, other governments and private donors up to 
summer 1995. The monthly cost for a temporary refuge seeker in collective centres 
was calculated in the draft law to be SIT 11,000 (£65)\3, and for health care an 
additional SIT 2,600 (£15) per month. People can try to get Convention or 
immigrant status, although there has been a political decision not to grant 
Convention status. If a legal status is achieved, then naturalisation is possible after 
ten years, or one year after marriage with a Slovenian citizen. 
3. The origins of the temporary refuge legislation, initiation and 
influences 
With the draft law on temporary protection, it is explicitly stated that there is 
a need, after three years, to legalise the existing unregularised situation of acquired 
temporary refuge and the rights and obligation arising therefrom, while providing 
legal foundations for future conduct. The aim of the legislation is to establish how 
temporary refuge can be granted and removed, the rights and obligations of 
temporary refuge holders and the role of governmental bodies dealing with this 
issue. UNHCR has been fully involved in the drafting of the new law, and has had 
some influence on it through its cooperation with the drafters and NGOs, as well as 
its attendance at parliamentary drafting sessions. 
To summarise the draft law: 
In cases where the government acknowledges, with information based on 
reports from various sources, that another state is at war or in similar circumstances, 
where there is occupation or massive human rights violations, then Slovenia will 
offer temporary refuge to people fleeing that state, setting a quota if domestic 
financial constraints so demand. Family reunification and strong humanitarian cases 
will be permitted to exceed the quota if one is established. In Article 27, persons 
from Bosnia Herzegovina are specifically mentioned as people who can benefit from 
13 Exchange rate at July 1995. 
Slovenia 204 
these provisions, although they must register within a thirty day period after the law 
becomes effective. 
Temporary refuge can be granted to people who resided in a country when 
the situation giving rise to the accordance of temporary refuge began and, due to 
those circumstances, came directly to Slovenia, those who were already in Slovenia 
and were prevented from returning, and to families (spouses and minor children) of 
those referred to already. It is open to citizens of the state in question and to 
stateless people who were resident in that state.14 People cannot receive temporary 
refuge if they are gUilty of crimes against humanity and international law, guilty of 
criminal acts punishable by three years or more imprisonment in Slovenia, already 
have refugee or residence status in Slovenia, or rejected, through their own will, 
temporary refuge already granted in Slovenia. Cessation will occur when 
circumstances are judged by the Slovenian government to have changed, when 
resettlement occurs, after voluntary return or if Slovenia accords another legal 
status. 
In the first draft it was stated that if people did not seek the status or went 
beyond the quota limit, or if they revoked their status or resided illegally in Slovenia 
then restrictions could be imposed on their movement, although care and 
maintenance would be guaranteed. Those limitations to movement will be reviewed 
in the second draft, and certainly will not include imprisonment. The notion was 
described to me as one of quarantine to protect Slovenian security where such 
protection was considered necessary. People not complying with orders restricting 
movement may be fined a minimum of SIT 2,000 (£11-50). 
Temporary refuge does not count towards residence for naturalisation 
purposes, and asylum applications will not be heard while a person is benefiting 
from temporary refuge status. Applications for temporary refuge for future arrivals 
must be made on entry, using an official form. Authorised officials will search the 
applicant and belongings. Then the temporary refuge seeker is to be transported to a 
collective centre, for further data collection and identity checks. OIR administers 
the application procedure, and an internal organisation of the Interior Ministry takes 
the decision on the application. The procedure may be shortened if sufficient 
14 Slovenia is particularly sensitive to the issue of statelessness in the former Yugoslavia, where so 
many people find themselves in that situation. 
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information is gathered. Once granted temporary refuge, a person is issued with a 
special card. Denial of temporary refuge may be appealed. Appeals are heard by 
the Ministry of Interior. The period of temporary refuge is specified in the original 
decision, but is not set in the legislation. Changes of residence must be notified to 
the Ministry of Interior - failure to do so three times can result in a revocation of the 
status, and a minimum fine of SIT 1,000 (£5-75). 
People with temporary refuge have the right to residence, care and 
maintenance in the Republic of Slovenia for the specified period, to health care, 
education and work under certain conditions, as well as to receive humanitarian 
assistance. People can reside in collective centres, and, if they have an income, 
must contribute to them according to their capabilities, to an amount determined by 
the government. Primary education is assured, secondary and post-secondary 
depends on resources, although UNHCR is encouraging access to secondary 
education for older children. 
The most important right outlined in the new law, according to OIR, 
UNHCR and NGOs is the right to work. This is seen as important for independence 
and dignity, and to balance the situation, as constantly receiving is seen as damaging 
to self-respect. Many have worked on the black market, but with the new legislation 
there will be a legitimate right to employment for temporarily protected people in 
Slovenia. OIR is to mediate with Employment Offices to find work for temporary 
refuge holders. After referral, the person in question is to contact the prospective 
employer, and a copy of the contract is to be sent to OIR. If the regulations are not 
adhered to, the employer may be fined at least SIT 160,000 (£915), and the 
responsible officer would get a personal fine of at least SIT 16,000 (£91-50), as 
would the individual employer. For temporary or casual work, no work permit is 
required. UNHCR is offering to assist OIR in pinpointing areas in which this new 
labour force can be effectively used, including via joint ventures, to the benefit of 
the Slovene economy as well as of the individuals in question, and in introducing 
self-employment. Repatriation, if it can take place, will be organised by OIR. 
The explanatory notes to the draft law strongly indicate that Slovenia is 
establishing this category in order to imitate regulations in other states, and that 
temporary refuge is specifically for mass influx situations - the acknowledgement 
being that "a refugee individually flees to a recipient country on the grounds of 
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persecution .... ". The quota system is indicated to be part of Slovenia's concept of 
burden-sharing and international solidarity, and if they decide they cannot cope with 
the numbers arriving, they will tum to other states. That only people coming 
directly to Slovenia can get this status is emphatically laid down (perhaps as a result 
of so many returns from EU states enacting safe third country legislation). 
Once the law has been passed, the new legalised status will be publicised via 
the mass media and DIR will issue a brochure for those concerned. Information 
concerning the procedure, status and rights will also be passed on to people from 
Bosnia Herzegovina currently in Slovenia via the collective centres and NGDs. 
4. Centres and Integration IS 
Having just won its own independence in 1991, after a ten day battle with 
troops of the JNA loyal to Serbia and the ideal of Yugoslavism, Slovenia found itself 
with empty, and partially destroyed, army barracks, as well as former factory 
housing blocks from the socialist era, which were relatively obvious and easily 
adaptable centres for the massive influxes from Croatia and later Bosnia 
Herzegovina from 1991 onwards. In July 1995 there were twenty four collective 
centres, all said to be in accordance with international standards. One third of the 
refugees (about 8,000 people) were in collective centres in July 1995, the other two 
thirds being with host families - usually relatives of Bosnian origin who had been 
naturalised as Slovenians since independence. 
People staying with families receive aid from UNHCR and the Red Cross. 
Donations of clothing are received from NGOs, although the Slovenian authorities 
are very careful over the donation of medical supplies, as they had bad experiences 
with overrun expiry dates on early supplies. There are strict controls on imports -
and the vast majority of medical donations must be made via pharmaceutical 
purchases in Slovenia. Collective centres offer care and maintenance in terms of 
food, housing, clothing, psycho-social aid and medical care. People are encouraged 
to organise their own lives in the centres, independently looking after order and 
cleanliness, and sometimes cooking too. 
Former centres, once they are no longer needed for this purpose are, and will 
See Appendix 2 for two first-hand accounts of Slovenian Collective Centres. 
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be, used for other pUrposesl6, or used for future influxes of asylum seekers and 
refugees. 
Basic medical care in Slovenia appears to be quite high, a remnant from the 
socialist days, during which period there was a health service for everyone, with 
both basic and specialist healthcare. Refugees get basic health care: in Ljubljana, a 
refugee health service is operated in one of the three collective centres, run by two 
doctors, and those staying in private homes in the capital also use this facility. 
Elsewhere in Slovenia there is access to local services, although these are not so 
closely geared to the particular needs of refugees. Health care needs have, however, 
after 3 years become more normalised, without so many special problems and 
injuries specific to the conflict. 
Slovenia is particularly active on the level of psycho-social assistance for 
people from Bosnia Herzegovina. The Slovene Foundation, funded on a project by 
project basis by, amongst others, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and the Soros 
Foundation, works in cooperation with the Education Ministry, the Red Cross and 
UNHCR. It has mental and social health teams made up of doctors, psychologists 
and teachers from Slovenia, Bosnia Herzegovina and other states, who visit 
collective centres and meet people, especially children and their mothers, for 
individual and collective counselling. The belief of the foundation is that a 
population oriented approach is most productive, so they work on motivating the 
refugees who they perceive to have low energy and a low capacity for coping, 
although the aggression rates are lower than the foundation staff had expected to 
encounter. The teams concentrate particularly on psycho-social difficulties of 
traumatised children - generally normal reactions to the abnormal situations they 
have encountered, having previously been psychologically secure, but lost their 
whole environment of security. J7 
Integration in Slovenia is aimed at as a natural process rather than through a 
detailed programme. On the one hand, the common Yugoslav history and similar 
languages could facilitate this process. On the other hand, the long held Slovenian 
view of themselves as the rich intellectuals of Yugoslavia and the Bosnians as the 
16 One in Ljubljana was, in August 1995, being converted into a boarding school, for example. 
17 The Slovene Foundation, 'Psycho Social Help to Refugee Children', (undated mimeo, received 
July 1995). 
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poor rural kin might not be easily overcome, and my own anecdotal experience was 
that this undercurrent was strongly present, even amongst officials dealing with the 
centres and procedures. It is also demonstrated in the adherence to ethnical 
breakdowns of statistics referred to above. In addition, there is a perception that the 
people from Bosnia Herzegovina in Slovenia are the most deprived category of those 
who managed to escape - the richer and more intelligent having been able to resettle 
further afield. 
In the end, participation might be the key. For the last three years, children 
from Bosnia Herzegovina were taught in 'Bosnian schools', either in centres, or 
using Slovene schools out of Slovene teaching hours. From September 1995 all 
children will go to Slovenian schools together, and older children from Bosnia 
Herzegovina will have the right to secondary education, without charge, whereas 
other foreigners must pay. They may also go to university - either without fees if 
locally possible, or on scholarships from foundations such as the Soros 
Foundation. 18 In the usual way of swings and roundabouts, there are people who 
will lose out from this newer type of participation. Many qualified teachers from 
Bosnia Herzegovina had been working in the 'Bosnian schools', and they will now 
suffer a second blow by losing their profession, although NGOs are pleading for 
some of these teachers at least to be given a role in maintaining Bosnian language 
and culture lessons for children from Bosnia Herzegovina. 
There are also vocational training programmes operated notably by foreign 
NGOs. For example, in September 1995, Nuova Frontiera (an Italian NGO)19 
planned to start its fourth project in Slovenia. Its first project was concerned with 
buying food and renovating collective centres. The second and third projects, of 
which the fourth is a continuation, have been increasingly large projects of 
vocational training for 15 to 25 year olds. There are five or six targeted 
professions: computing; waiterl cook; hairdressing; bricklaying and nursing, on 
which courses take place allover Slovenia, run by the Slovenian Popular University. 
At the end of the course, students receive a valid Slovenian certificate which is 
II Separate mother-tongue is also available, and several summer camps, including for example one 
entitled 'Getting to know Slovene Culture'. See 'A cry to the world', op.cit .. 
19 Established in 1985, with no political, profit or religious motives, Nuova Frontiera started its 
work in Slovenia in January 1994. It receives funding for its Slovenian projects from ECHO and from the 
regions of Italy (eg Lombardia and Bologna offered money for food) but no central Italian Government 
funds. It presents proposals to ECHO, which monitors the projects, using its EC delegation in LjUbljana. 
Nuova Frontiera also has contacts with other overseas and local NGOs working in Slovenia. 
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internationally recognised. The subjects for the courses were chosen together by the 
NGO, the government (OIR); UNHCR and the Bosnian embassy, bearing in mind 
both the possibility of a longer term stay in Slovenia and that of return, as well as 
what people may want to do. 
s. Return 
If repatriation of people to Bosnia Herzegovina becomes possible it is 
expected to be based on a bi-Iateral agreement concerning the questions of the place 
to which 'return' is to take place; how it is to be effectuated; the amount and type of 
financial aid from Slovenia to the individuals concerned; and the amount of financial 
assistance from Slovenia to the area to which they are being repatriated (ie 
rehabilitation assistance). Everything is to be organised by OIR. 
It is true that return and rehabilitation, of individuals and their towns and 
communities, are inextricably linked. In Slovenia's case, thinking about whether 
people will or will not return is probably irrelevant, given the large numbers 
disappearing from monthly statistics, especially as resettlements would be known of, 
either through bi-Iateral arrangements or the implementation of safe third country 
returns. Although conditions since 1994 have been far from ideal in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, homesickness and a sense of not belonging in Slovenia has caused 
many to return, as well as a willingness to re-join the fight on the part of many 
young men. The Slovene Foundation through its close psycho-social work with 
people receiving temporary refuge has found that many people want to go back, not 
least because as a largely rural population they feel a very strong attachment to the 
land they have left behind. After the signing of the Dayton agreements some people 
began to return spontaneously. However, they were quickly replaced with new 
protection seekers who had been among the internally displaced during the conflict, 
but who felt they could not go home because the territory from which they 
origniated had changed hands. So the overall numbers from November 1995 to 
January 1996 had remained at approximately 24,000 although the faces behind the 
statistics had changed.20 
Once the new legislation is in place, the statistics will become clearer. At a 
20 Marolt, Dominika, 9 January 1996. 
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point such as that, where registration becomes essential and attractive to persons 
seeking protection and the new rights including that to employment, it would be 
interesting to analyze the number who simply had not registered in the past, and to 
establish whether such new rights, and a feeling of greater security in the host state, 
cause a diminution in the perceived rate of spontaneous return. 
6. EU: influences on and cooperation with Slovenia 
As a new state bordering on the EU, Slovenia has already expressed its 
desire for membership of the organisation as it widens. In the meantime, on the 
migration level, the collective policies of the European States are already being felt 
and anticipated. For example, it is foreseen that when Schengen and Dublin will be 
implemented, there will be major effects for Slovenia. The new laws and policies 
being created in Ljubljana nearly all contain elements of harmonisation with those of 
the EU Member States. At the same time, Slovenia sees no need for wider regional 
instruments to regularise a situation such as they have faced with the influxes from 
Bosnia Herzegovina, once it has domestic legislation in place. 
In addition, Slovenia is, since its initial calls for burden-sharing, becoming 
increasingly reluctant to request financial aid from the EU, partly through a desire to 
demonstrate that it is rich and organised enough to join the 'club', partly through a 
reluctance to in fact have to take on a greater share itself. In fact, it sees that it 
must become a wider donor country if it is to be accepted. Indeed, the draft law 
says that " ... due to Slovenia's increasing "rapprochement to Europe" the world 
expects the Republic of Slovenia, to like other European countries, gradually become 
capable of baring the burden of the different kinds of refugees by itself." [SiC).21 
Many of the European NGOs operating in Slovenia are sponsored for 
particular projects by ECHO, although acquiring such funding is apparently 
becoming increasingly difficult. Funding via UNHCR is also becoming more 
difficult, as donor governments are not targeting their assistance at Slovenia any 
more. UNHCR is now contributing only $3 million (Om) to work in Slovenia, 
whereas the government is spending $19 million (£12.7m) on refugees in 1995. 
21 Draft Law, Explanatory Notes. 
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This matches the amount the government spent in 1994.22 
According to the preface to the draft law, in 1992 the OIR budget for its first 
six months of operation was SIT 1,222,537,710 (£7m) from the government and SIT 
544,270,511 (£3.1m) from other sources (Solidarity Fund, UNHCR, individual 
donations). In 1993 the budget from the government was SIT 2,192,459,327 
(£12.5m) and SIT 420,749,166 (£2.4m) from other sources. In 1994, for the first 
six months, OIR was allocated SIT 1,378,813,000 (£7.9m) from the budget. It also 
had a $1,268,690 (£850,000) contract with UNHCR and received 1,317,000 BCU 
(£lm) from the European Social Fund. There are also other contributions made via 
aid to international NGOs working in Slovenia. 
The cost of caring for 'refugees' was already described in 1993 as "troubling 
to the Slovene economy and also addling] to traces of xenophobia and nationalism at 
the fringe of the political spectrum. 1123 Partly as a result of stirring up fears over 
immigrants attaining Slovenian citizenship and entering the job market, the Slovene 
National Party (SNS) received 12% of the vote in elections of December 1992, and 
while not in the coalition government is the fourth largest party in Parliament. 
Conclusion 
As a newly independent state, with no legislation or practical experience in 
asylum and immigration matters, Slovenia had only international guidelines and 
standards, through international Conventions and what it could see of the practice of 
other states, to direct it during the early days of handling the sudden and on-going 
influx of people from Croatia and then Bosnia Herzegovina. After three years of 
experience, draft legislation to regularise the ad hoc position to the benefit of both 
the state and the persons seeking temporary refuge began its slow path through 
Parliament. Based on international commitments, and guided by both the desire to 
join a wider European Union and not to be a victim of restrictions elsewhere in the 
established Union, the legislation maintains flexibility in terms of requiring 
government decrees establishing that a situation requires temporary refuge to be 
22 OIR acknowledges solidarity from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and Switzerland, in its pamphlet 'A Cry to the World', op.cit .. 
2l Cohen, op.cit., p.279. 
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given and how many may receive such protection in Slovenia. 
In the particular case of the protection of people from Bosnia Herzegovina it 
is possible to detect a particular cultural and societal basis to Slovenia's style of 
protection once temporary refuge has been offered, based both on the host country 
and on the history of relations with the country from which those in need of 
protection have fled. On the first point, as, until recently, a republic of a socialist 
state, it is not surprising that Slovenia has a strong ethic of care and community 
running through its policy of protection. None of the temporarily protected persons 
live in independent housing, but are rather all in collective centres or guests of 
friends and relatives already established in Slovenia. Besides the basis of state and 
societal care, this fact is rooted in the scarcity of available housing in the country, 
and the availability of large buildings once used by the Yugoslav military or the 
communist workers. It is also possible to detect a strong sense in Slovenia that the 
refugees will return to what evolves of their country of origin, not least because of 
an understanding of the attachment to the land which the Bosnian population feels, 
and because return is seen taking place on a daily basis. Finally, Slovenia is able, 
and its new law shows it willing, to make use of this labour force in its own drive 
towards prosperity, much as was the case for west European states during refugee 
crises of the 1950s. 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 8 
TEMPORARY RESIDENCE IN AUSTRIA 
1. The situation in summer 1995 
In summer 1993, a residence act came into force in Austria, of which 
paragraph 12 allows the government to grant, by decree, a temporary residence 
status to people who have fled their country of origin for humanitarian reasons. 1 
During times of heightened international tension, armed conflict or 
other circumstances that endanger the safety of entire population 
groups, the Federal Government may order that directly affected 
groups of aliens who can find no protection elsewhere shall be 
accorded a temporary right of residence in the federal territory. 
In the order referred to in paragraph 1, the entry of the aliens and the 
duration of their residence shall be regulated in a manner that takes 
into account the circumstances of the particular case. 
At the same time as the act came into force, a decree was issued allowing a 
temporary residence permit to people from Bosnia Herzegovina who had arrived 
before July 1993, initially to last for six months. 2 Since then the permits have been 
gradually extended, and the latest extension is for one year, to 30 June 1996.3 
People from Bosnia Herzegovina who entered Austria after 1 July 1993 are also 
eligible for temporary residence permits if they entered the country legally, that is 
via an official border crossing, presented themselves to the guards there and were 
Section 12 of the Residence Act, 'Bundesgesetz, mit dem der Aufenthalt von Fremden in 
Osterreich geregelt wird (Aufenthaltsgesetz),. Unofficial translation by UNHeR. Date of entry into force 
1 July 1993, Reference in the Official Gazette, 466/1992 - appearing on 31 July 1992). 
2 Temporary residence is, as of summer 1995 only for Bosnian Muslims - although the legislation 
gives the possibility for decrees concerning other nationalities in the future. Thus there is no perception 
of discrimination, as all could be included. 
3 'Verordnung der Bundesregierung fiber das Aufenthaltsrecht von kriegsvertriebenen 




subsequently allowed entry. An official stamp must be received as proof of legal 
entry. If people did not know that they should have entered in this way, then they 
should go to the Aliens Police, who should verify whether the failure to cross at an 
official post was due to genuine ignorance of the regulation. This check of the 
legality of the entry seems to be a subjective process, largely based on trust. The 
aliens police also are to look at the situation of former residence, and if the person 
was in another country for more than fourteen days, where protection could have 
been or was received, they are to be rejected. 
People from border-towns between Bosnia Herzegovina and other republics 
are allowed a temporary residence permit if they arrived before July 1995, and 
Muslims from mixed areas in Serbia and Montenegro are also administered under 
this scheme. Other citizens of former Yugoslavia do not qualify for this type of 
status, and must file a regular asylum claim.4 The majority appear to have been 
rejected. 
Reports from non-governmental and international organisations suggest that 
there is an arbitrary acceptance of illegal entrants, although no one with fake 
documents is accepted. If people arrived illegally it is possible for them to be 
rejected and receive a deportation order together with a suspensive stamp. 
However, any Bosnians coming into the care projects must have a residence permit 
in accordance with paragraph 12. Some illegal arrivals go to the NGOs and are 
hosted by them. While civil servants claim that such Bosnians are anyway covered 
by the principle of non-refoulement, other organisations report that some 
deportations either directly or indirectly to Bosnia routed via Hungary have taken 
place.s Reports of detentions are also increasing. An Amnesty International 
(Austria) Report of November 1993 points out that contact with border police alone 
is insufficient if Austria is to uphold its commitment to the 1951 Convention as it 
claims to, as these police are not necessarily qualified to make judgements on the 
finer points of non-refoulement commitments, and often return people or refuse 
4 See UNHCR's 'Update on the implementation of temporary protection and developments relating 
to voluntary repatriation to Bosnia and Herzegovina', (mimeo), June 1995. This paper states that from 
1992 to 1994, 98~ of fonner Yugoslavs from areas outside Bosnia Herzegovina who filed a claim were 
rejected. 
UNHCR report that people have been returned to Hungary from Austria, and it is known that 
Hungary has deported persons from Bosnia Herzegovina to their country of origin. See for evidence, 
Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, (Washington: Human Rights Watch 1992). 
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entry, although the claim to protection may be valid. Amnesty International, whose 
worldwide mandate on refugee protection is almost exclusively confined to the 
upholding of respect for the right of non-return, point out that they have particular 
concern for persons fleeing civil war, who, while they mayor may not fulfil the 
Convention definitional criteria, quite likely have a genuine need of protection. 
They are also concerned about the practice of returning people to Croatia and 
Slovenia as nominally safe third countries, although Amnesty has evidence that these 
countries in fact practice refoulement regularly.6 If a person has fake documents 
they are considered to have committed a crime, and are put into detention. 
Temporary Residence status is received instantly, or within one or two 
weeks, depending on the province. During any waiting period Bosnians who entered 
legally are already essentially accepted without the permit. It is possible to apply 
for asylum while being in receipt of a temporary residence permit. Initially people 
lost temporary residence status, including the ad hoc care and maintenance if they 
went into individual procedures, and received no government assistance. This 
position was overturned by the high court and individual asylum application while in 
receipt of a temporary residence permit no longer entails a shift to the care and 
maintenance procedure of the Asylum Act. If a person does remove him or herself 
from the temporary residence scheme they can not move back on to it. 
The recognition rate for Bosnians in individual procedures is said to stand at 
around fifty percent. Initially people were not accepted on the basis that flight from 
civil war was not covered by the Convention definition. However, the High Court 
last year said that Bosnians fleeing ethnic cleansing are refugees en groupe and since 
that precedent they have been forced to grant asylum. There is therefore a problem 
of dual standards, as those who are recognised get Convention rights and others with 
temporary residence do not. This is seen as a question of unfairness. 
While there is thus a legal regulation covering the residence status of persons 
seeking protection from war, there are no legal provisions covering their integration 
into Austrian society. Their status is essentially that of aliens, with no free access to 
either the labour market or the social welfare system. However, an ad hoc project 
for the care and maintenance of people with this status coming from Bosnia 
6 Amnesty International (Austria), 'Insufficiencies of the Austrian Asylum Policy: an AI appeal to 
the Austrian Government', 11 November 1993. 
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Herzegovina has been established by the Interior Ministry and the provincial 
governments. 
2. Before Summer 1993 
The initial reaction of the Austrian government to the influx of Croatians 
and, later, people from Bosnia Herzegovina, seems to have been one of liberal 
humanitarian action, acknowledging that the situation might prove to be temporary, 
acting in an ad hoc and seemingly pragmatic way. The concept of short term 
protection7 was created for the Croats in September 1991, when many came to live 
with their family members who were in established Croatian communities in eastern 
Austria, as guest workers of the second and third generations. The person in the 
'Unde' government who was responsible for aliens asked the Ministry of the 
Interior for help in supporting the host families, as the Croatian community was 
generally poor. A joint support project was created by the provincial governments 
and the Ministry of Interior, with an agreement reached based on both private law 
and financial arrangements for an initial duration of 6 months. 
After the first influx from Croatia there was an increase in numbers, and 
other provinces of Austria became involved. There were not enough ethnic Croatian 
host families, so it was necessary to find other host families and to arrange 
centralised accommodation (in camps). The Ministry of Interior then signed similar 
supportive agreements with other provinces. By December 1991, 13,000 Croats had 
fled to Austria. This case proved to be a positive example of short term protection, 
and resulted in the return of the majority of the protected people. In March 1992, 
the project closed and assistance for return, in the form of a transport ticket, was 
offered. Those, between one and two thousand, who, for political reasons, could 
not return had an extension for two months, and then started to be integrated. The 
initial agreements were extended for people from Bosnia Herzegovina. This influx 
was high and lengthy: over 40,000 entered in just a few months of 1993. An appeal 
was made to the Austrian people to host newcomers from Bosnia Herzegovina, and a 
7 It seems that the Ministry of Interior in Austria rejects the terminology of "temporary protection" 
as the position in Austria is seen not as one of temporary protection but as one of temporary residence, 
with any relationships between Austrians and the people from the former Yugoslavia receiving this status 
being based on a close history, and long standing communication and travel between Austria and former 
Yugoslavia. 
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number of camps were organised. Two thirds of the displaced initially stayed with 
families and there was enormous assistance from the Austrian population, who also 
organised volunteer groups in communities and parishes. 
At first a normal residence permit was granted to incomers as there was no 
specific legislation to deal with them. Conditions were not restrictive, no passport 
was necessary, for example, although people had to show they were from Bosnia 
Herzegovina, and all three ethnic groups were accepted. When former Yugoslavia 
divided into new nations, and Croatia was recognised, followed by Bosnia 
Herzegovina, the situation concerning residence permits changed and only Bosnian 
Muslims who could prove their nationality received a temporary residence permit. 
The fact that the displacement of the Bosnians might not be so short term was 
acknowledged, and the pragmatic ad hoc measures were translated into a more fixed 
legal structure. 
To summarise, prior to 1991 there was no specific legislation or policy in 
Austria for influxes of people fleeing conflict and hoping their flight would be 
temporary. After the experience of the Croatian influx, and the development of ad 
hoc policies, the question of temporary residence was settled with paragraph 12 of 
the 1993 Residence Act, but the protection of those persons who could live in 
Austria - and the way they could organise their lives there - had no legal basis still, 
and, as of summer 1995, still did not. 
3. The origins of temporary residence status, initiation and 
influences 
After October 1990 elections, a new government came to power in Austria in 
December 1990. The existing asylum and immigration laws were, naturally, still 
based on the notion which had been fact for over forty years that there were 
generally strict exit controls which limited emigration from Eastern Europe, and that 
those who did arrive were voting with their feet, to be welcomed, and often would 
be accepted by other Western states. With the end of communism to Austria's east, 
this was no longer the case, and with conflict seen as highly possible in 
neighbouring states, and 'bad' experiences already from the outflow of Rumanians 
after the fall of Ceaucescu, the time was deemed right for new, more restrictive, 
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legislation to be passed. Essentially, the existing legislation concerning asylum and 
immigration seemed not to correspond to Austria's needs. The new government 
therefore enacted new legislation on immigration, including on asylum. 
The new programme of legislation was presented to the cabinet in early 
1991, and each part was passed one by one. First was the new Asylum Act,· which 
deals with asylum seekers and refugees and aims to accelerate procedures, while 
claiming to comply fully with the 1951 Convention. This is the element of the new 
Austrian laws which has caused most political controversy, particularly in Austria's 
relations with UNHCR.9 Secondly, there was the new Residence Act already 
referred to, which includes the paragraphs relevant to temporary residence status, 10 
and thirdly, legislation on immigration generally, which affects Bosnians with 
temporary residence status by impacting upon their right to work under a quota 
system. 11 Finally, the Aliens Act12 regulates the program me of entry to, and 
residence in Austria of asylum seekers and deals with rejections. 
The agreements and paragraphs of legislation concerned created a 
problematic basis for temporary protection. While there is legislation for temporary 
residence, there is none for care and maintenance which creates difficulties for those 
granted temporary residence, as well as competition for competence between the 
provinces and central government. The agreements which have been reached on 
integration, care and maintenance are exceptional, and revisable by the politicians. 
• 'Federal Law concerning the granting of asylum (1991 Asylum Act)', issued on 7 January 1992, 
reprinted in the Federal Law Gazette of the Republic of Austria [V.984 27986 (E)]. 
9 The only impact of this debate on the subject of temporary residence, is that persons awaiting the 
adjudication of an asylum claim receive temporary residence only if they entered Austria legally. As 90~ 
of cases involve limited transit through a 'safe third country', most entrants are considered to be illegal. 
megal entrants to Austria are detained - and this includes Bosnians. See the report 'AUSTRIA, Strong 
criticisms by UNHCR' in the Migration News Sheet (Brussels April 1995) on the UNHCR report 
"Everyday life of Refugees in Austria·, and strong criticisms of the Austrian system made by Mrs Ogata, 
the High Commissioner, in interviews in Vienna - criticisms which were also addressed directly to the 
Ministry of Interior. Both the Minister and senior officials refuted the allegations of restrictionism. 
10 According to information from a staff member of the Interior Ministry at the time of drafting, 
this paragraph on temporary residence for those fleeing conflicts was included in the Act at the last 
moment, due to apparent foresight based on past experiences of conflicts in neighbouring states, and mass 
exoduses from Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland in 1981. It is claimed that there was 
no discussion on whether or not this paragraph should be included, and that it is proving to be a very 
useful and efficient provision which has brought down the number of asylum requests. 
II See 3. Centres, Rights and Integration below. 
12 'Federal Law promulgating the Aliens Act and Amending the 1991 Asylum Act and the 
Residence Act', issued on 29 December 1992, in the Federal Law Gazette of the Republic of Austria 
[V.94 25208 (E)]. 
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It has not been in the political interest of the government to regulate the system due 
to the high costs. An efficient and flexible system for this situation was created on 
an ad hoc basis. However, the impression received from people working closely on 
the policies towards Bosnians with temporary residence was that it would be 
preferable to have legal regulations concerning who is to be responsible for care and 
maintenance in case another similar situation arises and to establish at least a 
minimum outline of the manner in which to proceed under similar circumstances ie 
to promulgate some concept of crisis management, based on the lessons learnt from 
this crisis. In fact, as a result of this crisis, the provinces have created a minimum 
"union" structure to deal with the situation. Ironically, it is also felt that in the past 
it was easier to organise temporary stays and integration because there were not so 
many laws, just one aliens act which was liberally implemented. Now with all the 
narrower acts referred to above, it is felt that progress on practical matters for non-
asylum seekers, such as the Bosnian influx, gets blocked. The overwhelming 
impression is that there are in some ways too many laws and in other ways not 
enough. Essentially it seems there are a whole host of laws and articles within 
apparently non-associated legislation which affect the handling of care for those with 
temporary residence permits - but no straightforward law on their situation. 
The lack of a political decision to integrate people can to some extent be put 
down to racial tensions and xenophobia, or at least a fear thereof. The right wing 
parties in Austria have seen an increase in support in recent years, accompanied by 
an increasing negative opinion towards aliens, a tension or xenophobia which, in 
part at least, might be said to be manufactured (or at least heightened) through a 
reluctance to broach the question of facilitated integration, and through the denial of 
the fact that Austria has become an immigration state. The negative impact of this 
has, according to workers in the migration field in Austria, been discovered too late. 
In the period after 1990 it was realised that something must be done, and a new 
department dealing with the integration of migrants and refugees was created in the 
Interior Ministry. At first the desire was to do things quietly, without making it a 
big political issue. After five years, the need for clarity was realised, even at the 
risk of unpopularity. The issue is therefore being increasingly brought into the 
public arena, and the arrival of a new Minister in April 1995 is said to have 
facilitated this process. 
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The question of precedent with regard to the temporary residence scheme is 
of concern to some commentators. It is felt that this system of temporary residence 
status has worked for the Bosnians, but the worry is that such a scheme, without 
integration facilities also rooted in legal fixtures may not work for others who do not 
have the same historical link with Austria. Even on the level of the residence 
document, a decree is required, and the political will to issue such a decree is thus 
also essential. 
While the numbers of people from Bosnia Herzegovina arriving in Austria 
are difficult to establish, not least because of the amount of unregistered andl or 
illegal entrants, it is difficult to say with any precision how many people have found 
some sort of protection there. However, it is estimated that between May '92 and 
December '94, 80,000 Bosnians received protection or assistance, and there are still 
22,000 on the care and maintenance programme. Others have 'integrated' (by 
finding full-time employment), emigrated or returned. 
Non-governmental organisations, in particular Caritas, have been involved in 
the care and maintenance projects. Caritas, a Catholic organisation, is involved in 
all provinces except Salzburg and Tyroll. The main assistance to Bosnians, 
including to Muslims, came from the Catholic and Protestant Churches, with no 
suggestion of aiming to convert them. In the beginning, Caritas encouraged people 
to take in Bosnians. 13 While relations between the Ministry of Interior and the 
NGOs seem generally to be good, the experience on these projects has not been 
entirely positive. The work on integration of Bosnians by the Ministry of Interior 
has been done in close cooperation with NGOs as well as the provinces, through 
contract arrangements. Rather than assistance going directly from the Ministry, 
much has been given via NOOs, particularly because the Aliens Police are part of 
the Ministry's structure, and there is concern over the confidence some displaced 
people might have about funds coming directly from those they often fear in case of 
deportation and other immigration difficulties. However, there seems to have been 
some disagreement over the fulfilling of the regulations regarding the payment and 
acknowledgement of funds. The implementation of regulations has to be correct to 
be legitimate and legitimised. In the implementation of this programme the 
\3 A poster in the headquarters of Caritas from the early days of the influx says that Bosnians are 
helping themselves, and asks people to please help them. 
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provinces work closely with the NGOs in terms of acceptance and the paying of 
money - and on the question of release from the project. Regular meetings are held 
between the Ministry and the provinces to raise problems and collectively find 
solutions, and to try to keep a balance among the provinces. Some provinces are 
becoming reluctant to work with the NGOs because they claim the latter have 
misused confidence and broken contracts by, for example, trying to claim that 
money came from NGOs. If this was the case, then NGOs did not fulfil the 
obligations put on them by the government. In the light of this negative experience, 
changes in operating arrangements were being considered, in summer 1995, 
particularly regarding cooperation on access to projects, but no major changes on the 
implementation side were envisaged. It is a question of allotting and knowing one's 
place and role within evolving arrangements. 
UNHCR, meanwhile, has not really influenced Austrian policies. From the 
Austrian point of view this is because the High Commissioner's Office is not 
including the activities and amount spent by the Austrian government and people in 
its assessment of the handling of the Yugoslav crisis to the right extent or in the 
right way, and because Austria has received no assistance. In addition there are 
difficulties over Austria's 1991 Asylum Act, as outlined above. According to 
UNHCR, the temporary protection scheme should apply to all Bosnians arriving in 
Austria. They have also been trying to help with admission or re-admission to other 
European countries, for example countries which had been transited. So UNHCR's 
role in Austria has been somewhat supportive in helping Austria search for other 
countries to which people may go, although the prevailing view is that if such 
alternative protection can not be found, the displaced who have arrived in Austria 
should be allowed to remain there. Essentially UNHCR is positive about the 
situation for people who are actually resident in Austria, but negative about the 
position of those who are trying to arrive. They see a need for more work permits 
and 'soft' measures such as training and social services, and basically, after three 
years would prefer to see a shift to real integration - on a big picture scale rather 
than in details. The major concern they have, however, is over access to protection 
and for 'illegal' Bosnians in detention and with families. These concerns are echoed 
by Caritas, which, like UNHCR sees Bosnians as in need of protection, whether or 
not they are 'refugees', and wishes for a step by step accordance of Convention 
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rights. 14 
The situation for Bosnians in Austria does seem to have become more 
restrictive. There are, for example, reported cases of the Bosnian Embassy in 
Vienna, where screening is done in order to give passports to Muslim arrivals, 
attempting to persuade young Muslim men to go back and fight. It is reported that 
if a conscription paper is not signed, a passport is not received. As a residence 
permit could be issued on a separate licence document as well as with a stamp in the 
passport, alternatives to seeking a passport from the embassy are being looked into 
by the Interior Ministry. 
Additionally, it became difficult for Bosnians to get to Austria. The influx in 
early 1995 was chiefly only for family reunification, for which cross border transit 
from Bosnia is fully organised. Family reunification is primarily for the core 
family, but it is claimed that the humanitarian angle is taken to this, and older 
parents or other relatives who are close to the family are considered if 
accommodation is guaranteed and the province accepts it. IS Croatia and Slovenia 
will only allow transit if people already have an Austrian residence permit. The 
relationship between Austria and these countries with regard to movements from and 
to Bosnia Herzegovina appears to have been quite good, although transit visas for 
return are difficult to obtain, as the Croatians in particular have not been interested 
in permitting return due to their own part in the conflict. 
Meanwhile, the period of two weeks which officially need to have been spent 
in a 'safe third country' for that legislation to apply has not always been adhered to 
in practice. If, in theory, one could have applied for protection in a third country 
the application in Austria seems to be being refused. In fact it seems that even three 
days en route via another country disqualifies an application if no prior permission 
to enter was secured. Such permission is gained from the Ministry of Interior for 
family reunification purposes so long as support is guaranteed by the family or local 
authority. How permission is obtained is obscure, and even for family reunification 
Croatia and Slovenia have refused transit if entry to Austria could not be guaranteed. 
14 In fact what Caritas in Austria seems to desire is something similar to the Dutch system described 
in Chapter 10, although they seemed not to have been informed of the details of that programme. 
U Family reunification does of course have a strong humanitarian aspect to it, but it is also possible 
to consider its use as a way of bolstering statistics without adding to the numbers seeking employment etc. 
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So, the first problem is how to reach the border and the second is how to cross it. 
In addition, as of 15 April 1995 Bosnians need a visa to enter Austria. 
3.a. The Particular Historic Background for Austria 
On three occasions since the second world war and before the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia in 1991, Austria was on the 'frontline' of refugee migrations from 
East Europe. On each occasion appeals were made to other West European and 
Western states for assistance and resettlement. A brief glance at this history is very 
informative in the current study, not only because it gives an example of temporary 
'protection,16 in Austria and of resettlement programmes as referred to in Chapter 
6, but also because over time a growing disinterest of more distant states in the 
plight of both the migrants and the state taking the larger part of the 'burden' can be 
perceived. This disinterest is expressed through progressively smaller proportions 
being resettled, through less action and generous talk by politicians, and can even be 
detected in the progressively briefer articles in the British newspapers of the periods 
in question. Much of this 'disinterest' can probably be put down to the phases of 
the Cold War which triggered a desire to assist those people voting with their feet, 
and the economic recovery of western Europe after the war, as prosperity did not 
increase humanitarian generosity to share space and protect, but domestic 
unemployment meant an incoming workforce became decreasingly attractive. 
In November 1956, after 60,000 Hungarians had arrived in Austria, the 
Foreign Ministry made an appeal for help to cope with the situation.17 It was 
pointed out that 60,000 people was the size of a middle-sized town, or the strength 
of a small country's army, and that Austria was technically incapable of coping with 
this influx. Dr Kreisky, the Foreign Secretary, said it was not a question of money 
or resources, but of "quick action which will produce a solution in a matter of 
hours. "18 The answer according to this appeal was for trains to be sent to the 
16 At the time it may have been referred to more probably as temporary 'asylum' or 'refuge'. 
17 According to progressive reports in The Times, from October 29 to November 23, there were on 
29 October, 10,000 refugees; on 15 November, 20,000; on 17 November, 25,000 and by 23 November 
60,000. 
II 'Appeal for Aid to Refugees', The Times, 23 November 1956, p.10. 
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borders, and people to be loaded on, without conditions or selection, and with a 
waiving of regular immigration procedures. Austria, it was said, had received 
650,000 refugees from Eastern Europe since 1945, of whom 190,000 were still in 
Austria, and 36,000 of those were still in camps. 
Other countries were on this occasion quick and generous in their response. 
In December 1956 the first refugees arrived in Australia'9 , New Zealand raised its 
quota for arrivals to 1,000 and offers from West European and other Western 
governments exceeded 70,000 with unlimited places offered by Canada (where 6,000 
had already arrived), France and the United Kingdom, while the total to have 
reached Austria was, according to the Inter-Governmental Committee for European 
Migration, 121,504.20 The Canadian government, talking of expected labour 
shortages the following spring, also accepted 2,000 more refugees who had already 
been resettled to the Netherlands, and up to 3,000 from France, allowing further 
movements to those countries from Austria. 
In 1968, Austria began its appeals for aid after 6,000 refugees had arrived 
from Czechoslovakia in just the first week after the Soviet invasion of 21 August. 
At that point, Austria was using the camps which since 1956 had housed Hungarian 
refugees to house the new Czechoslovak arrivals. 21 Austria was already preparing 
itself to shelter at least 20,000 refugees in public buildings, the Vienna Congress 
Hall and tents. Most of the arrivals, including many people who had been 
holidaying in Austria and Yugoslavia, were scientists, technicians and 
intellectuals.22 By 1 September, 24,000 Czechoslovak refugees were thought to be 
in Austria (including those who were not registered or receiving state assistance, but 
were staying with families and friends~, although in the forty-eight hours from 31 
August to 1 September, while 5,000 had crossed the border into Austria, 18,000 
19 'Australian welcome for first refugees', The Times, 3 December 1956, p.10. 86 Hungarian 
refugees arrived in Darwin. 
20 The Times, 7 December 1956, p.lO; 'Martial Law ordered in Hungary', The Times. 10 
December 1956, p.10. 
21 'Aid plea for 6,000 refugees', The Times, 30 August 1968, p.5. 
22 'Austrians preparing to shelter at least 20,000 refugees', The Times, 31 August 1968, p.l. 
23 'Refuge in an Austrian camp', The Times, 3 September 1968, p.4. In the 24 hours to 2 
September, 7,865 Czechoslovaks entered Czechoslovakia, while 1,258 left to go to Austria. There was a 
flood of requests for visas to all western embassies in Vienna, but especially to Canada, Australia and 
Switzerland. The first refugees to be resettled to Australia travelled by organised flight on 10 September 
1968. me Times, 11 September 1968, p.7). 
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Czechoslovaks had made the journey in the opposite direction.24 This situation of 
more people returning to Czechoslovakia than were fleeing it appears to have gone 
on for some time,2S but by the end of October, 92,000 journeys had been made out 
of Czechoslovakia since the invasion. Those Czechoslovaks who had sought refuge 
were reported to be forming a new organisation called the 'Fourth Category of 
Czechoslovakia', in order to distinguish themselves from the other three categories 
(emigres, displaced persons and refugees) and emphasise the temporary nature of 
their stay, as they were anxious to return as soon as the occupation would be 
over. 26 By December 1968, the Intergovernmental Committee for European 
Migration was reporting that 8,000 Czechoslovaks had moved to Canada, Australia 
and the United States, with Canada alone receiving 4,600 people since the invasion. 
An average of 1,000 people were still leaving Czechoslovakia daily, and 40,000 to 
50,000 were being protected in Western Europe, although the vast majority of them 
had not requested asylum.27 In the meantime, exit restrictions had been tightened 
by the Prague authorities, so that permits must show the destination and duration of 
overseas visits outside socialist countries, and how many journeys were to be 
permitted. In addition, private travel to seek employment, or without the agreement 
of the employer in Czechoslovakia, journeys for which no foreign currency had been 
advanced (the Czech currency was inconvertible, and the reason for the journey 
would have to be declared in order to obtain foreign money) and travel by people 
carrying such luggage as might indicate the intention of a longer term stay was not 
permitted. Thus Austria had no reason to fear a sustained flood of migrants, as 
controls on the Czechoslovak side of the border were strict enough to stop all but 
the most determined. 
During 1981, at least 20,000 Poles entered Austria, as Martial Law was 
'Dubcek admits errors', The Times, 2 September 1968, p.l. 
2-' 'More return than leave', The Times, 4 September 1968, p.4. In the 10 days following the 
invasion 30,000 more Czechoslovaks had entered Czechoslovakia than had left, according to the Austrian 
border-post count. 8,000 registered Czechoslovaks were still seeking protection in Austria. 
26 'Diary', The Times, 19 November 1968, p.10. The majority of such Czechoslovaks were still in 
Austria, however, other countries were also receiving requests for protection, or extension of visas 
(including their conversion from seasonal employment to study visas etc.). In the UK for example, 1,000 
extensions of stay had been granted - with employment restrictions lifted. 'Beds needed for Czechs', Ill! 
Times, 12 September 1968, p.6. 
27 '8,000 Czechs find new life overseas', The Times, 4 December 1968, p.4. 
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imposed following the rise and activities of the Solidarity movement. 28 U sing the 
same Traiskirchen refugee camp as had been a shelter to Hungarians and 
Czechoslovaks, the Austrians appealed in July 1981 for American assistance in 
taking in some of the Polish refugees or migrants, who while claiming temporary 
refuge in Austria also often cited a desire to resettle to the United States, Canada 
and Australia. In making this appeal, Austria referred to its own acceptance of 
Vietnamese refugees at America's request. On this occasion, however, resettlement 
opportunities were less forthcoming than they had been in the two earlier caseS.29 
In these past cases, according to the Interior Ministry, the situation was 
relatively easy to handle, as other countries were interested in the people involved 
and wanted to take them in as resettlement cases. However, in the case of people 
from Bosnia Herzegovina, this has not been the case. It is, on a reception and 
integration level, difficult to compare this case in the 1990s with those previous 
cases. The legal situations, and acceptance levels in non-neighbouring countries 
seem to be entirely different. However, the acceptance of people from Bosnia 
Herzegovina in Austria is reported to have been high. 
4. Centres, Rights and Integration 
While the major problem in the view of Austrian officials and NGOs seems 
to have been legal restrictiveness, coupled with a lack of flexibility and the change 
in political climate from the earlier crises described above, public opinion is also 
perceived to have changed, and increasingly involves fears of immigrants, some 
realistic, many unrealistic. As is the case for most of western Europe in the 1990s, 
living standards in Austria have risen since the 1950s, and many Austrians may have 
an unrealistic fear of losing what they have through the arrival of aliens.30 There 
21 'Walesa plea for aid to Poland', The Times, 21 November 1981, p.S. In November 1981 it was 
estimated, according to the same article, that 250 Poles were entering Austria each day. 
29 See The Times: 'Trickle of Polish defectors becomes a torrent', IS June 1981 p.6; 'More 
refugees', 1 July 1981, p.6; 'Austrian Appeal', 14 July 1981, p.6. The Polish Foreign Minister was 
reported to have said that Poland would see the recognition of those fleeing as refugees as an "unfriendly 
act". (12 November 1981). 
30 This position, echoed throughout western Europe, seems infinitely paradoxical, most obviously 
because though west Europeans of the 1990s must, through the rise of prosperity, generally have more 
they could give than was the case in the 1950s or '60s, there is a great fear that what they have will be 
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is also the problem of a lack of reflective political decision making and action in 
other fields which do not have alien integration as their primary focus, for example 
housing. It seems that Austrians can have difficulty in finding housing due to cost 
and availability, which leads to competition. However, aliens who in fact often pay 
more, as they do not have the information or communication skills to find cheaper 
alternatives, have some accommodation reserved for them, concentrated in certain 
districts, leading to over concentration and ghetto-isation, which in turn contributes 
to racial tensions. Housing policies can therefore be said to ignore the successful 
integration of aliens. 
Although there is no legal framework to schemes aimed at the integration of 
persons from Bosnia Herzegovina in Austria, the central and provincial governments 
have created a project for the care and maintenance of the Bosnians on the basis of 
two types of agreement. Firstly, for those who live in private accommodation, they 
are to receive 1,500AS (£100)31 per person per month; free health care, which does 
not include mental health care, because the regular social security system does 
not. 32 For those in organised accommodation, the level of the cost of the 
accommodation is defined as 5,OOOAS, (£330) plus 10% for heating (including 
housing, food, hygiene, maintenance care and electricity). This category also get 
l00AS (£3-60) per month for pocket money. Two thirds of the cost of the 
programme is borne by the Interior Ministry and one third by the provinces. The 
military assisted in the establishment of the programme by giving thirteen camps and 
helping with the organisation. There are also three established refugee camps. 
Attempts were made in Austria to disperse people so as not to have a high 
concentration in any given area of the country and to keep families (including 
extended families) together. This latter feature of the programme included the 
setting up of a family reunification unit, for reunification within Austria and from 
Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia, with information assistance from UNHCR. 
taken away by immigrants, whereas those who had much less in the earlier decades were prepared to 
accept many more new comers seeking protection, and swelling the labour markets, to create that 
prosperity to which attachment is now 80 strong. 
31 Exchange rate in July 1995. 
32 If a disease is affecting mental health then it is covered, yet that is rare. However, as many of 
the people concerned in these programmes will often be suffering trauma from their experiences this 
seems to be a deficiency of the scheme. ICMPD informed me that volunteer therapists have been working 
with Bosnians in Vienna. 
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Beyond housing and the basic needs, the feeling seems to have been that for 
social and material well being, people needed the chance to work and to be part of 
society from an economic point of view, something which would also maintain the 
sense of dignity and self value. In 1992-93 the labour market situation was 
recovering and people from Bosnia Herzegovina, with their legal status as aliens 
gained limited access to the labour markets. There is a priority system in 
Austria,33 with jobs going first to Austrians and recognised Convention refugees, 
then to guest workers and labour migrants who have been in Austria for long periods 
and have social welfare credits, thirdly to second generation aliens (that is those 
born in Austria and those who have spent five years or more at school there) and 
finally to all other aliens. The Bosnians moved into an intermediate position 
between the third and fourth categories. 
A second very formal limit in Austria is a quota system. This is a system for 
foreigners who are neither self-employed nor unemployed, under which the total 
number not in these categories (that is those who are employed) should not exceed 
8 % of the total number of people in Austria who are neither self employed nor 
unemployed. 34 For 1995 the maximum number of foreigners employed in Austria 
is to be 262,000. Some exceptions are possible: the percentage may, by a 
Ministerial decree, be increased to 9 % to give certain groups of people the chance to 
get work permits if there is perceived to be a public or general economic interest in 
integrating them into the labour market. In 1995, the 8% figure had already been 
passed in January, so the Minister made a decree allowing work permits to be given 
to 'integrated' young foreigners, Bosnian war refugees and certain highly qualified 
workers.3s The authorities were also advised to be particularly generous in giving 
permits to foreign school leavers, thus giving increased flexibility for the integration 
33 Employers must ask for work permits for prospective employees, and an investigation is made to 
see if anyone else could take the job from higher priority categories. 
34 The minister for labour and social welfare defines annually, by decree, what the aliena 
employment rate should be. It used to be 10%, then in 1993 went down to 8%. 
35 On 22 April 1995 the quota was increased to 9%. 'More Foreign Residents Allowed to Work', 
Migration News Sheet, May 1995. 
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of Bosnian war refugees.36 Of the 50,000 Bosnian de facto refugees in Austria in 
July 1995, 23,500 were said to be integrated into the labour market;37 12,500 have 
the right to claim a work permit or "Befreiungsschein" (exemption to be given after 
five years of employment, allowing free access to the Austrian labour market and so 
far only given to 1,500 refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina), 11,000 have a 
temporary work permit. Those who have a temporary work permit have the right to 
claim a permanent work permit after one year of employment, allowing them to 
work anywhere within a given Bundesland (federal state). Integration of other 
Bosnian war refugees who are old enough to work continues within extended 
margins - and 5,000 further employment permits are soon to be issued, so that by 
the end of 1995, 60% of Bosnian de facto refugees will be employed. Once people 
are employed, they are considered to be fully integrated. When making plans and 
projections, the Labour and Social Affairs Ministry expect that the number of 
foreigners in this group will reduce in time due to naturalisation or marriage with 
Austrian citizens. 
Although these statistics seem to demonstrate a relatively high level of 
employment of Bosnians who fled to Austria because of the conflict, there are some 
limiting factors. According to a July 1995 report by the Vienna-based Institute for 
Higher Studies, Austrian immigration and labour laws systematically discriminate 
against foreigners. 38 The leader of that project, Rainer Baubock, was cited as 
commenting that while politicians may see barriers to integration as a success, "the 
lasting segregation of a part of the population creates great problems." Austria had 
the worst mark for security of residency, and was unique in reserving the right to 
expel foreigners who have an open-ended residency permit. It also, according to 
this report, refuses to lift employment restrictions once residency is approved. In 
addition, the employment legislation in Austria appears to be problematic, and in 
56 According to ICMPD, this quota of extra places for school leavers, managers and Bosnians was 
made up of only 1,500 to 2,000 with so many taken by the two former categories that by July only limited 
places, 200 or so, were left for Bosnians. The suspicion seems to be that from the start, the aim was to 
give only very limited permits to Bosnians, from within or outside the programme. 
37 By -integrated into the labour market- it is meant that when Bosnians find work they can shift 
into the Aliens Act - and receive a longer term residence permit. They can apply for this inside Austria 
rather than having to fulfil the usual requirement of application from outside the country. However, if 
they do not have a passport it is difficult for them to receive such a longer term permit. 
• Austria gets bottom marks for treatment of foreigners', The Guardian, 27 July 1995, p.ll. 
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need of up-dating, to protect weaker groups. For example, there may be a need to 
address the question of the rights of dependents, usually women in immigrant cases, 
whose status is purely dependent on the breadwinner, and who can lose everything 
in cases of divorce or death. 
Secondly, it seems that in spite of, or because of, this restrictiveness, the 
Austrian labour market has a strong tradition of black labour, which may not be a 
good in itself, but is useful and possibly necessary to aliens. Illegal work is not 
accepted, but is often ignored by the Interior Ministry, unless it wants to use the 
situation to move towards political solutions, in which case, like the workers, the 
Ministry starts looking into loopholes in the regulations. Furthermore, those who do 
work, be it legally or illegally, receive only very low salaries in general because it is 
unskilled work. 
Other employment of displaced persons has, from the beginning, included 
Bosnian teachers being employed to teach Bosnian children in the mother tongue. 
However, while employing teachers was easy, employing health workers did not 
work out. 
Training programmes have been created, but these are very expensive. One 
billion schillings (£6.6m) is being paid out for maintenance and language courses, 
and everyone has access to a German language course. There are also a lot of 
programmes designed to alleviate the problems of daily life and to give 
qualifications. Training is usually aimed both at integration and re-integration: for 
example, construction work; metal work and art manufacturing. In addition, 
programmes have been created which attempt to combine the problems of the 
refugees with the problems of the unemployed local people by involving the latter in 
the projects with the aim of promoting acceptance. 
The Education Act does not distinguish between Austrians and Aliens, so it is 
easy to integrate the 5-15 year olds. Schools have been open to children from 
Bosnia Herzegovina since Autumn 1992, with free transport to and from school, and 
additional language support. Most university students have been able to continue 
their studies at Austrian universities. 
Officials, NGO workers, academics and research institutes in Austria all 
seem to have perceived a high level of acceptance of Bosnians by the Austrian 
people. One reason for this may be the experience of Austria during the latter half 
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of the twentieth century and before, of large influxes from various central and east 
European states and situations. Most of those arriving in Austria come from what 
might be described as similar cultures, and often from states with historic links to 
Austria via the Austro-Hungarian Empire in particular. In the case of former 
Yugoslavia proximity also meant that there was initially a strong popular desire to 
help, and groups such as Caritas advocated taking people in until capacity was 
reached, while other organisations which have not been involved in protection in 
Austria in the years preceding this crisis also became involved (eg the Red Cross). 
However, the liberalness of the first years has shifted to restrictiveness through 
legislation, and with right wing pressure, widespread acceptance has moved to 
limited xenophobia. The Bosnians themselves are said to have been happy with their 
reception but to have problems with integration. The only way to advance in 
Austrian society for all immigrant groups is said to have been to integrate and 
assimilate. 
s. Return 
Some people who had received a temporary residence permit in Austria have 
already started to go back to Bosnia Herzegovina, either to fight or because of an 
apparent inability to integrate in Austria and the concerns over later re-integration. 
Facilities provided for those who wish to return voluntarily to Bosnia Herzegovina 
from Austria include information, financial support for the journey and re-
establishment and keeping open the temporary residence status in case the returnee 
should decide to go back to Austria.39 Ranking conditions for return, people from 
Mostar interviewed by ICMPD said their top priority was safety, followed by free 
movement in the city, restoration of their own property, provision of 
accommodation, communal infrastructure (health, education, telecommunications etc) 
and finally income possibilities. 
Opinions vary over the level of desire for return. The view of UNHCR is 
that a high percentage of people now do not want to return to Bosnia. Caritas see 
that more than 50% of the displaced from Bosnia Herzegovina seem willing to 
39 ICMPD talks of a few thousand people resettling to third countries in 1993-1994, and a few 
hundred returned to Bosnia Herzegovina. 
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return as soon as possible if the situation changes. 30% meanwhile are said to see 
the question as too theoretical to answer. Older people in particular seem to want to 
return, as do women with children. After three years, however, it appears to be 
becoming impossible for people to keep on thinking about return, as the need to look 
more realistically at the immediate future develops. Essentially, it appears to be the 
case that after three years, the balance point between questions of return and 
integration has pretty much been reached. 
According to the Interior Ministry, when return becomes possible, it will be 
voluntary, with the ticket paid for. The view even before that moment comes is that 
much more information will be necessary, and tentative discussions have already 
been taking place with other countries via UNHCR. 
After the signing of the Washington Agreement (The 'Constitution of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina') on 18 March 1994, Austria, Croatia and 
Bosnia Herzegovina started discussions on voluntary return to free areas of BiH, 
according to the ICMPD Newsletter on Bosnia and Herzegovina.40 The Austrian 
government invited 12 countries to a conference on return in June 1994. 
Delegations at that meeting felt that the time was not right for organised return 
movements, but expressed support for UN and EU reconstruction efforts in Sarajevo 
and Mostar respectively, and acknowledged the need to offer advice and assistance 
to those who were already spontaneously returning. Meanwhile, a bi-Iateral 
agreement on conditions of voluntary return was signed by the Bosnian Muslim and 
Austrian governments in November 1994. Return facilitation would depend on the 
developments in the 'safe areas' as seen by the Bosnian government and Austria said 
it was prepared to contribute financial and material assistance, including on plans for 
employment possibilities and re-integration, within an established framework of 
regulations. 
Developments in the conflict over the following year, and particularly the fall 
of two of the 'safe areas', Srebrenica and Zepa, which were, according to the 
Washington Agreement plans, to have been attached to the UN administered capital 
of Sarajevo, have shown any generalised notions of return programmes to be 
premature. However, keeping the option alive, and including the people factor is 
surely important. This is after all a war about people and land and no successful 
40 ICMPD Newsletter of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Issue I, December 1994. 
Chapter 8 233 
conclusion for anyone could be reached if it did not include the return or 
resettlement of the people to the resultant state(s). 
6. EU: Coordination and opinion or other Member States: 
Burden-sharing 
If one were cynical, one could say that Austria is unlikely to have had 
difficulties with fitting into the European Union on the migration question, as its 
restrictive practices as outlined by UNHCR and Amnesty International would surely 
be in line with pan-European trends in the 1990s. Austria was one of the first 
states to put forward burden-sharing proposals, prior to its entry to the EU, within 
the framework of the Council of Europe, and together with Germany at the UNHCR 
convened 'emergency conference' in Geneva in July 1992.41 However, discussions 
for this thesis revealed that far from expecting burden-sharing to become an effective 
mechanism in the near future, Austria is becoming aware, and concerned, that active 
burden-sharing might, and probably will, involve the shifting of a heavier burden 
towards Austria in future crises, just as much as such mechanisms might benefit the 
country in the current case. In spite of this there is acknowledgement of some sort 
of burden-sharing idea as a beneficial means of cooperation on the political and 
practical rather then financial levels. In the meantime financial assistance to Croatia 
and Slovenia has been terminated. 
Conclusion 
An ad hoc programme of residence and protection for Croatians developed, 
in Austria, into a legislated form of temporary residence, with a continuing ad hoc 
and policy based programme of care and maintenance. Certain elements of the 
rights of the protected, such as access to education and employment, are based on 
41 See Davy, Ulrike, 'Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina: are they genuine? A closer look at 
the asylum practice in Austria and Germany', Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Vo1.18 No.1 (Winter 
1995), p.63. Davy cites the Austrian Interior Ministry as saying "We could find room maybe for one 
more trainload, but what about the second, the third, and the 10th train?" Compare this with Austria's 
Foreign Minister's request in 1956 that other European countries dispense with immigration procedures 
and simply send trains to Austria's borders to be loaded with Hungarian refugees - which to some extent 
was indeed what happened. (See note 41 above). 
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residency rather than the maintenance programme, and as such offer possibilities for 
independence and integration in the Austrian sense of economic self-sufficiency, 
although the actual opportunities to legally take up employment may in practice be 
rather more limited than appears theoretically to be the case. 
With both historic links to the peoples of former Yugoslavia and a history of 
immigration and integration (or maybe more accurately assimilation) during the late 
twentieth century and before, Austria's acceptance of this new wave of people in 
need of its protection appears to have been relatively high, although restrictions on 
admission and the chances of detention or deportation also seem quite elevated. As 
in the Slovene case, Austria's political handling of this situation appears to have had 
a Janus head - looking towards the country's own historical connections to the 
people who have been forced to flee, and towards its wider European partners, with 
the paradoxical 'humanitarian yet restrictive on admission to their own territory' 
type attitude they appear increasingly to have taken. There have also, of course, 
been Austria's domestic political concerns over the rise of the Right to take into 
account on formulation of policy and legislation on this matter. 
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EXCEPTIONAL LEAVE TO REMAIN 
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
1. The situation in summer 1995 
In the United Kingdom there are, outside official quota schemes, two 
established statuses for persons whose need for protection is acknowledged. There 
are therefore three possible decisions to be made on claims: refugee status and 
Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR) being the two statuses, and the other option 
being the refusal of an asylum claim. 
Asylum in the United Kingdom signifies Convention status in line with the 
1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 New York Protocol. ELR is a compassionate 
humanitarian status which, although with some history and not entirely ad hoc, is 
based on government policy of the moment, rather than any legislation. It is said to 
be granted for an appropriate period, if it would be unreasonable or impracticable 
given all the circumstances to seek to enforce the return of the person in question. 
When UNHCR made requests for the temporary protection of vulnerable 
persons from Bosnia Herzegovina, the United Kingdom government set up a quota 
of 1,000 principals plus their immediate dependents, to be called the Temporary 
Protection Programme (TPP). Those who would arrive on the quota Programme 
(their transportation from former Yugoslavia being paid for by the Overseas 
Development Administration and organised by UNHCRI 10M) would initially be 
received in a number of reception centres established by the Bosnia Project with 
finances from the Home Office1• They would be granted a slightly adapted form of 
ELR whereby family reunification would be instant (rather than the usual ELR four 
year waiting period). Other former Yugoslavs, more than 2,000 of whom arrived 
with small NGO convoys, would not be expected to receive refugee status and would 
not join the Programme, but would be likely to receive regular ELR. In fact (see 
Table 10.1 below) the majority of claims are still outstanding, highlighting perhaps 
See section 4 below. 
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the fact that while manifestly unfounded claims are rapidly dismissed, manifestly 
founded ones are not dealt with at similar speed. Furthermore, former Yugoslavia is 
among the top in the list of countries of origin from which applicants' appeals under 
the 1993 Act are being allowed.2 The safe third country rule is almost always 
enforced in cases involving former Yugoslavs, as the countries transited would 
usually be either EU countries, or European states with which return agreements 
exist. 
Table 10.1 Applications from non-programme fonner Yugoslavs and decisions 
on their cases 
Total At In Asylum ELR Refused Outstanding 
port country 
1990 15 na na na na na na 
1991 320 80 240 5 1 or 2 15 na 
1992 5,635 2,180 3,455 1 or 2 1 or 2 125 (60)· 5,400 
1993 1,830 260 1,565 - 55 125 (30)· 6,570 
1994 1,3853 310 1,075 25 1,265 475 (25)· 5,990 
[Source: Home Office) 
(bracketed figures marked * indicate refusals due to the third safe country rulings) 
2. Before November 1992, and the general situation 
Between 1985 and 1994, 14,700 principals and dependents were granted 
asylum in the UK, 64,500 people were given ELR, an additional 5,750 South East 
2 Research and Statistics Department, Home Office Statistical BuJletin, Issue 15195 (30 June 1995) 
p.12. 
Totalling these application figures and adding on the 2,034 who arrived on the quota by 12 May 
1995, plus the 405 applicants submitted by March 31 1995 (all statistics from Home Office bulletin) 
[11,634] and even allowing three additional family members for each of the principal applicants (who 
anyway could not be included as family reunification cases, but would have to have their own individual 
claim), the total number of persons would be 40,394, applicants - far below the figure of 160,000 which 
the Home Secretary (Michael Howard) talked of in early August 1995 (see The Guardian, 8 August 
1995), when he tried to demonstrate the UK's great generosity to persons in need of protection from the 
former Yugoslavia. This either reiterates the scepticism to be maintained over statistical approaches to 
migration, or raises dubious questions over the interpretation the UK government gives to its actions on 
protection. 
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Asians were resettled under special programmes, and 85,100 people were refused 
protection.4 From the mid-1980s to early 1990s, the United Kingdom had 
experienced massive increases in the number of asylum-seekers, from approximately 
4,000 per year in 1986 to 1988, up to 11,500 in 1989, 26,000 in 1990 and 45,000 in 
1991. While the slowness of procedures means that the decisions taken each year 
are not always directly matched to the applications made in that same year, the 
figures for both refugee status and the humanitarian status of Exceptional Leave to 
Remain had also been increasing over that period. 13% of cases decided upon in 
1986 received asylum, 70% were granted ELR and 17% were refused. The figures 
until 1990 remained roughly within these proportions, until in 1991 a sudden 
reversal of the ratios is noticeable, to 9% receiving asylum, 32% ELR and 59% 
being refused a protected status. The figures for both refugee status and ELR 
continued to drop, and in 1994 5% of decisions granted full refugee status, 20% 
ELR and 75 % of cases were refused. 
Table 10.2 Percentages of decisions made on asylum applications, 1984 to 1994 
'84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 
Asylum 34 24 13 13 25 32 26 9 3 8 5 
ELR 40 57 70 64 59 57 60 32 37 42 20 
Refusal 26 19 17 23 16 11 14 59 60 50 75 
[Source: Home Office] 
The position in 1995 was said by Home Office officials to be that approximately 5% 
were receiving asylum, 15 % receiving ELR and 80% being rejected. 
Two questions need to be raised here, firstly why the drops both in overall 
numbers of applicants after 1991 and secondly, why the drop in the percentages 
receiving a legitimated protected status? 
The increase in asylum applicants generally from 1985 onwards is held by 
many to be due to large numbers of economic migrants claiming asylum, as legal 
entry routes for employment and self-betterment have essentially been closed. In 
1991 restrictive measures were introduced in the UK, largely in terms of more 
Research and Statistics Department, op.cit., p.9. 
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stringent identity checks to stop multiple and fraudulent applications. The numbers 
for both 1992 and 1993 fell, although they increased once more in 1994. 
Meanwhile, following the introduction in July 1993 of the Asylum and Immigration 
Appeals Act 1993, the granting of ELR was limited to cases where 'genuine' 
humanitarian factors exist and speeded up processing of so-called 'manifestly 
unfounded' claims was developed. This latter factor meant that people would not be 
stuck in the procedural system for years, a waiting period which could give rise to 
reasons for allowing permission to stay on humanitarian grounds. 
Thus, the crisis of displacements in former Yugoslavia, and requests for 
protection of large numbers of the displaced, came at a time when restrictiveness in 
the UK had been increasing, and when the type of humanitarian status which could 
be accorded to such forced migrants was being limited. Although the case of 
persons from Bosnia Herzegovina was surely recognised as one of great 
humanitarian need, the response of the United Kingdom can be seen to have lain 
rather in developing means and notions of protection in the area of origin than in 
developing its own protective mechanisms and encouraging arrivals in the British 
Isles. 
3. The origins of the extension of exceptional leave to remain, 
non-legislation and influences 
With three basic systems in the UK, Convention, ELR and quotas, it is into 
the latter two categories that the majority of persons fleeing Bosnia Herzegovina and 
former Yugoslavia generally and arriving, or already resident, in the UK have 
fallen. 
In November 1992, two significant events took place for persons from former 
Yugoslavia who might receive protection in the UK. Firstly, on 6 November, 1992, 
a visa restriction was placed on people from all parts of former Yugoslavia except 
Slovenia and Croatia.s Secondly, in response to calls from UNHCR for the 
5 This restriction was announced by the Home Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, in the House of 
Commons, on 5 November. 1992. It following similar announcements by Germany. Sweden and 
Denmark. and was said to be in response to the fact that 
we are receiving in this country an increasing number of self-selected people from the 
former Yugoslavia including arrivals from S4fer parts of the country well away from the 
war zone. For example ill all analysis of a large sample of those from the former 
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granting of temporary protection to vulnerable persons from former Yugoslavia, the 
government of the United Kingdom, after consideration by Foreign and Home Office 
officials, established a quota of 1,000 principals plus their dependents (expected to 
total 4,500 people, although only 1,172 dependents and 862 principals had arrived 
by May 12, 19956) to be selected by UNHCR on the ground and evacuated to the 
UK. Although the decision for inclusion in the quota programme is made by 
UNHCR efforts were apparently made to select people with an established link to 
the UK, either through family already resident in the United Kingdom, or extended 
family members already included in the programme.7 People on the programme 
may also apply for Convention status, although the numbers of applications have not 
been particularly high. Establishing a quota means accepting a group for protection 
rather than the traditional screening of individuals, In the UK, the Secretary of State 
has discretion to decide to look at individuals or groups. Creating the 1,000 
programme meant accepting the whole group as selected by UNHCR, however 
people arriving alone are individually screened for asylum. There are plans to speed 
up the system, and it may in fact be the case that in future situations manifestly 
founded cases get grouped and go through. 
As a quota based system, this adaptation of the ELR policy is aimed solely at 
persons from former Yugoslavia. The 1,000 quota was extended by an additional 
Yugoslavia who /lave applied fro asylum. one third are found 10 have come from Serbia. 
where many of them are seeking to escape the effects of economic sanctions. 
This statement raises a series of politically sensitive questions. Firstly, a state bas no richt, according to 
the 1951 Convention, to select its refugees - by their very nature they arrive in flight from a country 
where they perceive themselves to be in danger, and are thus 'self-selecting'. Secondly, it is notable that 
the term 'safe parts of the country' is not used, but 'safer parts' - indicating an acknowledgement that all 
parts of former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia at that stage, were considered potential areas 
of conflict - and in Serbia there were gross violations of human rights taking place, reported by various 
international groups. Thirdly, no reference is made to the fact that many of those fleeing Serbia at that 
time were not only fleeing economic sanctions, if indeed their effect was part of the cause of fli&ht at all. 
Many people were fleeing the Milosevic regime, and young men were fleeing military drafting into an 
ethnic conflict they did not sympathise with. 
6 Home Office Statistics, p.5. UNReR. which as an international organisation bas to deal with 
evacuations to all countries, has often only let one family member on to transportation with a medical 
evacuation, as is the permitted procedure for most states - probably through not having the time to explain 
to each case going to the UK. that as they are being included in the quota they could take all immediate 
family dependents. The UK however has done nothing to ensure that all family members arrive, so in 
fact people have not always taken up family unity options. 
7 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the register of persons on the quota includes only a handful of 
surnames and towns of Bosnia Herzegovina. as selection has meant evacuating extended families to form 
coherent communities once in the UK. 
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500 places' in response to UNHCR's calls for a total of 5,000 more places in 
August 1995 following the fall of the 'safe areas' of Srebrenica and Zepa. Other 
countries had, as of September 1995, committed up to the 5,000 - with the United 
States accepting 2,500 people. Only Italy and the US had at that point given 
commitments towards the further 50,000 contingency places requested. Others said 
they wished to wait and see. 
Any other persons from former Yugoslavia seeking asylum either at ports of 
entry or from within the country - for those who had been there for employment or 
study in the past years - would have to enter the regular procedures. 
The decision to adapt a specific quota within the ELR category was taken 
under the influence of UNHCR's requests for temporary protection, although the 
High Commissioner's leverage did not extend to the type of scheme to be created or 
its domestic operation. The creation of the quota for 'vulnerable cases' in 
particular, and the stress on former detainees also appears to demonstrate a certain 
influence from the International Committee of the Red Cross and its requests for 
protection for those it had discovered in camps. However, the overall influence of 
NGOs has to be said to be minimal, unless their initiatives happen to fit with the 
government's own agenda. 
The programme itself has been confused and confUSing for at least three 
reasons. Under the 1,000 programme, medevacs9 and vulnerable cases got grouped 
together for practical purposes, although they are in fact two different cases and the 
former should not be included in the 1,000. As a result, the new 500 quota is 
expected to be kept completely separate from new medevacs, of which twenty new 
cases were agreed to in summer 1995. There is above all confusion over questions 
of nomination and denomination. UNHCR nominated the 1,000 plus dependents, 
and by summer 1995, 862 principals had arrived. While HCR could denominate the 
138 who had not arrived and try to fill the places with other people, prior to the 
establishment of the new quota, reception facilities were being closed down, 
In the second smaller quota, the number refers to the total amount of people who will be given 
permission to enter, and not to a number of principals with an unknown number of dependents. 
9 'Medevacs' is the term used for medical evacuations. A series of such evacuations have taken 
place since Britain took pity on the child Irma, after media reports had highlighted her plight amongst 
those of all children in Sarajevo in 1993. In the UK quota, medevac cases have been Croat, Serb and 
Muslim; ex-detainees have been only Muslim; and Bosnian Serbs and Croats but especially Muslims have 
been involved in the programme. 
Chapter 9 241 
meaning new arrivals on the programme would have to go straight into the 
community. In addition, there appears to have been no agreement that denominated 
cases could be re-nominated. Some nominated persons could not physically be 
evacuated, as they could not be found, and may in fact have died, although no-one is 
certain. UNHCR seems to have been unsure whether to fill their places with other 
people, and whether if they did that, and then discovered the original nominee, the 
UK would allow the denominated person to in fact take their place, pushing the 
quota over its original limits. Both UNHCR and the Home Office appear to say that 
the other wants to denominate people who are still alive, and that the other will not 
cooperate, or make clear what the situation could become. There is also confusion 
over quite what is meant by a temporary programme, and when and whether 
permanent settlement should be looked into. Finally, evidence from officials 
interviewed also demonstrated that some thought all former Yugoslavs were 
receiving equal forms of ELR whether or not they were on the programme, and that 
all were housed in reception facilities on first arriving, although this is not the case. 
Perhaps the greatest question mark over the decision to create a limited quota 
programme lies in claims that without pressure for temporary schemes, the UK 
government would have given ELR (but not Convention status) to all arrivals from 
former Yugoslavia. Two developments cast doubt on this claim. Firstly, could 
many have realistically arrived, especially given the implementation of the safe third 
country rule. Secondly, if ELR would have been accorded to all, why are those 
who did arrive still awaiting this decision. Like many other western European 
countries, the UK extended the calls for protection in the region of origin made in 
African and Asian forced displacement situations to the case of former Yugoslavia. 
As well as calls for protection in Croatia and Slovenia1o, this has included the 
supply of humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons, and those who 
have not been forced to move, but suffer hardship nonetheless, in the so-called 'safe 
areas' and elsewhere in Bosnia Herzegovina. The principle behind such policies has 
been that in west European governments' opinion, keeping people in the area of 
their war-tom homeland is in those people's own interests. This view was spelt out 
by the British Home Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, in his 5 November, 1992 speech 
announcing visa restrictions. He stated the opinion that 
10 As well as Serbia - which is less frequently mentioned. and pretty much ignored. 
United Kingdom 242 
the objectives of international aid to the former Yugoslavia should be to 
provide the means and create the confidence for as many people an possible 
to stay as close to their homes as possible, so that their eventual return 
remains a clear prospect. II 
While noting humanitarian compassion for ex-detainees, for whom this policy would 
"be neither practical nor humane"12, he then went on to highlight asylum abuse by 
Serbians and stated the need for control and the organisation of "specific 
arrangements for the reception of those we most want to help" (ie the Temporary 
Protection Programme to assist a maximum of 4,000 people, in effect only 2,034). 
This statement also implicitly states the UK government's belief that those who 
would receive protection outside former Yugoslavia would not return. The UK's 
further legitimation of its own role in the establishment of the concept of safe havens 
and areas (British Prime Minister, John Major, took the initiative in proposing such 
a system for the Kurds of Northern Iraq who were refused admission to Turkey) is 
that while such a policy may include an element of not wishing to attract people to 
the UK, it at least backs up its promotion of the ideal with relatively large quantities 
of humanitarian aid. 
The department dealing with Britain's role in humanitarian assistance is the 
Overseas Development Administration (aDA), a division of the Foreign Office. 
aDA's major work in former Yugoslavia lies in carrying out infrastructure and 
other repairs, so that people can live in a given place. It has its own engineers on 
the ground in Bosnia Herzegovina, both British and some locals. The latter include 
many qualified women, who have the advantage that they will not be drafted. The 
work they do is meant to be for emergency needs, ie they are repairs not 
reconstruction, and according to officials should perhaps best be described as aid to 
allow life to continue. This is, however, a grey area, and while reconstruction is 
not talked of, largely because the task ahead is so great and anything done now 
could so easily be destroyed, some of the repairs inevitably become movements 
towards re-establishing an infrastructure to allow peace to continue beyond an 
eventual cease fire. Efforts are made to target engineering work so that it does not 
directly benefit one party to the conflict in former Yugoslavia more than the others, 
and there are attempts to assess the needs of all sides. Engineers try to do some 
II Clarke, op.cit .. 
12 
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work in Serb held territory, but there is, for example, none in Banja Luka or the 
Bihac pocket, largely because of the lack of safety. The aim is to be evenhanded 
and to operate according to need, while being pragmatic. There is, whether for 
political, pragmatic or safety reasons, however, a bias towards the Croat and 
Muslim sides, demonstrated in the distribution of offices. ODA's head office in 
former Yugoslavia is in Split, with field offices in Sarajevo; Medugorje in the Croat 
area; near Mostar (although this has become a seconded position since the EU took 
over administration of Mostar); Gornji Vakuf, where work is done on both sides; 
Zenica and Tuzla. Besides trying to distribute work reasonable fairly, there are also 
great efforts made not to duplicate work of other agencies, and not to be used by 
any of the combatants. 
The British financial aid contribution is split roughly 50-50 between ECHO 
and direct ODA assistance, but the government and British civil service maintains 
more influence over their own actions than those of the European body. There 
seems to be a circular motion of contributions with ODA, keen to have an input into 
how the British contribution via ECHO is spent, referring its own engineers to 
ECHO (as well as other multi-lateral agencies) as a way of exercising an overview 
and recycling resources. ODA has also been eager to provide ECHO with assistance 
in kind, rather than financial contributions, although other Member States are not 
keen on this idea. It also tries to get outside money for its own projects or aspects 
of them - including from ECHO. Since establishing its own teams on the ground, 
the ODA has tended not to fund other reconstruction work (eg water projects of the 
Red Cross). Besides engineering work, the ODA provides some drivers for the 
distribution of UNHCR food aid, although the UN deals with the negotiations for 
safe passage and the assessment of need.13 ODA also makes grants to the World 
Food Programme, and has logisticians seconded to the World Health Organisation. 
ODA refers smaller UK NGO attempts to take food, medicine and clothing to 
Bosnia Herzegovina to UNHCR and WHO. This line is generally accepted by these 
groups. 14 It gives some funding to medical charities, and not just UK ones, but 
I' The division of need as assessed in Sarajevo, for example, has been 23% for Serbs and 77% for 
Muslims. 
14 There is said to be reasonable coordination of NGOs operating in Bosnia Herzegovina. There is, 
it seems, more of the disturbing in what is being done by some than in how it is being coordinated. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests for example that some groups, particularly American evangelicals, are 
United Kingdom 244 
also for example American ones which cannot get money from USAID.15 It also 
provides training, and has sent small teams of medics to Bosnia Herzegovina. 16 
In summary, aDA is involved in efforts on the ground aimed at sustaining 
life in spite of the prevailing situation, and laying the ground work for the future 
mammoth task of reconstruction. With regard to disaster management, however, 
while they do have someone working on conflict mitigation generally and on other 
specific situations, no one is working on former Yugoslavia in that context. They 
perceive a difficulty in trying to handle progress towards a solution within their 
administrative structure which focuses on practical assistance. However, there does 
seem to be a prevailing view that money spent on attempts to solve a conflict would 
save on the necessary disaster funds, and that therefore attempts to mediate the 
causes of conflict and flight could be an interesting option for exploration, both from 
a financial point of view in terms of in situ assistance, and the standpoint of limiting 
actual arrivals in the UK and western Europe generally. 
Finally, the position of the assistance providers on the question of temporary 
protection in the UK is that it should be a matter of last resort. The ethos seems to 
be that assistance should be given to help people stay at or near their homes, rather 
than helping them in seeking safety slightly further afield, not least because the 
financial cost of protection in the UK is so much greater than the cost of 'protection' 
in situ, although the quality and viability of such protection might be questioned. 
3a. Historical insight - the UK's reaction to the Hungarian mass 
outflow of 1956 
Austria had the historical experience of receiving a number of mass influxes 
during the second half of the twentieth century, which gave some background to the 
reactions there to the influxes from former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. During 
offering aid with religious ties attached - especially in attempts to convert Muslims without though to the 
offence this could cause to all sides given the religious background to the conflict. 
IS USAID is apparently concerned with reconciliation projects rather more than with on-going 
medical needs. 
16 Apparently the system in Yugoslav hospitals had not involved accident and emergency 
departments, but only direct specialisation, so the hospital staff were not used to a flood of emergencies 
who needed treating by the first doctors to hand. 
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the Hungarian crisis of 1956, the United Kingdom played a significant role in 
assisting Austria with the refugee inflow, and it is therefore interesting to consider 
the British actions in that situation as a precursor to the UK's protection role in 
former Yugoslavia. 
On 7 November, 195617, the UK Government announced, in line with 
popular sentiment, that it would admit 2,500 of the 10,000 or so Hungarian refugees 
who were already in Austria, with the British Council for Aid to Refugees [BCAR] 
(later the British Refugee Council) to make arrangements for reception, maintenance 
and settlement. The first refugees, selected in Austria by Home Office Immigration 
officials, arrived in the UK on 17 November, with transportation arranged by the 
Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration. On 23 November, in 
response to the urgent appeals of the Austrian Government, the British Government 
removed restrictions on the immigration of Hungarians, and from 17 November to 
10 December, 11,500 refugees arrived with none of the regular immigration checks 
being made. IS Having saturated the accommodation facilities with this large 
inflow, the United Kingdom, in fact, ordered a temporary halt to the inflow on 11 
December 1956.19 The non-governmental organisations of the day20 agreed with 
this suspension to the unlimited influx, and the Home Secretary, Major Lloyd 
George, announced in Parliament that during the suspension, the British government 
was considering giving money to Austria for the care of those refugees who would 
have been resettled. He also responded to fears for security which had been raised 
as normal immigration and individual asylum procedures had been suspended for 
Hungarians. Those procedures were dispensed with, he said, to allow speedy help 
to the refugees and the Austrian government. He showed reluctance to discuss 
security because it was important that the refugees feel secure themselves, "and 
17 Almost 36 years to the day therefore separate the announcements of the visa restrictions and 
1,000 quota for former Yugoslavs and that of the 2,000 quota, followed by almost unlimited accepted 
migration, of Hungarians. 
II In contrast to 11,500 arrivals in one month in 1956, 11,500 acknowledged arrivals of former 
Yugoslav asylum applicants occurred in the five years from 1990, and the vast majority were, by the end 
of those five years, still awaiting a decision on their claims. 
19 'Temporary halt to flow of refugees', The Times, 7 December 1956, p.10. First arrivals were 
usually sent to army bases, where they were cared for by army staff, the soldiers' wives and the Red 
Cross. 'Army's welcome for refugees', The Times, 7 December 1956, p.7. 
20 The Red Cross and the British Council for Aid to Refugees. 
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realise that at last they had reached a free country. 1121 
Meanwhile, the National Farmers Union was being used by 300 farmers to 
offer homes and jobs to Hungarian agricultural workers and the National Coal Board 
had recruited 3,561 refugees directly from Austria for mining jobs in Yorkshire.22 
An additional 630 refugees were recruited by the Coal Board (all with the 
government's approval) within the UK, however, due to the opposition of local 
branches of the National Union of Mineworkers (the National Union itself 
encouraged the placement of these refugee workers) only 821 of the recruits actually 
had jobs in the mining industry by 1958, and 3,000 of them had in fact, after 
receiving language and other training from the Coal Board, found employment 
elsewhere. 23 
In January 1957, immigration resumed - with 5,000 places offered to replace 
5,000 refugees who had been resettled to Canada. Beyond April 1957 only 
individual cases, travelling on visas, were admitted, many for family reunification 
purposes. Up to December 1957, over 21,000 Hungarian refugees arrived in the 
UK, of whom 5,711 had been resettled and 1,161 had returned either to Austria or 
Hungary or other East European states. 
Table 10.3 Hungarian Arrivals in the UK (1956-1957) 
Individual visas National Coal Board Scheme Bulk TOTAL 
Schemes 
1,242 3,561 16,648 21,451 
Table 10.4 Hungarian Departures from the UK (1957) 
To Canada To other destinations (eg Return to Austria, TOTAL 
Australia, US) Hungary and East 
Europe 
5,178 533 1,161 6,872 
21 'Events in Hungary: MPs anxious for debate', The Times, 14 December 1956, p.4. Both 
speeches were reportedly met with cheers from the House, and the Home Secretary also commented that 
as a country, Britain had no need to be ashamed of what had been done to date. Compare this with the 
1992 Home Secretary, Kenneth Clarke's words: "It is now necessary for the United Kingdom to ... 
control the process of admission and concentrate our efforts on the needy· (ie on the limited quota). 
22 'Farming notes and comments: to aid refugees', The Times, 10 December 1956, p.2, and 12 
December p.6. 
13 'Refugees in Britain', PEP, (1958) pp.25-26. 
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Table 10.S Situation of Hungarillns in the UK (1957) 
Settled (Employed Under National Coal Unemployed TOTAL 
and Housed) Board Training 
Scheme 




[Source: 'Refugees in Britain'] 
The BCAR was a voluntary organisation in which a special Hungarian 
Department was set up to cope with this influx. The Home Secretary had general 
oversight of the organisation, and acted as its liaison with Parliament. He seconded 
a number of civil servants to assist in staffing the Hungarian Department. The bulk 
of the funding for the Hungarian operation came from a Lord Mayor of London's 
National Hungarian and Central European Relief Fund, set up on 9 November, 
1956, only two days after the initial announcement concerning refugee reception was 
made. The fund's target of £2 million was reached by the end of 1956, and an 
additional £600,000 was raised in the following year. 60% of the Fund was used in 
the UK and 40% for assistance in other countries, notably Austria. £1 million of it 
was allocated directly to BCAR for reception and maintenance purposes, and a 
special grant was made to allow professionals such as doctors and dentists to receive 
training allowing them to practice in the UK. Housing was initially offered in army 
barracks, and later in a single reception centre with 5,000 places at Hednesford 
Camp in Staffordshire. Later large buildings were used to take in several hundred 
refugees. Eventually, due to a "strong determination not to be left with thousands of 
refugees who had become used to life in hostels, and unwilling, or even 
psychologically unable to face life outside the sheltering walls It 24 and in spite of 
needing to consider the Hungarians in only second place to the British families who 
had been awaiting housing for years, individual housing was found, by the end of 
1957, for all but the one and a half thousand most difficult cases, who remained in 
hostels. The BCAR's 1956-7 Annual Report said that its housing policy, in 
agreement with the Home Office was that refugees should be moved as quickly as 
24 'Refugees in Britain', op.cit., p.20. 
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possible into private accommodation 
where they could become part of the local community. It was felt that 
rapid integration of the refugees into the economy of this country 
could only be achieved by enabling them to start an independent new 
life amongst British people and by avoiding the concentration of large 
groups of Hungarians in anyone area. 25 
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This brief historical interlude has highlighted a large difference in the 
handling of two mass outflow situations. There are great variations in the numbers 
accepted or acceptable, and in financial assistance in proportional terms. The nature 
of the two situations must be said to be strongly influenced by non-humanitarian 
factors. The political, economic and employment climates in the United Kingdom of 
the 1950s and 1990s differ greatly, although the housing problem may have 
similarities. Politically, at the height of the Cold War, and following a war in 
which the lack of protection for refugees could be seen as a contributory factor to 
the high number of genocidal deaths, it is perhaps not surprising that there was an 
openness to refugees fleeing an Eastern Bloc state under Soviet repression. 
Economically, with reconstruction and rehabilitation after the Second World War 
under way in the UK, as in the rest of Western Europe, there was a need for a 
strong labour force. So the policy of admission, and permission for unlimited stay 
for refugees in 1956-7 is perhaps understandable, especially given the additional 
factor that resettlement opportunities in Canada, Australia and the US were high, 
and the solidarity boost given to sharing the burden of fellow Western states. The 
question really is why, after the lessons of the Second World War, more protection 
could not be offered to those facing post Cold War genocidal regimes. 
4. Centres and integration 
As noted above, the original quota for 1,000 cases, plus the later addition of 
500 place in response to UNHCR July 1995 appeal, involves the reception of 
arrivals in centres. People on the Temporary Protection Programme spend their first 
two or three months in the UK in these establishments, which are organised by the 
2' Cited in 'Refugees in Britain', op.cit., p.23. 
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British Refugee Council via its coordination body for this programme, the Bosnia 
Project, and funded by the Home Office. 
The Bosnia Project is the lead agency for reception of Bosnians in the UK. 
Other agencies involved are the Red Cross, Refugee Action (Derby) and the Scottish 
Refugee Council. Centres were used in seven areas of the United Kingdom, some 
of which had been used for previous mass arrivals, in particular the Vietnamese. A 
centre in Derby still housed some Vietnamese before receiving new comers on the 
1,000 quota. Having been the last centre to remain open from the initial 
programme, it was also in line to be the first to accept arrivals on the 500 quota in 
September 1995. Significant government funding is accorded to the project, for 
example in 1995 the Bosnia Project will receive £2.5 million for the new 500 quota. 
This will enable the Refugee Council to do things which will, it hopes, in the long 
term benefit other refugee categories too. On leaving centres the Bosnians are 
(paradoxically considering their temporary status) found permanent housing in the 
area around the centre, and their progress in establishing their new lives is assisted 
by 'Mid-Term Support Teams'. These teams consist of two development workers 
who liaise with national and local service providers. Their own services include a 
Serbo-Croat newsletter and helping in the organisation of community groups. 
The establishment of the programme began with real negotiations, and the 
Home Office selected the agencies to be involved. It chose the British Refugee 
Council, the Scottish Refugee Council and surprisingly the Red Cross, which had 
not been involved in more recent work, although (as seen above) it was involved, 
together with the British Refugee Council's predecessor, BCAR, in the reception of 
Hungarian refugees. Suddenly there was competition for money between the 
agencies. There was concern, inspired by experience of the Vietnamese case, that 
having two agencies working on one programme would prove difficult. Eventually 
it was decided that the Refugee Council would coordinate the work.26 
The Bosnia Project advocated having a quota, although it did not push for 
only 1,000. However, it has found one advantage of this limitation to be that 
reasonable housing can be provided for all. It also had no influence over the family 
reunification criteria, which in fact it felt were too tight to reflect the nature of the 
26 In fact all the relationships involved between agencies and with the Home Office are said to have 
been good - although beyond operational terms, there is confusion and disarray perceived on the Home 
Office side.by NGO workers. 
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Bosnian family - so the quota has in practice often been used to count father, 
grandfather and uncle each as principals plus all their dependent, immediate 
families. 
The idea of central management of a project coordinated by agencies and 
volunteers, rather than central or local government, dealing with the settlement of 
refugees was one of the key points advocated in a 1985 Home Office report. n 
Another conclusion of that report was that community based, clustered resettlement 
was one of the few widely relevant findings of the report's author's analysis of the 
wide but unsystematic and largely anecdotal research done in the field at that time. 
Creating clusters of refugees would, the report claimed, recreate the important social 
world lost as a result of displacement, help on the mental health level through 
offering culturally appropriate support, provide a framework within which refugees 
could help themselves, assist in adjustment, cause less need for government services 
and benefits in the long term, and allow cultural and religious connections to be 
maintained. Among other lessons of past scenarios, the findings of this report 
appear to have had some effects. 
Where the Bosnia Project sees itself as having been successful is in its own 
advocacy of 'cluster areas', with post-reception housing near the reception facilities, 
offering mid-term support and development, and having permanent housing arranged 
through negotiations with housing associations, and not taking places from the 
homeless. With the Vietnamese, and previous refugee groups, there had been a 
scattering or dispersal, partly to avoid concentration, partly to encourage 
assimilation, with many drifting towards London or other major centres after a 
while, where minority communities established themselves. The Home Office found 
dispersal problematic for the difficulties it presented in offering effective mid-term 
support and interpreting facilities, and having decided on the clustering process left 
the agency to decide which cities would be most suitable, according to factors such 
as existing agency facilities and relations with local landlords. Where the project 
sees itself as unsuccessful is in not persuading the government to give permanent 
places. 
The 1985 Home office report also endorsed the involvement as project 
rI Field, Simon, 'Resettling Refugees: the lessons of research', Home Office Research Study 87: A 
Home Office Research and Planning Unit Report, (London: HMSO 1985). 
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workers of members of the same ethnic group as the refugees, who had perhaps 
been living in the host country for a longer period of time, and would be both bi-
lingual and bi-cultural. The Bosnia Project has indeed been largely staffed by 
former Yugoslavs, and sees the use by other states of workers from the host 
community to deal with refugee issues as problematic. The British agency sees this 
as separatism - dividing the refugees from the wider community - whereas they see 
their own system as mixing groups from the grass roots level. One point on which 
they are adamant is that there is no national strategy of integration, nor any aim for 
it, and that there is no desire to make people British. They want viable Bosnian 
communities which can live alongside other communities - with no assimilation - and 
'integration' is like a bad word. 
The two stream system for former Yugoslavs in the UK means that there are 
differences in the rights and entitlements of those on the Temporary Protection 
Programme compared to those who receive regular Exceptional Leave to Remain 
and those who are still classed as asylum seekers while awaiting the processing of 
their applications. There is also the significant difference of there being reception 
facilities for persons arriving on the quota Programme while independent arrivals 
receive little or no support from the government or Refugee Council, and are 
scattered throughout the UK, although many do gather in London. These non-
programme people from Bosnia Herzegovina can and do become very isolated and 
vulnerable, with no guidance and support, and no status as they wait years for their 
applications to be processed. 28 
The position on the Temporary Protection Programme is more favourable 
than traditional ELR, but does not give full Convention rights. Refugee status 
holders have all the employment and education rights and benefits of British citizens. 
Those with ELR have similar employment and education rights, but unlike refugee 
status holders do not have a Convention travel document. If they do not have their 
own passport they get a travel document from the UK which confers no status. TPP 
people get social security benefits, generally on the same level as UK nationals. 
ELR holders get only 90% of income support, but the full amount of everything 
else. The special arrangements are really in having reception centres and their 
21 The Refugee Council and Bosnia Project are clearly aware of this distinction between the two 
categories, but unable to offer anything like the same level of assistance to non-programme arrivals due to 
a lack of funding. See the Bosnia Project Information Pack (London: Refugee Council) [mimeo]. 
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support. 
The biggest differences between the two strands of ELR centre on family 
reunification. Asylum seekers cannot be joined by their families, ELR holders can 
be joined by them after 4 years and TPP people have family reunification instantly. 
There is permission to work with no restrictions. School age children get schooling, 
university is possible in accordance with university regulations, which include a 
requirement for three years residence in the UK before fees will be reduced to Home 
rather than Overseas levels - a threefold difference. There is no specific targeted 
vocational training. On ELR after 7 years one is entitled to settlement - ie 
permanent residence, with no further immigration controls. (ELR is given in 
periods of 1 then 3 then 3 years.) The Temporary Protection Programme was 
originally for six months, then for a year. The intention is to give three years next 
time, but there is no settlement schedule. 
If a person has ELR but wants recognition as a refugee, he or she can apply, 
but has to give up the ELR status and become an asylum-seeker. It is not possible 
to have one status and apply for another. Anyone can apply for asylum or ELR - it 
is not targeted, and thus no discrimination in having the programme is perceived. 
ELR is intended as a safety net for people who do not qualify for Convention status, 
but whose protection need is acknowledged for humanitarian reasons. However, the 
efficiency of this safety net - providing as it could a guarantee of security for the de 
facto refugee and an honouring of international obligations by the British 
government, has to be questioned in the light of the dramatic statistical changes in 
its according over the early 1990s as seen above. 
s. Return 
While some of the ODA's projects may verge on reconstruction, there is no 
real discussion or contingency planning on return in UK policy making circles. It 
was originally envisaged that people on the programme would be in the UK for only 
a short stay, but the general feeling of policy makers and administrators seems to be 
that the prospects of return are becoming more and more remote. The UK still feels 
committed to return, but is starting to seriously consider settlement as an eventual 
outcome. 
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10M is responsible for assisting in the return of medevacs, which takes place 
on their return to good health. There are no arrangements for other categories and 
the prevailing view is that when the time to return comes, UNHCR must deal with 
it. That would also be the moment when, as in other states referred to above, the 
Foreign Office would once more become directly involved in negotiations and 
planning. 
6. EU: coordination and opinion of other member states, 
burden sharing 
Officially there is no desire in the UK to see a formally established 
mechanism of temporary protection, although it is privately acknowledged by people 
interviewed that at some point a decision on this may need to be made, although 
with the general climate of perceived opposition to refugee and migrant influxes, and 
the search for benefits from the situation rather than for awareness of human 
tragedy, it is unclear what the outcome of any debate on the issue may be. 
The UK claims to favour a flexible approach, with new policies evolving as a 
crisis emerges, pragmatically responding to the particular features of a given crisis 
with different approaches and emphases. It sees itself as having been able to do this 
in the former Yugoslav case by adapting the policy of exceptional leave to remain, 
which being a policy rather than fixed legislation is readily adaptable. Temporary 
protection policies and programmes more broadly are generally held to be too new 
to say whether there could be a common position, and to be dealt with so differently 
in each Member State of the European Union that harmonisation, even if desirable, 
would be very difficult. The politically pragmatic position is held to be that there 
will not be a regionally mechanism for this type of protection. The altruistic 
position is rather that there should be, even if it would not happen. The position 
with regard to the UK's view of itself in relation to other states seems to be that it 
occupies a middle ground, and while intending no changes itself, it hopes others 
which are more restrictive might liberalise to catch up. 
Meanwhile, opposed to burden-sharing programmes generally, and 
specifically against the German Presidency's plans at the EU in late 1994, the UK 
maintains a confidence at having played its part in former Yugoslavia by having 
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spent more than £271 million in aid there, whether bi-Iaterally or via the EU, and 
being third in the hierarchy of donors behind the US and Japan. What the British 
officials see as the problem is that the government chooses not the shout about what 
it has done. Internationally, Britain is rather more perceived to shout loudly about 
exaggerated claims of its great role on the refugee and protection issue. 
The safe third country rule is applied by the UK, but, it is claimed, less 
rigorously than in other cases, especially if people have relatives already legally 
resident in the UK. Officials spoken to estimate that 95 % of safe countries passed 
through are EU Member States. Before returning people to a safe third country, 
enquiries are made concerning refoulement etc, including taking Amnesty and 
UNHCR reports into account. 
Having held the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in late 1992 when the 
Edinburgh Conclusions concerning protection for vulnerable persons from former 
Yugoslavia were reached, the UK claims to feel it is a shame that measures were not 
taken further. However, it is also felt that the UK has done what it said it would, 
that is to take in anyone UNHCR puts forward, consider all applications, and not 
return people. 
Conclusion 
In the UK, the entire approach to protection for people from Bosnia 
Herzegovina is policy based, with no legislation in place on any of the Exceptional 
Leave to Remain or Programme provisions. 
If one takes temporary protection in the UK to mean only the two quota 
schemes of people on the Temporary Protection Programme, then one can see that 
the policy of the Home Office is certainly focused on limiting the number of 
arrivals. For this limited number, the reception, housing and financial benefits 
provisions must be said to be very reasonable by the standards of the cases under 
analysis here. The biggest question mark must hang over why it is that the 
flexibility of the ELR policy had to bend in the direction of according no credits 
towards eventual settlement as an outcome of this period of temporary protection, 
but rather focused on a return which the authorities from the beginning expressed 
scepticism about. 
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If one moves further to see short-term protection of people from Bosnia 
Herzegovina as including all those who arrive, then it is clear from the limited 
number of decisions made over claims that the real position for most is limited 
protection as an asylum seeker, with no actual status whatsoever. Being accorded 
ELR would actually give a relatively high standard of entitlements. British policy 
towards integrating immigrants is also clearly demonstrated, via this analysis of the 
position of the majority of people from Bosnia Herzegovina, to be one of individuals 
being left to 'sink or swim'. For a certain category of independent person this 
approach must surely be very effective. However, one cannot help wondering if this 
is a useful policy approach towards people who may very likely be deeply 
traumatised by the experiences of moving to a new country, climate and culture, and 
by the terrible events of war and ethnic cleansing in their homeland, which they may 
have experienced, and which they see daily on their television screens in a place 
they know, feel attached to, and where they have in all likelihood left relatives and 
friends behind. 
The UK's policy in this area appears to be confusing to the implementors, 
and to commentators, and is probably also confusing to many of the recipients of the 
limited protection of asylum seekers in the UK. 
'11Ie Netherlands 
1. The situation in summer 1995 
Chapter 10 
PROVISIONAL PROTECTION 
IN THE NETIlERLANDS 
As defined by Section 12b of the New Dutch Aliens Act of February 1994, 
VVTV status (Voorwaardelijke Vergunning Tot Verblijf - literally 'Provisional 
Permission to Remain') may be awarded to two categories of aliens, described as 
displaced persons and tolerated persons. 'Displaced persons' here referring to 
"persons arriving as a result of massive influx and for whom it would not be feasible 
to have a thorough interview"! covers, according to the government's use of the 
legislation up to July 1995, only persons from Bosnia Herzegovina. 'Tolerated 
persons' are generally those who have not been accepted as refugees in the first 
instance, and have not been given a humanitarian status, but who, nonetheless 
cannot be returned to their country of origin. 
For the displaced persons category, which is the one of concern in this study, 
people are interviewed briefly to ascertain proof of nationality, and that a safe third 
country, in which protection was or could have been sought, was not transited.2 
VVTV is then granted instantly.3 VVTV is renewed annually for a period of up to 
three years. In the meantime, a change of circumstances in the country of origin 
could permit the Justice Minister to decide to withdraw the status on a general basis, 
at which point the asylum requests which resulted in a judgement of VVTV being 
UNHCR, Survey on Temporary Protection, (Geneva 18 March 1994). 
2 The Dutch Safe third countries Bill was passed on February 8 and implemented on 21 April 
1995, in order to line up with the implementation of the Schengen Accords. Schengen malees it easier to 
implement safe third country rules among the members, and does not malee movement for residence and 
protection easier, as the responsibility still lies with the first host state which processes the application. 
Until the safe third country bill came into force the application for asylum was an application for either 
protection as a refugee or residence on humanitarian grounds, but it was made as a single application. 
Since February, an application for asylum can only be made if no safe third country was visited en route. 
The institution of safe third country bills in most states of the EU has forced numbers down - but it is 
unlikely that this will be a lasting phenomenon. 
, For tolerated persons vvrv is granted only after an asylum application has been rejected, and if 
no new facts or circumstances have arisen prior to the request for a review. 
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the appropriate level of protection, and were subsequently postponed, are 
reactivated, although one report suggests that a simultaneous decision could be taken 
on withdrawal and on the original asylum request.4 The distinctive feature of the 
Dutch VVTV scheme is the gradual accumulation of rights and entitlements over the 
three year period. If the situation has not altered sufficiently to permit withdrawal 
of the status and return after three years, the status is converted to one of permanent 
residence for humanitarian reasons. 
2. Before January 1994 
It was the rise in the influx of spontaneous Bosnian arrivals in 1992 which 
prompted the initial political decision in the Netherlands to create an ad hoc 
regulation allowing for the admission and reception of persons from former 
Yugoslavia who would be permitted to remain on a temporary basis, based on the 
existing regulations in the old Asylum Act. In addition to the creation of an ad hoc 
regulation, the Netherlands' government sent a mission to Croatia in August 1992 to 
organise the transporation of groups invited to go to the Netherlands, including ex-
detainees, women, children and the sick and injured. 
The political thinking of that time held that planning for a period of three to 
six months would be sufficient, and there seems to have been a desire for 
experimentation to see what steps were workable in practice. So, largely with the 
aim of keeping the number of people entering the slow individualised procedures 
down, a combined scheme with a limited and provisional legal basis was set in 
motion. Essentially there were two short-term programmes, both known as TROO 
(1ijdelijke Regeling Opvang Ontheemden - Temporary Arrangement for Displaced 
Persons). The Justice Ministry was responsible for the admission arrangements 
which went by this name, and the Welfare Ministry for the reception arrangements. 
This scheme gave recipients a place in a reception centre, or funding for their hosts 
if they were accommodated with family members or friends. Additional centres 
specifically for Bosnians were established, at which costs were to be kept at below 
4 'The Netherlands', Country report prepared by the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental 
Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia, 
(Mimeo, July 1995). 
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the level of those for regular asylum-seekers. S The deadline for the closure of the 
TROO scheme was originally 1 January 1994, although this was extended to 1 
January 1995 when passage of the New Aliens Act, including VVTV status was 
delayed. 
The initial schemes were a response to UNHCR's appeals in August 1992 for 
temporary protection of persons displaced by the conflict in former Yugoslavia, and 
were, until 14 April 1993, open to people from all republics, provided that they 
could not be returned to a safe third country, and that they did not pose a serious 
threat to public order, peace and national security in the Netherlands. 
As the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina continued into 1993, it was appreciated 
that this short-term, non-regulated policy was not satisfactory, either for the 
displaced persons or for the Dutch government and people. Two decisions were 
therefore taken: the first was to establish in law a scheme for provisional protection 
and the second to accord Convention or humanitarian status6 to all those who had 
entered the Netherlands during 1992 and before 14 April 1993, and applied for 
asylum. For those who arrived after that date, people from Bosnia Herzegovina 
would still be covered by the TROO scheme. Other former Yugoslavs had to enter 
the regular procedures. The granting of 'A' status to the earlier groups was forced 
both by the provisions of the old Aliens Act and by a speech by the Justice Minister 
in Parliament announcing that the accordance of Convention Status to persons from 
Bosnia Herzegovina already in the Netherlands would be the most likely course. It 
should be noted, however, that many of those who were in Holland had not filed an 
application specifically because they hoped their stay would be brief, and were 
treating it as a brief visit to family or friends already in the Netherlands. 
Later a Parliamentary decision established an invitation for 1,500 people to 
go to the Netherlands from Bosnia Herzegovina, with transport arranged, in partial 
cooperation with UNHCR. 
5 This division of centres was one aspect of overall policy which disappeared when the scheme was 
abolished. 
6 The attraction of Convention Refugee status for the displaced persons would be the 
accompanying travel documents. For people who might wish to remain indefinitely, however, the 
humanitarian status would ultimately be more attractive, as it does not appear to include a cessation 
clause. There was a rejection rate of only 10% for asylum seekers who had been covered by TROO. 
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2. The origins of VVTV, initiation and influences 
The creation of a temporary protection policy in the Netherlands, which on 
an international political level results in the ability to demonstrate a willingness to be 
involved in protection and to assist neighbouring states, was instigated by UNHeR's 
requests for such protection to be given to persons fleeing Bosnia Herzegovina. The 
policy behind the law was the result of the experiences of the first two years of the 
displacement crisis of former Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the content of the law, and 
its most unique feature of graduated integration, appear to have been initially 
formulated by the Social Affairs Ministry, with the work of policy formulation 
continued by the Justice and Interior Ministries, and the final execution of the 
content, in terms of integration facilities and operationaJisation after recognition of 
status is made, coming down, as of I July 1995, to the municipal authorities. 7 The 
NGOs involved in refugee work in the Netherlands had little real impact in the 
creation of the policy, although they are very much involved in the programmes of 
care and counselling concerned with its implementation" The political decision to 
go ahead with legislation on temporary protection was taken in 1993. 
The reasoning behind the creation of VVTV for these two categories seems 
to have been threefold. Firstly, it was felt that, as this was neither the first nor last 
time a mass influx situation was likely to occur there was a need for regulations. 
Secondly, there was a sense of needing, after all the ad hoc measures which had 
been developed, to regularise the situation of those persons currently in need of 
protection for these reasons. Thirdly, there was a need to clarify legal and reception 
procedures. 
While the system of ad hoc measures was in place confusion reigned over 
who bore the major responsibility. The Welfare Ministry was responsible for 
asylum seekers, but as many of those who had fled Bosnia Herzegovina were not 
applying for asylum, that Ministry saw the financial support of displaced persons as 
7 The municipalities are not bappy with the situation, and complained particularly about the 
financial calculations, which in the first reading of the bill reduced their money, although it was restored 
to fonner limits later. 
• It seems that NGOs in the Netherlands bad been able to work closely with the government until 
three or four years ago. Then as the government got more restrictive, the NGOs became more 
challenging opponents. Now. the cooperation level is again rising. 
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part of the Social Affairs Ministry's budget. That Ministry therefore became 
involved in the drafting of the legislation - aiming to keep the social security costs 
down as it did so, and the new 'Purple Coalition' government which came to power 
in May 1994 handed responsibility for protection of persons with this status to the 
Interior Ministry. Responsibility for admission and initial reception have meanwhile 
been joined (perhaps with the aim of keeping procedures rapid and reception costs 
therefore down) and accorded to the Iustice Ministry. 
Although the confusion over responsibilities may have been dissipated by the 
creation of this law, the political execution of the law is still creating some disorder. 
While there appear to be no solid reasons for refusing this status to people clearly 
falling into the two categories defined in the legislation, in its application the 
government has so far chosen to be rather restrictive, largely to limit the 
attractiveness of the Netherlands as a haven. The restrictiveness is not so applicable 
to the case of persons from Bosnia Herzegovina, unless they have passed through a 
so-called safe third country, although only one third of applicants from Bosnia 
Herzegovina received VVTV in 1994, while almost half received Convention status. 
However, 'displaced persons' are defined not by their situation but by their number 
and the precise definition of how many constitutes a 'massive influx' has not been 
made. This means that the cases of other large groups of asylum seekers who are 
not classified as 'displaced persons' are becoming a matter of concern for refugee 
interest groups. Furthermore persons falling into the category of 'tolerated' in 
particular are very rarely being accorded this status. This is seen as acting as a 
potential deterrent to others who may try to reach the Netherlands if they hear that 
persons of their nationality are easily receiving even a short-term permit to stay, but 
it is also creating disquiet and causing more accusations of restrictiveness to be 
made. 9 Additionally, it is leaving people in the procedures, and the asylum policy 
in the Netherlands is such that after three years as an asylum seeker (itself a 
, Suggestions do exist that the relatively low number of persons receiving this status is in part due 
to lawyers advising clients to appeal against its accordance, in the belief that they could or should receive 
Convention status, particularly as earlier protection seekers fleeing the same situation in the same country 
did. These suggestions do not appear unreasonable, and could give further impetus to arguments for the 
creation of provisions appropriate to mass influx cases arising from particular situations in the country of 
origin before another crisis occurs. It might be called human nature to try to achieve the best deal 
possible - and while a precedent exists of the accordance of full refugee status, lawyers and non-
governmental groups, as well as protection seekers themselves, may well push for this maximum, whether 
or not the more limited form of protection offered is in fact sufficient and suitable. This position will be 
elaborated in Part Four of the current thesis. 
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minimum level of short-term protection without the security of a residence permit) a 
claimant is given a humanitarian status. What is more, as applicants who are 
refused this status quite often also cannot be returned, they are remaining in costly 
asylum centres. 10 
In the Dutch social security system, no distinction is made between races and 
nationalities once people, including refugees and legal immigrants have officially 
entered the system. The difficulty when the Bosnians arrived was that they were 
asking to stay for only a short period of time, or at least to be able to return, so they 
did not really want to enter the system fully. The big question for the Social Affairs 
Ministry was what to do with the Bosnians as, if they allowed them into the system, 
they risked attracting massive numbers of refugees. But, at the same time, the 
Bosnians could not, at the other extreme, be put into custody until return became 
possible. So, it was perceived that a mix would be desirable, allowing those people 
who were seeking temporary protection for humanitarian reasons to receive short-
term asylum, including on the level of financial and employment entitlements, and 
meaning they should go back once the situation was resolved. In order to limit the 
scope of the policy, the allowances were kept below social security standards, 
matching only basic minimum needs. So, for example, there is a lower level of 
family allowance for children than is the norm. Integration, meanwhile, is, 
according to the policy, a regulated and gradual process. In the first year there are 
language and acculturation courses, but no employment is permitted. In the second 
year, education in the form of vocational training is allowed (aimed more at what 
people will do if they stay than at what skills they can take back in the case of 
return), together with permission for temporary work. In the third year normal 
employment is allowed,11 and after three years, when a full resident permit is 
received, full social assistance, and full time employment is permitted. 
However, restrictions on refugees are continuing to increase, and the 
10 Applications for asylum made by those who initially receive vvrv will be dealt with during the 
three year period of phased integration. 
II The third year of the scheme has not yet been reached, so while it has, as people entered the 
second year, become apparent that the temporary work permitted in the second year means aaricultural 
and seasonal employment of about twelve weeks, both the protected persons and NOOs working with 
them are becoming concerned that the third year full employment entitlement may not really mean an 
equal opportunity with all Dutch and other nationals in the Netherlands to take up whatever employment 
ones qualifications and experience would indicate to be possible. 
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acceptance of certain groups appears to be stronger than that of others because of 
facton such as differing behaviour, work ethics and language abilities. The basic 
aim of social welfare policies in the Netherlands is said to be to subdue tensions by 
keeping everyone on a level, while not letting anyone, Dutch or immigrant, drop 
into poverty, or significant inequality. In order to improve the chances of 
integration, there are attempts to increase the chances for employment and 
education. So, when this "waiting room" idea was proposed, it was broadly 
accepted. The notion is that asylum seekers are on the threshold; VVTV holders are 
in the waiting room; residence permit holders and refugees are inside. (The former 
two categories are not in the social security system, the latter are.) The Social 
Affairs ministry claims to have come up with this proposal because they were aware 
of the social security costs on the government. Keeping people in centres costs the 
central government a lot of money. As VVTV is paid for by the municipalities, 
through government money and local taxes, it is cheaper, and permission to work in 
the longer term keeps costs on the government down even more. 
If the permit has not been withdrawn, by decision of the Justice Minister 
based on a change of situation in the country of origin and thus the strong possibility 
for return, then after three years a full humanitarian status is granted. The practice 
of phased integration is based on the idea that return will hopefully be possible. It 
balances the contradictory notions of integration and return, but it is increasingly 
acknowledged (with a large measure of realism) that for many the system will 
eventually lead to permanent residence. The position on return and integration is 
clarified to the people receiving this protection. 
There were dual concerns in creating this policy. Firstly, there was an 
appreciation in the Social Affairs Ministry that if people were kept out of the 
employment market for too long, then whether they stay in the Netherlands or return 
to their country of origin, or indeed if they are resettled elsewhere, they may never 
get back into it. The second concern was of course to not create an attraction for 
additional large numbers. Furthermore, there was a challenge to watch over the 
balance in the policy content and an aim to keep the cost of the social security 
system down, while maintaining the perception in public opinion that welcoming 
refugees is a good thing. That is to say there was a desire to maintain social 
acceptance, by amongst other things, keeping the visible and tangible costs down. 
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As indicated in the preceding paragraph, the need to reduce numbers is held 
to be one of the main aims, and seems to be a dominant policy in all EU states. 
Proportionally, the Netherlands has a massive influx to population ratio, especially 
in cities. However, the question of whether the country is being or feeling 
overwhelmed is subjective. Public opinion is shifting to view the problem as 
overwhelming, largely due to press coverage. Articles such as one which appeared 
in De Yolkskrant, showing a very positive example of refugees and asylum seekers 
living happily and harmoniously in a very upper-middle class community are the 
exception rather than the rule, as is indeed the Bloemendaal case it describes. 12 
Opening asylum centres is becoming very difficult due to local public opposition. 
Opinion is, however, based on superficial information. At the same time the (right 
wing) Liberal Partyl3 - part of the ruling Purple Coalition is restrictive on asylum 
policies and popular. It tends to attract headlines with its restrictive proposals and 
then withdraw its plans. 
The political decision to create this law seems to have been both positive and 
humanitarian. Creating laws to regulate the positions of all concerned in a 
protection relationship is often seen as a necessary process. The consequences of 
the laws are often, however, only taken into account when the application of them 
becomes imminent. The momentum which existed for creating legislation can 
disappear when it comes to application, particularly as legislation has little or no 
long-term perspective, but the consequences for the long-term (in terms, for 
example, of an increase in numbers) frighten politicians (as in their view, the public 
would be frightened). 
The ad hoc measures of the early months of the crisis, culminating in the 
TRoo schemes appear to have been flexible, adjustable, and renewable as long as 
the situation permitted a strong hope for a resolution to the conflict which had 
caused the displacements. They were pragmatic, and controllable measures. Fixing 
the measures with a legal basis, with the consequences this could entail, brought 
about some loss in flexibility, and the scope for control being reduced. If VVTV 
12 'Een verdomd grappig contrast: Bloemendaal koestert zijn asielzoekers'. (,A jolly good contrast: 
Bloemendaal appreciates its asylum seekers'), De Volkskrant, (19 April 1995) . 
., The VVD. Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (the People's Party for Freedom and 
Democracy). 
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status is given, with its fixed programme of integration, including 410 Hfl (£170) 
per month exclusive of housing, then the consequence which hurts the government 
and public opinion most is that people can start to integrate and the likelihood of 
return in diminished. However, it is also clear that people cannot be kept in 
reception centres for lengthy periods. One year is really the absolute maximum, 
both for the refugees' own mental and physical health, and from the point of view of 
cost. Also, enormous centres can not be maintained: there were, even in summer 
1995, 35,000 people in 80 plus centres. 
4. Centres, Rights and Integration 
When asylum seekers first arrive in the Netherlands, they go to reception 
facilities, which are usually of mixed nationalities. Once admissibility has been 
determined, they are housed in asylum centres, until actual status is determined, or 
other types of housing becomes available. In the case of persons from Bosnia 
Herzegovina, who receive an 'F' document,14 they are to be housed by the 
municipal authorities, usually in houses rather than large centres. The aim is said to 
be to move all asylum-seekers and various categories of 'refugees' out of centres as 
soon as possible, not least because of the tensions which can arise between different 
national groups as some are perceived to have a greater chance of achieving 
recognition of their refugeehood than others. However, there are reported cases of 
people from Bosnia Herzegovina staying in centres for up to two years because of a 
shortage of housing. 
A new law was passed on I April 1995, regulating the care provisions to be 
undertaken by the municipalities for VVTV holders, and this was due to come into 
effect in July 1995. This law obliges the municipalities to arrange housing for 
people with VVTV (as they must for persons with the two other statuses of 
recognition), which is to be offered in kind. The Interior Ministry is to give money 
to the municipalities to cover housing, amenities and insurance. In addition the 
holder of VVTV is to receive an allowance, comparable to that of asylum-seekers, 
which will be adjusted if there is any other source of income. 
For the VVTV programme, it is the Interior Ministry which is most 
14 The identity document for VVTV status holders. 
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concerned with questions of integration. As stated above, the Dutch VVTV scheme 
has a three year phased programme of integration. It is this step by step approach to 
involving recipients in the host society which is most criticised by the Dutch NGOs. 
The major problems with the system are held to be that it does not allow people the 
freedom to choose where they will live; that people have only limited moneyl5; that 
as yet the restrictions on employment in the third year of the programme have not 
been clarified, and in the second year it is only seasonal workl6 and that the 
Municipalities are opposed to the rules because of the administrative difficulties they 
encounter. The Dutch Refugee Council would like to see persons with VVTV being 
accorded the full Convention rights - only for a limited period, although that should 
not be defined at a three year mark, a time setting which is perceived as artificial. 
Meanwhile, there have been reports that due to increasing signs of 'care 
dependency' and the perceived risk of marginalisation of VVTV holders, there will 
be moves towards more rapid integration in terms of education and labour facilities. 
The I April 1995 law includes provisions for allowing twelve weeks of employment 
during the first year (where previously none was allowed), but it is already 
anticipated that further changes to the structuring of this system will be made during 
the months to comeY The cost of VVTV for 1995 was estimated to be 75m Hfl 
(OI.25m). 
There is no right to family reunification, and none appears to be planned, in 
spite of this being the area of Dutch policy and legislation which remains of concern 
to UNHeR. Persons receiving Convention or humanitarian status do receive an 
entitlement to reunification for the immediate family. 
IS Persons over eighteen years of age receive 445 Hfl (£185) per month for food and clothina. 
Information from persons working closely with those on the vvrv programme indicate that the recipients 
themselves appreciate receiving this assistance, and feel able to survive with it. The problem really seems 
to be one for the municipalities who must find the money. 
16 In the case of the vvrv scheme it is the Refugee Council which offers advice and assists with 
contact making in the search for employment. For other recognised categories it is the Arbeidsbureau (the 
state operated job centres) which fill this role. 
17 IGC report, op.cit., p.19. 
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s. Return 
One of the aims of the phased integration programme is to facilitate eventual 
return, the idea being that with people living in regulated housing facilities, and 
having only limited access to social arrangements such as employment and training, 
they will be more likely to want to return, and easier to gather together should a 
repatriation programme be organised. Accounts as to the level of integration and 
desire to return vary depending on who one speaks to, but while it appears that the 
desire to return is waning over time, it seems there is still a strong willingness to go 
back on the part of at least half of the persons from Bosnia Herzegovina in the 
Netherlands. The question remains as to whether it is gradual.ly deeper integration 
which is causing the motivation to return to diminish, or the knowledge that the on-
going conflict has changed what once was home - meaning that return to the same 
house and land in the same village and even return to the same area may for many 
never be a possibility. The experience of the Dutch Refugee Council is that 
integration does not impede eventual return 18, but rather by upholding self worth, 
in fact allows a person a greater chance of coming to terms with the distressing 
circumstances which prompted movement, and potentially offers greater possibilities 
for successful re-integration and adaptation to the society and country of origin if 
return does become possible. The government view on this is, however, that if 
nothing else, limitations on integration at least allow for the logistical operation 
surrounding eventual deportations, and even basic encouragement and promotion of 
return, to be handled more smoothly. 
As of summer 1995 the question of return for persons from Bosnia 
Herzegovina did not seem to have been addressed in any realistic framework, as it 
was seen as an entirely theoretical proposition until the conflict would appear to be 
nearing a certain end, although a working group of the Iustice Ministry was reported 
to be considering the subject. 19 The general view seems to be though that if return 
becomes a positive option it will not be forced, will be carried out within a carefully 
II See also, Steen, Ann Belinda, 'Refugee Resettlement: Denmark and Britain compared'. IfH;, 
Refugee Participation Network, 14 (January 1993). 
19 IGC report, op.cit .. 
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crafted political framework including repatriation agreements with the emerging 
governments of the region of origin and UNHCR, and offering some ad hoc, and 
non-precedent setting, financial allowance. 
6. EU: Coordination and opinion of other Member States: 
Burden-sharing 
The prevalent view in the various ministries seems to be that the Netherlands 
bas, in VVTV, devised a programme which suits its immigration structures and 
traditions, matches most of the desires of UNHCR20, and is something to be proud 
of, and which the other European states might eventually wish to imitate. However, 
it is generally acknowledged that, while harmonisation on this issue could only 
happen within the EU framework, it is highly unlikely to occur, at least on a formal 
basis in the near future.21 Other states are seen to have been reluctant to move 
forward, or to have indulged in high profile political gestures rather than making 
basic policy movements towards a form of limited protection. There is an added 
feeling that, like themselves, other states are stuck with short-term national policy 
adaptations in reaction to crises rather than taking a long-term, cooperative view.22 
However, if other neighbouring states do not produce their own temporary 
protection schemes, the Netherlands may be presented with a situation of increasing 
numbers - in which case its own relatively liberal stance of the early years of the 
displacement crisis of former Yugoslavia may have to become more restrictive, 
2111 Family reunification is lacking, and may prove to be the sticking point for the Netherlands were 
harmonisation of temporary protection rules ever to be envisaged. 
21 Informal harmonisation, through for example adapting national systems in the light of 
experimental processes which have proved effective in other states, is constantly taking place. 
22 This short-termism also means that states are not looking very deeply at the notion of a 
comprehensive approach. To a policy maker dealing with on-going crises and the surrounding problems, 
talk of tackling the root causes of a conflict, and linking the issues of conflict prevention and resolution to 
the pressing needs of displaced persons arriving at the borders of a perhaps reluctant host state, probably 
seems rather academic and ivory tower like, with no really tangible solutions for governments to grasp at. 
However, indirect movements in the direction of preventing or postponing forced migration may well be 
the result of the increasing importance attached to development issues within Foreign Ministries. 
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especially as moves towards burden-sharing have so far failed. 23 
Conclusion 
The establishment of a legal basis to temporary protection in the Netherlands 
demonstrated a level of political willingness to address the situation of both the 
displaced persons and the host society in the face of a mass influx of people seeking 
protection from a conflict, and through the scope of the law, persons fleeing 
generalised violence and abuse too. However, the limited implementation of the law 
from its adoption in January 1994 to summer 1995 shows a political unwillingness to 
face up to the actual large numbers of a mass influx, in a situation where 
surrounding states have not gone so far with their legal provisions, and where 
political forces still try to restrict the number of similar entrants. It might, 
therefore, be doubtful that the liberality and humanitarianism which led to this law 
being established will lead to positive policies. It is likely rather that restrictive 
policy application will lead to a new pragmatism of restriction. 
This area of Provisional Residence Permits is the most politicised of a highly 
politicised field. Policies are constructed, somewhat artificially, to be restrictive, in 
order to keep the numbers down. There is also, of course, a conflict between 
domestic and foreign policies. Having a large number of Bosnians in the 
Netherlands does not particularly influence policies with regard to peace-keeping in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Meanwhile, neither this protection not the numbers of soldiers 
on the ground influence policies towards the conflict and intervention. The aims are 
more noble. However, in spite of taking in large numbers, and being prominent on 
the ground, due to its political smallness, the Netherlands' influence is minimal.24 
23 This failure to agree on burden-sharing within the EU could be seen as an example of the 
nationalistic and short term approach to asylum questions in the EU, where the sovereignty issue has 
become such a significant barrier to further political harmonisation, even on issues which clearly effect the 
rights of all peoples and states concerned. 
24 There appear, however, to have been some tensions with the members of the Contact Group, as 
the Netherlands is excluded in spite of its huge commitments, both on the ground, and in terms of 
protection in the Netherlands. In fact it is rarely consulted or informed of developments, although 
notable, it was briefed on a meeting held at the French embassy in the Hague in late May. a time at which 
NATO ministers were convening in Nordwijk. This demonstrates the need for diplomacy surrounding 
every aspect of the Yugoslav crisis. There were additional difficulties over the Netherlands' role as the 
anger of the Serbs had been provoked in 1991, due to a perception of a pro-Croatian stance in the 
handling of the early stages of the crisis when the Netherlands held the Presidency of the Council of 
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The most notable feature of the Dutch system, beyond the fact of having 
legislated for future mass influx situations, lies in the progressive phasing of 
integration, which appears to still be the subject of adaptation as the programme 
evolves. This system reflects a point of view which seems to say that while return 
is the aim, it might not happen, but in the meantime, over a reasonable period, there 
is no need for either the protected or the hosts to rush in either direction, and the 
necessary details of integration strategies can be gradually developed. This is a 
system which may prove controversial for those who imagine refugees can stand up 
for themselves instantly, or need to be able to work fully immediately. However, it 
pragmatically acknowledges both the need for a period of stability and the need of 
the host society to feel that their own employment opportunities are not threatened 
through the humanitarian act of protecting those in need. As yet, such a progressive 
programme is untested, and the end result of the three year 'waiting room' period 




As a result of calls for temporary protection for people fleeing former Yugos-
lavia, systems as numerous as the states of Europe have been developed, some based 
on evolving ad hoc policy arrangements, some entering into legislation as fixed 
regulations to be used as a basis for future similar protection if the need arises, 
maintaining some sense of flexibility within the apparent rigidity of legislation. 
There has been no pattern in this development. As this study has shown, even the 
dates of policy and legislative developments have varied widely.! Beyond the status 
of the regulations, the primary differences in temporary protection schemes lie in 
two categories: definitional and implementational. In the first category differences 
centre on who they are for (for example, they may be for all those who flee the 
crisis or only particularly vulnerable groups; only one ethnic group or all); how long 
they will endure; what the outcome will be; whether settlement is considered as a 
strong possibility and planned for or only return is considered as a viable or 
desirable outcome. In the second category differences centre on the desired levels of 
integration, practised through access to employment, housing and education, and on 
the level of dependent care as opposed to independence from the protecting state. 
All of the differences between the schemes reflect, to some extent, domestic 
political, cultural and societal norms. Based on the evidence of these case studies 
and the nature of the apparent aims of European political integration, the conclusion 
of this Part will be formulated in terms of how Europe could build on the various 
mechanisms created, in a way which would benefit Europe, the separate states and 
the protected individuals. 
Within the wider scheme of European immigration policies and the process of 
harmonisation within the EU, it is perhaps natural to imagine deeper cooperation on 
temporary protection than has so far been the case. Further coordination would also 
be to the advantage of the protected, particularly if it included the extension and 
admission of freedom of movement within the Union to such third country nationals. 
See Appendix One. 
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The question is, if harmonisation were to be attempted, how should it proceed? The 
attempted harmonisation of the understanding of Article la of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees was of long duration. Consideration should be 
given to finding a means to cooperate on the essential, where there is already a 
certain amount of agreement. Other features which, while important, can be very 
well dealt with at the national level could be left for later treatment. All of the 
states dealt with in this limited study, and others in western Europe, have some form 
of admission for large groups fleeing conflict as a result of their handling of the 
displacements in Bosnia Herzegovina. Coordination could therefore begin on the 
level of admission. 
The nature of Europe-wide temporary protection might most successfully be 
found in a multi-level approach, satisfying the many facets of the protection debate. 
A European level policy could determine that, by agreement of the ministers 
responsible for immigration, the EU would acknowledge that a given conflict (in a 
state close to the EU) required short-term protection away from the country of origin 
for a number of its victims. This would allow states collectively to offer 
humanitarian protection in a way which acknowledges normative concerns built up in 
the course of the twentieth century over respect for human and minority rights. 
Having established that protection is necessary, each state could offer entitlements 
beyond the right to life in the way considered most appropriate for its own society, 
but meeting certain minimum requirements. Flexibility in precise implementation of 
the integration and day to day living aspects of temporary protection is necessary, 
even if a Europe-wide basis to the concept could be established. This adaptability is 
needed to reflect cultural and societal variations, as well as in order to be adaptable 
to those individuals seeking protection within the group of displaced persons. The 
possibility should not be excluded that smaller groupings of states might cooperate 
formally or informally on reception and integration facilities in the light of their own 
experiences and 'experimentation' to date. Leaving the details of protection to state 
level politics would acknowledge the debate over sovereign control of membership 
(in terms of quality not quantity). Finally, the ability for the protected person to 
move between Member States after an initial period, when the need for pure 
protection is overtaken by the need to live a viable existence, in order to find the 
culturally based system which most suits his or her needs would acknowledge the 
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broader interpretation of freedom of movement for all in Europe, not just citizens of 
the EU. 
Such a system may give rise to fears of 'protection shopping'. The existence 
of disparate mechanisms, offering various advantages to different types of people 
could be said already to open up that possibility, however. Without wishing to be 
facetious over a very serious subject, one could imagine that presented with the 
'catalogue' of temporary protection systems, a person fleeing a conflict might well 
choose to land in the state which suits him or her the best. 2 An active self-starting 
person, given a helicopter out of the besieged capital of a war-torn land, might well 
choose to head to the UK and use previously acquired skills to set up a business.3 
A person left alone after the deaths of family members and feeling helpless when 
given the same chance to escape, might well choose to head to somewhere like the 
Netherlands, where there would be the opportunity for initial dependency followed 
by a chance to stand alone when confidence had returned. Someone wishing to stay 
close to a central or east European state of origin to increase the chances of return, 
and in order to be able to take the family along might well head to Austria. 
Establishing the need for protection by decision of the Council of Ministers 
would avoid increased attractiveness of Member States for temporary protection 
purposes, particularly as the people to whom such protection would be provided 
would be defined as a large group fleeing a particular situation. The fears of 
'protection-shopping', to which freedom of movement between states beyond an 
initial period might give rise, could or should lead to a desire to coordinate 
entitlements and facilities so that in fact permitting free movement for the 
temporarily protected would be just like free movement of EU citizens. Some 
would move, some would stay, and some sort of natural balance would ensue. 
In spite of acknowledgement of a need for cooperation on immigration and 
asylum policies, the movements from Bosnia Herzegovina have demonstrated further 
state-centred developments of policy and legislation with no harmonisation across the 
2 The above four chapters formed an analysis of temporary protection mechanisms in four of the 
thirty states whose approach to the outflow of people from Bosnia Herzegovina are outlined in the 
UNHCR 'Survey on the implementation of temporary protection' of 8 March 1995. Surveys such as those 
produced by UNHCR, or indeed the above chapters, could almost be viewed as a catalogue of the 
available options, from which prospective clients might determine where their chances look best. 
, A person fleeing in this way, even in a theoretical scenario, would need air transport to avoid the 
safe third country rulings. 
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EU. If immigration and asylum policy coordination is to be achieved, there is now 
another area in which work needs to be done, whereas a rapid round of crisis 
meetings in 1992 might have resulted in coordination of approaches to admission of 
certain categories of those in need of protection. Non-cooperation has resulted in an 
array of mechanisms, and confusion within and about domestic systems. Europe 
should acknowledge the need to develop temporary protection as the next phase of 
evolution of refugee protection, and work on the essentials of coordination within 
the scope of on-going work. However, there will probably be no political basis for 
developing the concept of temporary protection further until there is another crisis. 
The engine of protection developments tends only to roll at the time of instant need. 
In the former Yugoslav case, the engines of the European states have been travelling 
in different gears, going at different speeds and following different routes. If this 
image is combined with the notion of harmonised definitions together with nationally 
appropriate conditions, then the European states would be moving together, in terms 
of pace, along different routes, but towards a common goal. 
Another mass migration provoking situation in or around Europe might not 
happen. Waiting until it does to develop the basics of appropriate protection 
mechanisms would be to negate all the work done on refugee protection and 
European asylum, humanitarian and human and minority rights development 
throughout the twentieth century. It must be hoped that further crises do not occur: 
in the interests of both refugees and the states concerned, Europe should not wait 
until it faces another regional refugee crisis to find the political will to develop its 




The thesis of this study is that the evolution of refugee protection in Europe 
should continue, and that its progress should involve the search for a mechanism of 
short-term protection for those forced to flee conflict. As was suggested in the 
Introduction, many of the displacement situations of the post-Cold War period may 
be best dealt with by the granting of temporary protection, in line with the minimum 
protection guaranteed by nonrefoulement, and in keeping with the notion of burden 
sharing. The suggestion is also that a mechanism of short-term protection developed 
in Europe should take into account the cause of flight and the nature of European 
cooperation and coordination. Temporary protection itself was seen in the 1980s as 
emerging at the intersection of refugee law, human rights law and humanitarian 
practise. I As has been demonstrated in this thesis, such a protective mechanism 
also has the potential of mediating the claims of human rights and state sovereignty. 
This feature gives the development of such a mechanism in a regional context a 
particular edge in the sphere of international relations of the I 990s , in terms of 
practical decision-making and of the academic debate. In the practical field thoughts 
on the meaning of sovereignty are being redressed by the notions of according some 
traditional domestic powers to supra-national or collective bodies, primarily in the 
EU context. The concept of sovereignty is also being challenged by the questioning 
of the nature of statehood in the post Cold War world, in particular with the rise in 
nationalism and desires for self-determination by seemingly ever smaller units. On 
the academic front, more traditional theories on state power and cooperation are 
being challenged by critical theories, including a rise in the credence attached to 
notions of rights and justice. 
The most prominent cause of flight for European refugees in the decade 
following the close of the Cold War is envisaged to be conflict brought about by 
ethnic tensions as the nature of statehood and the boundaries marking the entities of 
the continent are developed. In the conflicts and tensions which may arise some 
See Periuss, Deborah and Joan F. Hartman, 'Temporary Protection: Emergence of a customary 
Dorm', Virginia Journal of International Law, (Spring 1986) p.S33. 
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people will seek a refuge. One duty of states towards their neighbours could be said 
to be the protection of their citizens so that they will not choose or be force to 
migrate. However, one lesson of the Yugoslav conflict is that displacement may, in 
this process, be not only a result of conflict but the very aim of the warring parties. 
When people seek a refuge they will thrust themselves, or will be thrust, into the 
sphere of attention of international politics. In order to satisfy the political demands 
of domestic electorates, regional partners and international expectations and 
obligations the states in which refuge is sought will turn to the history of refugee 
protection for a basis for their actions and the development of their approach. 
In Chapter 1 it was made clear that the documents defining refugees have 
been developed over the course of the twentieth century in a manner consistent with 
the circumstances of the period. There have been times when the causes of flight 
dictated the terms of reference, and times when internal politics and international 
relations held sway. There have been times of wide acceptance of the humanitarian 
necessity of protection and times of restrictiveness, where considerations of state 
interest and power have over-ridden broader humanitarianism. In the 1990s there 
are at least three paths which states could choose to follow. They could stick with 
the Convention definition, with its basis in individualised persecution, and maintain 
that strict interpretation, restricting entry to their territories for those in flight. They 
could, alternatively, adopt a liberal interpretation of the Convention definition and 
associated practices, and decide it was politically appropriate to accept more people 
as refugees and offer them the full panoply of entitlements and security of asylum. 
The third alternative would be to maintain a relatively strict adherence to the terms 
of the Convention, while adopting a more widespread practice of temporary 
protection and burden-sharing for regional crises based on regional concerns. 
Whatever the legal stance taken, from a political angle, states cannot ignore those 
forced to flee by war, who fall into the victim category of refugee. 
In each alternative the question of what protection means has to be addressed. 
The first option of restricted interpretation would, for example, limit numbers, and 
perhaps enable governments to offer the full entitlements of their citizens to the 
individuals accepted into their society. The second alternative, respecting all the 
rights and entitlements for large numbers of refugees, would satisfy all human rights 
claims and create an ideal, or idealistic, situation. The third possibility would open 
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up the chance to protect lives, with somewhat limited possibilities for personal 
development beyond survival in the first instance, but allow a position of satisfaction 
of all claims to the protection of life, and international commitments. Chapter 2 
demonstrated that the protection of life is paramount. The opportunity to survive 
precedes the nuancing of survival in private homes rather than a hostel or collective 
centre situation, with the dignity of employment opportunities contrasted to the 
dependency of social support and charity. Over time, however, that dignity needs to 
be achievable. 
Whichever path European states would adopt would be largely dependent on 
the on-going process of regional political integration. The coordination of policies 
in a border-restriction free European entity has, in its early stages, demonstrated a 
high capacity for restrictive thinking. The opportunity to re-think asylum and 
protection policies in a new supra-national context could, however, provide the 
occasion for imaginative policy development to create protection mechanisms for 
those hitherto excluded or marginalised. Concurrently, the broadening of 
democracy, high human rights standards and the potential for a spread of security in 
the region in the long term could generate possibilities for wider cooperation on 
these issues, and as minority and ethnic tensions could with care and close attention 
be soothed, west European states could face a situation of reduced chances of 
conflict in their mist, and therefore the occasion to develop the effective protection 
of those who are forced to flee the exceptional crises. 
Deciding on a joint path could be difficult, but the most pressing concern 
often seems to centre more on the terms of entry than on post-admission conditions. 
In the short-term, therefore, the process of collective policy formulation could focus 
on admission requirements. This would leave open the possibility for domestic 
formulation of policies concerning the constituent elements of protection, with sub-
European level cooperation between immediate neighbours gradually spreading, 
limiting the chances of 'protection-shopping'. 
In considering the type of protection to be offered by European states, the 
developing a regional approach must also assess a range of policy alternatives which 
could allow for a reduction in the possibilities of crises occurring, different 
protection options and must allow for a range of alternative ultimate solutions. 
A wide range of alternatives for conflict prevention (as distinct from flight 
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prevention) could be tried. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
is operating in some countries to identify potential areas of tension between state 
governments and minorities at an early stage (for example minority language 
education opportunities). Such attempts at preventing the escalation of tensions into 
potential conflicts, spotting tensions and dissolving them with impartiality before 
they become strong, and giving early warning that conflict could happen are very 
useful. However, such root cause measures cannot be relied upon to prevent every 
potential displacement provoking situation. It is therefore essential that protection 
options be maintained and developed. To phrase this slightly differently, a primary 
state interest in the context of humanitarian affairs may be to avoid and prevent 
armed conflict whenever possible. However, conflict between varying 'interests', 
for example between the desire of minorities for secession or autonomy and the will 
of the majority to maintain full control over a territory, as well as the breakdown of 
state structures, cannot be avoided on every occasion. In instances where conflict 
does escalate, and people do flee, it is in the interests of the states of the region to 
calmly deal with the human situation, maintaining the legal rights of both states and 
people, and enacting reasonable protection measures allowing the continuance of 
life, with all the rights and duties that entails. 
Various means of protection within the country of origin have been 
considered and some attempted, in various regions of the world, during the 1980s 
and '90s. For those whose movement out of the country of origin is prevented, 
whether by the policies of neighbouring states, their own state closing its borders or 
due to geographical and physical considerations, there is no instrument of protection 
as such. Attempts at 'safe areas' have not been successful whereever they have been 
attempted. Without acceptable developments in the organisational approach and 
mandate of international refugee and humanitarian agencies and without extensive re-
consideration of the implications of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is 
unlikely that any successful internal protection arrangements could be made. 
Protection outside the country of origin, alongside assistance for those who cannot 
or choose not to move therefore must be developed. This development needs to 
include removing the element of prevention of onward movement due to the policies 
of regional neighbours from the reasons for which forced migrants remain internally 
displaced persons and do not become refugees. 
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The regional development of temporary protection offers strong potential as a 
tool for managing conflict provoked migration scenarios. However, the enactment 
of such an approach, including the initial stages of policy and legislative 
formulation, and the faith in the ability to cope which would be necessary, require 
much courage by states, their policy makers and citizens. Above all, the 
development of short-term protection policies, with a somewhat limited focus in 
terms of the circumstances which call for them and the elements of protection 
granted, must not impinge on the accordance of asylum in the more permanent and 
individualised sense which it has achieved. In fact, broadening the protective 
approach and removing the focus on asylum for large groups should be accompanied 
by, or have the effect of, strengthening asylum as a full protection for those whose 
chance of protection in the country of origin, as an individual, is very limited unless 
circumstances change dramatically. Asylum should also not be excluded for those 
whose initial movement is part of a larger exodus. 
The mistake of seeing protection as a solution should also not be made. 
Protection is a step leading to a solution. The nature of asylum during the Cold 
War developed to make it a political tool, rather than a neutral practice. Asylum 
also became linked to integration, particularly in western Europe. As other solutions 
(return and resettlement) were largely excluded, asylum came to mean integration, 
rather than being seen as a step on the way to integration. Temporary protection 
could be understood as a return to the origins of asylum. The terminology needs to 
change because the practice has changed. Even in the 1951 Convention refugee 
protection (asylum) is seen as a situation which can cease when return is possible. 
Instead, the political circumstances of the Cold War meant that asylum extended into 
integration without cessation. Temporary protection should be seen as a phase in 
state-individual and state-state relations which ceases once return becomes possible, 
once resettlement with permanent integration is offered, or once integration in the 
protective state becomes the only viable medium- to long-term alternative because a 
conflict is enduring. Many highlight return as the only successful solution to 
temporary protection. However, states need to have the courage and tools for 
practical negotiation and understanding to appreciate that permanent settlement and 
resettlement are not a failure of temporary protection, but rather a successful 
outcome of such policies. The aim of protection is to maintain the right to life. If 
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states aim to maintain the right to live in the country of origin then they need to 
formulate accompanying policies of conflict prevention and resolution. However, it 
is only logical to say that if people are to have the chance to live their lives in their 
country of origin they must be protected from death as innocent victims of a 
conflict, just as individuals are offered asylum as protection from persecution in 
their state of origin. Mechanisms of temporary protection permit the chance of 
return to safety. However return must not be seen as the only option, and the risk 
of a lack of safety must be weighed carefully if the alternative of internal protection 
is considered. 
The alternative solution of resettlement is a decreasing option, as so few 
states are prepared to consider places in their immigration flow for those who had 
achieved safety elsewhere, even if the price of such safety is instability or hardship 
for the host state. This option may, however, re-emerge as part of burden-sharing 
arrangements accompanying temporary protection measures. The more likely 
burden-sharing method is, however, of a financial nature. If short-term protection 
when a conflict arises is to be effective it must include burden-sharing measures. 
One effect of assisting with the financial onus of protection is the promotion of 
regional stability through economic development opportunities and the reduction of 
the impression of refugees taking from citizens. Many frontline protection states in 
cases of European conflict would be east and central European states themselves 
only recently developing market economies and creating opportunities for national 
and individual prosperity. Burden-sharing of this nature between European states 
with longer established wealth would also be necessary to avoid difficulties in 
regional relations. 
Essentially, what we are talking about here is who gets protection, where and 
when, and how such decisions on protection can be made in the context of the 
broader picture. 
For the future, we need to find the answers to the questions raised in the 
Introduction. It was suggested that, in the light of the refugee crisis resulting from 
the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina, Europe has a number of alternatives. It could 
exclude all in search of protection from ethnic conflict and forced displacement by 
applying a limited interpretation of the still relevant Convention definition. It could 
go against the notion of non-discrimination by having a dual faceted application of 
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the Convention, with a liberal understanding for Europeans and a more restricted 
one for arrivals seeking asylum from more distant states. A liberal interpretation of 
the definition could be generally applied, increasing the number of accepted asylum 
claims substantially. Finally, Europe could institute a regional protection mandate 
for defined groups of people within defined time frames and upholding defined 
rights and duties, and encourage, within the democratic and humanitarian spirit, the 
institution of similar systems in other regions. Concurrent to this, it would be able 
to maintain the asylum tradition for all who seek it. 
The argument being presented in this study is that the latter alternative is one 
which should be explored in the light of the handling of the refugee movements from 
former Yugoslavia, and the general European approach to asylum and immigration 
and regional political cooperation on this subject and related issues. A mechanism 
of temporary protection would complete and link the elements of a comprehensive 
approach in Europe and thus permit more success in the handling of future 
displacement crises than could be perceived in the early 1990s. 
In Part Three the differences between the temporary protection policies of 
four European states were explored. Some states have created new legislation for 
large groups forced to flee by conflict. Others have rather adapted policies to cover 
the group in question, but installed no longer term basis for further developments. 
Some states have included the care of those temporarily protected in their legislation 
or policies, singled out particular sub-units from the larger group for particular 
protection, or left all care and maintenance strategies to ad hoc planning. All of the 
states considered had included NGOs in their operations to some degree. While all 
states had found a means to include a certain number of victims and acknowledged 
the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina as a cause for flight which made some of its 
victims deserving of protection, all had found different means of operating that 
protection in accordance with their normal processes and the facilities and assistance 
from NGOs and public bodies available. 
The nature of temporary protection in Europe might most successfully be 
found in a multi-level approach, satisfying the many facets of the protection debate. 
The European Union is the only organisation in the continent where states 
demonstrate a degree of political will to cooperate on immigration matters, because 
the policies of one have a knock on effect on all due to decisions on the subject of 
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internal controls in the collective territory of the Member States. Initial 
development of a European policy would therefore stand most chance of success if 
broached in that body. A European level policy could determine that, by agreement 
of the ministers responsible for immigration, the EU could acknowledge a given 
conflict (in a state close to the EU) as requiring short term protection away from the 
country of origin for a number of its victims. This would allow states to collectively 
offer humanitarian protection in a way which acknowledges normative concerns built 
up over the twentieth century over respect for human and minority rights. Having 
established that protection is necessary, each state would offer protection beyond the 
right to life in the way considered most appropriate for its own society, but meeting 
certain minimum requirements. Leaving the details of protection to state level 
politics would acknowledge the debate over sovereign control of membership (in 
terms of the quality of membership not the quantity of new 'temporary' members). 
Finally, the ability for the protected person to move between Member States after an 
initial period, when the need for pure protection is overtaken by the need to live a 
viable existence, in order to find the culturally based system which most suits his or 
her needs would acknowledge the broader interpretation of freedom of movement for 
all in the EU, not just for EU citizens. 
If the evolution of protection in Europe follows its historical path, there 
would not only be contextualisation, but it would also need a further crisis for the 
political basis for developing the concept of temporary protection to be found. The 
engine of protection policy development rolls during a time of immediate need. In 
the former Yugoslav case, the engines have been rolling, but European states, in 
spite of the enunciated desire to harmonise and coordinate, have been travelling in 
different gears going at different speeds and following different routes. 
The lessons of this crisis point to a need for advance preparation. Politicians 
generally take a short-term view of immigration and asylum. Illustrations of this 
can be found in the fact that UNHCR's mandate is only ever for a five year period, 
and the terms of the original 1951 Convention, which in speaking only of events 
before 1950 clearly showed a belief, or naive hope, that refugee movements were a 
finite phenomenon. After decades of short-term vision, the chance offered by 
coordination discussions to take a long-term vision and create a range of flexible 
mechanisms, including a notion of short-term protection for certain categories should 
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be taken. The engines of European protection policy apparatus need to move 
together, at least on the determination of which approach is to be taken under which 
circumstances and the type of protective mechanism to be enacted, and admission 
procedures for mass influxes. Then, moving at the same pace, policies could be 
developing along different domestic protective paths towards the same goal. 
There is a need to work out what temporary protection needs to do and why 
it needs to do it. The functions of such a mechanism for states, for the protected 
and for relations between states (both host-host and host-origin) need to be clear. 
The cases in which temporary protection is the most appropriate and the cases for 
which traditional asylum must be maintained need to be defined. 
No state is an island. Belatedly, but not too late, states are 
recognising that traditional sovereigntist reactions to immigration 
questions don't get you very far. Yes, in principle we decide who 
will and who will not be allowed to join our community, but real life 
and real people generally stand between the wish and the fulfilment.2 
If one takes a pragmatic stand one sees that no amount of restrictive concepts 
created by those responsible for immigration policies will prevent people who feel 
the need to migrate from trying to do so and arriving at states of safety or the 
country of their dreams. The best states can hope to do is to find a way of 
exercising some control and enacting measures which make a certain amount of 
immigration acceptable. Closing asylum and protection channels to all with the aim 
of denying entry to illegal, or economic, immigrants solves little while causing 
enormous confusion and doubt. The confusion and doubt is experienced by the 
immigrants, the host population and other states. When imposing restrictions the 
greatest outcry is over the challenge to international obligations and to moral 
standing. Those who demand that all immigrants be accepted are also not being 
pragmatic, but taking an extreme opposition to the extreme position governments 
present. To maintain international obligations and to offer a stance morally 
acceptable to a concerned population, the management of immigration needs to 
clearly distinguish between those forced to flee and those who choose to advance 
their own economic well-being. Many of the restrictive measures developed during 
the 1980s and '90s have this as their aim. However, being created from the position 
2 Harder, Peter, 'Migration: a new international dimension', International Journal of Refugee Law, 
Vol.S No.1 (1993) p.l04. 
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of excluding they have a negative impact, and tend to be interpreted as a 
manifestation of governments panicking in the face of an uncontrollable problem. A 
calmer and more positive approach could be developed, with policy makers 
developing mechanisms which include those in need, and as a result limit 
opportunities for those whose need is not for safety but for a better job, larger 
salary, in short those who seek to migrate for opportunity not for survival. 
Temporary protection should, then, be a channel of inclusion for those whose 
immediate safety cannot be realistically foreseen in their country of origin because 
there is a climate of generalised violence and conflict, because groups of civilians 
are being targeted for 'removal', either forcibly displaced or killed, and because 
there is indiscriminate bombing, shelling and general warfare in much of the 
country. It should be employed in situations where there can be reasonable 
optimism for a solution in the short to medium term. However it should not be 
assumed, in offering protection, that a solution permitting return for all is an 
obvious eventuality. Temporary protection should have the function of protecting 
lives. It should be a guarantee of safety for the people concerned. 
For the states offering protection, short-term mechanisms would function as a 
means of permitting them to live up to international obligations regarding refugees 
and human rights. Offering temporary protection in situations of mass influxes 
would also allow for an alleviation of procedural problems in processing claims, and 
give a period of reflection over the longer-term possibilities. Although states have 
not yet demonstrably used the giving of protection as a reason for becoming more 
involved in the settlement of a conflict, protection could be linked to the (non-
)intervention debate. For inter-state relations the offering of temporary protection 
with associated burden-sharing could strengthen collaboration and understanding 
between host states. Between the host states and the state of origin the generosity of 
a protective stance during a time of need can be useful in strengthening ties once a 
conflict is over, and can allow the host states to playa greater role in rehabilitation. 
This latter role would enhance the prospects of return, as noted perhaps the most 
desired goal on the part of the protecting states, and promote longer-term stability. 
Temporary protection offers a morally and politically justifiable means to the 
promotion of refugee and human rights in a world of states adhering to sovereign 
values of membership. It is a measure which has the potential to mediate the 
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conceptual poles of human rights and state sovereignty, while completing the links of 
a comprehensive approach ranging from resolution of the causes of flight to a 
breadth of ultimate solutions. The benefits of this development of protection in the 
regional context involve not only completing the chain of approaches, but also 
promoting cooperation on protection matters and enhancing collaboration for future 
stability. At the same time, such regional developments could strengthen universal 
protection principles by re-enforcing the goal of protecting all those whose survival 
in their country of origin is made doubtful through either individualised targeting or 
generalised victimisation. Further development of this approach, including an 
appraisal of the lessons provided by the mechanisms evolved in the context of the 
former Yugoslav crisis, would enhance the holistic nature of refugee protection in 
Europe. 
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Appendix One: Table of comparison of twenty key features of the schemes described in Part Three 
---- -_ .. -
SWVENIA AUSTRIA UNITED KINGDOM NETHERLANDS 
Status of legislation on Measures still ad hoc, Legislation enacted in Policy of Exceptional Legislation enacted in 
residence but draft legislation July 1993 permitting Leave to Remain 1992 
going through temporary residence 
Parliament 
Status of legislation on Measures still ad hoc, No legislation - ad hoc No legislation. Policy Legislation enacted in 
care and protection but draft legislation policy measures of care of protection for 1992 
going through and maintenance limited Temporary 
Parliament Protection Programme 
Date at which policy or (Draft Law), Second 1993 1992 Ad hoc policy (TROO) 
legislative changes were reading, 1995 1992; VVTV 
made legislation 1994 
Safe third country rule NA Yes Yes Yes 
enforced? 
Quota in force? No, although one may No Yes, for Temporary Small quota in 
be established Protection Programme. cooperation with 
according to the draft Other arrivals dealt UNHCR, but no limit 
law. with through regular on number who can 
channels receive VVTV 
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Care organised by whom? Government (OIR) and Provincial governments Bosnia Project Municipal ! 
NGOs and Caritas governments, with 
assistance from the 
Dutch Refugee Council 
Costs of care met by Government, NGOs, Central and Provincial Home Office, plus Municipal governments 
whom? International governments some private donations 
Organisations and to the Refugee Council 
private donations 
Period of stay permitted Unspecified Started as six monthly, Started as six monthly Three years, followed 
then yearly extensions followed by yearly by permanent status if 
extensions return is not possible 
1 
Possibility to apply for May apply, but a May apply while ELR or TPP status Temporarily suspended ! 
Convention status political decision has retaining temporary would be withdrawn while in receipt of 
been taken not to grant residence status VVTV 
Convention status. 
Possibilities for After 10 years with a Residence status is Settlement after 7 years Permanent settlement 
I naturalisationl settlement legal status (which altere once employment with ELR, although the after three years if, in 
temporary refuge is is found TPP does not count. the opinion of the 
not) or one year after Dutch government, 





Amount received per Cost of care in a centre Equivalent of £100 per Comparable social Equivalent of £220 per 
person is £90 per month. month if a person lives security benefits to month plus housing 
with a family. The those of British citizens 
cost of accomodation in 
a centre is £330, plus 
they receive about £10 
per month in 'pocket 
money' 
Family reunification Yes Yes Instant if on TPP, after No 
possible? 4 years with ELR (NB, 
4 years after granting 
of ELR) 
Accommodation In centres or with In centres or with On TPP, in centres for Initially in reception 
family or friends. families and friends. approximately 4 centres then in selected 
Independent housing is months, then in housing within a 
also possible. permanent housing municipality 





Education Yes, at all levels after Yes Yes, with usual Yes I 
the law will pass. regulations, including 
Until then, primary overseas fees for 
only, in separate University places 
schools. After (approx £6,000 per 
September 1995, year for non-science 
primary and secondary courses). 
education in Slovene 
schools. 
I 
Employment Once the new law is Limited quota access Yes, with no Phased opportunities 
passed, yes. and according to restrictions for status over the three year 
eligilbility hierarchy. holders. period. I 
. 
Healthcare Yes Yes, but not mental Yes Yes 
health. 
Dispersal! concentration Relative concentration, Dispersal - although Clustering, to form Distribution decided on 
partly due to density. extended families are Bosnian communities. by a central authority. 
kept together. 
Care workers Include Bosnians, and Mainly Austrians Workers include many Mainly Dutch 
anyway with cultural former Yugoslavs volunteers 




Descriptions of two collective centres in Slovenia 
~ko.Da Lola CoUective Centre 
480 people live in tJW cmtre abouI fony kilometres from LjubljanD. Half of them are children, mostly with their 
IftOthers ... their fathers figlu on in Bosnia Herr.egovina. Very few 18-30 Jf!ar old men are to N seen, mostly young 
WOIfIeft, old people and children. Oltkr women W«Ir Mathearws - the shining '$wotdt' on the wrist of a t.enage girl 
is, for some rt!lUon, striking. 
An old army bafTtlch, the OIIIMe walls of which are crumbling, it is a mixed centre, of Bosnian Croats and Bomian 
MllSlims, with the fonrtt!r, 1DUU1IIJIIy, in a slighl majority. 1Mre is tension between the two groups - lell .0 Wa" 
their 'sides' in tlu conflict joint!d togethl!r - mort! so whttn tluir wider ethnic groups are fighting each olher. Many of 
llu people lure are described by thl! director as having learning difficulties - including an inability to distinguish right 
from wrong. 1M lack of employment serves to heighten tlu tensions: Ihere had been a stabbing the week befort! my 
visit. 
However, there are good sports facilities, and a thriving amateur dramatics group. Children especially ,pend houri 
playing football, basketball and volleyball, and riding around on bicycles, bought with earnings from the blade 
maricet. The women spend time sewing and knitting - but tMy wish they could sell what tMy produce, rather than jllSt 
displaying it for themselves and tlteir few visitors. 
In mid-morning, people throng in the driveway, near a postbox and lelephone used 10 communicate wilh family and 
Jrimds left behind. Laler people collect their food - in buckets, pans, plastic bowls. 
The corridors smell, damp and diny, and IhI!re is rubbish everywhere. The bedrooms are enormous rooms, divided 
into three by huge curtains. Eadt third of a room has three double beds crammed into il - one bed per family. In 
OM area live a couple in tluir 80s, another in IhI!ir 60s and a wounded Muslim soldier of 22. A 7V perches above 
OM bed. In anothl!r art!a live a young Croat couple and two older Muslim couples. 
1M wash areas, comntlllllJl, one for men, one for women, are .flooded, as is thl! room with six washing machines from 
wINdt suds, steam and water pour. 
There are separate rt!ligiOlU rooms for the two communities, in tlu basement of tlu building. 1M 'mosque' il 
spartan, the 'clturch' decorated with purple drapes and gold crucijius. The Croats in thl! centre are i'flluenced, and 
manipuloted, by a Croatian priest, from the home town of most of thl!m, and now in a nearby monastery. He IaYI 
mas. at the monastery - their 'dulrch' is us.d for their own prayers. Both rooms are locked, but both are in daily lUe 
_ emphasising diJleren" and 'tkvoutness '. 
Other basement rooms incIwIe a 7V room for oltkr people - strewn with newspapers, and a colourfullcindergarten, 
pacUd with toys dONJled by weslern NGOs. 
FtnalIy, there is the sclaool room - looIcing lilce a classroom anywlure. There is a new map of Europe, showing llu 
fonrwr Yugoslav reptlblics as separate slates. 1Mre are tlu children's drawings of llumselves and tluir families, their 
Iwfues left behind, and animaLs. 1Mrt! art! depictions of slone age weapons - used for history teaching, I am told. 
And a wall jriae depicting Walt Dimey's 'Aladdin' - harmless one would think. But it is pointed out to me that tJW 
is another emphasising of Muslim culture, in a mixed cenlr •. 
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~nuu1ins1co Colkctive Centn 
7ms cmlre. in Ljubljana. is two buildings. formerly lAUd to house workers during the socialist period. Here. as in 
other cmln!S in 1M capilDl. 1M din!cton hGw three basic rules: ewryone '"'"t clean up: then! '"'"t be no fights 011 
the grOlDllls of etlWeity: and noise trUUt be upl to a minimum after lOpm. 
375 people liw here. and then! is 0IIe roomfor each family offour or five. There are 135 children. 155 women, 58 
men aged 25 or owr, and 27 men aged 17-24. 
1M corridors an! wry doric. Howewr a room lioolced i,.,o MoYJS bright and white and clean - with many green pIanIs, 
as well as two televisions. afridge. a small cooIcer and a wry large bed. Washingfaeilities were also wry clean. 
In Ljubljana ,he priority is 011 coses of health proble,ns. People needing health core are moved 10 lhe capital from 
more rural areas. Then! are not many tensions in this u"'re - any fights an! usually over the children and lheir 
behaviour. and any sociaJ problems COllum mainly schooling. There are problems owr the lack of wo'* and 
ocatpation; between women who hGw men with ,hem and those who don ',: economic inequality problems. 1M 
majority wo,* already (illegally) - bill dam 1M more mottey the refugees have the fewer problems ,he managers hGw -
SO they ignore it. 
1M complai,., of the people working in the cmtre is that the Bosnians seem to mow all about their rights - bill 
nothing about their duties. 
1Mn! are sewraJ activities - fOOlbaU; table tmnis; pairating; photography. 
In the basemmt is an art studio with an amazing display of tale,.,. Some pictures are of beautiful scenery, others are 
IIarrowing - a shJI on a blood red backgrountJ for example. 
1Mre is a need to find the right sort of ko,ders for these activities - finding good leatkrs is hard, bill 'bad' koders 
are many. 1Mre an! attempts to enCOfUDge such trouble leaders to channel their energies i,.,o positiw activities. 
7Mn! are weekly _tings between the managemmt and refugee leaders. 
A man wotting in the 1111 studio 011 a video montage of the MoYJr in Bosnia Herzegovina, and surrounded by what looI: 
tiki ardIiIeCfIU'QI plans, is DboIa to resettIe to Ctmodo with his wife and young child. He acknowledges ill a new life 
willi many chances, bill seems nervous about it. People are scored when it comes to resettling to, for exampk, 
Canada and the us. 
Most refugees hen! still lWJrII to go baclc, especiaJly as many are women alone wilh children. Mosl who leaw are 
people .front lIfi.ud_rriages. 
1M n!1atiotu between the SIovmians and BomiDns Qn! generally good. 
Mowmmt oIIlside the cmtre is only questioned for administraliw purposes - eg to cancel meals etc. 
1M mosque room in this cerllre is OIIly used when islamic donors are around! 
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